I have three different translations (don't ask). I learned from reading one (Howard and Paret, I think), skimming the other two, and reading commentary, that the quality of translation significantly determines what one gets out of studying CvC. e.g. Translating "vernichten" as "destruction" rather than "negation" leads to a lot of misunderstanding of what CvC was trying to convey.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
today:
vernichten = to annihilate
zerstören = to destroy
negieren = to negate
1830's meanings may have differed.
"vernichten" has "total" almost built in. Something that was "vernichtet" is 100% gone. "zerstören" can also be applied to parts instead of only the whole thing. "negieren" is close to "to neutralize", doesn't require any damage - it is usually used as "to say no".
From 1959 Langenscheidt's, Verneinung = concept of negation; Vernichtung = concept of annihilation. Cf., nein = no; nicht = not.
Sounds like someone, as Fuchs just pointed out, was trying to get to the concept of "neutralize" by toning down (making more "humane") the English "translation" of "vernichtung". Cf., as we used in CORDS-Phoenix, "neutralize" to include kill, detain and convert.
Context will tell the tale; but CvC noted at more than one point that the enemy force does not have to be physically destroyed - e.g., it can collapse in one way or another. BUT, there always lurks in the background the real threat and ability to destroy.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 02-25-2010 at 01:50 AM.
I'll go out on a limb and say it doesn't matter who we study, only that we do so-
Whether it is Clauswitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, or whoever is in style at time, what matters is that professionals tear into something, think critically about it, and analyze it. Whether you agree or disagree with the concepts you are reading, you exercise that all important muscle between your ears.
Now, if the LTC's issue is students at the War College are passively accepting Clauswitz rather than actively thinking, engaging, and applying concepts... then maybe he could have a case.
As to professional soldiers wanting to be... professional? Dedicated to thier chosen profession of arms? Thats like saying a fireman shouldn't vigorously train and plan to fight fires. A volunteer firefighter should be able to overcome with determination and "occaisional ineptitude".
Okay- dead horse, excuse me for that. I'm new.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hope this helps. In this translation the "nur" or "only" has been left out!
Originally Posted by CvC, Book 1, Chapter 2If we consider the whole sentence, vernichten contains both "annhiliation" and "making void", as "Vernichtung der feindlichen Streitkraft" states that a short phrase for "reducing the enemy military power (fighting capability) to such a state that it is no longer be able to prosecute the fight (war)."The military power must be destroyed (annihilated, made void), that is, reduced to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the war (fight). This is the (only!) sense in which we wish to be understood hereafter, whenever we use the expression "destruction of the enemy's military power." (Italics by Graham, bold additions by Firn)
....
A bit more on the vernichten part.
Originally Posted by CvC, same chapterIf we speak of the destruction of the enemy's armed force, we must expressly point out that nothing obliges us to confine this idea to the mere physical force; on the contrary, the moral is necessarily implied as well, because both in fact are interwoven with each other even in the most minute details, and, therefore, cannot be separated. But it is just in connection with the inevitable effect which has been referred to, of a great act of destruction (a great victory) upon all other decisions by arms, that this moral element is most fluid, if we may use that expression, and, therefore, distributes itself the most easily through all the parts.
Against the far superior worth which the destruction of the enemy's armed force has over all other means, stands the expense and risk of this means, and it is only to avoid these that any other means are taken.
That this means must be costly stands to reason, for the waste of our own military forces must, ceteris paribus, always be greater the more our aim is directed upon the destruction of the enemy's.
But the danger of this means lies in this, that just the greater efficacy which we seek recoils on ourselves, and therefore has worse consequences in case we fail of success. (This is a pretty weak and distorting part of the translation!)
My rough translation of the last bit: "The superior (overwhelming) worth, which the annihilation of the enemy forces has over all other means, is opposed by the valuableness (costliness, preciousness) and danger of this mean, and only to avoid those [the consequences of those], other ways are taken [in war].
....
This seems to be a rather deep insight both in finance in war. Right Enron?
Die Waffenentscheidung ist für alle großen und kleinen Operationen des Krieges, was die bare Zahlung für den Wechselhandel ist; wie entfernt diese Beziehungen auch sein, wie selten die Realisationen eintreten mögen, ganz können sie niemals fehlen.The decision by arms is, for all operations in war, great and small, what cash payment is in bill transactions. However remote from each other these relations, however seldom the realisation may take place, still it can never entirely fail to occur.
Firn
Last edited by Firn; 02-25-2010 at 09:46 AM.
I forgot to explain the "Wechselhandel" or "bill transaction" of that time. Basically you give some sort of security, usually a cheque which doesn't gets chashed to get a credit.
The decision by arms is, for all operations in war, great and small, what cash payment is in bill transactions (The "bill" was some sort of cheque or security presented to obtain a (of course larger) credit. At some point you have to pay and not just show something ). However remote from each other these relations, however seldom the realisation may take place, still it can never entirely fail to occur.
Perhaps this could be edited in.
Firn
I wrote "negieren = to negate" (although "negieren" is an imported word; Latin "negare") because of the context.
The mentioned "to say no" is better translated with the verb "verneinen", but it's not the only meaning of "negieren".
Maybe this gives credence to one of the points the LTC was trying to make in the originally quoted article (although for different reasons)- due to problems inherent to translation, should we focus instead on an english speaking theorist in our Professional Military Education?
Which begs the question, are there any good ones to use of sufficient academic rigor, breadth and depth, and applicable to full spectrum operations?
Or, are we stuck choosing between translations from German, French (both working for russians-oddly) or Chinese. (CvC, Jomini, and Sun Tzu; the most popular I think)
Still though, I hardly think his comment about WWII means much. I could make a serious low-blow about the French military...
It would be more productive if he attempted to solve his asserted "problem" by suggesting alternatives (Studying BH Liddel Hart, learning through conceptual exercises, summary executions of low performing officers) rather than simply whine about how a military school focuses on a single school of thought.
Last edited by Fergieis; 02-25-2010 at 04:16 PM. Reason: Happy to glad
Wilf and kotkinjs1 have already pointed to a far better translation than this work from 1874. Wilf's post shows a good path to understanding. With an open and critic mind and some help pretty much everybody should gain good insight.
We are really fortunate when it comes to translations, as we have more and more choices. Other than that, Jomini was a Swiss, and the French were not the only ones who got routed.
Firn
Just in case SWC readers have missed this item on KoW blog:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/02/the-passions-of-war/
Since I've not read anything the Prussian author has written I cannot say more.
davidbfpo
Corsica != Italian.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corsican_language
I'm working a CvC analogy into my interpretation of "The Surge," and how I viewed events on the ground in 2006. Several of my friends that were there have already concurred, and I wanted to ask some of the practisioners on SWC if they felt the same way before I include it in a published article.
Thanks much in advance, and I apologize for taking up space for my own interest.
When in 1806 the Prussian generals....plunged into the open jaws of disaster by using Frederick the Great's oblique order of battle, it was not just a case of a style that had outlived its usefulness but the most extreme poverty of the imagination to which routine has ever led. The result was that the Prussian army under Hohenlohe was ruined more completely than any army has ever been ruined on the battlefield.
-Carl von Clausewitz, On War
Patrolling Baghdad in May and June of 2003 after we finished the Thunder Runs was surreal. We had defeated Saddam's Army and conducted regime change, but the disruption without full occupation was unsettling. It just did not feel right. I left proud of what we had accomplished, but I was worried on how things would turn out. Going back in 2005 on a Special Forces staff was awkward. We weren't losing, but we weren't winning. It was like watching the last couple of Kevin Costner movies. He's a great actor, but Waterworld just sucked. The Government of Iraq was declared sovereign, they were holding democratic elections, but the violence just continued to escalate. I still cheer for Costner as I continued to cheer for Iraq. Then, everything changed.
Allow me to be absolutely clear, let there be no doubt, in 2006, we were losing the war in Iraq. Stepping off the C-130 in LSA Anaconda, you could smell the fear in the air as we drug our tail between our legs in some Orwellian propaganda of "putting the Iraqis in the lead" as we retreated to the comforts of massive forward operating bases and expanded our intake of salsa nights, Burger King, and flat screen televisions. Outside those massive entrenchments, a civil war was brewing and escalating bordering on genocide as entire villages and neighborhoods were cleansed and displaced. No one knew what to do so we stuck our heads in the sand and tried to forget hoping this nightmare would just end. Even today, I'm not sure if the average American will truly understand how close we came to losing during those days. They just take it in stride that everything worked during the cleanliness of Kimberly Kagan's "the Surge" far more concerned with the value of their homes and stock market investments since the administration failed to ask them to mobilize for war. They were more consumed with American Idol and Survivor. It is far more existential than that.
I felt angry refusing to lose a war that had taken so much of my twenties and resolved not to let those that came before me down. It was time to adjust.
v/r
Mike
Last edited by MikeF; 02-26-2010 at 01:29 AM.
they traced their ancestry to the Buonaparte family of Sarzana, Italy, which is located on the Ligurian-Tuscan border about 10 miles east of La Spezia. That family is known from the 1300-1400s at Sarzana.
Near the end of the 1400s, one of them (a merc) ended up in Corsica and began the Corsican branch, leading down to Carlo, Nap's father - I3 in chart.
Carlo's descent, including Nap, is here.
Cheers
Mike
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