The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

How does one best apply Clausewitz's insights on warfare to the realm of Insurgency and counterinsurgency? Reasonable minds can differ, and it is a topic worthy of debate as it strikes to the heart of designing effective strategies, and crafting successful campaign plans for many of the operations we find ourselves embroiled in in the Irregular dominated environment we face today.

The attached paper, written by COL John C Buckley II back in 1995 when he was a Major at Leavenworth does an excellent job of tackling this complex subject. He uses the American experience in Vietnam and the British experience in Ireland to explore his take on a proper application of Clausewitz. Regardless of if you agree or disagree with his position, this is a piece of work well worth considering.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf Alas not working try below.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

[slapout9]

Bob's World, can you check the link you posted? I don't think it is working.

[Ron Humphrey]

Bob's World, can you check the link you posted? I don't think it is working.

You may have to already be logged into a .mil site though.

Worked when I'm logged in with my CAC

[davidbfpo]

Slap,

The link posted worked earlier, albeit on another post and the one on this thread doesn't work. Try this: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Got It! Thanks Guys

[Entropy]

From the latest Wright Stuff:

Contemporary interpretations of complex warfare are neither holistic nor precise enough to make a fundamental distinction in strategy – what is static and what is dynamic in a given operational situation? This paper interprets Clausewitz to focus on the unchanging nature and changing character of war, highlighting the importance of discerning both of these aspects to understanding complex warfare. Without a baseline for “the given,” fundamental questions about the causes and context of conflict are not likely to be asked. As a result, plans and operations may produce tactical victories without contributing to desired strategic effects. Currently, three intellectual impediments inhibit our understanding of the nature of war: (1) misapplying Clausewitz’ key concepts of the Trinity; (2) viewing conflict along a uni-dimensional “spectrum of conflict”; and (3) using false dichotomies. These misinterpretations generate imprecise terms and partial concepts that do not adequately address why warfare occurs or capture its changing character in local context. We can overcome these impediments and develop strategic judgment with two basic changes in the way we use Clausewitzian ideas. First, the Trinity should be used to model the nature not just the character of war. This would direct strategists toward the investigation of motives and causes, and lead planners to design those factors into operations rather than assume them away. Second, precise terms with defined opposites should be used. Sharp distinctions, flexibly employed to ascertain what is changing from what is not, could help specify local factors such as causes, key actors, relationships, all key to establishing effective operational priorities.

I haven't read it yet, but it looks interesting.

[William F. Owen]

While I think I get where this guy is coming from, but I was actually a bit confused till be revealed Which Trinity he was referring to -passion, uncertainty, and reason - cos CvC does like Trinities!

What I can't get my head around is this stuff about "Complex Warfare."

Current examples of complex warfare include US-led post-invasion coalition operations in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003), the still smoldering Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah conflict of July-August 2006, and
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Each of these examples involve a variety of armed groups, types and scope of goals, and levels and methods of violence that can suddenly erupt, abate, and reignite due to persistent social instability.

All warfare is and always will be complex! To say it is more complex today than it ever was is an opinion that is evidence free.

What is more, Piracy is really right on the very edge of any workable definition of Warfare, unless they are attempting to do things, they, Pirates historically have not. Piracy is primarily criminal. It may be used in warfare, but that is when it is done with the sanction of a state eg: -"Privateers"

In the round, I like where this guy is coming from, I just don't like how he got here!

[Ron Humphrey]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.

Is it perhaps because just as war is war and people are people, those same ol people require a form of reeducation in all things war on occasion that such takes place due to changes in environment, capabilities, and simply being reminded how expensive both in terms of money,time, and most especially human lives it is.

Second in relation to the first is the majority of this renewed verbiage focused on informing those who defend or those being defended? Is there a major difference?

Thought's

[William F. Owen]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.

I wish I could. The reason, as you allude, is probably human, and not an actual technical difference. It's probably a subject for a PhD, probably mine....

[Entropy]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.

IMO, a lot has to do with the natural tendency of humans as a species to be self-centered and ignore the relevance of anything beyond recent history. We tend to call something "new" when in reality it is only new to us and think of ourselves as smarter than our ancestors and thereby ignore or underplay the hard lessons they've handed down to us.

[Cavguy]

One of my CGSC instructors (retired officer) has this book coming out next month. He argues our fixation with Clausewitz is responsible for us becoming strategically muddled.

He's let some of it fly in my classes so far, my opinion is he has created a strawman of Clausewitz and the whole center of gravity concept. He believes the trinity only applied in his era, and is irrelevant.

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

I have paraphrased (perhaps inaccurately) some of the arguments made. Will have to wait for the book to appropriately and fairly respond to the arguments. Recommend Wilf review it for SWJ though.

The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (Hardcover)
by Stephen L. Melton
http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Del.../dp/0760337136
Product Description

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

[Klugzilla]

It sounds like he is making the typical misinterpretation of the trinity. The trinity is composed of three principal tendencies or forces: hostility, chance, and purpose. These are universal to war and human nature. The "secondary" trinity (military, governement, and people) is often mistaken for what Uncle Carl was actually talking about and may not be applicable to all situations today. Tell him to go back to the pond.

[tequila]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

[Rex Brynen]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I think you're confusing it with the success of the Rwandan government/Interahamwe against the RPF (10%+ of the population killed).

[kowalskil]

That's an interesting one. The Soviets killed roughly 5-6% of the total population of Afghanistan and drove another 20% into exile in Iran and Pakistan. I'm having a bit of trouble remembering if they were successful, anyone?

I do not think they benefitted from that war. In fact, it contributed to the end of the USSR.

Ludwik Kowalski
.

[Bill Moore]

I can't recall the books, but there were two that I recall reading that claimed the insurgents were ready to call it quits due to the brutal and effective tactics the Soviets were employing and this was according to the insurgents themselves. Maybe, or maybe not, I'm simply presenting a counterargument. It was clear that the introduction of the Stinger changed the character of the war in favor of the insurgents.

Oppressive and brutal COIN operations have been proven to work repeatedly, while half stepping has a very bad track record of success. I'm not advocating we forfeit our morals to crush another country's insurgent problem, but to claim that they "can't" kill their way out of the situation is misleading. In most cases they certainly can, but to do so would be a violation of international law and norms, a Pyrrhic victory, so we encourage them to pursue other strategies.

[Tom Odom]

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

Neil

I just wonder whether he has ever had the opportunity to see even 5% destruction of a population.

I have seen 10% and could see using the Sherman mantra were we taking on N Korea. But as his book relates to Iraq and Afghanistan, I would point out that the side that did kill 10% of the population, lost the war.

Tom

[John Grenier]

It sounds like he is making the typical misinterpretation of the trinity. The trinity is composed of three principal tendencies or forces: hostility, chance, and purpose. These are universal to war and human nature. The "secondary" trinity (military, governement, and people) is often mistaken for what Uncle Carl was actually talking about and may not be applicable to all situations today. Tell him to go back to the pond.

Klugzilla, paleez!

[Xenophon67]

"However brave a nation may be, however warlike its habits, however intense its hatred of the enemy, however favourable the nature of the country, it is an undeniable fact that a people's war cannot be kept up in an atmosphere too full of danger. If, therefore, its combustible material is to be fanned by any means into a considerable flame it must be at remote points where there is more air, and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter XXVI

Perhaps the Taliban do not fit exactly into the 'people's war' mold, however, I think this mainly unread chapter holds some weight when discussing the validity of CvC in Afghanistan.

Clearly, the number of dead civilians will not determine victory - absurd. Body counts...attrition...where is Bob McNamara when you need him?

Center of Gravity - elusive no doubt, lost in the fog of war, once 'found' does planning and execution fall victim to friction and the opportunity lost again - perhaps. CoGs do exist, they are viable, yet to muster the resources and especially the will to relentlessly attack them is another matter altogether.

Regardless of the means - the way to reach an end state is to make the 'atmosphere too dangerous' and to take the 'air' away.... Enough with the metaphors.

Population-centric COIN advocates need to rethink the CoG identification of the civilians as the singular source of Taliban power.

However costly (and probably unrealistic) it might be to seal off/control the border- it must be done. Simultaneously, totally eradicate the poppy fields. Then the Taliban are truly without air to breath, the very essence that gives them strength is gone.

"From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare." Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1

Sealing off the border (Algeria-Maurice Line) stops the influx of insurgents, arms and transport of opium. Destruction of the opium eliminates the money to pay the insurgents, buy the arms and bribe officials. Even if this effort is not totally successful it will lead to a culminating point whereby an 'overthrow' can occur, their resources denied to them, their air gone - a dangerous atmosphere indeed.

Victory - well how about after the overthrow an opponent 'pinned' to the ground. Perhaps it is best to talk about management of the conflict, on our terms, in our favor.

Good posts - very thought provoking. I am going back to scour CvC.....

[Schmedlap]

The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

Given his background and yours (in terms of level of responsibility), does it feel like you're being scolded by a four-year-old? Just curious, because I've always wondered how I would react in a situation like that. Thankfully, it hasn't happened yet.