The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

Define "un-balance" in this context.

'Mystify, Mislead and Surprise" as Old Confederate fighter would say.

[Bob's World]

As I recall, Germany eventually lost WWII.

The victory over France in 1940 was an operational masterpiece, but the Germans, while spectacular operationally and tactically, were horrible strategically - primarily because Hitler fancied himself a strategist when in reality he was nothing of the kind.

Tactics win battles, operations win campaigns, but strategy wins wars. Germany lost the war due to strategic errors, too numerous to list here.

I think you meant to say "Hitler...[was] horrible strategically." I don't think "Germans" got much of a vote on strategic issues in that era.

[slapout9]

I have read the posted paper two times and it started good..... but then it seems to run out of steam...... or maybe the author just didn't go far enough with the basic idea. But it was an interesting paper and War as a form bargaining by Armed Groups is an idea that has merit. The New Trinity of Power,Profit and Prestige was also interesting.... a lot of Gang Psychology in there.

[Fuchs]

As I recall, Germany eventually lost WWII.

The victory over France in 1940 was an operational masterpiece, but the Germans, while spectacular operationally and tactically, were horrible strategically - primarily because Hitler fancied himself a strategist when in reality he was nothing of the kind.

Tactics win battles, operations win campaigns, but strategy wins wars. Germany lost the war due to strategic errors, too numerous to list here.

The strategy of 1940 turned a terrible war situation into a near-win. It was good strategy (or lucky, it depends).

The events of 1941 were part of a different strategy.


The land campaigns of 1940 were meant to a) improve Germany's difficult raw material supply situation (Swedish ore secured by occupying Norway - captured Eastern French iron ore mines played that role in WWI) and then turned the imbalance of power in Germany's favour by knocking out one of the three most powerful armies and one of the three most powerful air forces of the world at once.
The strategic effect was huge and a clear look at the events of 1940 should enable you to see the separation between the 1940 strategies and the 1941 madness.

[M-A Lagrange]

The strategy of 1940 turned a terrible war situation into a near-win. It was good strategy (or lucky, it depends).

The events of 1941 were part of a different strategy.


The land campaigns of 1940 were meant to a) improve Germany's difficult raw material supply situation (Swedish ore secured by occupying Norway - captured Eastern French iron ore mines played that role in WWI) and then turned the imbalance of power in Germany's favour by knocking out one of the three most powerful armies and one of the three most powerful air forces of the world at once.
The strategic effect was huge and a clear look at the events of 1940 should enable you to see the separation between the 1940 strategies and the 1941 madness.

You can even add the complete un relevance of the French strategy and army which was basically not up to date (very few armored vehicles, no airborne, trench war as only winning model...) and French generals incompetency due to politic and administrative management.
The german movement around the Ligne Maginot through Belgium is a good exemple of excellent tactic and strategy to fix and desorganise opponents.
An interresting book published last year shows that French could have damage much more the Germans in 1940 (but still loose the battle) if Petain did not surrender against the will of the national assembly.
But it's pure fiction...

[Fuchs]

You can even add the complete un relevance of the French strategy and army which was basically not up to date (very few armored vehicles, no airborne, trench war as only winning model...) and French generals incompetency due to politic and administrative management.
The german movement around the Ligne Maginot through Belgium is a good exemple of excellent tactic and strategy to fix and desorganise opponents.
An interresting book published last year shows that French could have damage much more the Germans in 1940 (but still loose the battle) if Petain did not surrender against the will of the national assembly.
But it's pure fiction...

Except that they had more and on average more powerful tanks, had more motor vehicles, more halftracks, ...

The Germans didn't move so much around the Maginot line as they moved into the flank of the anticipated counter-offensive. The French weren't surprised about the (initially) silence along the Maginot line. The line served its purpose by allowing France to deploy less troops there than would otherwise have been necessary. It was an economy of force obstacle that was meant to compensate for France`s smaller population.

The really relevant book about the campaign (expecially about its decisive parts) is this one. It was published by the official German military history agency/archive and is the official German account of the campaign - based on an incredible archive research.

[M.L.]

The strategy of 1940 turned a terrible war situation into a near-win. It was good strategy (or lucky, it depends).

The events of 1941 were part of a different strategy.


The land campaigns of 1940 were meant to a) improve Germany's difficult raw material supply situation (Swedish ore secured by occupying Norway - captured Eastern French iron ore mines played that role in WWI) and then turned the imbalance of power in Germany's favour by knocking out one of the three most powerful armies and one of the three most powerful air forces of the world at once.
The strategic effect was huge and a clear look at the events of 1940 should enable you to see the separation between the 1940 strategies and the 1941 madness.

As I said before, operations (the operational level of war) wins campaigns. You will see in your quote above the words land campaigns. 1939-1945 were all a series of campaigns which supported the German strategic objectives for WWII. They lost. Good operationally, poor strategically.

[M.L.]

I think you meant to say "Hitler...[was] horrible strategically." I don't think "Germans" got much of a vote on strategic issues in that era.

No....I meant to say exactly what I said. "The Germans" includes Hitler. Regardless of who had a vote, Germany pursued strategic ends as a nation, and Hitler most certainly did not act alone.

[Fuchs]

As I said before, operations (the operational level of war) wins campaigns. You will see in your quote above the words land campaigns. 1939-1945 were all a series of campaigns which supported the German strategic objectives for WWII. They lost. Good operationally, poor strategically.

The strategy evolved, though. The early strategy was successful.

[Bob's World]

No....I meant to say exactly what I said. "The Germans" includes Hitler. Regardless of who had a vote, Germany pursued strategic ends as a nation, and Hitler most certainly did not act alone.

The ones who dissented were killed or otherwise marginalized. No, your statement is overly broad, and therefore wildly inaccurate. Did the poor strategy of Germany in WWII lead to their ultimate decimation as a nation? Certainly. Were the German high command schooled in Clausewitz and well aware of the role Napoleon had in both building and destroying France and did they see the same flaw of human nature in Hitler leading them to the same inevitable end? Yes. But Napoleons and Hitlers do not lead by consensus or work to enact the will of the people, rather they dictate. The cautions on the effects of absolute power are wise, (as we sadly see every day in Afghanistan as well...)

I was just offering you a hand, you don't have to take it, and are certainly entitled to your opinions. I figured you had misspoke. I know I often do.

[Infanteer]

As I said before, operations (the operational level of war) wins campaigns. You will see in your quote above the words land campaigns. 1939-1945 were all a series of campaigns which supported the German strategic objectives for WWII. They lost. Good operationally, poor strategically.

I'm starting to see a point to the argument (made by Wilf I believe) that the "operational level of war" actually doesn't exist at all. All operations did was provide a theoretical link between tactics (combined arms warfare of the German variety) and strategy (a quick defeat of the French through a bypass of their main forces in Belgium) - there was no operational level that existed independant of this; all commanders from Platoon to Army Group conducted operational art when they ensured their tactics met the strategy.

So, the German's had good strategy in 1940; their strategy of three concurrent drives into the vast Russian steps was not so good.

At a grand strategic/policy level, getting into a two-front war with the free world was disasterous.

[M.L.]

The ones who dissented were killed or otherwise marginalized. No, your statement is overly broad, and therefore wildly inaccurate. Did the poor strategy of Germany in WWII lead to their ultimate decimation as a nation? Certainly. Were the German high command schooled in Clausewitz and well aware of the role Napoleon had in both building and destroying France and did they see the same flaw of human nature in Hitler leading them to the same inevitable end? Yes. But Napoleons and Hitlers do not lead by consensus or work to enact the will of the people, rather they dictate. The cautions on the effects of absolute power are wise, (as we sadly see every day in Afghanistan as well...)

I was just offering you a hand, you don't have to take it, and are certainly entitled to your opinions. I figured you had misspoke. I know I often do.

It is a commonly accepted practice to discuss history in terms of the Germans, the Japanese, the Americans, etc...

History books, you will find, refer to Hitler, the German High Command, the German Army, etc... as simply the Germans; the German strategy, the German offensive, the German tactics, etc... This isn't new. To split hairs in terminology based on the political situation in Germany is not worth the time.

To debate who had what say in the German strategy is largely irrelevant when discussing the efficacy of the strategy itself, and the efficacy of the strategy was the crux of the discussion.

If you want to talk about WHO was responsible for the poor German strategy...I got it. However, I was simply evaluating the strategy vis a vis France in 1940.

[M.L.]

I'm starting to see a point to the argument (made by Wilf I believe) that the "operational level of war" actually doesn't exist at all. All operations did was provide a theoretical link between tactics (combined arms warfare of the German variety) and strategy (a quick defeat of the French through a bypass of their main forces in Belgium) - there was no operational level that existed independant of this; all commanders from Platoon to Army Group conducted operational art when they ensured their tactics met the strategy.

So, the German's had good strategy in 1940; their strategy of three concurrent drives into the vast Russian steps was not so good.

At a grand strategic/policy level, getting into a two-front war with the free world was disasterous.

The defeat of France was an operation that was part of a larger strategy. The fact is that Hitler hated Bolsheviks, and blamed them for Germany's fortunes in WWI. Hitlers strategy was essentially no different than the Schlieffen Plan; defeat France first, then Russia. To say the German strategy was good in 1940 but poor in 1941 doesn't make sense. The strategy never changed. It was poor from the beginning. It just went well at the beginning, and crappy at the end.

You could make the case that the operational level of war does not exist. 90% of the strategic community would disagree with you, but you could make the case nevertheless.

Let's use Germany as a case study. The German strategy to defeat France first was achieved by a sequenced series of operations. The first of these was called Case Yellow, and the second Case Red.

This process of sequencing operations to achieve strategic effects is operational warfare.

As another case study, take OPERATION TORCH. The Allies invade North Africa. The strategy is to expel the Germans from North Africa in order to control the Suez Canal and set the conditions for an assault into Italy.

So, where do you land in North Africa? At what beaches or ports? What are your intermediate objectives to achieve the desired strategic effects?

This is operational warfare. Its hard, and not many people can do it well. Wishing it away is a technique, although I wouldn't recommend it.

[Ken White]

...The strategy never changed. It was poor from the beginning. It just went well at the beginning, and crappy at the end...You could make the case that the operational level of war does not exist. 90% of the strategic community would disagree with you, but you could make the case nevertheless.

Hmm. That could mean that there is none...

This is operational warfare. Its hard, and not many people can do it well. Wishing it away is a technique, although I wouldn't recommend it.

Seriously speaking, I agree that it exists. I also agree that not many can do it well -- or, perhaps, that its techniques and principles are often misapplied...

The latter, I think. There are times, places and proper use. We as an an Army have a tendency to use precepts and principles when they are not appropriate simply because they are taught, ergo they must be used...

[William F. Owen]

You could make the case that the operational level of war does not exist. 90% of the strategic community would disagree with you, but you could make the case nevertheless.

You can make the case because those that pump the "operational level" cannot make a solid case. The idea of an "operational level of war" is severe impediment to clear thinking and action. It was invented by folks who didn't understand Strategy and Tactics.

What is a level of war? I submit it's meaningless. There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics. Operations is merely the planing and conduct the sustains tactics in a time and space.

That you can and must conduct operations, in no way makes the case of an "operational level." How do Divisional or Corps Tactics differ from "Operations?" The idea that Tactics "stops" at the Battle Group level is clearly absurd. Additionally, very small sub-unit actions get called "Operations."

This process of sequencing operations to achieve strategic effects is operational warfare.

So campaign planning and "operational level Warfare" is the same thing?

So, where do you land in North Africa? At what beaches or ports? What are your intermediate objectives to achieve the desired strategic effects?

Those are entirely tactical decisions. Planning is required. That plan and its conduct can be called an Operation. Its still tactics.

I've read just about all there is to read on the so-called "Operational level of war," from Hamley to Naveh, and most of the Soviet stuff. It's pseudo-academic, and does not conform to the Ends, Ways and Means.

[Tukhachevskii]

PLANNING FOR AND APPLYING MILITARY FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF TERMS

[Polarbear1605]

You can make the case because those that pump the "operational level" cannot make a solid case. The idea of an "operational level of war" is severe impediment to clear thinking and action. It was invented by folks who didn't understand Strategy and Tactics.

What is a level of war? I submit it's meaningless. There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics. Operations is merely the planing and conduct the sustains tactics in a time and space.

That you can and must conduct operations, in no way makes the case of an "operational level." How do Divisional or Corps Tactics differ from "Operations?" The idea that Tactics "stops" at the Battle Group level is clearly absurd. Additionally, very small sub-unit actions get called "Operations."

So campaign planning and "operational level Warfare" is the same thing?

Those are entirely tactical decisions. Planning is required. That plan and its conduct can be called an Operation. Its still tactics.

Got to agree with WILF on this one; at least on the American side. US Generals are getting famious for bad strategy. Most recently Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations are in fact tactics and excuse generals from studing and thinking strategy. Strategy (and its application) does not come with a set of stars; it has to be learned by study. Consequently, generals advise the national command authority badly and ignor setting the strategic tapistry for regional conflicts.

[slapout9]

Generals are getting famious for bad strategy. Most recently Iraq and Afghanistan. Operations are in fact tactics and excuse generals from studing and thinking strategy.

Yep, the Operational level of war is nothing but a Guvmint jobs program. It just adds another useless layer of "Planners" to the situation.

[M.L.]

So campaign planning and "operational level Warfare" is the same thing?

For the most part, yes. Campaign planning occurs at the operational level of war, although the operational war is not limited to campaign planning.

"The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."

[SWJ Blog]

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Entry Excerpt:

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory
by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Over the past nine years United States counterinsurgency strategy reflected a reliance on Clausewitzian industrial-era tenets with a faulty emphasis on superior western technology, doctrine fixated on lethal operations, and a western skewed perspective on jus ad bellum (just cause for war). American military culture is largely responsible for the first two contextual biases, while western society is liable for the third in response to September 11, 2001. To turn this operational failure around, the U.S. military instrument of power should replace the teachings of 19th century German military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz with Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and abandon the aforementioned contextual factors in favor of more appropriate counterinsurgency alternatives. These include an increased emphasis on civil-military relations, jus in bello (just conduct during war) through non-lethal operations, and quantifiable conflict resolution that includes negotiating with moderate Taliban militia groups, as unpalatable as that sounds to military purists. This paper stresses that moderates do not include radical Islamic terrorists or non-native fighters.

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.



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