The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

Collins does not define the operational level of war, but he does define "operational art"

"Military plans and operations that implement military strategies at theater level. Campaigns predominate if armed combat occurs."

He defines campaigns as:

"A series of theater-level military actions that may or may not be strategically significant."

To complete this, he defines theater operations as:

"A major politico-military or geographic area (such as Western Europe or the Middle East) for which military commanders in chief prepare plans and conduct operations."

Its not like we're discussing Bigfoot or the Loch Ness Monster. These are simply theoretical constructs to focus and guide military planning and operations. The fact that they exist is indisputable. One can debate their value, but their existence is irrefutable.

[M.L.]

Those are entirely tactical decisions. Planning is required. That plan and its conduct can be called an Operation. Its still tactics.

Tactics? Really? So General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was the commander for Torch, was planning a tactical engagement?

Well, I suppose that is one way to look at tactics....

[Fuchs]

I agree, and it makes sense to think of an operational level of war, for it makes the thinking easier, separates the dissimilar tactics of units and large formations.

Tactical advices that make sense for battalions often don't make sense for army groups or corps.

Things like march planning, bridging equipment allocation or air power allocation to regions and tasks simply play no role at the battalion level while stuff like this is very important for corps commanders. It's the operational level where things like fuel, ammunition, formation reserves become endogenous instead of exogenous factors.
It makes no sense to treat everything below strategy level the same just because up to just below the supreme commander everyone is supposed to act in his commander's intent with no clear break that separates operational and tactical actions.


Today:

Tactics can be necessary from individual to corps level.

Operational art can be necessary from brigade to army/air force HQ level. I once wrote that operational art is formation tactics to approximate its meaning.

Strategy can be necessary from theatre commander (even if he's only in control of a reinforced battalion in a tiny mission) up to head of state.
Countries with civilian control over the military should allocate the ultimate strategy decision-making authority to the head of state, with good advice and staff support by the military. Said head of state can delegate it down to theatre commander level.

[William F. Owen]

Tactics? Really? So General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was the commander for Torch, was planning a tactical engagement?

Well his staff was. Yes. The purpose to which all planning was centred was the performance of tactics.

For the most part, yes. Campaign planning occurs at the operational level of war, although the operational war is not limited to campaign planning.

So why not just say "campaign planning." Adding "operational level of war" adds nothing. If a campaign plan ends up being called "Operation Iraqi Freedom" it does not the "operational level" of war make!

"The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations."

OK, so if I re-write that as ""Campaigns are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish objectives within theaters" is that materially different of misleading?

"These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."

No it does not. Logistics and administration are tactical disciplines.

Question: Can you write a manual on Divisional Tactics? If yes, then there is no "operational level." There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics, and only one of those is a "level of war" because it's the "only level."

[Fuchs]

Question: Can you write a manual on Divisional Tactics? If yes, then there is no "operational level." There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics, and only one of those is a "level of war" because it's the "only level."

The snake bites its end. You need to have defined the limit of tactics (thus have decided whether all the stuff others consider to be operational is tactics as you think) to decide whether you can write such a manual. The question does therefore provide no logically coherent test.

You dismiss the separation of tactics from operational level, et you accept the division between strategy and tactics. I suspect you won't be able to justify the latter division and defend it against the same kind of critique you offer against the operational level.
Mater Tzu taught that it was all the same, after all.

Generally, commanding of many is like commanding of a few.

It is a matter of dividing them into groups.

[M.L.]

To illustrate the point, lets take the example of Operation Michael in 1918. The German tactics - using storm troops to infiltrate the allied line, then regular infantry to exploit, worked brilliantly. The offensive exceeded all German expectations. Likewise, the Germans executed three other offensives along the western front, all of which succeeded in gaining ground.

Unfortunately, the German offensives did not produce any strategically significant results. What was missing was an operational plan. These successful tactics were not linked to strategic effects, which is what operational planning does.

The offensives were not properly sequenced or focused to achieve operational objectives. Nor were the logistics trains able to keep up with the offensives. Eventually they culminated.

Let us suppose Operation Michael had been properly planned operationally. Rather than three additional, unfocused offensives, the Germans would have reinforced the original offensive to drive to Amiens, which was a key regional transportation node. Had the Germans taken Amiens, they very well could have cut the Britain-France line, enveloping the British from the south and pushing them into the sea.

The other three offensives had no operational objectives comparable to Amiens. They simply gained more ground for the Germans, which in the end, only gave them a longer line to defend.

German commander Erich Ludendorff was so focused on tactics, i.e. "break through the line," that he failed to plan properly at the operational level.

Take a look at this map of the western front of March, 1918: http://goo.gl/5BYjD.

Now go to google maps and check out Ameins here:

http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&sour...,1.783905&z=10

It's pretty apparent why operational planning is important.

[M.L.]

Question: Can you write a manual on Divisional Tactics? If yes, then there is no "operational level." There is Policy, Strategy and Tactics, and only one of those is a "level of war" because it's the "only level."

You can write a manual and call it anything you want. I don't see your point.

[Ken White]

For the most part, yes. Campaign planning occurs at the operational level of war, although the operational war is not limited to campaign planning.

""...that its techniques and principles are often misapplied...We as an an Army have a tendency to use precepts and principles when they are not appropriate simply because they are taught, ergo they must be used...""

Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives." (emphasis added / kw)

The first item in bold print is an invitation to the Type A go-getters of the US Army to go 'Operational' as that clause implies they are doing something more grand than the humdrum (and 'low level' thus simply using the 'Operational level' concept elevates one above the hoi polloi...) application of decent tactics to obtain goals. The second leads some to believe that if they merely label what they do as being at the Operational level, they are in fact doing great things. -- I cite Norm Schwarzkopf as an example with his contention that the Desert Storm tactical ploy (not his idea, BTW) was an "Operational level maneuver."

The Operational level aspects of Desert Storm were the placing of forces including Third US Army, VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps (+) in theater -- after that it was all tactical. Similarly, placing US Forces in Afghanistan was an Operational level move that made all of Afghanistan and what transpires there 'Operational level.' Everything downstream is tactical -- but I'll bet big bucks a lot of RC / BCT and even Bn Staff time in country is spent on 'Operational level planning...' and merging LOO (a must use term as it has been favored by the current Vice Chief... ).

We embraced the Operational Level of war as a result of its use in European Armies as a descriptor of the tactical deployment and support evolutions of echelons above Corps. That was done in the late 70s and 80s as we were then almost totally focused (wrongly...) on Europe and loved all things European. There is great applicability of the level in Joint Operations and the Army as a participant in those needs to understand the principles but the applicability to Army units in Theater is far less clear. The term was not in general use in the US Army prior to the 1980s and we went to North Africa -- and a lot of other places in several Theaters -- during WW II without using it.

Further, as Bob's World's quoted comment of Collins emphasizes the operational ART consists of "Military plans and operations that implement military strategies at theater level. Campaigns predominate if armed combat occurs." Thus if one accepts that and most do, then whether there is an Operational Level of War becomes a semantic food fight (in which we are all merrily engaging... ) and is perhaps intriguing but little more. I'd also note that it is an art, not a science...

What is important is the potential misuse -- and waste of staff time -- of Operational level planning efforts on what are tactical evolutions. Far more pernicious is that unwarranted elevation inadvertently (or deliberately in some cases) encouraging Staff and Commander to interfere with tactical evolutions by subordinate Commanders in the guise of 'engineering success' and insuring 'all the LOOs are followed...' while operating under the delusion that they are a high level planning operation using military science to control the destiny of nations by directing the Plebs to perform the proper tactical evolutions to attain strategic goals...

My Mother told me to be careful what I wanted, I might get it. Long experience tells me the US Army needs to follow that precept and be careful what they promulgate as doctrine -- because they almost certainly will get it. If it's provided it will almost certainly be used -- even if it's ill advised and sadly or even dangerously misapplied, misplaced or misused.

[Fuchs]

What was missing was an operational plan. These successful tactics were not linked to strategic effects, which is what operational planning does.

The offensives were not properly sequenced or focused to achieve operational objectives. Nor were the logistics trains able to keep up with the offensives. Eventually they culminated.

Let us suppose Operation Michael had been properly planned operationally.

It was planned properly, under the constraints of the time.
The very same limitations were present in late 1917 when half of the Italian army's power was destroyed in the Battle of Caporetto.

The enemy in France proved to be more resilient and to have greater reserves. The failure was not an unsatisfactory operational plan, but a wrong strategy: Germany should have agreed to the 14 Points plan of Wilson for damage control.

[slapout9]

Campaigns predominate if armed combat occurs." Thus if one accepts that and most do, then whether there is an Operational Level of War becomes a semantic food fight (in which we are all merrily engaging... ) and is perhaps intriguing but little more. I'd also note that it is an art, not a science...

It's like Vodoo if enough people believe in it then it does exist.....the big dogs says there is an Operational level so there is going to be one whether we like it or not.

[M.L.]

Here is a simple question. Must tactics be linked to strategy?

If the answer is yes, then a case can be made for operational planning.

If the answer is yes, BUT I don't like it to be called "the operational level of war", then you are arguing about semantics, not warfare, and it's not worth our collective time to debate the issue.

If the answer is no, well, that is your opinion and you are certainly entitled to it. The vast majority of military theory and history disagrees with you, but drive on with your bad self.

[Infanteer]

The defeat of France was an operation that was part of a larger strategy.

I don't see it that way, and I don't really recall it being explained that way when I learned about strategy and tactics. The defeat of France was a strategy; a linking of ways and means to ends. Ends were defined by German policy (sometimes called grand strategy, but I find that muddies the definition of strategy). The defeat was accomplished by tactical maneuvers by the Army Group commanders down, all who were able to link their tactics to the strategy of knocking out France.

The most clear way of explaining this relationship that I was given was the Schlieffen Plan. The policy was a rapid defeat in West to quickly reinforce the East. The strategy was the "wide right hook" through Belgium, keeping the right strong and tactics were all the stuff that the military performed to do so. Obviously, there was a failure in the application of the operational art as the tactics, especially concerning 1st Army in and around Paris, did not synch with the strategy.

I'm not arguing that the operational art doesn't exist - it is the art of linking tactics to strategy and people can be poor or good at it. It involves those factors that you mention.

What I am arguing (after seeing how Wilf explained it) is that it is not a separate and distinct "level of war" that is practiced by commanders and their staffs; rather it is a mechanism that they all use. I am arguing this because it makes sense to me and upon reflection, I've never seen any manual really make a good explanation for the operational art as a separate and distinct level of war. As a platoon commander in Afghanistan, I used operational art to apply my tactics (patrolling) to the strategy (neutralizing insurgent access to the population) which supported the policy (supporting the Karzai government). Comd RC(S), a Div Comd, did the same thing by using the operational art to link his tactics for Moshtarek (maneuvering forces into a contested area) to the strategy (neutralizing insurgent access to the population) which support the policy (supporting the Karzai government). Sure, Major General Carter and I had different considerations, but it doesn't change the fact that our processes were the same.

Tactics: "the art or science of disposing military or naval forces for battle and maneuvering them in battle." from Dictionary.com. Makes sense to me. Arguing that the "operational art" is what brigades and higher do is just making up a name instead of simply acknowledging that tactical considerations are different for different levels of command. It appears to be forcing a distinction where none really exists. Fuchs states that since there is a difference between battalion and corps tactical considerations, that there must be separate and unique "level of war". Things like march planning, bridging equipment and air power sound like tactics to me. Tactical considerations are also different between platoon and battalion - are there different levels of war at play here? No - tactics are applied by anyone commanding troops, from a squad leader to an Army group commander; the considerations just differ based on the amount of men commanded and the size of the terrain being utilized.

Now, as M.L. said, 90% of the community may say I'm wrong, but 90% of the community also pushed out crap like Maneuver Warfare and Pop-centric COIN, with all the inherent flaws, as doctrine so I'm okay with that. Maybe I'm just being argumentative, but the argument above makes more sense to me than the one that states that there is some magical level between tactics and strategy. Operational art is a independant variable existing within tactics and strategy, not a concrete level between them. One does not get promoted to Brigadier General and all of the sudden leave the realm of tactics to function on the "operational level of war".

[M.L.]

It was planned properly, under the constraints of the time.
The very same limitations were present in late 1917 when half of the Italian army's power was destroyed in the Battle of Caporetto.

The enemy in France proved to be more resilient and to have greater reserves. The failure was not an unsatisfactory operational plan, but a wrong strategy: Germany should have agreed to the 14 Points plan of Wilson for damage control.

You are 100% wrong. The door to Amiens was open. Ludendorff had only to walk through it, and he didn't. To say that Michael was planned properly is a gross misinterpretation of history. Show me one historian who agrees with you, and I'll concede the point.

[Fuchs]

Door open or not - there was not enough operational mobility to compensate for the defender's interior lines (intact and uninterrupted rail-road network). That's why the offensive had no regular Schwerpunkt.

It was simply not about manoeuvring on large scale, but about pushing to opposing armies towards collapse.

Besides; nothing beyond the first day could possibly be planned. There had been no sustained breakthroughs for three and a half ears on that front.

[M.L.]

Infanteer,

The defeat of France was a strategic objective, achieved through a series of two operations. These, in turn, were achieved using blitzkrieg tactics.

Strategic Objective --> Defeat of France

Operational Objectives -->
-->Secure the northern flank by occupying Belgium
--->Attack south, bypassing the Maginot line, and taking Paris

These objectives were supported by a series of engagements and battles using blitzkrieg tactics.

[M.L.]

Door open or not - there was not enough operational mobility to compensate for the defender's interior lines (intact and uninterrupted rail-road network). That's why the offensive had no regular Schwerpunkt.

It was simply not about manoeuvring on large scale, but about pushing to opposing armies towards collapse.

Besides; nothing beyond the first day could possibly be planned. There had been no sustained breakthroughs for three and a half ears on that front.

That's why Amiens was so important - it would have interrupted the railroad network and cut off the British from the French.

[Infanteer]

The defeat of France was a strategic objective, achieved through a series of two operations. These, in turn, were achieved using blitzkrieg tactics.

Yes, and those two operations were tactical plans. "You, move XVI Corps here and you, take X Corps down here to keep the reserves occupied". Repeat down to "you, drive your tank over there and you shoot at those guys".

I don't see how one of these is on a separate level of war from the other.

[M.L.]

I'm not arguing that the operational art doesn't exist - it is the art of linking tactics to strategy and people can be poor or good at it. It involves those factors that you mention.

If you believe that strategy must be linked to tactics, then you are on the right track.

Whether is should be called a "level or war" or not is largely irrelevant - that is an argument about what should be in the dictionary. I personally believe it should be portrayed as a level of war because there are important concepts in operational warfare which are neither tactical nor strategic.

Operational warfare is neither concrete nor distinct from tactics or strategy. If its purpose is to link the two, how could it be? That is why many people who haven't had the opportunity to either serve at those level or read a lot of history have a hard time envisioning operational warfare. Tactics and strategy are easy because they exist at opposite ends of a continuum. Operational warfare is tougher.

Despite the numerous opinions in this forum, I've seen little in the way of evidence that would convince me that operational warfare does not exist. People here are very good at giving opinions, but not as good at proving a point through the use of empirical evidence, acknowledged experts, and/or historical vignettes.

I've offered several historical examples which demonstrate both the existence and importance of operational warfare.

[M.L.]

Yes, and those two operations were tactical plans. "You, move XVI Corps here and you, take X Corps down here to keep the reserves occupied". Repeat down to "you, drive your tank over there and you shoot at those guys".

I don't see how one of these is on a separate level of war from the other.

Because completion of operational objectives achieves strategic effects. Completion of tactical objectives (take that hill, destroy that battalion), does not.

Taking a Corps here or there achieves strategic objectives, and is significantly more difficult than driving a tank here or there.

Can't you see how absurd it is to suggest that maneuvering a Corps is the same as maneuvering a tank?!

[M.L.]

Gents-

I understand many of you disagree with me. Got it. But from now on, please provide some sort of evidence to support your contentions.

If all you have is your opinion, you are welcome to it, but frankly I'm not interested unless you have a background which suggests that you have a unique perspective on the matter.

Otherwise, we are spinning our wheels. I don't really care what your opinion is without evidence to back it up. Nor should you care about my opinion.