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Thread: The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

  1. #661
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    For those of you who are willing to entertain the idea that the vast majority of the military and history communities are not insane, and that there actually might be an operational level of war, I recommend this book:

    http://www.history.army.mil/books/OpArt/index.htm

    It is free to read online and traces operational warfare from its birth in the Napoleonic Era to 1991 and the Gulf War. The preface is two pages and describes the differences between strategy, operations, and tactics pretty well in a short space.

    For the rest of you, well, you may find this an interesting work of fiction....
    Last edited by M.L.; 12-12-2010 at 01:41 PM.
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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    ML,

    You are clearly a military professional who knows a great deal about his profession and also takes great comfort in that knowledge. Such is the science of war and the path for development of leaders. There is no criticism intended or implied in that observation.

    Doctrine and knowledge provide a comfort zone to operate competently within sight of. But one only discovers new places and new ideas when they release themselves from that comfort zone and strikes out into less familiar territory. SWJ is an excellent place for such exploration. What I have come to appreciate is that what one understands is far more important than what one knows. Knowledge is just the doorway to understanding. This takes one into the art of war.

    Take it from one who defends hard gained positions more stubbornly than most. But even when digging in hard, I am listening to what is being said, thinking about why it is others may believe things differently than I do, and am continually improving my position. Few things are black and white in this business.

    Bob
    Last edited by Bob's World; 12-12-2010 at 02:35 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by M.L. View Post
    Let me give you an example

    End= Cripple German Economy and Industry
    Way=Bombing
    Means=Bombers (crews, airfields, ordinance, fuel, parts, etc...)
    End = The Unconditional surrender of Germany
    Strategy = includes the physical destruction of the means of production
    Ways = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.

    Historians are comfortable with the term without throwing a hissy fit, so I am too.
    Historians maybe. Those who study warfare to inform current and future practice are not.
    As for the operational level of war, the linking of strategy to tactics must occur. This is operational warfare.
    How is strategy - by it's very nature as the link between policy and tactics, not already linked to tactics?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by M.L. View Post
    For those of you who are willing to entertain the idea that the vast majority of the military and history communities are not insane.
    No one said they were insane. They are just very poor at studying their art, and use language badly. Military history is mostly poor, in terms of informing practice.
    It is free to read online and traces operational warfare from its birth in the Napoleonic Era to 1991 and the Gulf War. The preface is two pages and describes the differences between strategy, operations, and tactics pretty well in a short space.
    So Hannibal, Julius Caesar and Alexander didn't conduct operations? What was anyone one of them doing that Napoleon was not?

    If you want to see just how poor the intellectual and historical basis for "An operational level" is, go read Shimon Naveh. "The Pursuit of Excellence."
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    I have that book on my shelf and I've tried twice to get into it, both times being repelled by his esoteric style and heavy wordsmithing of the English language.

  6. #666
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Thanks for posting that. I'd skimmed it some time ago and recalled two points.

    Quote Originally Posted by M.L. View Post
    For those of you who are willing to entertain the idea that the vast majority of the military and history communities are not insane, and that there actually might be an operational level of war, I recommend this book:

    http://www.history.army.mil/books/OpArt/index.htm
    I agreed there is an Operational Art so I guess that proves that I do not consider most of the military and history communities to be insane. My point is the rather more important issue that Military folks are too often slaves to doctrine.

    Two items from your link are pertinent. The first by BG (Ret) Harold W. Nelson discussing US history and usage:
    "The U.S. fought its wars for more than 200 years without needing an “operational level.” Strategy and tactics were good enough for Clausewitz and Jomini - and for our fathers and grandfathers as they fought the biggest wars known to man. They learned how to plan and conduct campaigns without any special terminology, so why do we need a new term, an intermediate level, in our hierarchy of warfighting concepts? I believe the introduction of the new term reflects a revision in our view of war rather than recent changes in the nature of war. A quick look at some of the things our predecessors wrote and studied convinces me that there was a growing awareness of what we now call the operational level of war long before we introduced the term. Its application should, therefore, help us to understand the use of military force in twentieth-century wars while helping us plan for the future."
    Good summary and most of us can agree with that to at least some degree.

    The second point -- and the problem as it exists with the "Operational Level of War" is illustrated by a clutch of items by BG (Ret) John S. Brown, former Chief Of Military History.
    "Twentieth-century Americans adopted an egalitarian attitude toward military staff work; rather than evolving a small, highly specialized elite cadre, they rotated officers between staff and line assignments fairly routinely. In the views of the officers themselves, they “did their time” on staff in order to return to the troop, flight, or sea duty they truly preferred.
    . . .
    The mathematics worked out to a return to troops as a field-grade officer within two to three as opposed to four to five years. A fraction of SAMS’s popularity was its exploitation of a time-honored American technique: Seduce talented officers into staff work by promising to make them line officers in due course.
    . . .
    Whatever their motives, SAMS graduates proliferated throughout the Army and enhanced staff proficiency - particularly with respect to the operational art heavily emphasized at the time. They were reinforced by an emphasis upon the operational art in the basic course, and thus the tendency of all recent officer graduates of the service school systems to use concepts and vocabulary that facilitated its use. The 1986 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100–5, Operations, deployed an array of historical operational vignettes to make its points; such terms as Center of Gravity, Lines of Operation, and Culminating Point were recommended as key concepts for operational design. Although they did not develop a precise equivalent to SAMS, Navy and Air Force educators also gave due attention to the operational art and campaign planning during this period and developed appropriate literature for their student officers as well." (emphasis added / kw)
    The first item placed in bold is important to put SAMS in perspective for what it really is and to add tha another fraction of that popularity is the intellectual cachet note. The point, though, is those officers leave SAMS for a Corps or Division Staff -- but later will likely command Bns and Bdes; thus the SAMS 'Operational' mentality gets transferred to lower level by that as well as the trickle down effect cited in the second item emphasized.

    Those two factors mean that the 'Operational level' as a methodology is significantly overly insinuated and thus often misunderstood and misused throughout the Army.

    This also from BG (Ret) Brown:
    "During DESERT STORM the arms and services operated together with an unprecedented virtuosity that smashed a theretofore formidable opponent in a brief time - with astonishingly few casualties. One would be hard put to imagine a more effective demonstration of joint and combined operations than that turned in to liberate Kuwait."
    I beg to differ. One would be hard put to find another 'war' wherein the opponent could have been dispatched in half the time with a third the effort. Desert Storm was an aberration, 100 US casualties in 100 hours to accomplish the mission (more or less...) is not a war, it is an FTX with live Ammo.

    Unfortunately, that operation not only set some unattainable expectations in the minds of many (not least US Politicians...), it more damagingly embedded the myth of the Operational level of War in the US Army and due to that essential overselling, over insinuation and potential for misuse of an important concept and the (dare I suggest excessive...) number of SAMS graduates, the Operational Art is prostituted, misused and obscures or deters proper tactics. As Wilf and others with academic and experience at upper echelons cred note {LINK}.

    Anyone who espouses the valid need for an Operational art and interface between Tactics and Strategy should be concerned with addressing that very real problem.

  7. #667
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Thee and me..

    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    I have that book on my shelf and I've tried twice to get into it, both times being repelled by his esoteric style and heavy wordsmithing of the English language.
    Heavy going...

  8. #668
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    "Strategy may dictate whether or not to fight, but operations will determine where and when to fight and tactics how to conduct the fight. " From the Preface of the book.


    I thought this was pretty good.


    Also this appears to be the study I was talking about, the time frame is right around 2005 and the length of the study over 450 pages is also right, the cover is different but I don't always remember stuff like I used to.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    So Hannibal, Julius Caesar and Alexander didn't conduct operations? What was anyone one of them doing that Napoleon was not?
    They manoeuvred only one army (corps) at once, while Napoleon centrally commanded (at the same time!) several corps which moved with more than a day's march separation.


    Caesar occasionally sent a legion away to deal with a minor problem, but such a detached legion would follow a different purpose than the main army.

    Hannibal left some garrisons behind, but he manoeuvred with a single army.


    The one core advance of Napoleon for the art of war was to march the corps dispersed and then let them converge to decisive battles - all while under his control (with some delay, of course).

    There were few previous examples that resembled such activity, and the only ones where the theatre commander/king really kept more than one army/corps under his control was when an army in a coastal region was paired with a fleet (such as Alexander's advance in the Levant).
    The Steppe people leaders temporarily lost control of their detached armies/corps.

  10. #670
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    They manoeuvred only one army (corps) at once, while Napoleon centrally commanded (at the same time!) several corps which moved with more than a day's march separation.
    Yes, more likely due to the size of Revolutionary Armies than anything else. I agree with you that this is a key distinction between Napoleonic Armies and its predecessors. However, this does not mean that Caesar, Hannibal and Alexander did not conduct campaign planning - they still had to sit down and say "Hmm, to pacify Gaul, I need to burn out the Belgae while still keeping these fellows around Cisalpine Gaul in line. So, I'll do X, Y and Z with Legions X, XV and II".

    For some reason the military profession more than many others falls for that curious human tendency to believe that what we are doing in our generation is something new and transformational and progressive when compared to everybody before us.

  11. #671
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    The one core advance of Napoleon for the art of war was to march the corps dispersed and then let them converge to decisive battles - all while under his control (with some delay, of course).
    ...but people had done that before. Ghenghis Khan in Transoxianna in 1219/20 is just one of several examples I can think off. Ancient "Armies" often had to march dispersed because they simply ate out the land they were covering.

    I was re-reading Moltke last night, and noted he only ever talks of "Strategy" and "Tactics." - as does Hamley. Both men understood the need to conduct "Operations," but merely saw this as the necessary preliminaries to battle.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    WILF,

    Since we are really just talking about the terms and concepts we use to describe this fundamental human dynamic of warfare, my question is what harm comes from some incorporating an "operational level" in their descriptions and some preferring a leaner "Strategy and Tactics" approach? Neither actually changes the dynamics of warfare, they merely break it down and describe it differently.

    Do you see some danger from employing the concept of operational levels of warfare, or do you simply find it superfluous to the more established Strategy/Tactics approach?

    If no harm, then no foul. After all, this is theory to describe something real. The theory cannot change the reality.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Do you see some danger from employing the concept of operational levels of warfare, or do you simply find it superfluous to the more established Strategy/Tactics approach?
    Excellent question. I find it superfluous, and there fore actually damaging. My sole concern is the teaching that informs practice. I really have little or no time for abstract theory, unless it contributes to action, so....

    a.) The Operational level adds nothing, IF you understand Strategy and Tactics as described by classical military thought. If Moltke didn't need it, why do we?
    b.) Adding and dreaming up stuff like the operational level, basically shows we do not study warfare correctly. It's a sophistry. It undermines teaching that works, if the teaching is done well.

    It's liken "Hybrid Warfare." If you use baby talk, then you'll end up thinking like a baby. If you use silly words, you'll end up doing silly stuff.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    a.) The Operational level adds nothing, IF you understand Strategy and Tactics as described by classical military thought. If Moltke didn't need it, why do we?
    b.) Adding and dreaming up stuff like the operational level, basically shows we do not study warfare correctly. It's a sophistry. It undermines teaching that works, if the teaching is done well.
    a) We might face a better enemy sometime - someone who's not stuck in the 19th century.

    b) Would only relevant if your a.) was correct.


    The operational level may be another set of tactics, but it makes sense to separate it from small-unit and unit tactics simply because you cannot lead a corps like you can lead a company. You cannot lead a company like you need to lead a corps. I wouldn't mind calling it "lower tactics" and "higher tactics", but the convention is to call it "tactics" and "operational art".


    Tactical success at battalion level can sabotage the corps leader's intent. An example would be a battalion being able to defeat attackers when it was supposed to let them pass into a trap. The separation of tactics and operational art helps people to understand that there are differences, to tolerate superficially suboptimal events (such as getting no artillery support) at the unit level in favour of the operational intent.
    The differentiation between unit and formation tactics is useful in many ways.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    a) We might face a better enemy sometime - someone who's not stuck in the 19th century.
    Is Newtonian physics stuck in 18th century?
    The operational level may be another set of tactics, but it makes sense to separate it from small-unit and unit tactics simply because you cannot lead a corps like you can lead a company.
    That's command. That's nothing to do with an supposed "operational level." All commanders and all levels are require to plan and conduct operations.
    There are tactics for platoons and their are tactics for Corps. All do "operations."
    Tactical success at battalion level can sabotage the corps leader's intent.
    An example would be a battalion being able to defeat attackers when it was supposed to let them pass into a trap.
    As the attackers were defeated, where's the problem? Looks like just a bad plan to me.
    The differentiation between unit and formation tactics is useful in many ways.
    The differentiation is the level of command. One is formation. One is Unit.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Wilf,

    OK, fair enough, and I completely agree that many of the concepts, (and Hybrid warfare is an excellent example) are wheeled out by those who study a current problem and cook up a name for it without bothering to look at the thousands of years of historical examples that provide context to that "modern" problem. Too often we don't need any of the myriad new names, merely better understanding of existing concepts.

    I'm not convinced "operational level of war" falls into that category though. I think it rests on a solid foundation of historical study and experience, and is not just a concept cooked up to label something that someone sees sitting in front of them that they personally have never seen before. I'm comfortable with the concept and see its value in helping to focus a certain scope of strategy and tactics to pursue policy. Certainly for the US with our Geographic Combatant Command construct it serves a valuable purpose.

    Now, as to the appropriateness of GCCs; that is another debate for another thread...
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Is Newtonian physics stuck in 18th century?

    That's command. That's nothing to do with an supposed "operational level." All commanders and all levels are require to plan and conduct operations.
    There are tactics for platoons and their are tactics for Corps. All do "operations."

    As the attackers were defeated, where's the problem? Looks like just a bad plan to me.

    The differentiation is the level of command. One is formation. One is Unit.
    Newtonian physics has become obsolete early in the 20th century when relativity theory arrived.

    The inflationary use of the word "operations"," operational", "operator" is no argument against an operational level of war.
    Small units and units don't need to plan much if anything in mobile warfare, while corps and divisions need tor amp up their planning to cope with the demands of mobile warfare.

    Wilf, either I have not made my point clear (and I think I did) or you truly don't understand the operational level of war. A battalion's success that ruins the plan of a corps is a disaster.



    Wilf, sometime in 2009 you turned into a Clausewitzian acolyte. Fine. There's a problem though: You seem to dismiss almost everything that came after Clausewitz, probably with the single exception of Foch.

    You're closing your eyes and then you pretend there's nothing new because you cannot see it.

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    If no harm, then no foul. After all, this is theory to describe something real. The theory cannot change the reality.
    Definitions are crucial - if we define something wrong or incorrectly, then we likely have a skewed application.

    Sure, I can say an elephant has 2 trunks and 6 legs; that theory doesn't change the reality that an elephant has 1 trunk and 4 legs. But when I use my 2 trunks/6 legs theory and fight an elephant in real life, my skewed understanding probably leads to a less than optimal outcome.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    The operational level may be another set of tactics, but it makes sense to separate it from small-unit and unit tactics simply because you cannot lead a corps like you can lead a company. You cannot lead a company like you need to lead a corps. I wouldn't mind calling it "lower tactics" and "higher tactics", but the convention is to call it "tactics" and "operational art".
    ....and you cannot lead a brigade or a squad like you can lead a corps or a company. So there are distinctions at almost every echelon - why does one line of distinction constitute a separate "level of war"? Differences at each echelon are a function of size and scope, not of differing levels of war.

    Does a Corps commander use tactics? Does a platoon commander use operational art? As a commander, will I one day transition to "operational art"? Or will I simply command more people to move to and within battle or, as a staffer, plan to do so with more people, more stuff and more ground? How is command of VII Corps by General Franks in 1991, wheeling a few armoured divisions into the Iraqi flank, any different from a company commander wheeling his combat team into an enemy position?

    I think the answers to this expose the folly of defining "operational art" and "campaigning" as being on a unique plane done only by certain people. It is done by any commander, and his staff, at any level who plans and initiates an operation.
    Last edited by Infanteer; 12-13-2010 at 03:00 PM. Reason: grammar and clarity

  19. #679
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Newtonian physics has become obsolete early in the 20th century when relativity theory arrived.
    Yet we still use them and they still provide clear and explicit guidance for practical engineering.

    The inflationary use of the word "operations"," operational", "operator" is no argument against an operational level of war.
    Yet it,
    a.) Adds nothing.
    b.) People don't need it.
    c.) It's tramples on the good guidance set by strategy and tactics.

    Wilf, either I have not made my point clear (and I think I did) or you truly don't understand the operational level of war.
    What is there to understand? Enveloping an enemy division using three brigades and Corps level reserves does not require "an operational level." Its tactics at the Corps level, thus the Corps level of Command. Moltke knew this and never talked about the "operational level." Planning relates to a level of command.
    A battalion's success that ruins the plan of a corps is a disaster.
    Only if an idiot did the planning. Show me when this has ever happened?
    Wilf, sometime in 2009 you turned into a Clausewitzian acolyte. Fine. There's a problem though: You seem to dismiss almost everything that came after Clausewitz, probably with the single exception of Foch.
    ...and you'd be completely wrong. Yes I adhere to classical teachings, (Clausewitz, Foch, Moltke, Hamely, Callwell and few others) but I in no way reject other useful teaching. Please show me some, if you can find it.
    I think the work of Robert Leonhard and Jim Storr are profoundly useful (both men are still living) as is some of that of Stephen Biddle.
    ...but most modern military thought is garbage. I would cite the "operational level" as being a good example.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default CvC explained by Colin S. Gray

    Saw this over at Zenpundits website. One of the best and easiest articles to read and understand CvC by Colin S. Gray.

    http://www.clausewitz.dk/ColinGray1.pdf

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