The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

You draw Moltke the Elder, I bring Guderian, Manstein and their whole generation to the table, they spoke regularly about "operativ" in the meaning of "operational".

The operational level was especially helpful as a construct (which are tactics and strategy as well - all mere acoustic words and b/w contrast without the meaning given to it by others than us) during the Interwar Years.

The tactics had evolved and solved the breakthrough problem, but the exploitation of the breakthrough - the whole mobile warfare thing that was supposed to follow - had to be developed during the inter-war years. The acceptance of an operational level of warfare helped greatly in the process.
Those who did not fully embrace or understand it were stuck in short-range stuff, in tactical considerations about defeating the line in depth and the formations deployed in the line (Liddell-Hart, the French, the Italians) while those who embraced the idea that there's something "operativ" above the division tactics (~equivalent of today's large reinforced battalion battle groups) were able to address the real remaining challenge: What to do, that to achieve after a breakthrough - and how?


It's always possible to ignore the value of designations - especially if one doesn't recognize the differences like others do. The differences between leading a company and a corps are large enough to justify a separation. You can discuss against that as much as you want - that merely shows that you don't see the difference.

We could as well fragment the art of war into many more levels - small unit, multiple small units (Coy), combined arms command (mixed Bn / Bn battle group), command of multiple combined arms forces in a formation (Bde or Div), one level higher with integrated aviation support and other specialized assets (Div or Corps), theatre command, military strategy, civilian strategy.

In the end, it's much easier to just fragment it into strategic, operational, tactical and let different manuals for different unit/formation sizes suffice for the subdivisions.

"Operational Level of War" is well understood and until the early 90's "operations"/"operativ" was also well understood because the inflationary use hadn't taken effect yet. It's language, its meaning is shared and understood and it serves the purpose of communication.


A personal crusade should rather be directed against the inflationary use of words which ruins well-defined words such as "kinetic" or "operation".

[William F. Owen]

You draw Moltke the Elder, I bring Guderian, Manstein and their whole generation to the table, they spoke regularly about "operativ" in the meaning of "operational".

Moltke never once interposed the term "Operativ" as a link between Strategy and Tactics. He merely used it in the same way as Hamley, Foch and others.
Guderian and Manstein used the term in the same way. Truppenfuhrung makes not mention of the "Operational Level" and nor do any of Guderian's orders cited in his memoir. They are all issued to levels of command, and were obviously planned as such.

The operational level was especially helpful as a construct during the Interwar Years.

By whom and when?

Explicitly, what do you mean by "operational level?"

[Tukhachevskii]

As I see it we're stuck in a kind of langauge game with different people using different rules. As Wittgenstein said "the meaning of a wrod derives from its usage". Just becasue someone said "operativ" doesn't mean that they understand that word (or its referent, a different kettle of fish, I know) to mean the same as, say, "operatsiia" or "operational". Just because the Ancients used the word Strategos doesn't mean they meant strategy or strategic (even thought that's the root of our current terminology)...startegos actually refered to (the) command(er) of tactical formations not to a level of war. As Peter Winch might argue ...are people acting operationally when they themselves wouldn't know what that was i.e., does operational art exist before or after it is defined and people understand themselves to be doing it? Does the fact that Napoleon is conducting "grand tactics" (the term then in currency) but to us it looks alot like what we now call "operational art" mean he was conducting operational art or was he conducting tactics? The Wehrmacht of the Second World War (as argued by Michael Geyer) was actually applying mechanisation and technology to tactics to create an industrial form of "grand tactics" which they "euphemistically " termed "operativ". If one were to ask them what that term actually meant...what would the answer have been?

[Fuchs]

"operativ" was in everyday use describing plans and actions on army to theatre level. I don't refer to memoirs and especially not to their English translations - I refer to how the word was actually used in the 30's and 40's.

Besides; TF does use the term as well - in the original.

"31. Die Dauer operativer und taktischer Handlungern ist nicht immer im voraus zu übersehen, auch erfolgreiche Gefechte verlaufen oft langsam,"

(~The duration of operational and tactical actions cannot always be anticipated, even successful engagements often develop slowly.)

It took me five second to find this example.

[Pete]

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies published by the U.S. War Department during the late 19th and early 20th centuries uses the word operations as a synonym for "activities," as shown below:

Volume XII - in Three Parts. 1885. (Vol. 12, Chap. 24)
Chapter XXIV - Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. Mar 17-Sep 2, 1862.
Part I -- Reports, Mar 17-Jun 25
Part II -- Reports, Jun 26-Sep 2
Part II -- Supplement. 1886.
Part III -- Correspondence

Volume XIII. 1885. (Vol. 13, Chap. 25)
Chapter XXV -- Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Department of the Northwest. Apr. 10-Nov. 20, 1862.

Volume XIV. 1885. (Vol. 14, Chap. 26)
Chapter XXVI - Operations on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Middle and East Florida. Apr 12, 1862-Jun 11, 1863.

Volume XV. 1886. (Vol. 15, Chap. 27)
Chapter XXVII - Operations in West Florida, Southern Alabama, Southern Mississippi (embracing all operations against Vicksburg, May 18-Jul 27, 1862); and Louisiana, May 12, 1862-May 14, 1863; and operations in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, Sep 20,1862-May 14, 1863.

[jmm99]

HT to Pete for going back to the Civil War histories of the later 1800s, which brought to mind Halleck as a US military author of 1860 and earlier.

First this, from NYT of 1863, "REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. HALLECK.; A Review of the Military Operations of the Past Year. SYNOPSIS OF THE REPORT." (Published: December 12, 1863), which provides some examples of what he meant by operations:

Gen. HALLECK then briefly recounts the minor operations of the Army of the Potomac up to the battle of Rappahannock Station, but gives no new facts. The operations in Western Virginia have been mainly of a defensive character, in repelling raids and breaking up guerrilla bands.

The force in the Department of North Carolina during the past year has been too small for any important operations against the enemy, and has acted mostly on the defensive. But HILL's operations against FOSTER in North Carolina, as well as LONGSTREET's against PECK in Virginia, were entirely unsuccessful.

Gen. GILLMORE's operations before Charleston are recited at some length, with this comment:

"Gen. GILLMORE's operations have been characterized by great professional skill and boldness. He has overcome difficulties almost unknown in modern sieges. Indeed, his operations on Morris Island constitute almost a new era in the science of engineering and gunnery. Since the capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg he has enlarged these works, and established powerful batteries which effectually command Fort Sumter, and can render efficient aid to any naval attack upon Charleston. They also control the entrance to the harbor."

In the Department of the Gulf operations have been generally successful. The preliminary movements to the siege of Port Hudson are given at length. On the 8th of July the place unconditionally surrendered. We captured 6,233 prisoners, 51 pieces of artillery, two steamers, 4,400 pounds of cannon-powder, 5,000 small arms, 150,000 rounds of ammunition, &c. Our loss from the 3d to the 30th of May, including the assault of the 27th, as reported, was about 1,000.

Halleck was a writer (both of things military and things internationally legal). His discussion of operations just before the Civil War is found in Henry Wager Halleck, Military Art and Science, 1860, 449 pages (ca. 10mb download from Google Books), beginning at pdf p.45:

Halleck1860.jpg

but more in depth at pp.51-58 (of pdf) - looks a lot like Jomini.

That is part of Chapter 2, Strategy, so it seems to this reader that Halleck saw operations as a subset of strategy, involving planning and execution of those plans via campaigns in each theatre of operations - as opposed to the larger application of strategy in the theatre of war.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

When talking about Halleck and others, we need to be very careful that we're not projecting OUR terms and concepts onto their writings. It's quite possible that Halleck simply called movements in the field "operations" without any sort of conception of a "new area of military terminology" (in fact, given the context of the quotes by both Jmm and Pete I'd say that we're likely projecting). Halleck was heavily influenced by Jomini and Napoleon, but I don't recall either of them espousing a specific operational level of warfare. In fact, I'd argue that given the communication limitations that existed during their time such a distinction would be impractical at best.

[jmm99]

Dennis Hart Mahan, Advanced-guard, out-post, and detachment service of troops (1847, rev, 1863; 305 pages) (Google Books, 8mb download), from CHAPTER IX, PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY:

484. Plan of Campaign.—Before undertaking any military operation, great or small, we should first settle down upon some decided end to be gained; determine upon beforehand, as far as practicable, the steps to be taken to attain our object. In one word, we should clearly see what we propose to accomplish, in order that we may not go blindly to work and leave anything to chance. The mental process by which all that is here supposed is elaborated is termed the laying out of the plan of campaign.

Samo as Halleck with more detail (see pages before and after above quoted) - operations, campaigns and planning linked.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

no big deal.

BTW: I'm not contending that Halleck and Mahan were into a "new area of military terminology" - from what I can see (and from Halleck's bibliography in his Strategy chapter - and I positing that everyone who comments on Halleck and Mahan will have at least skimmed through their stategy chapters), they were lifting these concepts from earlier writers.

Regards

Mike

[Steve Blair]

no big deal.

BTW: I'm not contending that Halleck and Mahan were into a "new area of military terminology" - from what I can see (and from Halleck's bibliography in his Strategy chapter - and I positing that everyone who comments on Halleck and Mahan will have at least skimmed through their stategy chapters), they were lifting these concepts from earlier writers.

Regards

Mike

No biggie, Mike. Just pointing out that the term operations back then was used very loosely to describe just about any field activity by troops. I don't know that they had the same conceptions about the term "operational" that we do when we mention the "operational level of war." I would contend that they would use campaign in that sense...but even then it can get convoluted because campaigning was also used at the time to indicate service in the field.

Just going for some historical context is all.

[M.L.]

A couple of key points:

- Simply because someone did not use the term "operations" doesn't mean they didn't think or plan at the operational level. Scouring books for some kind of litmus test involving particular words doesn't prove much. It's more appropriate to examine the history and apply a critical analysis.

- Don't get hung up on the word "operations." The use of that word is not limited to operational warfare. Simply because something is called "Operation XYZ" doesn't mean it is operational planning.

- Perhaps the real question to ask is if there is a particular set of skills required to plan and execute at the operational level? Having worked at the tactical and strategic levels, as well as the operational level, I believe there is. Furthermore, I believe history shows both the existence of and the need for operational war fighting. The vast majority of military historians, commanders, planners, and theorists recognize its existence and importance.

To argue that there is no such thing as operational warfare is a long hill to climb in the face of this overwhelming evidence and agreement.

- As a final note, it is important to understand where the influential thinkers of the 19th century were coming from (Clausewitz, Jomini, et al.). The Napoleonic wars were so fundamentally different from previous wars, due in large part to the French Revolution, that the post-Napoleonic era thinkers were struggling to make sense of what had just happened. They had inklings of what would become operational art, particularly the Germans, but no one really caught on until after WWI. The trench warfare of the western front really exposed the need for operational thinking, particularly as it related to joint warfare.

[M.L.]

End = The Unconditional surrender of Germany
Strategy = includes the physical destruction of the means of production
Ways = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.

Ends, Strategy, Ways? ?????

Did you Google Ends, Ways, Means? I don't mean to be a jerk, but if you seriously don't understand Ends, Ways, Means, then it is going to be pretty hard for us to have a conversation.

[Fuchs]

Well, he's right that crippling the economy was no end, but an interim step:
It improved the chances of allied forces in battle which in turn was supposed to force the enemy to surrender (or wipe him out).

[Pete]

Don't get hung up on the word "operations." The use of that word is not limited to operational warfare. Simply because something is called "Operation XYZ" doesn't mean it is operational planning.

The word operations has long been part of the U.S. military vocabulary -- however, the Operational level of warfare did not become part of U.S. Army doctrine until the AirLand Battle version of FM 100-5 circa 1982. It is said to have been inserted between the Tactical and Strategic levels at the behest of Bundeswehr officers who reviewed the draft manual. About that time in the U.S. Army there had been consideration given to the idea of abolishing the Corps-level headquarters, so inferentially the Operational level might have been seen as a justification for continuing to retain the Corps. This is not the only thread we've had on the Operational level of war.

[Pete]

Click here for a previous discussion of the Operational level of war. You'll have to scroll down almost to the end to find it.

[jmm99]

John Bigelow, The principles of strategy: illustrated mainly from American campaigns (1891; 200 pages) (Google Books, 11mb download);

and Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, The operations of war: explained and illustrated (1866; 438 pages) (Google Books, 17b download); cited by Wilf in an earlier post.

I haven't downloaded either - projects for tomorrow.

Briefly back to Halleck and Mahan (similar to Jomini), their divisions of:

1. Theatre of war (singular and with an overriding strategy for the war - which can be global or more limited),

2. Theatre(s) of operations - depends on an "army" or "armies", and if "armies" whether they act in concert (thus, one theatre) or not (thus, multi-theatres), and

3. Zone(s) of operations - divisions of the "theatre of operations";

and other terms of art dealing with operations, suggest to this reader that to them (1) operations and campaigns, their planning and execution, were a subset of strategy; and (2) that (1) links the strategy for the war to grand tactics and tactics involved in individual engagements.

In essence, the picture I get is that operations and campaigns are the way to string together the individual combats into a necklace of pearls leading to the ultimate rare pearl (the end goal that culminates the strategy for the war).

Jomini (ch III vs ch IV in his Art of War) clearly distinguishes between Strategy (including operations and campaigns, planning and execution) in ch III and Grand Tactics and Battles (including Tactics) in ch IV. Halleck and Mahan followed Jomini in that regard.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Ends, Strategy, Ways? ?????

Did you Google Ends, Ways, Means? I don't mean to be a jerk, but if you seriously don't understand Ends, Ways, Means, then it is going to be pretty hard for us to have a conversation.

Fairly obviously a typo, compounded by a paste error.

Ends = A policy =The Unconditional surrender of Germany
Ways = A strategy = that includes the physical destruction of the means of production
Means = Tactics = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.

[M.L.]

Fairly obviously a typo, compounded by a paste error.

Ends = A policy =The Unconditional surrender of Germany
Ways = A strategy = that includes the physical destruction of the means of production
Means = Tactics = aerial bombing, sabotage, etc etc etc.

Ok. Really, put Ends, Ways, Means into Google and let me know what you find.
Means ≠ Tactics.

[William F. Owen]

Ok. Really, put Ends, Ways, Means into Google and let me know what you find.

Yes, and 99% is wrong. You can type "strategic Bomber" into Google and similar rubbish will spout out. A bomber cannot be "Strategic" anymore than a Corporal.
Why we have a problem is because Officers seek education in Google and Wikipedia and not by actual rigourous study of the work proven as useful.

Ends Ways and Means IS Policy, Strategy and Tactics, if you are using classical teaching. Means is tactics. Read Clausewitz. He makes it even more plain. Means is "Combat." Thus a strategy has to be executable in tactical forms, as in Combat - not in resources.
Moltke, Foch, Clausewitz and Hamely did not write about Strategy and Resources. They wrote of strategy and tactics.

[slapout9]

Ends Ways and Means IS Policy, Strategy and Tactics,

Pretty good, Policy,Strategy,Tactics is much more descriptive.


In todays world a Strategic Bomber could be a Corporal,thats part of the problem.