The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[M.L.]

I agree but so does Colin S Gray in the article by him that I posted. Both simply believe that CvC is the best we have as far as a general theory of War. As to whether they are right or not I don't know as I think CvC is only half right myself. What I do know is that Wilf is not stupid! Stubborn cetainly but he is not dumb.

Fair enough. As I said, "Wilf" has some different ideas about things, most of which don't stand up to critical analysis. I don't discount the possibility that he is a genius rather than a loon. Many visionaries were considered mad, only to be venerated later.

Who knows? In 10 years I might be talking about how the latest idea of Means=Tactics was developed long ago on SWJ by a maverick strategist, and how I was there to witness it.

[slapout9]

Let's not confuse things (assets/forces) with effects.

A bomber, in and of itself, is not an inherently strategic asset.

A bomber which drops a nuclear device, well, that tends to have a strategic impact.

The original conception of a strategic bomber was that of an aircraft which was designed to go after targets which would yield strategic effects. For example, the B-1 was designed to penetrate Soviet airspace (integrated air defense threat) and deliver a nuclear payload - a strategic mission if I ever saw one.

So, we can generally associate certain forces with certain effects at every level of war (ends, ways, and means...IF you believe in that voodoo), however, that does not preclude the use of those forces for other missions.

A primarily tactical asset can have a strategic effect. The opposite is true, though common sense says that would be a waste of resources.

My statement was not my opinion that was and is the official Air Force position on their reorganization of forces. My opinion is you can "dedicate" a certain number of forces of any type to a Strategic Mission and say that they are Strategic Bombers ,but it has nothing to do with a type of Plane. What if a SF type infiltrated into the designated Strategic target with a suitcase Nuke is he not a Strategic bomber? Especially if his sole mission was to prepare for and train for nothing but that. I believe it is the dedication of certain assets to certain missions that makes them or doesn't make them Strategic.

[slapout9]

Two things make CvC more valuable as a broad, "big idea" kind of work than as a book of quotable quotes. First, the book was never finished. Second, CvC uses a dialectical method to form his ideas. He may express one idea in one passage, then an opposing idea in the next passage. Simply quoting one passage doesn't really tell us much. We have to read the entire work and synthesize the big ideas.

Absolutley, that is why I say On War should be retitled "Thoughts on War" because he never finished editing the book(s) he appears to have conversations (Thoughts on War) with himself to sort out his final theory which we may never know.

[Ken White]

Fair enough. Like I said, his construct of ends/ways/means is fundamentally and radically different from conventional military thought and theory. He could be a prodigy who is fantastically ahead of his time. Or, he may simply misunderstand the subject. I tend toward the latter explanation, but I've been wrong before...

Haven't we all. Likely will be again.

He understands it, he just doesn't agree that it's a valid premise and he is not alone in that. There are others about. We adopted it at the request of NATO -- not just the Bundeswehr and Pete is correct, saving the Corps was an issue at the time. I was still active at the time and blithering away with TRADOC -- a fate worse than death...

...How could a general officer and a PhD both be talking about imaginary things like blitzkrieg and operational warfare?!

I dunno -- how could a general officer and a Phd do this [url=http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=939](LINK)[/url? As an aside, I've seen a number of really dumb things said and done by many General Officers and PhDs. Neither of those august credentials confers infallibility, not by a long shot -- and taking either as hewers of stone as in the gospel tablets is seriously dangerous.

I'd say Abu Ghraib was a huge setback strategically from an information operations standpoint. It completely undermined the US narrative of "liberating" the Iraqi people, as well as further undermining the already underwhelming international support.

We can disagree on all that. IO has its place but is woefully misused and misunderstood -- sort of like the operational art -- it was an IO ding without question but little more.

The bulk of the Iraqi people never believed we were there to liberate them. Many still do not -- and many more only now are really wondering what the heck we were doing. We were never going to have much international support in that. Abu Gharaib merely gave people an excuse to voice as cover for what they were going to do -- or really, not do -- anyway.

It was certainly a rallying cry for insurgent recruitment, both inside Iraq and out.

Mmm. Perhaps. In any event, the net impact of that added recruitment had little overall impact and likely did not prolong things as much as did general US Army ineptitude in the prosecution of the entire effort. In fairness to that Army and the people who went, they were asked to do something that previous leadership had not trained them for and they did a good job of turning it around. Abu Gharaib will likley not rise much above footnote status in the Official History.

Would the insurgency have been fundamentally changed had Abu Ghraib not happened? Impossible to say, but I believe that it certainly hurt the US strategically, though perhaps not (as you say) in a lasting way.

I suppose it depends on one's definition of strategic harm. IMO, harm has to be lasting and affect the course of a campaign if not of a war to be 'strategic'-- otherwise, they are generally operational impacts that may or may not cause some strategic rethinks. Abu Gharaib did not rise to the level of inducing such a rethink. No strategic modification was undertaken -- or needed.

I think the larger point is that the levels of warfare are very dynamic. Certain acts by units or even individuals at the tactical level can and do have strategic effects.

I agree with that -- but also suggest that such impacts are extremely rare and almost never rise to the level of strategic impact unless by accident or other mischance. I'll try to think of an example, there must be one but I'm drawing a blank right now...

[slapout9]

Means=Tactics was developed long ago on SWJ by a maverick strategist, and how I was there to witness it.

Means=weapons and troops to me.

[William F. Owen]

Strategic Bomber = Enola Gay

One long range bomber that performed an entirely tactical action

Strategic Corporal = Lynndie England

A woman who did something criminal, and tactical to the extent that it has policy implications (actually it probably didn't.)

Tactics bear on the policy, and may modify it, as they set forth the strategy. None of that makes bombers or corporals strategic.

Strategy and operations were not as distinct in the Napoleonic era as they are today. Therefore, much of what we think of as operational war fighting was indeed "strategy" during that time.

I think that impression may be the source of your confusion.

Given this information, you'll note that your rather restrictive list of sources (Moltke, Foch, Clausewitz and Hamely) all hail from periods of history when operational warfare was in its infancy.

Yes, a short list. Not many people know their stuff, and the late 18th century creates the corps military ideas for most of the 20th. Indeed most of it is still relevant today

Unsurprisingly, you won't learn much about operational warfare this way.

Sorry, but I am pretty well read in Triandiffilov, Tuckachevsky, and Svechcin, the most of the "fathers" of deep battle, operational art and all the other Soviet Era work that has been greatly over blown, as a result of being not well understood. If you want to start a thread on Triandifillov, and the 1929 FSR, then be my guest.

I've read Clausewitz. While Clausewitz is useful, your interpretation is far too literal. Focusing on the exact wording of a book, written nearly 200 years ago in a different language, is inadvisable at best.

So Google is right and Clausewitz is wrong.....

[William F. Owen]

Means=weapons and troops to me.

Almost. It's the USE of weapons and troops. Combat, thus fighting, thus tactics.

[William F. Owen]

A bomber which drops a nuclear device, well, that tends to have a strategic impact.

Not true. It depend what it drops the bomb on and why. The delivery will always be tactical, and it is by no means certain that the result with the deliver the policy, thus be "strategic."

CvC is quoted often, and misinterpreted more often. This is a case of both.

OK, explain how. Tell me why Clausewitz is wrong about means. I argue Clausewitz, with some pretty big dogs in the Clausewitz world, so I'm very much up for examining this is in some detail, if as you say, "I don't get Clausewitz."

[William F. Owen]

Uh-oh. The Kelly/Brennan SSI monograph uses the word Blitzkrieg, which is an imaginary doctrine, on page 91. How could a general officer and a PhD both be talking about imaginary things like blitzkrieg and operational warfare?!

I trust Mr. Owen will set them straight!

I know Justin. We talk... quite a lot! I strongly agree with some of what he writes and not so much with other stuff.
As he isn't here, I'll leave it at that.

[Fuchs]

There are strategic bombers because that's what they're called. They are not necessarily "stategic", but they are "strategic bombers" necause that#s what they're called.

A chair is a chair because it's being called a chair.

[Tukhachevskii]

Almost. It's the USE of weapons and troops. Combat, thus fighting, thus tactics.

Now I'm confused. I was always taught that...

Ends = Policy

Means = Resources avaliable to acheive ends

Ways = Strategy or how resources can be applied/and shape the ways to acheive the ends (Strategy encompasses operations and tactics given that strategy determines them all).

[William F. Owen]

Now I'm confused. I was always taught that...

Ends = Policy

Means = Resources avaliable to acheive ends

Ways = Strategy or how resources can be applied/and shape the ways to acheive the ends (Strategy encompasses operations and tactics given that strategy determines them all).

Glad I had this opportunity to correct you. Means are instrumental. Mere possession has no effect. It is employment. The US had far more resources than North Vietnam, yet they lost. Same in Mogadishu.

[William F. Owen]

There are strategic bombers because that's what they're called. They are not necessarily "stategic", but they are "strategic bombers" necause that#s what they're called.

A chair is a chair because it's being called a chair.

That's not really the point. "Strategic bombers" are usually just "Long Range Bombers." Given that, which do think is the more accurate, thus more helpful name?

[Fuchs]

We're not discussing how to christen the category of hardware, but what's its designation. They're being called "strategic bombers" and this makes them "strategic bombers". Things are what we call them.


Sure, long-range bomber would be more descriptive for most examples, but then again long range wasn't relevant for many examples. The Russians traded fuel for bombs and flew mostly short-range missions with their Pe-8, for example.

"Heavy bomber" suits most best, for their relatively large size is the most outstanding shared characteristic. It might still mislead because the payloads of many such bombers were often rather light, though.

[Bob's World]

They are called strategic bombers because they were intended to be employed to product strategic effects. The same is true for SOF.

All actions are tactical in nature; from pushing the big red button in a missile silo somewhere, to pulling the trigger on one's rifle as one eases the sights slightly in front of that running enemy. It is the nature of the intended effects that determines if something is "tactical" or "strategic."

If one is employing a "strategic bomber" or submarine, or whatever for tactical purposes, then it is a tactical platform at that point. Nothing is inherently one or the other, it depends on the mission.

[M.L.]

Now I'm confused. I was always taught that...

Ends = Policy

Means = Resources avaliable to acheive ends

Ways = Strategy or how resources can be applied/and shape the ways to acheive the ends (Strategy encompasses operations and tactics given that strategy determines them all).

You're on the right track. Mr. Owen will disagree with you, but even he will admit that 99% of the broader military community embraces this meaning of ends, ways, and means.

[M.L.]

My statement was not my opinion that was and is the official Air Force position on their reorganization of forces. My opinion is you can "dedicate" a certain number of forces of any type to a Strategic Mission and say that they are Strategic Bombers ,but it has nothing to do with a type of Plane. What if a SF type infiltrated into the designated Strategic target with a suitcase Nuke is he not a Strategic bomber? Especially if his sole mission was to prepare for and train for nothing but that. I believe it is the dedication of certain assets to certain missions that makes them or doesn't make them Strategic.

I agree with you for the most part. A B-1 was designed for strategic effects, but has and is doing tactical missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

One item of food for thought might be a low-density asset, such as the B-2. With only 20 in the inventory, destruction of one or more might give an potential enemy a decisive strategic advantage. So, that is an example of an asset that by its fundamental nature is strategic.

[M.L.]

They are called strategic bombers because they were intended to be employed to product strategic effects. The same is true for SOF.

All actions are tactical in nature; from pushing the big red button in a missile silo somewhere, to pulling the trigger on one's rifle as one eases the sights slightly in front of that running enemy. It is the nature of the intended effects that determines if something is "tactical" or "strategic."

If one is employing a "strategic bomber" or submarine, or whatever for tactical purposes, then it is a tactical platform at that point. Nothing is inherently one or the other, it depends on the mission.

Well said. I'd just tack on the above about low-density, strategically important assets.

[Entropy]

The distinction between "tactical" and "strategic" regarding specific airframes isn't relevant anymore, if it ever was to begin with.

[slapout9]

The distinction between "tactical" and "strategic" regarding specific airframes isn't relevant anymore, if it ever was to begin with.

Yes,that is doctrinally correct. The Strategic and Tactical Air Commands no longer exist! They were combined into the Air Combat Command and they can do both types of Missions depending on the situation.