The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

I'm sure Mr. Owen will still tell you blitzkrieg is imaginary.

Not imaginary. It's use just just delineates the informed student from the uninformed, once they are aware of the argument.

I've used the word "Blitzkrieg." Having spent nearly two years reading most of the inter-war FSRs, and the German scholarship on the matter, I no longer do. If I did, I would look like an idiot to those informed on the subject.

I used to say (and sadly believe in ) "Manoeuvre Warfare," and use terms like "Recon Pull." Having studied the subject, and done the work, I no longer do. If I did, I would appear foolish. Thus when I now read a work that talks about "manoeuvre warfare," as a distinct and contrasting form of operations, it tells me the man doing the writing has not examined his subject rigourously.

[Tukhachevskii]

Glad I had this opportunity to correct you. Means are instrumental. Mere possession has no effect. It is employment. The US had far more resources than North Vietnam, yet they lost. Same in Mogadishu.

Sir, sorry for being a dunce but I really don't get what you're getting at with the above.

Firstly,

Means are instrumental. Mere possession has no effect

I agree wholeheartedly. This is a question of means/resources.

But,

It is employment[WAYs]. The US had far more resources [MEANS] that North Vietnam, yet they lost.

I know they did and that was a problem with both the ENDS (policy) that that sought and the WAYs (Strategy) they employed to achieve those ends...obviously if both the Ends and the Ways are in dissonance then the the MEANS (one's resources) will be merely wasted. One's MEANS merely determine whats feasable not how they can be used (i.e., Juene Ecole VS Battleships, Pre vs Post Anaconda in OEF, etc.) Sorry if I'm barking up the wrong tree

[Fuchs]

I think existing Clausewitz scholarship using the Paret translation leaves no real ambiguity as to what Clausewitz meant. This is why I strongly recommend that folks read Gray or HR Smith before they dive into Clausewitz.

As an aside, the Oxford Concise first definition of "Means" is "that by which a result is brought about."

Clausewitz didn't write "means". He wrote "Mittel".
There are multiple meanings for "Mittel"; average, tools, method

I recommend to read Clausewitz - not a translation, for I haven't seen a good one so far.

[M.L.]

Mulberry harbors did not exist in January 1943 when the Allies agreed to invade western Europe, yet, by June 1944, they were available.

Contrary to your statement, a good strategy may call for 'resources' that need to be finessed, developed or obtained. Constraints imposed by 'available resources' doomed US strategy in both Korea and Viet Nam -- and the jury's still out on the latest two.

As the Actress said to the Bishop, "it's not what you have, it's how you make up your shortfalls."

I think you may have mistaken my statement to mean "available assets" vs available resources.

One crucial piece of strategy is force development - deciding the types and numbers of assets based on the capabilities you think you will want in the future.

Still, the development of new technologies is limited by the money, R&D people, etc... to develop them.

In the case of Mulberry harbors, someone at some point decided they needed that resource (means) based on a desired method (ways) of achieving a tactical, operational, or strategic goal (ends).

[M.L.]

Gents, this is getting somewhat pedantic. Let me clarify.

a.) Is Strategy the link between Policy and Tactics? YES/NO
b.) Is that commonly/usefully expressed as "Ends Ways and Means." YES/NO

Colin S. Gray (and many others) calls Policy, Strategy and Tactics, "The Strategy Triad."

Essentially the counter argument (ML) says, as Means is Logistics/Resources, Ends Ways and Means is not an expression of the triad. It's something different. Strategy is Policy, Strategy, and Logistics.

I didn't make this up. I was taught it. It is the main stream view amongst those who know what strategy actually is. It's in the books. IF you think something different, then write an article on any length you requires, arguing that statement A is not connected to Statement B, and I'll get it published in Infinity Journal, and we can see who wants to rebut the argument, in addition to myself!

Seems it has already happened:

"Professor Eliot Cohen has provided a thoughtful outline for strategy. He starts with the requirement to make assumptions about the environment and the problem. Once the strategist has stated his assumptions, then he can consider the ends (goals), ways (the how) and means (resources) triangle." (Emphasis added)

- COL (Ret.) TX Hammes, USMC, "Assumptions – A Fatal Oversight"
Article 1, Issue 1 of Infinity Journal
http://www.infinityjournal.com/artic...atal_Oversight

[Dayuhan]

I would submit that since the fall of Soviet Union the US has been feeling a whole lot less "contained," with our global behavior becoming increasingly outrageous over the past 20 years.

I'd submit the opposite: without the overriding, if often irrational, justification of the commie menace our behaviour has become a great deal less outrageous and a great deal more restrained than it was in the Cold War. Are we still staging coups and propping up tinpot dictators around the world, as we did in the 70s and 80s? Not to nearly the same extent as we once did. Our meddling and intervention in Latin America and East Asia has dropped off to practically nil, with all manner of positive results for those regions. Even in Africa... we're still around, modestly, but we're not holding the skirts of the Mobutus and Selassies and Does of the place, as we once did. What have we now to match the outrageousness of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, of US support for Marcos and Somoza, Duvalier and Noriega, and so many others in so many places? The founding fathers might lie uneasily in their graves these days, but they'd have been spinning like dervishes in the early 80s.

We've had our moments, we always do, but the only one I could really call "outrageous", and certainly outrageously unnecessary, was Iraq. Gulf I was a fairly modest response to a direct externally initiated threat to critical US interests. Afghanistan... well, we went beyond the realm of reason when we decided to try and govern the place, but there was certainly ample justification for going there: it's not like we'd shown any interest before 9/11.

Empirically, in terms of quantity, duration, and intensity of direct and indirect intervention, how would you support the idea that we've become more outrageous since the end of the Cold War?

OEF-P from its very beginning was contained by strict rules that protected the sovereignty of that country. Most of the good of that campaign comes as a result of actions shaped to fit within those tight parameters. OIF and OEF-A began without such constraints, allowing us to act in ways that have done us as much harm as good.

Apples and oranges, really. Regime change is completely unlike support of an allied government threatened (however questionably) by insurgents (however loosely defined, and you have to get very loose indeed to call the Abu Sayyaf "insurgents"). Regime change is of course fundamentally incompatible with respect for the other country's sovereignty.

[Tukhachevskii]

Sirs, as I see it (and admittedly my eyesight may be poorer than most) what we have is a twofold problem. Firstly, that of designation and secondly of advocacy.

First, many of us have different understandings of the meaning of key words and their referents. Lacking a common terminology (with agreed definitions) we are deploying flaccid designators. Not until we can get them rigid can we begin to argue on a level playing field. Perhaps we need some linguistic Viagra!
Secondly, many of us are actually advocating a specific interpretation or view rather than clarifying what our terms mean. I for one don’t believe that there is a universal standard, an unchanging universal Platonic form, to which we can hold up our interpretations as either true or false. Unlike Kripke, then, I don’t believe that our descriptions are adequate to an existing state of affairs (i.e., the correspondence theory of truth ) given that war and warfare are human endeavours (thus socially constructed) and not natural kinds (like rocks or atoms with definable properties). Which merely means that we and up arguing for or against our views (a la Kuhn and Feyerabend). It’s not really a question of what we’re talking about but how we do so and it’s not a question of how things are but how they should be. Many of us are deploying terms in their conventional usage (i.e., as commonly understood (problematic in itself I know, this is not to say the conventional view is “right” of course). Some of us are innovating ideologists using a strategy of paradiastolic redescription (using words in newer/different senses). Some are advocating a view point in the guise of clarifying existing terms. Truth, as Nietzsche said, is a “sum of human relations”. So until we can all agree to what words like “Strategy”, “Operations” and “Tactics” mean we’ll talk past each other only to advocate (not prove) our own viewpoints as valid. That, unfortunately will no doubt result in an infinite regress.


Personally, the manner in which I was taught how to comprehend the relationship between ends, means and ways is similar to that explained by Dr. J. D. Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade who’s comments, though used as a campaign planning heuristic, are nonetheless still applicable generally (IMO). However, this does not mean I agree with (or advocate!) many of his other explanations (for instance, re: COG).

Even though we speak of ends, ways, and means, realistically we actually think of the process in terms of ends, means, and ways. The ends (or end state) drive the purpose of the campaign. The means determine how that can be accomplished and have to be considered before you can realistically determine the ways. Put another way, to be able to accomplish certain ways of approaching the campaign requires you to have resources; the resources, or means, determine just how ambitious or constrained you will be in determining the ways to accomplish the mission. [...]

Before a friendly analysis of ends, ways, and means, the enemy must be thoroughly examined in the same manner. The key to determining the means available to the enemy is found in the intelligence estimate in a paragraph called the “enumeration of enemy capabilities.” This list should be a comprehensive list of all of the resources and capabilities available to the enemy. Do not let your intelligence staff officers cheat on this step; it is critical that you assess all the means that are available to the enemy. In a stability operation or insurgency, this is even more important. Not only does the enemy have military forces, but he also will likely use paramilitary forces and insurgents, engage in information operations, and leverage the instability of refugee camps. Today no one wants to take on the United States in a conventional “fair fight” on the battlefield, so our enemies are looking for means to attack us and still get the ends they want. Their means are only limited by their imagination. Many of our enemies will use means that we have not thought of before and would not use even if we had thought of them. Think of those means when considering the means available to the enemy because you may see them in the campaign. Use creative thinking to analyze what the enemy has available to him.

For friendly means, one key document as a starting point is the task organization that indicates allocated and apportioned forces. It is important to have a good feel for all the assets that are available to the campaign planner and when they will be available (force flow). Other critical means that can be brought to bear in the campaign are assets that do not belong to the commander but are conducting activities in theatre that help accomplish objectives. It is critical to be aware of all the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and other governmental agencies (OGAs) in theatre—as well as the media and commercial contractors—and to understand what they can and cannot do. If there is a potential refugee problem in theatre, you can be sure that you would prefer to have the NGOs and others help you keep that under control, even if you have to lend a hand once in a while.

During the initial phases of OIF, a lot of non‐infantry units found out that they could be used for patrols; a lot of non‐MP units found out that they could be used for law enforcement. Do not let “rice bowl” issues keep you from being creative in how to use the assets that are made available in theatre. Units can be given nonstandard missions, and planners must be creative in how they apply assets to each problem. Another important consideration when determining the means available is to think beyond the initial stages of the campaign. For example, engineer assets are critical in both offensive and defensive operations in support of manoeuvre units, but they may have a different focus and “customer” for stability operations. Rotary and fixed‐wing lift will be important for offensive and defensive operations and perhaps even more important for stability operations. You cannot have enough MPs in a stability operation; be prepared to give that mission to other units when the time comes.

Once you have determined the end or end state and you have a comprehensive understanding of the resources and means that are available to you, you can determine the ways—the methods you will use to develop your COA. [see attached JPEG] (pp.20-22)

And this from British Army Field Manual Vol. 1, Part 10 Counter-Insurgency, which, again, though referring to COIN can be generalised with regards to its implications,

. Ends, Ways and Means. A commander will wish to determine how he can achieve his mission (the ways), what situation needs to be created (the Ends) and what resources are needed to do so (the Means). As in any military situation, commanders planning a counterinsurgency will often find that they are constrained as the paucity of Means required to achieve the Ends impinge of their freedom of action. Commanders should achieve a balance between the Ends, Ways and Means and compromises have to be made (often in time) as illustrated in Figure 7-3 [see attached JPEG]. When tackling Ends, Ways and Means the following should be considered:

• Ends. In order to achieve the Ends it is most likely that the military will be required to provide a secure environment in which other host nation’s government and other civilian organisations can work.

• Ways. The Ways will be the full range of those activities that support the development of the lines of operation required to achieve the Ends. Even though security should be the line of operation that the military focus upon, there will be circumstances where the situation is too dangerous for civilian organisations to operate and the military will have to fill the void through MACE. If the military forces are to lead across the other lines of operation, the prioritisation and planning should involve the host nation’s government and other civilian organisations where possible.

• Means. A commander should not limit his ambition to acquiring the Means required to achieve the Ends. It is likely that he will have to reorganise existing structures, obtain new equipment through Urgent Operational Requirements and use his initiative to fill those gaps that exist. More than any other type of campaign, counterinsurgency lends itself to creative methods of producing the Means. The role of host nation security forces cannot be underestimated. (p. 7-6)

[M.L.]

Clausewitz didn't write "means". He wrote "Mittel".
There are multiple meanings for "Mittel"; average, tools, method

I recommend to read Clausewitz - not a translation, for I haven't seen a good one so far.

This is a very valuable insight. The context of the Paret translation (sorry, I'm inhibited by my poor command of German) always suggested to me that Clausewitz uses the term to mean both resources (tools) and methods.

Thanks for confirming my suspicions.

[M.L.]

Essentially the counter argument (ML) says, as Means is Logistics/Resources,

By the way, I clearly stated in a previous post that Logistics and Resources were NOT the same thing. I'm all for civil debate, but if you'd like to quote me, I'd prefer you actually read my posts, then get it right.

Thanks.

Means=Resources (Logistics is not the same thing)

[slapout9]

What we are talking about is why I believe Strategy should be changed from Ends,Ways,Means to the Police view of Motive, Method, and Opportunity. People cause crimes and they cause wars whenever you get away from the primary Motivation of the war you are on the road to loosing. CvC wrote alot about motivation of the enemy and it is the true COG IMO. And any Strategy has to start with that IMO.

[Fuchs]

I'd submit the opposite: without the overriding, if often irrational, justification of the commie menace our behaviour has become a great deal less outrageous and a great deal more restrained than it was in the Cold War. Are we still staging coups and propping up tinpot dictators around the world, as we did in the 70s and 80s? Not to nearly the same extent as we once did.

Did you miss OIF, subsidies to Musharraf's Pakistan and the support to Ethiopia for invading Somalia???

[Bob's World]

Did you miss OIF, subsidies to Musharraf's Pakistan and the support to Ethiopia for invading Somalia???

Fuchs, to find a better list of our "tinpot dictators" Google foreign fighters and the states that they come from to find the ones with Muslim connections.

For those of other persuasions one would need different search criteria. Correlating targets of US foreign aid and the Freedom House rankings of nations in regards to freedom is a good start. Obviously our Muslim friends show up here as well.

Friendly dictators used to be a great tool, but in the current and emerging globalized environment it really carries more baggage than goodness. Unfortunately, we are still deeply entwined in that business as we have yet to recalibrate to what effective post-cold war policy should look like.

[Ken White]

I think you may have mistaken my statement to mean "available assets" vs available resources.

Resources IMO are used to provide assets. If a specific asset or item is required, you must have the resources or wherewithal to procure or produce the desired item.

One crucial piece of strategy is force development - deciding the types and numbers of assets based on the capabilities you think you will want in the future.

No question, thus my comment on the Mulberries. They were not envisioned prior to late 1942, were available in mid 1944 so had the strategy been constrained by available technology in 1943, Normandy might not have occurred. In the event, resources -- to include production capability -- were available to procure what was determined necessary and the rest is history.

What will be required in the future is always going to be problematic, thus my comment that maximum flexibility is necessary. The strategist must constantly refine and innovate. Unfortunately, that seems to be the case for the US only when we are forced into an existential war.

Still, the development of new technologies is limited by the money, R&D people, etc... to develop them.

This is the crux of our disagreement. While those factors certainly impact, such development is actually far more dependent on the ideas of the strategists.

In the case of Mulberry harbors, someone at some point decided they needed that resource (means) based on a desired method (ways) of achieving a tactical, operational, or strategic goal (ends).

They decided on A way and proceeded to implement it. They could well have come up with other less resource intensive ways had they desired or been forced to do so...

The basic point is a strategy should not fetter small minds -- nor fall prey to them.

[Backwards Observer]

Paret translation, book one, chapter two, page 95.

So much then for the ends to be pursued in war; let us now turn to the means.

There is only one: combat. However many forms combat takes, how ever far it may be removed from the brute discharge of hatred and enmity of a physical encounter, however many forces may intrude which themselves are not part of fighting, it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat.

The emphasis here is on means as an action. To understand means as including or even subsisting solely of resources suggests a strategy that may be skewed from the performance of the engagement to the accumulation and management of materiel. The effectiveness of such a strategy may or may not be suitable, but it does seem to be a reinterpretation of the Prussian's intent. The disagreement here has a vaguely theological tone. Just a layman's impression.

[M.L.]

Resources IMO are used to provide assets. If a specific asset or item is required, you must have the resources or wherewithal to procure or produce the desired item.No question, thus my comment on the Mulberries. They were not envisioned prior to late 1942, were available in mid 1944 so had the strategy been constrained by available technology in 1943, Normandy might not have occurred. In the event, resources -- to include production capability -- were available to procure what was determined necessary and the rest is history.

What will be required in the future is always going to be problematic, thus my comment that maximum flexibility is necessary. The strategist must constantly refine and innovate. Unfortunately, that seems to be the case for the US only when we are forced into an existential war. This is the crux of our disagreement. While those factors certainly impact, such development is actually far more dependent on the ideas of the strategists.They decided on A way and proceeded to implement it. They could well have come up with other less resource intensive ways had they desired or been forced to do so...

The basic point is a strategy should not fetter small minds -- nor fall prey to them.

Actually, I don't really disagree with you other than to say that resources are always limited in some form or fashion, therefore, a balancing act must take place.

I do not suggest that we ought to inhibit strategy based on currently available assets. Nor do I suggest that expanding resources and innovation (creating new means) should not be part of a strategy.

What I am suggesting is that ends are not the end-all be-all of strategy. They must be balanced by ways and means.

One of the most often overlooked resources (means) is time. Time is always constrained. Thus, the strategist (even given "infinite" funds), must decide on the allocation of those funds in time. A good example of this is the decision of the Japanese government during WWII to cease work on a nuclear weapon, which was based on an assessment of the time it would take to bring the project to fruition measured against their perception of the time to accomplish strategic objectives. Obviously, the Allies came to a different conclusion.

Another example (at the operational level) is sea port and airhead capacity. Though we may have enough forces to accomplish a certain objective, we must balance that with the limited means of inflowing those forces to the theater of operation (in a force projection scenario). Thus, we must examine the intended strategic end state in time, then determine the best way ahead given limited means.

Every situation is different. Which means are constrained and how much are different. Never the less, strategy must always balance ends with the means that are reasonably available and/or attainable.

[M.L.]

The emphasis here is on means as an action. To understand means as including or even subsisting solely of resources suggests a strategy that may be skewed from the performance of the engagement to the accumulation and management of materiel. The effectiveness of such a strategy may or may not be suitable, but it does seem to be a reinterpretation of the Prussian's intent. The disagreement here has a vaguely theological tone. Just a layman's impression.

I would simply say that Clausewitz used the term "means" to indicate both resources and methods. The modern "Ends, Ways, Means" construct delineates those two into means (resources) and ways (methods).

The contemporary construct is consistent with Clausewitz's idea, just not his terminology. To my mind, it adds more clarity.

As far as "a strategy that may be skewed from the performance of the engagement to the accumulation and management of materiel.", I'm advocating nothing of the kind. You'll often see the word "balance" in my posts, which I believe is the essential skill for the strategist.

[Backwards Observer]

You'll often see the word "balance" in my posts, which I believe is the essential skill for the strategist.

Agreed.

In a war of ideas, how would you categorise "the idea"?

[Bob's World]

Agreed.

In a war of ideas, how would you categorise "the idea"?

"war of ideas" is a misnomer.

Was the "idea" of Nazisim the problem in WWII?
Was the "idea" of Communism the problem in the Cold War?
Is the "idea" of Islamism the problem today?

When Ends between two parties come into conflict and both have the will, ways and means to promote/protect their ends from that competitor one is likely to end up in violent competition.

The "idea" is typically a tool employed to build "will" among the populace. Critical, but not the bad guy we make it out to be.

Even today Islamism as an idea is not the threat. Dig deeper, get past the rhetoric, look to what political issues are really at stake. Sometimes one doesn't like what the find when they do that, as it causes them to question their "rightness" in the matter.

Smedley Butler had such a moment after his long career of distinguished service. Others as well. Its a dirty business, this competition between nations, and one doesn't scramble to top without getting a little muddy.

[Backwards Observer]

"war of ideas" is a misnomer.

Was the "idea" of Nazisim the problem in WWII?
Was the "idea" of Communism the problem in the Cold War?
Is the "idea" of Islamism the problem today?

When Ends between two parties come into conflict and both have the will, ways and means to promote/protect their ends from that competitor one is likely to end up in violent competition.

The "idea" is typically a tool employed to build "will" among the populace. Critical, but not the bad guy we make it out to be.

Even today Islamism as an idea is not the threat. Dig deeper, get past the rhetoric, look to what political issues are really at stake. Sometimes one doesn't like what the find when they do that, as it causes them to question their "rightness" in the matter.

Smedley Butler had such a moment after his long career of distinguished service. Others as well. Its a dirty business, this competition between nations, and one doesn't scramble to top without getting a little muddy.

Makes sense. I thought about writing "war of ideas", but I didn't want it to be taken the wrong way. Well, I'm glad I asked first, because if you'd asked me that I would've had to go take a nap. Prosit!

[slapout9]

CvC on proper Strategic Analysis: highlights are my own. Ends,Ways and Means are only half a Strategy, it completely overlooks the Human element of the motive for War. It is the Human element that always beats America...you would think we would have learned that by now.

"If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance,which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors,viz. The total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter-though not exclusively-of figures,and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gaged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it."