The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

Actually I don't see this as picking on CvC. I see it as someone pointing out that most US military thought is very poor and bumper sticker forcing mechanisms do not work.

I could quibble with detail, like using the word "Blitzkrieg," but just because stupid people mis-quote Clausewitz and do not understand him, does not make CvC not incredibly useful - and no one has ever done better!

CvC is only the best because he is the only comprehensive theorist on war that withstands rigour. If someone wants to argue that, I'm very "up for it!"

[J Wolfsberger]

Wilf, Sully,

If you have time to waste, the NYT article leads here: http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175208/

The reason it will be a waste of time is that it is the most thoroughly muddled "thinking" on the subject of war I've ever read. I agree, he can't possibly be picking on CvC, since he either never read him, or didn't comprehend what he read.

[William F. Owen]

The reason it will be a waste of time is that it is the most thoroughly muddled "thinking" on the subject of war I've ever read.

....and as if for confirmation...

For many of us, these are the key pieces of analysis that made sense of our post-9/11 world.
- Naomi Klein

Why? What didn't make sense in the world before and what is you do not get now??

[MikeF]

What translation of Clausewitz would y'all recommend?

I'm putting some of my beer money away towards buying more books.

v/r

Mike

[Michael C]

Last time I posted a thread on this forum, the response was fantastic. Though I asked a simple, yet innocuous question (who believes war is war) the responses were awesome and got into the issues of defining war, war's nature and the character of war/insurgency/civil wars etc.

Since I am continuing the series on my blog, I want to ask a corollary question. I have found time and again that the far and away master of military theory is Carl von Clausewitz. Many commentors on this forum love Clausewitz, I know that. My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Here are my two last posts on the "war is war" topic. The first is "War is War is Clausewitz" and the second is "Killing, Fighting, Death, Destruction War is War"

I also want to thank everyone who commented on the last post I put up. I am working on a personal definition of war, and many of the comments had new and original ideas I hadn't heard.

[Bob's World]

Michael, Michael, Michael...chumming the waters of the Small Wars Journal with your bloody questions!

Ok, as the first shark on the scene, let me just say "YES."

Clausewitz offers much for those who seek to understand warfare; where we get into trouble is when we determine that becuase we are good at Clauswitzian warfare to make every problem warfare and and wage it as such.

The proplem is not CvC, it is our over-application of his teachings to things that (while oft violent) have little to do with warfare at all. Consider this excerpt from a post a made a few minutes ago regarding COIN and Afghanistan.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...-here/#c014650

1. Why are soldiers rather than politicians having these conversations? Insurgency is politics, but it is the type of politics born of the failures of the current crop of politicians, so they pass the problem to the military to solve on their behalf, and the military then (not surprisingly) makes the problem one of war and warfare. Politicians leave warfare to soldiers. (Mission passed, mission solved…)

2. Why politicians remain on their hands: It’s a war now, with a General in charge. Once the General “wins” or “loses” either one, the politicians and diplomats will then be able to get back to doing what they do. This is a natural mindset, but it is equally a crippling one. COIN is a civil emergency for the host nation government; for the intervening government it is best seen little different than our approaches to an Indonesian tsunami or Bangladeshi flood. The military is a wonderful reserve of excess capability and capacity to help a civil government turn the corner on an overwhelming emergency. Last in, first out. Not our emergency and certainly not our “war.”


Best of luck with your blog!

Bob

[slapout9]

CvC was half right in his definition of War. I use the SBW definition. It is the use of Force or Fraud to achieve the objective. Fraud can be thought of as Subversion or Psychological Warfare combined with or substituted for Physical Warfare.

[J Wolfsberger]

My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

Not enough in the sense that the principles he was developing (remember that Vom Kriege was an incomplete first draft published after his death) haven't really changed.

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

[Firn]

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

His most important point in this regard might indeed be that as war is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with the inter-mixtion of other means one should also take a good hard look at that pesky Politik. Fighting a war does not mean politik stops and other means disappear. In this case a good reading of him should open minds and ways and not close them down. It is quite ironic that the man which blasted others for trying to ignore the political context of military problems should be a problem in this regard.

Given that the inner tendency of war tends to spiral out of control, as he observed, to heavy military means might not be in the interest of a country which wants to limit violence to be able to withdraw while reaching most of it's political objectives. As usual doing the right thing in this difficult context was the hard part. In Anbar it seemed to work.

Firn

[M.L.]

Michael C-

I posted this on your blog, but here are my thoughts:

Two points. You said on your blog:

"The most common definition of war--Clausewitz’ definition--is that war is the continuation of politics by other means. War has two parts: the political and the violent. His definition doesn’t specify which should be primary--the politics or the violence--but from what I understand, he views politics, or grand strategy, as the most important factor in war."

First, Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will" He also said that warfare has three elements, not two. Those elements are policy (or the nation), violence (or the military) and the people. He said these three elements were a "paradoxical trinity" and that a theory which ignores any of the three isn't much of a theory. Clausewitz said any one of them might be the most important at any given time, but that they all play a part.

Second point. Clausewitz first defined war (as stated above) within the context of "total war." In other words, what is the true, unconstrained nature of war? It is violence and death to the last man. However, he later defines war as a "a continuation of policy" as an acknowledgment that war always serves a political objective, and is therefore constrained. Clausewitz stated that defining the political objective was the first and most important question to be answered before starting a war, however, that doesn't mean that politics is the most important part of the "paradoxical trinity."

So, back to the central question, what is the nature of war? Its pure nature is violence and death to the last man. However, we constrain war to serve political objectives. Discussions of armed social science, ROE, et. al, are questions of how far we constrain war to meet political ends.

[Michael C]

I have gone away from using/reading forums, but one of the best parts of discussion boards like this is using them as a sounding board for one's ideas. So thanks again everyone for the comments.

@Bob-I'll agree that Clausewitz himself isn't the problem. Like all philosophies or dogmas that are overused, the founder is often not the problem so much as the disciples who put too much faith into one solution. And I agree that our political system way too often passes the buck to the military, then lets them fail in situations that are politically impossible, or at least really, really difficult.

@Slapout- I plan to use that definition of warfare in a future post on defining war(fare). I hadn't heard it before the last post, and I think it raises interesting problems and arguments.

@J Wolfsberger- I mentioned that On War was unfinished at CvC's death, and I think that fact is undermentioned when it comes to CvC.

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

[H. Nelson]

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts.

Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

If Clausewitz ever added real value to warefare, it was to frame it as a science. Other than that, he just advanced a murderous and tedious type of fighting that had large consequences in WWI.

Cheers,

H.

http://onparadox.blogspot.com/

[William F. Owen]

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts.

Basically you've clearly never read Clausewitz. Yes it's complicated. Study of War and Warfare requires effort and guidance from those who have.

Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

Sun Tzu is not superior. Let me guess, you've read the Griffiths translation, and you thing Sun-Tzu wrote the "Art of War?"
Boyd? Give me break! A man who didn't know a lot about military history, left almost no writings, and a faith based following based on poor understanding of warfare and War. For a very grass roots intro, try this. Plus, search for Boyd in the forums.

If Clausewitz ever added real value to warefare, it was to frame it as a science. Other than that, he just advanced a murderous and tedious type of fighting that had large consequences in WWI.

Rubbish. That is completely wrong, and utterly without evidence. You need to have some understanding of a subject before you start pontificating.

[Taiko]

This reminds me of an anecdote from On War:

A colleague wrote to CvC wanting advice on the final exam he was drafting for junior officers. The questions set for the exam included a number of different operations and tactical maneuvers, and the officers had to write which one they thought was best. In responding to the colleague’s letter CvC wrote that he could not answer the question because the examiner did not provide the policy context from which the officers could draw their answers from.

In my opinion it seems you are both arguing past each other in a theoretical vacuum. If you both used the context of policy, and historical examples, there would be cases were you are both right and wrong. Policy will always determine the ways, ends and means at the start of a conflict, however, that does not necessarily mean policy is always the sole arbiter throughout the various phases of war. This is the paradox of the trinity.

ML wrote:

Means are resources, not methods.

If we are viewing this from a strictly CvC perspective, in On War he takes "war preparation", that is logistics and resources as a given. Hence, means are considered tactics/methods of employing violence.

ML wrote:


"Containment" is a strategic end state.

The policy, or end state, was to 'contain' the USSR from expanding into America's sphere of influence. The strategies for achieving 'containment' ranged from Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation', to Kennedy's 'flexible response' and Reagan's 'star wars'/'national missile defense system'.

H.Nelson wrote:

There was a reason Clausewitz wanted his papers burned at his death. 'On War' was an unfinished, poorly thought out, self-contradictory notebook of thoughts. Sun Tzu is far superior, and if you add him to Boyd you get Maneuver Warfare Theory. I am pretty sure the marines have a statue of Boyd, but I doubt they have one of Clausewitz.

Very entertaining indeed and welcome. Pray tell, do you know the difference between war and warfare? There is an old saying that ignorance in bliss, however, when it comes to strategy ignorance gets people killed.

[SWJ Blog]

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Entry Excerpt:

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory
by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Over the past nine years United States counterinsurgency strategy reflected a reliance on Clausewitzian industrial-era tenets with a faulty emphasis on superior western technology, doctrine fixated on lethal operations, and a western skewed perspective on jus ad bellum (just cause for war). American military culture is largely responsible for the first two contextual biases, while western society is liable for the third in response to September 11, 2001. To turn this operational failure around, the U.S. military instrument of power should replace the teachings of 19th century German military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz with Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and abandon the aforementioned contextual factors in favor of more appropriate counterinsurgency alternatives. These include an increased emphasis on civil-military relations, jus in bello (just conduct during war) through non-lethal operations, and quantifiable conflict resolution that includes negotiating with moderate Taliban militia groups, as unpalatable as that sounds to military purists. This paper stresses that moderates do not include radical Islamic terrorists or non-native fighters.

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.



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[SWJ Blog]

From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

Entry Excerpt:

From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War
by Tony Corn

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

A decade after 9/11, the absurdity of the U.S. grand strategy in the Long War is never better illustrated than by the fact that Washington currently spends $ 100 billion dollars a year in Afghanistan chasing a grand total of 100 Al Qaeda fighters (one billion per terrorist). If there is only one reason to rediscover Liddell Hart today, it is because, as Sir Ernest Rutherford famously said in a different context: “We are running out of money, gentlemen. It’s time to start thinking.”

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC.



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[SWJ Blog]

Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army

Entry Excerpt:

Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army
by Christopher Otero

Download the Full Article:Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army

One of the most intellectually challenging moments in the United States Command and General Staff College is when after 10 years of serving in an Army at War you are finally introduced to the two major theorists of modern warfare, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl Von Clausewitz. Both are considered to be the most prominent theorists of the western way of warfare and the question that often gets framed by our instructors is which of these two best inform your understanding of modern war? Do you consider yourself Jominian or Clausewitzian in your outlook?

Download the Full Article:Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini: A Discussion on Theory, MDMP, and Design in the Post OIF Army

MAJ Christopher Otero, USA, is an active duty military intelligence officer who has served multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq at the Battalion, Brigade Combat Team, and Division level. MAJ Otero is currently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect the position of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.



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[SWJ Blog]

Clausewitz and the Non-State Actor: A Contemporary Application of the Paradoxical Trinity to Countering Terrorism

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[SWJ Blog]

Carl von Clausewitz, Meet Albert Einstein and Max Planck

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[SWJ Blog]

Give Carl von Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce

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