Defining "instrumentality"
Hi Wilf & Ken,
My problem with your answers is the implicit breadth of your concept of what the word "instrumental" means in this context, which seems to be all violent actions north of an epileptic seizure.
Taken to that grand extent, sure, most violence can be defined as purposeful toward an end but when all things are something, then nothing is. Common sense and five minutes observation at a busy intersection in a bad neigborhood at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening will disabuse anyone of the idea that all violence has rational root causes. Sometimes the pretext for violence is a nominal excuse.
Too broad a definition to be useful analytically, in my view. Perhaps WM's suggestion of reframing the debate is more productive
Or, more likely, there is nothing to debate?
'Instrumental' to me as Wilf stated simply means it has a purpose other than recreational; whether said purpose is rational or not is neither said or implied.
Though I could make a valid case for any conflict being at least partly irrational. Necessary perhaps but still irrational...
In any event, I'm not at all sure that debate is merited. Quite the contrary.
As we are stuck on semantics, no.
Hi Ken,
Sorry I can't buy the premise that all organized violence is "instrumental" minus violent acts that might be "recreational" in nature, though "fun" per se cannot be excluded as a byproduct of the former.
I will wish you a Happy New year though! Cheers!
Not a problem.
Happy New Year!
Why not? It's a quite widely accepted premise, coined by Colin S. Gray, if I am not mistaken.Originally Posted by zenpundit
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Applying Clausewitz to Insurgency
How does one best apply Clausewitz's insights on warfare to the realm of Insurgency and counterinsurgency? Reasonable minds can differ, and it is a topic worthy of debate as it strikes to the heart of designing effective strategies, and crafting successful campaign plans for many of the operations we find ourselves embroiled in in the Irregular dominated environment we face today.
The attached paper, written by COL John C Buckley II back in 1995 when he was a Major at Leavenworth does an excellent job of tackling this complex subject. He uses the American experience in Vietnam and the British experience in Ireland to explore his take on a proper application of Clausewitz. Regardless of if you agree or disagree with his position, this is a piece of work well worth considering.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf Alas not working try below.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-22-2009 at 07:16 PM. Reason: New link added and words to explain.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Bob's World, can you check the link you posted? I don't think it is working.
It'll work
You may have to already be logged into a .mil site though.
Worked when I'm logged in with my CAC
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Link works
Slap,
The link posted worked earlier, albeit on another post and the one on this thread doesn't work. Try this: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
davidbfpo
Got It! Thanks Guys
All,
Thanks for the assist. Still a rookie at starting a thread and maneuvering around this site. Looks like David's link is working.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I do not think any significant modification is required of Clausewitz in order to understand insurgency. If we accept that the state itself represents and imposes the will of the class which holds power (or in competitive societies, the sum of the resolutions of their conflicts), then the state becomes a vehicle for violence and war, and not its driver. From there we can accept that insurgency comes about as a similar decision for a class to pursue war, but outside of the means of the state. Violence remains instrumental and deliberate.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Have to disagree--Clausewitz' trinity is the government/leadership, the military, and the people. In an insurgency, the Clausewitzian trinity collapses--the people become the military, or at least a subset of the people do. In conducting counter-insurgency, the leadership of the state tries to impose its will on the people (or, again, a subset of them) by means of the military. This sets the whole trinitarian construct on its head, I think. In the normal way of Clausewitzian war, I submit the leadership uses the military as a means of executing the will of the people. It may be the case that leadership may need to take extra measures to garner the support of the people for military action, but I do not think that suppression of the will of one's own people by military means is really part of the continuation of politics by other means.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Tend to agree with WM. American Pride, once you look at the paper, you may well still not agree, but at least you will have worked your way through a well stated argument that offers you a different perspective.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
One can view Clausewitz' work as an attempt to justify a return to the status quo ante bellum after the defeat of Napoleon. In the good old pre-Napoleonic days, wars were lead by aristocratic leaders of professional armies while the people stayed out of the way, for the most part. Admittedly a subset of the people were engaged in those wars, but, except for the occasional siege, war was conducted by professionals away from population centers. The French Revolution changed much of that, at least as far as France was concerned. War was no longer the private domain of professionals. While not quite total war, the Napoleonic conflicts came pretty close. (The American Civil War and the Franco-Prussina War are the first instances of Western total war in the industrial age, I think.) On this analysis, Clausewitz was much like most other writers and thinkers on the Continent during the period--helping Metternich in his attempt to turn back the hands of time to a point before the Tennis Court Oath and holding them there.
If one accepts this interpretation, then Clausewitz definitely has no purchase as an explanation for insurgency and counter-insurgency.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Carl the great fits in my pantheon along
with all the other 20 or so who have good things to offer -- but no total solution because there is none. People are too complex and dynamic (Well, not me; the dynamic bit...
Having said all that, I totally agree with you that insurgency in general and modern insurgency in particular was a little beyond Clausewitz. He offers little help in how to oppose or support it.
True, and it was also an area that he had precious little experience with and (it could be argued) wasn't really trying to study or include in his framework. He does deal to a degree with "wars of the people" (don't remember his exact wording ATM), but it's more as an aside and might possibly be something he would have expanded had he lived to finish On War.
I honestly don't think we'll make much progress until we shed the Cold War framework that tends to cloud much of the thinking about insurgencies. Obviously they existed long before the whole US vs. USSR framework, but it seems that a single historical anomaly (the Cold War) has clouded much of that historical memory and tinted our basic approach to insurgencies. The Cold War forced too much focus on State activities and left popular movements and ethnic strife out of the picture or minimized them as root causes or enablers. For example, many of the mistakes the US made in Vietnam came from trying to read the conflict as part of the larger Cold War framework and not being able to "see" the actual, local situation (IMO, anyhow). Insurgencies tend to be multi-faceted, fluid, and subject to many pulls and shifts (not to mention fellow travelers who may not have the same end objectives as the original insurgent leaders - if there are any main leaders), yet we still want to see them as Maoist or "Commie-supported" activities (although you could insert your favorite political motive for 'Commie' and get the same result). And the advances in communication platforms only exaggerate the multi-polar nature of many insurgencies and insurgent movements.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Cogent comment. We are still wedded not only to the Cold War
but to WW II lessons not learned. I'm unsure how to break that mindset but after many years in and a few outside watching the operation, I'm firmly convinced we will continue to have major problems unless we modernize thinking xonsiderably.
That slam, BTW, applies every bit as much to the Civilian Politicians and appointees and to the pundits as it does to the Armed Forces. I'm the old guy but I think all those groups are in a time warp and that the Armed forces are thus constrained to be there as well...
This is why I introduced (in another thread) class analysis into COIN. The "people" as a part of Clausewitz's trinity can be further deconstructed into a sub-trinity of "Class", "Faction", and "Mask". If we conceive of the trinity as the three components of the whole of the state, and the 'people' as another sub-trinity, it is not difficult to extend Clausewitz's theory to insurgency IMO.
If the 'leadership' and 'people' are already two separate components, as you have identified, how is "supression of the will of one's own people by military means" not "the continuation of politics by other means" if the normal course of politics would be for the leadership to "take extra measures to garner... support"?It may be the case that leadership may need to take extra measures to garner the support of the people for military action, but I do not think that suppression of the will of one's own people by military means is really part of the continuation of politics by other means.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Unabashed fan of St Carl
Look -- there are many useless parts of "On War", especially those prescriptive elements about 19th century warfare. OK. I get it.
The beauty of Clausewitz is the philosophical, enduring portion of a coupla his books.
C posits the theoretical existence of "absolute war". Well worth re-reading on a regular basis. But he goes on to say that absolute war, maybe like the physical concept of absolute zero, cannot exist in reality. He then goes on to explain all the limiting factors on warfare. To my way of thinking, the limitations/constraints that we normally associate with insurgency/counterinsurgency are simply other limiting factors that the boss would be very comfortable with.
Getting hung up on rigid concepts of the Westphalian nation state, and "government" are our biases, not Carl's.
I think that Ken studied under Clausewitz, so he may have a better interpretation than I.
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