The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[jmm99]

From BW
Some day this will happen. Nations working to achieve their national objectives, competing for advantage, but within the framework of a global strategic construct. Would have to be very principle based to work.

If the following syllogism is posited (credit Marc T):

Principle > interpretation of principle > implementation of interpretation

the problem lies not so much in divergence as to the principle, but as to divergence in steps 2 and 3. That is the problem, as I see it, in several areas:

1. Using CvC principles - your world

2. Using legal principles - my world

3. Developing a national policy (grand strategy) - another thread.

A global strategic construct (adopted by the world) is beyond my perception.

[wm]

Clausewitz said that the aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy by matching your effort against his power of resistance. Furthermore, the aim of war must be taken as applying to both sides. I take this to mean that it is a fight between the military legs of the trinity stool under the direction of the government and supported by the people.

While I suspect this interpretation is the usual case, it need not be. Since the "nation" consists of the three parts of the trinity, that nation's primary power base most likely derives from a combination of all three parts of the trinity. In a given "nation" one part may dominate, and that part would then be the primary focus of effort by an opponent seeking to impose its will on the other nation (one way of understanding the shwerpunkt). In the good old days, it was largely a matter of army vs. army. But that seems to have become much less likely as nations moved to mobilizing more and more of their population to fight in wars, overtly as uniformed participants, or covertly as partisans, resistance, spies, guerrillas, or what have you. The Franco-Prussian War pointed out that defeat of the main army in the field was not sufficient to impose the will of Germany upon France.

[William F. Owen]

CvC was very concerned with generating big armies and proposed conscription as a result. A nation in arms was relevant to issues of insurgencies of the day. Spain was an object lesson in this and Clausewitz recognised that.

First off, Insurengcies were just not a major issue at the time he was writing, but CvC, like myself, saw Guerillas and Insurgents as just another form of warfare, and his thesis was basically they achieved their aim in the same way as conventional armies - thus needed to be defeated in the same way. Mao-Tse Tung apparently read more CvC than Sun-Tzu and this is where he gets the move to conventional phase, as, in his opinion, only conventional forces are decisive. OK, not always true, but it does have some merit.

Point being, the view that "protecting the population" is the corner stone of COIN, is in fact, the requirement for the military defeat of the insurgency.

[Bob's World]

CvC was very concerned with generating big armies and proposed conscription as a result. A nation in arms was relevant to issues of insurgencies of the day. Spain was an object lesson in this and Clausewitz recognised that.

First off, Insurengcies were just not a major issue at the time he was writing, but CvC, like myself, saw Guerillas and Insurgents as just another form of warfare, and his thesis was basically they achieved their aim in the same way as conventional armies - thus needed to be defeated in the same way. Mao-Tse Tung apparently read more CvC than Sun-Tzu and this is where he gets the move to conventional phase, as, in his opinion, only conventional forces are decisive. OK, not always true, but it does have some merit.

Point being, the view that "protecting the population" is the corner stone of COIN, is in fact, the requirement for the military defeat of the insurgency.

I have to totally agree with your statement of the basis for your position, all the way up to your conclusion. Mao's model for waging an effective insurgency against a state absolutely called for a gradual growth of capacity to ultimately developing a conventional, and decisive, force. This is the essence of Maoist insurgency.

But what we are discussing here is how does the counterinsurgent truly defeat Mr. Mao or Mr Ho or their latter day desciples?? If, when they surge to phase three conventional and decisive operations, and are defeated by the counterinsurgent, they simply step back into phase 2 operations until they once again have the capacity and believe the timing is right to surge yet again to phase three. This can go on for generations.

I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.

Most COIN "victories" are little more than delays of the inevitable, because most governments simply do not want to change how they treat their own populace, and prefer to blame unrest on the insurgent, and consider his removal as "mission accomplished." Not all of them announce that wearing a flightsuit on the deck of a carrier, but the effect is the same.

[slapout9]

.
I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.

Most COIN "victories" are little more than delays of the inevitable, because most governments simply do not want to change how they treat their own populace, and prefer to blame unrest on the insurgent, and consider his removal as "mission accomplished." Not all of them announce that wearing a flightsuit on the deck of a carrier, but the effect is the same.

This is why I have always said that the Strategic Framework for COIN Strategy should not be Ends,Ways,and Means. It is better framed in the Police Framework of Motive..Methods.. and Opportunity. If you don't deal with the Motive it will never end.

[William F. Owen]

I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.

....and I agree. If the bad guy keeps getting knocked back to phase 1 or 2, he is not making progress. He may give up. He may have his will to continue, broken. That is all military force can do.

After that it is back to Politics! - and that is when the social/welfare work begins, BUT - that is nothing to do with the military. They've done their bit.

COIN is military. Social equality, welfare and human rights are not Military activities.

[Ron Humphrey]

After that it is back to Politics! - and that is when the social/welfare work begins, BUT - that is nothing to do with the military. They've done their bit.

COIN is military. Social equality, welfare and human rights are not Military activities.

](Emphasis Ron)

Without a force to enable an environment which allows them they almost never happen, or if they do it doesn't last long.

So is it as easy as we'd like it to seperate the two?

[Ken White]

Wilf is saying that the military does the force bit and the civilian political -- and aid types -- do the other stuff. That is an approach that I am absolutely convinced is correct as I have watched the US Armed Forces try to mix the two in several nations over many years and we do not do it at all well. In fact we do it badly and the attempts have adversely impacted both our military performance and capability as well as our efforts at the political bits.

I think the answer to Ron's question is Yes, it is easy to separate the two -- provided one wants to do that.

The problem is, of course, that we are not really a colonial or imperial power, thus the idea of military support to the civil power is not natural for us. That's okay -- the answer, IMO, is to avoid if at all possible such efforts. I acknowledge that may not always be possible and for such circumstances, we need a civilian effort prepared to be implemented when necessary. We are doing that now (sort of...) but we really need to back off DoD and the Services filling gaps in the civil structure. What we do not need to do is to let our short attention span derail this effort in a few years or our egos and turf or budget battles interfere.

That last is a very real potential problem. Not only between DoD and the civilian side but within the Department and between Services and Commands, That parochialism is truly dangerous and needs to be halted.

Our past efforts at mixing military and civilian support have done us no favors. Nor are our current efforts, well done as they are, doing long term good.

[jmm99]

From CvC based on Graham's Translation and Vom Kriege (brackets for JMM endnotes added):

War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power [1]. Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law [2]), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed [3]; and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside in a manner as something not properly belonging to war.

Der Krieg ist also ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen.

Die Gewalt rüstet sich mit den Erfindungen der Künste und Wissenschaften aus, um der Gewalt zu begegnen. Unmerkliche, kaum nennenswerte Beschränkungen, die sie sich selbst setzt unter dem Namen völkerrechtlicher Sitte, begleiten sie, ohne ihre Kraft wesentlich zu schwächen [1]. Gewalt, d. h. die physische Gewalt (denn eine moralische gibt es außer dem Begriffe des Staates und Gesetzes nicht [2]), ist also das Mittel, dem Feinde unseren Willen aufzudringen, der Zweck. Um diesen Zweck sicher zu erreichen, müssen wir den Feind wehrlos machen [3], und dies ist dem Begriff nach das eigentliche Ziel der kriegerischen Handlung. Es vertritt den Zweck und verdrängt ihn gewissermaßen als etwas nicht zum Kriege selbst Gehöriges.

Assuming for purposes of discussion that the initial definition is valid, an act of violence (from Latin vis = physical force) is essential to the existence of war. The inclusion of "inventions of Art and Science" brings us to the more modern substitution of "armed conflict" for the older term "war".

Taking now, the stages of insurgency (adding phase 0, as suggested by BW in other threads):

phase 0 > phase 1 > phase 2 > phase 3

this is a continuum, which passes from emphasis on the Rule of Law [4] to emphasis on the Principles of War [5]. The key phrase is "the enemy must be disarmed" (müssen wir den Feind wehrlos machen) and its interpretation (what does "disarm" mean). Then, after deciding that, comes its implementation - and who does what to accomplish that.

The civilian world and the military world both play key roles (albeit greater or lesser depending on the given phase). They had best learn to talk to each other.

-------------------------------------------------

[1] "Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power." One wonders what CvC would think of the GCs, other conventions and modern ROEs - which are quite perceptible in our Laws of War.

[2] "... for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law ..." One wonders what CvC would have thought about non-State actors such as AQ, who have their own Rule of Law, Principles of War and Laws of War.

[3] The term "wehrlos" translates generally as "unprotected", "defenseless" or "helpless" (more figurative), which have a broader meaning than "disarmed".

[4] Rule of Law, as used here, is taken in its broadest meaning - including not only acts by a State (everything that a State does is in a sense "a law"), but by non-State actors who are Powers to armed conflicts. While the Rule of Law is aimed more at using non-violent means (absence of physical force) to enforce its rules, it does retain and uses acts of violence (physical force) to compel compliance. So, the continuum cannot be placed into neat, all-inclusive or exclusive boxes.

[5] To what extent the Laws of War have impinged on the Principles of War seems to me to be a difficult question - more so in some areas than others, as I perceive it - without dogmatism as to generalities.

[Surferbeetle]

Wilf is saying that the military does the force bit and the civilian political -- and aid types -- do the other stuff. That is an approach that I am absolutely convinced is correct as I have watched the US Armed Forces try to mix the two in several nations over many years and we do not do it at all well. In fact we do it badly and the attempts have adversely impacted both our military performance and capability as well as our efforts at the political bits.

I think the answer to Ron's question is Yes, it is easy to separate the two -- provided one wants to do that.

The problem is, of course, that we are not really a colonial or imperial power, thus the idea of military support to the civil power is not natural for us. That's okay -- the answer, IMO, is to avoid if at all possible such efforts.

Wilf, Ken, & Ron,

Name order seems to represent a spectrum here...Wilf with the military is for 'traditional' military work, Ken in the middle, and Ron recognizing that warfare is not just limited to shooting bullets.

Recognizing that we are not truly accomplished at coordinated DIME operations is certainly step one, but it's not enough to say let's leave it at that and move on. My thesis is that the previous 'world order' has thawed, large parts of it are again shifting around, and we need to adapt in order set the stage for future success. Did we really successfully set the stage for success after the fall of the Berlin Wall? Well, here is another chance to shine

I am going to bang my drum again about the need for Full Spectrum capabilities. Fielding effective Full Spectrum forces mean that we must be able to excel throughout the spectrum and, no matter how painful, it's time to get with the program. Perhaps there is more to war than Clausewitz and that damn Fulda Gap mentality...

I'll throw out a couple of 'not invented here' models that we are all familiar with and ask why are we not thinking about them as other than curiosities?

I have book one of Alistair Horne's a Savage War of Peace and his description of the French Section Administrative Specialisee are a western model that has seen limited success in conditions similar to what we face.

The French army resumed an important role in local Algerian administration through the Special Administration Section (Section Administrative Spécialisée, SAS), created in 1955. The SAS's mission was to establish contact with the Muslim population and weaken nationalist influence in the rural areas by asserting the "French presence" there. SAS officers — called képis bleus (blue caps) — also recruited and trained bands of loyal Muslim irregulars, known as harkis. Armed with shotguns and using guerrilla tactics similar to those of the FLN, the harkis, who eventually numbered about 180,000 volunteers, more than the FLN effectives,[16] were an ideal instrument of counterinsurgency warfare.

Hezbollah's model is also worth examination:

In addition to Hezbollah’s military structure, the movement also runs a sophisticated network of schools, clinics, and social services. The militia, which is represented in government as well as parliament, also runs news outlets, radio and TV stations, and a telephone communications network. In the group’s demographic strongholds, (which, besides southern Lebanon, include the Bekaa Valley and Dahivah, Beirut’s southern suburb) the vast majority of Hezbollah’s predominantly Shi’a constituents rely on social and charity organizations. Most notable of these organizations are “Imdad”, which provides medical and educational services; “Mu’asasat Al-Shahid”, which pays pensions to families of Hezbollah fighters who are killed in action; and “Jihad al-Bina,” which is still in the process of rebuilding homes destroyed by the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel (Arab News, August 12, 2006). The Paris donor conference of January 2007, in which European nations and the United States pledged $7.6 billion in aid to Lebanon, was seen by many Lebanese as a desperate attempt by the international community to shore up the embattled government and keep up with Hezbollah’s rebuilding schemes, which by then had already handed out millions in cash to people who had lost their homes during the 34-day war with Israel (Daily Star, January 29, 2007; AP, January 24, 2007).

Bob's World has come very close to describing the indescribable truth about war between non-western and western forces.

I believe the essence of our disagreement is that it appears that your position is that when that phase three operation is knocked back to phase 2 or even phase 1 operations the insurgency is defeated. My position is that the insurgency is not defeated under the underlying causes are addressed so that the populace lacks the causation to continue the fight. To, in effect, disempower Mr. Mao or Mr. Ho or whoever else might come along, with whatever ideology they might choose to use.

Just because we don't like to use DIME doesn't mean that our opponents do not. I think it's our job to get serious about Full Spectrum and, like it or not, coordinated DIME capabilities are the way forward.

Regards,

Steve

[Ken White]

Wilf, Ken, & Ron,

Name order seems to represent a spectrum here...Wilf with the military is for 'traditional' military work, Ken in the middle, and Ron recognizing that warfare is not just limited to shooting bullets.

Cannot speak for those other handsome devils but if by middle, you mean what I said -- we must be able to do it, we do not do it very well and we should avoid trying to do it if possible and, in preparation for that, the emphasis on all other than the military actions must be shifted to civilian agencies of the US government -- then you're correct.

Recognizing that we are not truly accomplished at coordinated DIME operations is certainly step one, but it's not enough to say let's leave it at that and move on. My thesis is that the previous 'world order' has thawed, large parts of it are again shifting around, and we need to adapt in order set the stage for future success. Did we really successfully set the stage for success after the fall of the Berlin Wall? Well, here is another chance to shine

No, we did not. Nor did we set the stage for success in World War II with Civil affairs and Military Government -- we did what seemed to be an adequate (remember that word) solution at the time and one that took advantage of the fact that the quite large Army then in existence was able to provide people with the requisite specialties to get the job done to an adequate level in occupied territories with a thoroughly defeated enemy population.

We're still doing that, because that's the way we've 'always' done it.

But we no longer have that ultra large Army with all those specialties and draconian "you will" laws; we do not have to accept an 'adequate' solution -- we're supposed to be a lot smarter now... -- and we can afford to pay for the best persons for a given job; and we are not now dealing with defeated former enemy populations who will do what they're told -- and I submit the military mindset is not best suited for winning other minds (not a knock, I include myself and a slew of friends and relatives in that mindset)...

I am going to bang my drum again about the need for Full Spectrum capabilities. Fielding effective Full Spectrum forces mean that we must be able to excel throughout the spectrum and, no matter how painful, it's time to get with the program. Perhaps there is more to war than Clausewitz and that damn Fulda Gap mentality...

There is certainly more to war than that -- however, there is little more to warfare than that. Military forces are designed for warfare; they are multi-task capable and can do most anything. However, like any other organization, when they are employed outside their core competencies, effectiveness declines.

That said, as I'm sure you'll recall, I've also been beating the drum for full spectrum capabilities -- however, we seem to differ on who should contribute what to those capabilities. I have no question that some CA capability is required for early entry forces in ANY spectrum. Nor do I question that in some FID efforts, a primarily (not fully, primarily) military CA effort will be required.

I do strongly believe that the US can and should assiduously avoid FID efforts if at all possible. I also believe that many such efforts can be avoided -- e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan could have been -- but I acknowledge that Politicians will do stupid things due to perceived domestic political pressures and that Armed Forces -- and the rest of the US government -- must be prepared for such commitments. That said, there is no reason to do it 'the way we've always done it' anymore than is there reason to worry about Fulda. The Army isn't the only US government operation that has failed to adapt to a changing world. Nor should it be the only one that does adapt...

I'll throw out a couple of 'not invented here' models that we are all familiar with and ask why are we not thinking about them as other than curiosities?

The quick and dirty answer is because we are not they and they are not us. Very differing governmental approaches and traditions. What has worked for them will likely not work for us for several reasons.

Bob's World has come very close to describing the indescribable truth about war between non-western and western forces.
...
Just because we don't like to use DIME doesn't mean that our opponents do not. I think it's our job to get serious about Full Spectrum and, like it or not, coordinated DIME capabilities are the way forward.

I totally agree with Bob's World in that and with your statement. We only disagree on from whence a sustained (note emphasis) effort should come.

It is not a question of DIME. However, I believe you're using that as shorthand for FID and COIN assist efforts. (IW may or may not require developmental assistance). If so, in my view, it is a question of using your strengths and not getting tricked into doing something that you are intrinsically not capable of doing well. Sometimes getting into such conflicts is unavoidable but in most cases a little operational and strategic ingenuity -- and an occasional slight risk -- can negate a requirement to get pinned down doing something that is not in your long term interest.

It also is not just that we don't like to do it-- who does? -- it is that we do not and will not do it other than marginally well; it is against the inclinations of the American psyche and few of us will adapt well to doing it. Some will and they can carry us through -- but we, as a nation, can do better.

That is not to impugn any of the people who have worked their buns off and even died in an effort to do the 'DIME' job on the ground now or earlier. They have done and are doing a superb job -- it is, rather, a question of 'whose job is it?' I submit once the initial combat effort is over, it is in our (DoD and the Armed forces) interest on many levels to shift much of the other than military effort to the civilian agencies.

There will be those who will say you cannot get civilians to do that, etc. Sorry, I remember another time and place where that was once said -- and later the place was absolutely crawling with US and third nation civilians who were quite well paid -- and did a good job. In fact, if you look at the history, the Army did a poor job in the FID arena until they got humungous civilian involvement. I cannot speak from experience to either Afghanistan or Iraq but it appears from news reports that increasing civilian involvement there has had a beneficial effect also.

I have a Leatherman tool, A Gerber MultiTool and a Swiss Tool. All three are handy, good for emergencies and quick fixes and I've used all -- but I do find that given the option and a little time to get the right implement, using the proper tool for the job works much better for me. YMMV.

I'll also note that DIME is constituted of four elements -- Military is only one of those...

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

Subutai certainly has passed on much to his students ; I also enjoyed learning about Yasotay’s TTP’s as a youngster new to the Army (no wikipedia posting yet, but his devastating attack from an unexpected quarter while on fire has stuck with me all these years…). Sun Tzu’s dictum’s have always been worth reflecting upon. Rommel’s, the Gray Ghost’s, Gus’s, and Jomini’s, actions/works were/are worth the time to study as well.

SOF emphasis on humans being more important than hardware is another commonality that we share. We also both understand that it takes time properly prioritize and allocate scarce resources in order properly train and effectively utilize our forces and that the returns are consistently worth more than the initial effort.

It is not a question of DIME. However, I believe you're using that as shorthand for FID and COIN assist efforts. (IW may or may not require developmental assistance). If so, in my view, it is a question of using your strengths and not getting tricked into doing something that you are intrinsically not capable of doing well. Sometimes getting into such conflicts is unavoidable but in most cases a little operational and strategic ingenuity -- and an occasional slight risk -- can negate a requirement to get pinned down doing something that is not in your long term interest.

Here however is where I respectfully disagree with you. The US Military has the capability, has executed (not as well as we do the traditional stuff – you are correct in noting this), and will continue to have to execute FID/COIN/DIME operations. We have no choice but to improve our skill set (and our interagency cooperation and support) if we desire to maintain or to continue to improve our position in the world.

My 2009 copy of the The Economist’s Pocket World in Figures reports Germany’s GDP at 2,897 billion USD and Japan’s GDP at 4,368 USD. Like many today I enjoy the fruits of German automotive engineering and Japanese electrical engineering. When I discussed WWII with some of my relatives they relayed the benefits of reconstruction/economic integration/globalization were not fully visible at the time. I’ll go further and ask you about the national discussion concerning the merits of the Marshall Plan at the time versus the outcomes that you have witnessed. Hindsight being 20/20 the gamble paid off but I'll bet not everybody agreed with the allocation of resources.

The reconstruction effort in Iraq has not matched our successes with the Marshall Plan. Maybe it will down the road, we will see.

My crystal ball on Afghanistan wonders what it is that we expect to gain, however I certainly have no lock on infallibility.

I have a Leatherman tool, A Gerber MultiTool and a Swiss Tool. All three are handy, good for emergencies and quick fixes and I've used all -- but I do find that given the option and a little time to get the right implement, using the proper tool for the job works much better for me. YMMV.

You are right, multitools and duct tape are in fact amazing first responder tools but they are not long-term fixes. However, if the radiator hose pops in (pick your location) you and I are the multitool and duct-tape that have been used to ensure that our ‘car’ can limp to the ‘garage’ where the specialists are. Multitools and ductape are carried/maintained by the wise.

I'll also note that DIME is constituted of four elements -- Military is only one of those...

This is the heart of it. Warfare is not limited to club, sling & stone, rifle, or atom bomb. Warfare is a manifestation of the competition for resources; we are animals despite our prized veneer of civilization. Sometimes we kill, sometimes we embargo, and sometimes we negotiate but it’s all about the competition for resources. We are not thinking wisely when we allow daylight between the objectives of our DIME apparatus or our ability to deploy/utilize DIME elements in peacetime, other than war, or war. Full Spectrum applies to mom, dad, the crumbsnatchers, and the whole of government. Clausewitz is not enough.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

-- who was very limited in what he did and thus can teach -- and Jomini who I believe is a hack. Sun Tzu is overused...

Here however is where I respectfully disagree with you. The US Military has the capability, has executed (not as well as we do the traditional stuff – you are correct in noting this), and will continue to have to execute FID/COIN/DIME operations. We have no choice but to improve our skill set (and our interagency cooperation and support) if we desire to maintain or to continue to improve our position in the world.

I'm not sure we're in disagreement; we certainly are not on what you just wrote. The issue, I thought I was addressing is who should perform the bulk of the other than military effort after initial entry. I contend that is not the Army's job. Are you saying that it is? Or saying that others must help but the Army must be in charge?

My 2009 copy of the Economist’s Pocket World in Figures reports Germany’s GDP at 2,897 billion USD and Japan’s GDP at 4,368 USD. Like many today I enjoy the fruits of German automotive engineering and Japanese electrical engineering. When I discussed WWII with some of my relatives they relayed the benefits of reconstruction/economic integration/globalization were not fully visible at the time. I’ll go further and ask you about the national discussion concerning the merits of the Marshall Plan at the time versus the outcomes that you have witnessed. Hindsight being 20/20 the gamble paid off but I'll bet not everybody agreed with the allocation of resources.

Obviously, I'm in need of a class in Communicating.I don't seem to be doing that well. Yes, they are a success story and no one can deny the relative success of the CA/MG effort in bringing that about -- though a read of the history will show that in neither country was everything perfect; it never is. As I thought I said, the system we developed was adequate to contend with populations that had been thoroughly defeated and were complaisant and compliant.

Something I also said which you seem to elide was: "But we no longer have that ultra large Army with all those specialties and draconian "you will" laws; we do not have to accept an 'adequate' solution -- we're supposed to be a lot smarter now... -- and we can afford to pay for the best persons for a given job; and we are not now dealing with defeated former enemy populations who will do what they're told -- and I submit the military mindset is not best suited for winning other minds (not a knock, I include myself and a slew of friends and relatives in that mindset)."

Army run efforts in both Korea and Viet Nam with populations that had not only not been defeated but had no particular reason to be compliant were a totally different thing than postwar Germany and Japan (and I saw the latter). That is the point.

The reconstruction effort in Iraq has not matched our successes with the Marshall Plan. Maybe it will down the road, we will see.

Not a fair comparison in any case, putting a devastated continent back on its feet far transcends anything done with one little country that was hardly devastated, indeed and comparitively, had not suffered at all. The Marshall Plan was indeed a success and Kennan and Clayton who refined it and their Secretary of State George C. Marshall deserve a lot of praise for that even if it was the idea of Marshall's predecessor at state, James Byrnes. State and the Economic Cooperation Administration they formed to execute the plan also deserve much credit.

I'm unsure how that bolsters your case; The Army, Civil Affairs and the Occupation had absolutely nothing to do with the Marshall Plan. And, no, not everyone agreed with it but I'm not sure how that interfaces with a discussion of who should perform the bulk of the DI_E work in a FID scenario. Particularly when it was a state effort throughout.

You are right, multitools and duct tape are in fact amazing first responder tools but they are not long-term fixes. However, if the radiator hose pops in (pick your location) you and I are the multitool and duct-tape that have been used to ensure that our ‘car’ can limp to the ‘garage’ where the specialists are. Multitools and ductape are carried/maintained by the wise.

Communication again -- I thought I said that. Maybe not. What does this say:"That said, as I'm sure you'll recall, I've also been beating the drum for full spectrum capabilities -- however, we seem to differ on who should contribute what to those capabilities. I have no question that some CA capability is required for early entry forces in ANY spectrum. Nor do I question that in some FID efforts, a primarily (not fully, primarily) military CA effort will be required." I'm unsure how to better word that, what would you suggest?

This is the heart of it. Warfare is not limited to club, sling & stone, rifle, or atom bomb. Warfare is a manifestation of the competition for resources; we are animals despite our prized veneer of civilization...

Of course we are but, if I may, warfare is limited to club sling et.al. War, OTOH is not.

Sometimes we kill,

That's warfare

sometimes we embargo,

That's not warfare, war yes, warfare no. Don't take my word for it:

war·fare
1.
a. The waging of war against an enemy; armed conflict.
b. Military operations marked by a specific characteristic: guerrilla warfare; chemical warfare.

and sometimes we negotiate but it’s all about the competition for resources. We are not thinking wisely when we allow daylight between the objectives of our DIME apparatus or our ability to deploy/utilize DIME elements in peacetime, other than war, or war. Full Spectrum applies to mom, dad, the crumbsnatchers, and the whole of government. Clausewitz is not enough.

I do not disagree with a thing you say there. What you carefully do not do is say who has the lead and the responsibility for the D, the I and the E parts prior to (and that is important) and after initial entry.

Nor do you address who should have the lead in peacetime in an effort to forestall, preclude or sidestep a war. If you contend that is an Army job, I totally disagree and again say that simply because we have done it that way for forty years doesn't make it (a) Right or (b) the only way. At one time, I ran the budget for a lot of CA Bdes and Cmds and their ODT in th late 80s-- it was not a good effort for the US though it had undeniable training benefits for the Reservists who went.

I'm watched up close in two wars where the Military took the initial lead (as could be predicted and should continue to occur [I underlined that to draw attention to it]) and did an acceptable job. They later were supplanted by civilian agencies who put more resources in the right place instead of where Military Commanders wanted them. The civilian efforts quickly improved the processes and that convinced me that they need to be involved and that early on. I am essentially seeing the same thing occur today in two theaters.

My point is that -- as I said above -- the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge."

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

Communication is a two way street; at least half (and very probably more) of any mis-communication is on me.

I gonna stick with Sun Tzu thanks , and won't argue too much about the other two (Mosby & Jomini) other than to say they are examples of authors who provide insights upon unconventional thinking while simultaneously acknowledging both were flawed people in many aspects of their lives.

The issue, I thought I was addressing is who should perform the bulk of the other than military effort after initial entry. I contend that is not the Army's job. Are you saying that it is? Or saying that others must help but the Army must be in charge?

I'm unsure how that bolsters your case; The Army, Civil Affairs and the Occupation had absolutely nothing to do with the Marshall Plan.

Nor do you address who should have the lead in peacetime in an effort to forestall, preclude or sidestep a war. If you contend that is an Army job, I totally disagree and again say that simply because we have done it that way for forty years doesn't make it (a) Right or (b) the only way. At one time, I ran the budget for a lot of CA Bdes and Cmds and their ODT in th late 80s-- it was not a good effort for the US though it had undeniable training benefits for the Reservists who went.

Noting your acknowledgment of our history, let’s take a closer look at our actions with respect to Germany. Here is a short list of US Army Officers (and as you know, but not necessarily everyone else does, military government soldiers were the precursor to civil affairs soldiers) who were involved in planning for and executing ‘nation building’ in Germany during and after WWII:

General George C. Marshall

George Catlett Marshall (December 31, 1880 – October 16, 1959) was an American military leader, Chief of Staff of the Army, Secretary of State, and the third Secretary of Defense. Once noted as the "organizer of victory" by Winston Churchill for his leadership of the Allied victory in World War II,[1] Marshall served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff during the war and as the chief military adviser to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As Secretary of State his name was given to the Marshall Plan, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.[2]

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Dwight David “Ike” Eisenhower (October 14, 1890 – March 28, 1969) was the 34th President of the United States from 1953 until 1961 and a five-star general in the United States Army. During the Second World War, he served as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, with responsibility for planning and supervising the successful invasion of France and Germany in 1944–45. In 1951, he became the first supreme commander of NATO.[1]

Following the German unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945, Eisenhower was appointed Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone, based in Frankfurt am Main.

General Lucius D. Clay

General Lucius Dubignon Clay (April 23, 1897 – April 16, 1978) was an American general and military governor best known for his administration of Germany immediately after World War II. Clay was deputy to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1945; deputy military governor, Germany (U.S.) 1946; commander in chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and military governor of the U.S. Zone, Germany, 1947–49. He retired in 1949. Clay is considered the "father" of the Berlin Airlift (1948–49)

It’s also interesting to look at the military governors of all of the Occupation Zones in Germany after WWII

The Marshall Plan

The Marshall Plan (from its enactment, officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was the primary plan of the United States for rebuilding and creating a stronger foundation for the countries of Western Europe, and repelling communism after World War II. The initiative was named for Secretary of State George Marshall and was largely the creation of State Department officials, especially William L. Clayton and George F. Kennan.

The reconstruction plan, developed at a meeting of the participating European states, was established on July 12, 1947

In terms of comparing the costs of reconstruction of Germany and Iraq, I have not adjusted WWII dollars to today’s dollars but the comparison none-the-less reveals we have spent big bucks on both.

Ambassador Dobbins has put out some deeper references on ‘how to’ and ‘why’ nation building is important which illustrate the importance (warts and all) of the US Military, among others in this process.

Bottom line it is because of my experiences and reading of history that I state that DIME is the tool used

to forestall, preclude or sidestep a war

and yes sir, this definitely means that sometimes the Army has the lead (before, during, and after a shooting war). This does not mean we should always lead, but whether USG personnel are wearing uniforms, wingtips, or birkenstocks at the end of the day we are all USG and all of us need to be on the same page and working toward a shared goal. Once again, DIME elements (to include the Army) have a role before, during, and after a shooting war.

What you carefully do not do is say who has the lead and the responsibility for the D, the I and the E parts prior to (and that is important) and after initial entry.

The President has final responsibility, and I believe that the NSC may be expanding it's coordination role; however for me I follow my chain of command which means I am nowhere near echelons above reality.

My point is that -- as I said above -- the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge."

You are right, all of us need to work harder on playing team and focus on the win as opposed to who's in charge.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

...In terms of comparing the costs of reconstruction of Germany and Iraq, I have not adjusted WWII dollars to today’s dollars but the comparison none-the-less reveals we have spent big bucks on both.

No question -- however my comment was and is that you cannot in any way compare the scale of devastation in Europewith the relatively minor amount of that in Iraq and that the Marsahll Plan was a State Department initiative that the Army was unlikely to have thought of. Whether they might have eventually is immaterial, it was State's game and thus has nothing to do with the Army and DIME. It has everything to do with the D.I.and E, particularly the Diplomacy which is absolutely not a DoD mission though they have stumbled into it by default and need to stumble out of -- as the SecDef and the CJCS have noted. Nor the Economics, also not a DoD forte. Zip on the M side for the Marshall Plan which has little bearing on what I thought we were discussing.

Ambassador Dobbins has put out some deeper references on ‘how to’ and ‘why’ nation building is important which illustrate the importance (warts and all) of the US Military, among others in this process.

I have stated all along that it is -- so why are you trying to convince me of that?

Bottom line it is because of my experiences and reading of history that I state that DIME is the tool used.

And I have not disputed that, I agreed with that. Again, no need to convince me of it.

and yes sir, this definitely means that sometimes the Army has the lead (before, during, and after a shooting war). This does not mean we should always lead, but whether USG personnel are wearing uniforms, wingtips, or birkenstocks at the end of the day we are all USG and all of us need to be on the same page and working toward a shared goal.

I have agreed with that -- the issue we are having, I think, is the Clintonesque definition of 'sometimes' against my contention that word should be replaced by 'seldom' with respect to most cases for the during and after. My suspicion is that if we concentrated on that and stop diverting to Germany which I really, really wish I had never, ever mentioned and which almost certainly has little relationship to future endeavors we might get to the crux of the matter.

You are right, all of us need to work harder on playing team and focus on the win as opposed to who's in charge.

That was not what I said. That was:

""the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge.""(emphasis added /kw)

Not "all of us" -- just the Army -- the Army needs to accept that the D.I. and E. are not their missions in most cases. It is the Army who should encourage the other agencies of government to get involved because the non-military aspects of DIME they can do better than the Army will. Not because the CA folks cannot do great work but because they are in and / or must operate within the Army Chain of Command and it will never be a priority mission for the Army. It will be supported and its necessity will be acknowledged -- but it will never get adequate priority. That's not history read; that's life observed.

Do not take that as an attack on CA -- it is not and you should realize that. CA is, as I said, needed and the Army needs to be involved; DIME is critical and the Army needs to be involved and prepared to do it all initially in some circumstances, it just in most cases should not be the lead in the sustained pre conflict and FID efforts for the D.I. and E. aspects -- if for no other reason that it does not have the personnel depth to do it properly on a sustained basis. Unless you want to deploy a year on and ten months off -- or worse... .

[Surferbeetle]

we might get to the crux of the matter. That was not what I said. That was:

""the Army needs to foster and encourage significant improvement in other government agencies and should absolutely not try to compete with them in a game of "who's in charge.""(emphasis added /kw)

Not "all of us" -- just the Army -- the Army needs to accept that the D.I. and E. are not their missions in most cases. It is the Army who should encourage the other agencies of government to get involved because the non-military aspects of DIME they can do better than the Army will. Not because the CA folks cannot do great work but because they are in and / or must operate within the Army Chain of Command and it will never be a priority mission for the Army. It will be supported and its necessity will be acknowledged -- but it will never get adequate priority. That's not history read; that's life observed.

Do not take that as an attack on CA -- it is not and you should realize that. CA is, as I said, needed and the Army needs to be involved; DIME is critical and the Army needs to be involved and prepared to do it all initially in some circumstances, it just in most cases should not be the lead in the sustained pre conflict and FID efforts for the D.I. and E. aspects -- if for no other reason that it does not have the personnel depth to do it properly on a sustained basis. Unless you want to deploy a year on and ten months off -- or worse... .

Ken,

I am chasing the macro view with the use of the word 'us' as in all of the USG and I don't take the CA observation personally (and am staying away from the interns as well ). Facts are facts, too much work for too few people and CA work itself is not as high on the priority list as are other missions...got it, no problem.

Lets talk about DIME in terms of USG. We both agree that all of us (DIME people) need to be out there slugging away to solve our nations issues and all of us need to be focused upon our respective parts of the the pie in order to be maximally effective.

Both of us are realists however. DOD has the bodies to mass upon our nations problems, other USG Agencies do not have an expeditionary mindset, do not have an expeditionary structure, and are certainly not funded to the tune of DOD. This is why we have been and are continuing to use multi-tools and duct-tape for permanent repairs.

I haven't read the new budget yet, but press reports do not seem to indicate that our D,I, & E folks have been funded at the DOD level in the new budget...so....GPF forces are doing CMO (Civil Military Operations)/Civil Affairs(CA -ack!)//Military Government(MG)/D,I, & E work just like always (as opposed to sometimes much less seldom) and they will continue to do so until the funding changes.

Wrong, you betcha, but it's the reality of full spectrum my friend. It's always been us (that's why I spent the time on Germany in my previous post), at least they are finally giving us more troops, and are working to reduce the op-tempo with the 2011 withdrawal plan. In the meantime who else but DOD is gonna do it?

Let's just hope the duct tape holds. Maybe we can draft the bankers to help out they certainly need to give back...

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Both of us are realists however. DOD has the bodies to mass upon our nations problems, other USG Agencies do not have an expeditionary mindset, do not have an expeditionary structure, and are certainly not funded to the tune of DOD. This is why we have been and are continuing to use multi-tools and duct-tape for permanent repairs.

True and that's why we've been talking past each other for hours. Yea, verily, I are a realist -- but I also know that the reality you cite is because; as I said in the first post on the topic -- we've always done it that way.

Not because it's smart, not because it is the best solution, not because the civilians cannot be found to go and do -- We proved in Korea and Viet Nam they can be and are slowly, reluctantly doing so again. My point is and has been that the better way to do business now that we have the civilian side involved if not interested is to keep them involved for the future. That is better for the US worldwide DIME effort, better for the Army -- and will be better for those civilian agencies as they will eventually realize.

I haven't read the new budget yet, but press reports do not seem to indicate that our D,I, & E folks have been funded at the DOD level in the new budget...so....GPF forces are doing CMO (Civil Military Operations)/Civil Affairs(CA -ack!)//Military Government(MG) work just like always (as opposed to sometimes) and they will continue to do so until the funding changes.

No one has clue what that budget will look like when the new crowd gets through scrubbing it. In any event, the issue is not this years budget, it's the 2012 and beyond projections.

Wrong, you betcha, but it's the reality of full spectrum my friend.

No, it is the reality of the way we've always done it because DoD picked up the odd jobs in order to get the bucks and / or had enough bucks to do it when Congress cut State and Foreign Aid because they're stupid -- Congress, not the programs.

It's always been us (that's why I spent the time on Germany in my previous post),

Concentrating on a state Department program? Sure it was us in Germany and Japan -- for all the reasons I cited in my first post on the topic -- it could be easily done; not because it was the best solution.

at least they are finally giving us more troops, and are working to reduce the op-tempo with the 2011 withdrawal plan.

Ha. Political smoke and mirrors. Don't put that plan in the bank and don't plan on a slowing optempo.

In the meantime who else but DOD is gonna do it?

Probably the increasing number of State and other folks that are in both theaters -- not enough, but more every month.

That is not the issue - I have acknowledged that DoD has done it by default; that 'is the way we've always done it' but I say it is wrong and that DoD will never do it well because it is not a core task. The guys and gals that actually do it will give it their best shot -- but DoD and the Army or SOCOM will not. You know that as well as I do. Probably better.

We know why we're doing it, we know we will always have to do a good bit of it -- but we should also know that it is to the NATIONs advantage for other agencies to have the lead on much of it.

Let's just hope the duct tape holds. Maybe we can draft the bankers to help out they certainly need to give back...

It'll hold, the kids will make it work but there is a better way. I cannot advocate the continued use of duct tape when there's a better solution. No one pays much attention to me and that's okay -- but as long as one person who might make a difference sees it and even if he or she doesn't do what I suggest, at least gives it some thought. The parochial folks don't want change, those who care more for the good of the country than they do for flags and spaces might precipitate some change.

One thing I know -- you're not going to get much change within DoD from the top -- few of those folks are going to be on the cutting edge of anything. Too risky. Change has to come from the bottom. Slow but it works. Eventually...

The Bankers don't need to give back, they're reasonably clean. It's the Money traders and Investment Houses plus Fannie and Freddy -- and their Allies in Congress -- that need to go to jail. Those same clods in Congress are part of the reason we're using duct tape instead of State, Aid, Ag and Commerce.

We've beat this horse enough today. See you tomorrow...

[Entropy]

From the latest Wright Stuff:

Contemporary interpretations of complex warfare are neither holistic nor precise enough to make a fundamental distinction in strategy – what is static and what is dynamic in a given operational situation? This paper interprets Clausewitz to focus on the unchanging nature and changing character of war, highlighting the importance of discerning both of these aspects to understanding complex warfare. Without a baseline for “the given,” fundamental questions about the causes and context of conflict are not likely to be asked. As a result, plans and operations may produce tactical victories without contributing to desired strategic effects. Currently, three intellectual impediments inhibit our understanding of the nature of war: (1) misapplying Clausewitz’ key concepts of the Trinity; (2) viewing conflict along a uni-dimensional “spectrum of conflict”; and (3) using false dichotomies. These misinterpretations generate imprecise terms and partial concepts that do not adequately address why warfare occurs or capture its changing character in local context. We can overcome these impediments and develop strategic judgment with two basic changes in the way we use Clausewitzian ideas. First, the Trinity should be used to model the nature not just the character of war. This would direct strategists toward the investigation of motives and causes, and lead planners to design those factors into operations rather than assume them away. Second, precise terms with defined opposites should be used. Sharp distinctions, flexibly employed to ascertain what is changing from what is not, could help specify local factors such as causes, key actors, relationships, all key to establishing effective operational priorities.

I haven't read it yet, but it looks interesting.

[William F. Owen]

While I think I get where this guy is coming from, but I was actually a bit confused till be revealed Which Trinity he was referring to -passion, uncertainty, and reason - cos CvC does like Trinities!

What I can't get my head around is this stuff about "Complex Warfare."

Current examples of complex warfare include US-led post-invasion coalition operations in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003), the still smoldering Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah conflict of July-August 2006, and
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Each of these examples involve a variety of armed groups, types and scope of goals, and levels and methods of violence that can suddenly erupt, abate, and reignite due to persistent social instability.

All warfare is and always will be complex! To say it is more complex today than it ever was is an opinion that is evidence free.

What is more, Piracy is really right on the very edge of any workable definition of Warfare, unless they are attempting to do things, they, Pirates historically have not. Piracy is primarily criminal. It may be used in warfare, but that is when it is done with the sanction of a state eg: -"Privateers"

In the round, I like where this guy is coming from, I just don't like how he got here!

[Ron Humphrey]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.

Is it perhaps because just as war is war and people are people, those same ol people require a form of reeducation in all things war on occasion that such takes place due to changes in environment, capabilities, and simply being reminded how expensive both in terms of money,time, and most especially human lives it is.

Second in relation to the first is the majority of this renewed verbiage focused on informing those who defend or those being defended? Is there a major difference?

Thought's