The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.

I wish I could. The reason, as you allude, is probably human, and not an actual technical difference. It's probably a subject for a PhD, probably mine....

[Entropy]

Got it. Can somebody please tell me then, since it is pretty widely acknowledged that the aforementioned is indeed true; why do we constantly used new or different terminology despite that fact.

IMO, a lot has to do with the natural tendency of humans as a species to be self-centered and ignore the relevance of anything beyond recent history. We tend to call something "new" when in reality it is only new to us and think of ourselves as smarter than our ancestors and thereby ignore or underplay the hard lessons they've handed down to us.

[William F. Owen]

And here is the stuff

I also must continue to recommend this book

Don't pay the $89.95. You should be able to find copies for about $30 on abebooks.com

[Taiko]

Just a couple of interesting incites from my own study for my research phd thesis on Clausewitz and the validity of his propositions on the nature of war and its conduct to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies.

1. In Book 8 Chapter 3 when Clausewitz applies his trinitarian definition to explain the variation in the level and intensity of violence in war he uses the Tatar tribes as an example. In todays vocabulary TaTar tribes were non-state transnational actors, with no government other than the people who made up the tribal alliances based on filial hierarchy and tribal customs. Just as importantly, Clausewitz points out that the people were the military. When we look at Iraq and Afghanistan specifically, there are some interesting commonalities. In terms of looking at what Gray has called the secondary trinity, there is no hierarchy or ordering principle amongst the government, military or people. In many cases one part of the triad can be subsumed by another, Clausewitz's account of the feudal era and cabinet wars, where "the people are all but non-existent", is another example at the other end of the spectrum. All three characteristics, in Enchavarria's words, are regulating principles that are subject to time and place. They are intervening variables that effect the political process of policy making (they give violence its purpose) of both state and non-state actors at the strategic level.

2. Keeping this in mind reread pages: 92-94 (Book 1 Chapter 2: Purpose and Means, in the Howard and Paret translation). Of most interest, "operations with direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliances, or paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc." I believe this is applicable to both the non-state insurgencies and the counter-insurgencies efforts of the state. Of most importance is how we define alliance. In terms of traditional/complex insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, the alliance can be seen as the political relationship between the people, military, and the government. Operations with direct political repercussions describes how violence is used for the purpose of either maintaining or disrupting the alliances of either side. In many respects from these two points alone Clausewitz has at a very basic level explained what the purpose of "the surge" in Iraq was about at the strategic level, and could just as easily be applied to the Af/Pak conflict zone. In my opinion, you could almost translate these two points as a summary of Kilcullen's main theory in Accidental Guerrilla. There are other "nuggets of gold" scattered throughout his work that I believe are relevant to understanding insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in general and in specifics.

Admittedly, I am still a novice when it comes to both understanding Clausewitz, insurgencies, and counter-insurgencies. However, as I progress with my thesis I would like to contribute more to this discussion as I believe that Clausewitz can provide some important insights, and I would greatly appreciate any corrections in my understanding of the concepts.

[William F. Owen]

In terms of traditional/complex insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, the alliance can be seen as the political relationship between the people, military, and the government. Operations with direct political repercussions describes how violence is used for the purpose of either maintaining or disrupting the alliances of either side. In many respects from these two points alone Clausewitz has at a very basic level explained what the purpose of "the surge" in Iraq was about at the strategic level, and could just as easily be applied to the Af/Pak conflict zone.

You are correct. Attacking or seeking to effect the internal relationships inherent to Clausewitz's description. Thus all insurgencies and all conflict is complex, just based on the number of relationships and the speed at whih they change. There is no, and never has been, any simple conflict or simple insurgency. IMO, attempting to define these things as "complex" actually obscures understanding.

In my opinion, you could almost translate these two points as a summary of Kilcullen's main theory in Accidental Guerrilla. There are other "nuggets of gold" scattered throughout his work that I believe are relevant to understanding insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in general and in specifics.

Well in my Military Thought reading list, Clausewitz is at the top, but "Accidental" does not even make the list. - and there's the reason.

[Bob's World]

Part of the problem we face now is that on top of a fairly sound family of doctrinal terms we overlaid new terms that overlapped, like "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance."

We've also tweaked old definitions to better fit either the things we were doing, or the foggy perceptions of what was going on around us. "Unconventional Warfare" was abused in the name of this, though recently ADM Olson intervened and reinstated the classic, narrow definition for UW.

Then there is our experience and sloppy aplication of terms. Calling everything either "Insurgency" and therefore "Counterinsurgency" also added murk to the waters. The major operations in Iraq and Afganistan are arguably neither one COIN for US forces, yet for a generation COIN is defined by these operations.

Meanwhile, where has SOF, arguably the keeper of these torches, been? Out hunting bad guys, like the intel guys told us to.

Time to clean this mess up a bit; and efforts are underway to do so. Patience everyone.

[slapout9]

Time to clean this mess up a bit; and efforts are underway to do so. Patience everyone.

Now you are talking

[Taiko]

My apologies for a lengthy post. I have been thinking about this subject for quite some time, however, up until now I have not had the chance to discuss it with people who have knowledge on the subject area. My supervisor has a wealth of knowledge on terrorism and insurgency, but little on Clausewitz, so I have had to muddle through the master theorists work on my own.


From a Clausewitzian perspective war is war. Its very essence is a violent clash of two or more opposing wills. For Clausewitz, why we fight is more important than how we fight. If we can understand why we are fighting it will be a lot easier to work out how to fight. I think that he would be amused at the length strategic theorists have gone in developing labels and theories for warfare, and would remind us the this is what Jomini, Bulow, and Lloyd were essentially doing, and point out this is why their theories are now dated and of relevance only to specific circumstances. I think he would argue that whatever adjective you would like to attach to warfare be it conventional, unconventional, regular or irregular, traditional or complex insurgency and counter insurgency, high and low intensity conflict, war is war. He would also warn us that in becoming too preoccupied with the type of warfare we are fighting we may commit the cardinal sin of losing sight of the political objective, and focus too narrowly on the military aim.

One of the roles of theory is to provide a common language that policy-makers, military professionals, and civilian academics can use in order to better communicate their understanding of the phenomena they are dealing with. I will argue that CvC's paradoxical trinity provides this language. The paradoxical trinity was designed to explain the nature of war. CvC argued that in order to conduct war successfully it is pivotal that we understand the nature of it. In addition, war's nature, that is the level and intensity of violence, is variable. It changes from war to war, and just as importantly its nature may change multiple times during a single war.

To use Afghanistan as an example:

Using CvC tripartite definition of war, the nature of the initial stages of the Afghan conflict would look something like this.

US: (violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions,chance and probability-policy-(politics) government, military, people

Warlords: (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings/intentions-policy-(politics) military, people, government

Taliban: (violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability-policy-(politics) government, military, people

The arrangement of the intervening variables is obviously subject to debate. However, the debate begins with the nature of the war, why we are fighting, rather than, how to fight the war, and it uses a common language. The logic being once we can establish which of the intervening variables plays the most dominant role in determining the nature of the war, we can then move onto to developing the strategies, operational and tactical methods to conduct the war. If we fast forward to present conditions in Afghanistan we can establish that the nature of war has changed since its initial phases.

US: (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings/intentions-policy-(politics) government, military, people

Coalition Partners: (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings-policy-(politics) people, government, military

Afghanistan (state): (violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings and intentions-policy-(politics) government, military, people

Taliban: (violence) chance and probability, hostile feelings/intentions, purpose-policy-(politics) military, people, government

We could even break this down further to the international, regional, district, and local level in order to build a picture of the nature of the war in progress ,the plethora of actors involved, the level of intensity in violence and the various political objectives. As such, the trinity can be used not only at the policy-making level, but by the junior officer at the tactical level, to inform their judgement on the nature of the war and how to conduct it. For example, we could also include all coalition partners and other states with invested interests in the conflict in order to get a full picture at the international level. Alternatively, we could go to the local level to identify the nature of the various tribal interest and their alliances, the level of violence, the military aims and political objectives. As we can see, war and warfare is a very complex phenomena, because in reality each actor needs to take into account its own variables as well as the variables of all the other actors in order to determine the level of intensity in violence and where that violence can be directed in order to achieve the political purpose which called the war into being.

At no stage in developing this understanding of the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan did I need to specifically refer to a specific style of warfare. To be quite honest, I believe that the phrase 'military operations' does not need an adjective to describe how we should conduct the war in Afghanistan at the general level. That is the task of the paradoxical trinity and why CvC spent over 30 years developing it. The preoccupation with trying to label 'warfare' distracts us from the main task of establishing what the specific nature and characteristics of the war are, and determining the strategic, operational, and tactical methods needed to meet the level and intensity of the violence to fulfill our political purpose.

I am not arguing that the amount of work that has gone into understanding how to fight the war in Afghanistan, or similar conflicts, is superfluous. Far from it. Rather, in a similar vein to CvC, I'm arguing that we should shift the ontological term of reference away from warfare and trying to establish principles of military victory, and back towards the nature of war and its conduct, that is, how to use violence in order to achieve a political objective. This is where the study of civil wars, revolutionary wars, wars of independence, cabinet wars, world wars (insert adjective of choice) etc. can serve its purpose, as it will help in creating a better understanding of what roles each of the intervening variables play in determining the nature of the war we are fighting and the level of intensity in the violence used.

Just to finish off quickly. I think that it is important to recognise the limits of Clausewitz's theory. In writing On War, it is my opinion that CvC's sole purpose was to write about the role and use of combat to achieve a political objective. As has been shown, due to the complex task of warfare, the militaries role in a conflict is just that, combat. In Afghanistan, for example, the military role is to disrupt the attempts of the Taliban and A'Q from developing military and political alliances with the Afghan people. And, create alliances with the Afghan people in order to determine friend from foe. This will determine the level and intensity of violence needed in order to achieve the military aim. Their sole purpose is to create the space needed in order for civilians, Afghani civilians with help from American civilian agencies, to develop the foundations for a stable government at the local, regional, national and international level. Essentially, develop the military and political environment that leaves the Taliban/A Q with zero military and political support. That is after all the most basic political purpose of the war. I'll leave it at that, however, there is obviously more nuance to CvC's theory, to the conflict in Afghanistan and the political objectives in play, but I guess that is for my thesis.

If anyone is interested I have just completed a work in progress paper (3000 words), as part of the requirements of my research phd, on CvC's paradoxical trinity. Feel free to PM me for a copy

[William F. Owen]

Taiko

Good post. For me, 90% of you are saying reflects my often repeated opinions here. Particularly

• From a Clausewitzian perspective war is war. Its very essence is a violent clash of two opposing wills. For Clausewitz, why we fight is more important than how we fight.
• One of the roles of theory is to provide a common language that policy-makers, military professionals, and civilian academics can use in order to better communicate their understanding of the phenomena they are dealing with.
• At no stage in developing this understanding of the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan did I need to specifically refer to a specific style of warfare. To be quite honest, I believe that the phrase 'military operations' does not need an adjective to describe how we should conduct the war in Afghanistan at the general level.

On the last point, describing the nature of the conflict, is only necessary for purposes of how modern militaries understand war, and not how war actually is. People get upset when you say "War is War."

This is where the study of civil wars, revolutionary wars, wars of independence, cabinet wars, world wars (insert adjective of choice) etc. can serve its purpose, as it will help in creating a better understanding of what roles each of the intervening variables play in determining the nature of the war we are fighting and the level of intensity in the violence used.

Again that is useful.

Have you read this

[Ron Humphrey]

Taiko

Good post. For me, 90% of you are saying reflects my often repeated opinions here. Particularly

• From a Clausewitzian perspective war is war. Its very essence is a violent clash of two opposing wills. For Clausewitz, why we fight is more important than how we fight.
• One of the roles of theory is to provide a common language that policy-makers, military professionals, and civilian academics can use in order to better communicate their understanding of the phenomena they are dealing with.
• At no stage in developing this understanding of the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan did I need to specifically refer to a specific style of warfare. To be quite honest, I believe that the phrase 'military operations' does not need an adjective to describe how we should conduct the war in Afghanistan at the general level.

On the last point, describing the nature of the conflict, is only necessary for purposes of how modern militaries understand war, and not how war actually is. People get upset when you say "War is War."

Again that is useful.

Have you read this

get upset
Aside from the most likely reason which may be that many like myself don't really know better(Don't know what we don't know) Thus the benefit in those such as are on this forum sharing the experience in efforts to correct said ignorance.

Still at least for myself the issue with the generality of the the statement is that it leaves me perplexed when I look around at the various conflicts throughout the globe and how in each respectively it probably seems very warlike yet might not be defined as such in many minds.

- If a one tribe out of forty has chosen to actively engage in combat against a given party yet the others are also interacting with both that tribe and the opposed party whose at war and whose SFA or FID or just plain politikin

- Is the mexican government at war with La Familia and others or is it simply LE

Are the FARC and the gov of Columbia at war or is the gov practicing CT/CN/LE

Are the battles the Pakistani Army are engaged in right now War or something else does that determination effect whether ISAF is at war or FID/SFA in regards to direct action.

- Many other examples come to mind which at first blush tend to reinforce the commonality your statement implies but in the same they also seem to be far more or less than war; context depending.

Finally if one accepts that a given action is war than don't you necessarily have to determine what comes between War and Peace and at which point or under which circumstances that is?

Oh heck Now I've confused myself
Help

[William F. Owen]

Still at least for myself the issue with the generality of the the statement is that it leaves me perplexed when I look around at the various conflicts throughout the globe and how in each respectively it probably seems very warlike yet might not be defined as such in many minds.

For me, War is, as CvC said it was, the setting forth of policy by other means. Within that, I include any and all forms of violence that challenge the power of the state. FARC and Narco Gangs in Mexico are good examples of exactly that.

The primary purpose of Government is the defence of the nation, in it's widest sense. Any violent attempt at changing that, or even modifying it, is War/conflict/armed struggle/pick your bumper sticker.

Now there are many other forms of armed violence. That between criminal gangs for example, but this is where considering the purpose, and not the nature of the conflict becomes relevant. Conflict between criminals are armed struggles over the population, terrain, and economic resources. The same maybe true of nomads and tribes. Point being, all these conflict reflect enduring and relationships between them.

Is a little group of nomads fighting to protect a water hole is the same as a super power fighting to protect it's oil? I submit it is, and it is useful to recognise it.

[Taiko]

Finally if one accepts that a given action is war than don't you necessarily have to determine what comes between War and Peace and at which point or under which circumstances that is?Help

War is not an isolated phenomena. It has its own grammar (warfare), but not its own logic. In other words, war has no inherent nature or laws of its own. Social conditions give rise to war and are the same conditions that circumscribe and moderate it. Just as importantly, the social conditions themselves are not part of war, as they already exist before fighting starts, hence, war is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means. War is a sub-concept of politics, it is politics that provides war with its logic and gives it its nature.

War begins not with the attack by Actor A, but with the defense of the attack by Actor B. Without the violent clash of opposing wills, attack and defense, there is no war, as defined by CvC. It ends when the political objective that calls war into being is achieved, that is to say, when one actor's will over the other meets no violent resistance, or when pure exhaustion on either sides results in neither being able to enforce its will on the other resulting, once again, in the ending of physical resistance. The political objective that calls war into being determines when it ends, that is to say, the political objective determines what the peace will look like. How that peace is established, the acceptance of the new political/social conditions by both actors, will also set up the possible conditions for a future war. World War 1 and 2 are classic examples of the interplay of politics, peace and war, or of war as the continuation of politics by other means. The countless wars within the various states of Africa could also be used as an example.

[William F. Owen]

War begins not with the attack by Actor A, but with the defense of the attack by Actor B. Without the violent clash of opposing wills, attack and defense, there is no war, as defined by CvC.

Hmmmm... I like that. Good observation. This would also define the attack of Actor A, as a de-facto "act of war," in that B would seek to oppose it. EG: Hitler's various unopposed occupations were acts of war, but uncontested, thus no war.

...so Bin Laden's and AQs various attacks or "acts of war" do not lead to a "war" until 911.

[slapout9]

For me, War is, as CvC said it was, the setting forth of policy by other means. Within that, I include any and all forms of violence that challenge the power of the state. FARC and Narco Gangs in Mexico are good examples of exactly that.

The primary purpose of Government is the defence of the nation, in it's widest sense. Any violent attempt at changing that, or even modifying it, is War/conflict/armed struggle/pick your bumper sticker.

Now there are many other forms of armed violence. That between criminal gangs for example, but this is where considering the purpose, and not the nature of the conflict becomes relevant. Conflict between criminals are armed struggles over the population, terrain, and economic resources. The same maybe true of nomads and tribes. Point being, all these conflict reflect enduring and relationships between them.

Is a little group of nomads fighting to protect a water hole is the same as a super power fighting to protect it's oil? I submit it is, and it is useful to recognise it.

Wilf,using violence to impose your will on your opponent is almost an exact definition of a crime against a person. So was 911 a crime or an act of war? Can it be both at the same time?

[Bob's World]

Just as war is politics by other means, war is far more than just the violent application of politics as it is the overall continuum that is important, and not just the violent phase viewed in isolation. To do so removes perspective and purpose from the actions of the parties, and makes it merely a mindless test of strength and will. The key in warfare is not simply to prevail in that physical contest, but to also achieve the political objective. HOW one addresses the physical will largely determine if one shapes the right conditions - physical, mental, emotional, etc among both the victor and the vanquished, the warriors, and the populaces and governments that set them on this course.

Our definition for FID runs the full range, from "phase 0" times of peace up through full combat operations and back again. It is continuous.

COIN, on the other hand, as currently defined, ignores the critical "road to war" phase (99% of the time for most populaces, and 50% for even the most unstable of populaces) and only begins once the violence does. This asymmetry of definitions is, in my mind, a major obstacle to clear understanding in this area.

So, concepts that I am playing with to clean up understanding and enhance effectiveness of engagement:

What I am playing with is a proposal to expand the spectrum of COIN to match the spectrum of FID;

To clarify that COIN is executed by the HN; and that FID is that done by those who intervene to support the HN; and UW that which is done by those who intervene to counter the HN/support the dissident.


There is a similar asymmetry in the definitions of FID and SFA. FID is restricted to just internal threats, but all forms of engagement. SFA is expanded to include external threats, but is limited to just security force engagement. The proposal I support (from the boys at Bragg) is to simply expand FID to also include external threats; at which point SFA neatly nests under FID as a clear subset.


Oh, and as to CvC: His writing is based on State vs State conflict, and must be read as such. As he stated himself in regards to the struggles Napoleon faced in dealing with the Spanish populace-based resistance to his occupation. (Paraphrasing) "This is something very different. I don't understand it, but I know it is different and I need to think about it..."

So do we.

[Taiko]

Oh, and as to CvC: His writing is based on State vs State conflict, and must be read as such. As he stated himself in regards to the struggles Napoleon faced in dealing with the Spanish populace-based resistance to his occupation. (Paraphrasing) "This is something very different. I don't understand it, but I know it is different and I need to think about it..."

I would disagree with this assessment. Two points to begin with.

1. Clausewitz stated that a "more general and theoretical treatment of the subject may become feasible if we consider the nature of states and societies as they are determined by their time and prevailing conditions...all conduct war in their own particular way, using different methods, and pursuing different aims". I will invoke the spirit of Colin Gray on this one, and argue that "war is a social institution and it is wage by societies, not only by states". In Book One Chapter One he uses the word 'state' once. In his tripartite definition of war he uses the word government, not state. In applying his trinitarian definition he used the example of the nomadic tartar tribes. In Book 1 Chapter 2 on the purpose and means of war he never refers to the state or state vs state conflict.

2. In developing the concept of center of gravity, "in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion".

Clausewitz's initial military experience was in the twilight of the cabinet wars of the Monarchies. As an adult he observed the birth of the nation-state, and witnessed war approach its absolute level. Society and how its was governed, the structure of the state, was fundamentally different in both cases. With Prussia's first defeat by Napoleon he counseled for a popular uprising and the forming of militias. In addition, there are also the lectures he gave and untranslated monographs he wrote on small wars and he spent a considerable amount of time studying guerilla warfare.

I agree with your assessment of the purpose of violence in your first sentence (sorry I haven't worked out how to multi-quote yet), however, Clausewitz's theory is combat-centric. In saying that, I do believe that it was Clausewitz who introduced the concept of the physical and psychological effort needed in order to impose one's will on an opponent. As "military force is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated".

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,using violence to impose your will on your opponent is almost an exact definition of a crime against a person. So was 911 a crime or an act of war? Can it be both at the same time?

Was 911 perpetrated for political purposes? If yes, then yes. Forget the act. What was the purpose?

[William F. Owen]

J
Oh, and as to CvC: His writing is based on State vs State conflict, and must be read as such.

None of that is true. If you want to read CvC in a myopic and simplistic way, then go ahead, but that is not how it was intended to be read or the purpose to which the work was directed. To whit,

The key in warfare is not simply to prevail in that physical contest, but to also achieve the political objective. - something best said, and best explained by CvC.

[Bob's World]

None of that is true. If you want to read CvC in a myopic and simplistic way, then go ahead, but that is not how it was intended to be read or the purpose to which the work was directed. To whit,

The key in warfare is not simply to prevail in that physical contest, but to also achieve the political objective. - something best said, and best explained by CvC.

Actually, probably more "myopic and simplistic" would be to take one man's incomplete writings, based on a very particular experience set and timeframe, and apply them with Biblical certainty to every circumstance... but that's just me.

There is great value in CvC, but it is what it is, no more and no less.

[Taiko]

Clausewitz is more often quoted than read. There is little wonder that he was afraid of being subject to misinterpretation and half baked criticism, for "in matters of this kind everyone feels he is justified to publish the first thing that comes into his head when he picks up a pen" I have that printed out over my desk and it is something I keep in mind everyday before I type a single word.