Plowing Over the Taliban

[JMA]

JMA, As I said, we can agree to disagree. But when you do disagree, ensure you read what I say and argue with that.

Bob you are not being entirely on the level here.

I said simply that your interpretation of what Wilf stated about "... that defeat of the insurgent through warfare is victory" is wrong. I stand by that. With the end of armed violence it reverts back to a civil issue which may be legal or illegal but which ever way able to be controlled by the civil power (for that read the police). To understand more clearly where Wilf is coming from here it would be worth your while to research the British MCP - (military aid to the civil power) Doctrine.

Working off this basis when he says:

...were it not for that one condition, (the armed opposition) the British Army would not be (in Afghanistan), ...

illegal political challenge is not "day to day," and it is a populace driven to the belief that it must operate outside the law to achieve resolution of issues that the government is unwilling to address through legal means that makes the essence of insurgency.

Now whether the opposition is legal or illegal it does not matter until such time as it reaches the level of armed opposition and by which time the civil power can no longer control and contain the situation and calls in the military.

Note: not every demand made by political groups (especially in a democracy) that the current sitting government denies justifies the move to illegal action. This also applies to so called regional minority rights (as applicable to the National Pashtoon minority concentrated in Helmand - they may be the largest single group but they are a national minority and have no say if they are at odds with the remainder of the country).

Defeating the enemy creates your freedom of action to do all else.

You understand this?

The military should be last in and first out in government prevention and response to insurgency. Definitions that only recognize the high end violent aspect of insurgency is like a definition of icebergs that only recognizes that portion rising above the surface of the water. One can attack that portion of the iceberg for a long time and only give rise to more ice. Same if one treats insurgency the same way.

Wilf indicates that with the advent of armed opposition the military will by necessity get involved. When the armed opposition is crushed then the army can return to barracks.

That is his point (as I understand it) what is yours?

A civil emergency is civil business. That is the vast majority of insurgency.

Until such time as (probably due to armed insurrection) the military is required/instructed to deploy to provide aid to the civil power it remains a civil matter.

In a country awash with weapons, (armed) warlord militias, (armed) drug lord militias, and the Taliban with its mercenary forces that may well be ealier rather than later in the insurgency cycle.

I will agree with WILF on this point: "War is war." Where we disagree is that I do not believe that insurgency is war.

Mere semantics.

[Bob's World]

The "enemy" you seek so aggressively to defeat is your own populace. Do YOU understand that?? Do you beat your children when they disagree with you so that you might have a bit more "freedom of maneuver" around the house??

The British model, like that of the US, is rooted in lessons learned from forcing our foreign will and interests onto some populace that was typically quite dissatisfied with the government we had so nicely provided them with. That all belongs in the dustbin of history, and modern tomes based on those same lessons, such as FM 3-24, should be tossed in along with.

All I have done is open the aperture to look at the totality of the dynamic so that we can address the entire problem with a whole of government approach throughout its lifespan. To have a separate military doctrine that declares that insurgency suddenly becomes "war" and must be militarily crushed every time it surges beyond some arbitrary line, only to become "civil" once again as it drops below is the type of nonsensical fiction that makes most COIN campaigns such frustratingly long, drawn-out affairs.

I realize that Civilian governments love to punt their messy failures to the military to clean up for them. They will sometimes need military assistance, but should never be able to pass off their civic responsibility in the process.

I realize that the military is trained, organized and equipped to wage war, and that violent insurgency looks a lot like war. The urge to do what one is trained, organized and equipped to do against something that looks so much like what one was trained, organized and equipped to address is powerful. But insurgency is not war, and to follow those instincts is to make the matter worse, and merely suppress the symptoms at best, and almost always making the root problems worse in the process.

Again, we agree to disagree. I appreciate very much where you are coming from. I just believe it is high time to move forward. Today's suppressed insurgencies are the latent energy that organizations such as AQ tap into to wage their non-state campaigns of transnational terror. Old tactics as you, WILF, and many others promote make organizations such as AQ stronger, and create greater risks for our populaces at home and our interests abroad.

You are so fixated on your target that you have forgotten your mission.

[JMA]

The "enemy" you seek so aggressively to defeat is your own populace. Do YOU understand that?? Do you beat your children when they disagree with you so that you might have a bit more "freedom of maneuver" around the house??

No, no, no, Robert. The Afghanistan situation is not like Kent State University (1970) or the current Wall St sit-in.

This is a screwed up country. Let me agree with you on a political level. NATO should not be propping up a illegitimate and corrupt Karzai regime.

That said 100,000 troops are deployed to that end.

Who are they fighting? What are they fighting for? If any of them have an answer to either or of those questions then the follow up question should be why are they doing such an inept job.

The first enemy in the field is the Taliban and their paid mercenary army (funded by US allies and the proceeds of drug sales). A totally hopeless situation. Then there are warlords and drug lords who it appears are allies (sometimes).

So (like you) if they don't know who the enemy is then what is the chance off success? Zero.

The British model, like that of the US, is rooted in lessons learned from forcing our foreign will and interests onto some populace that was typically quite dissatisfied with the government we had so nicely provided them with. That all belongs in the dustbin of history, and modern tomes based on those same lessons, such as FM 3-24, should be tossed in along with.

The British model? I said British MCP doctrine. As to COIN models the Brits don't have a model, the Brits don't have a f*$£%$£ clue.

I can agree with you that FM 3-24 should be tossed by I suspect for different reasons.

All I have done is open the aperture to look at the totality of the dynamic so that we can address the entire problem with a whole of government approach throughout its lifespan. To have a separate military doctrine that declares that insurgency suddenly becomes "war" and must be militarily crushed every time it surges beyond some arbitrary line, only to become "civil" once again as it drops below is the type of nonsensical fiction that makes most COIN campaigns such frustratingly long, drawn-out affairs.

No Bob keep it simple (remember KISS?)

As soon as the situation gets beyond the ability of the civili power (with its police to handle) then the military gets called in. Generally this is when a armed insurrection starts.

Of course the government can always surrender immediately to avoid any messy 'long, drawn-out affairs' yes?

The line is not arbitrary it is when the situation develops beyond the control of the civil authority. In most cases they leave it too long before the military is brought in.

I realize that Civilian governments love to punt their messy failures to the military to clean up for them. They will sometimes need military assistance, but should never be able to pass off their civic responsibility in the process.

The military (both US and Brit) have not been smart either. At the top end of the political and military structures it all looks very much like the Keystone Cops. The military should not accept the civil authority passing them the baby either. Weak generals are really no good to politicians or the military... and that's the state the US and the Brits are in.

I realize that the military is trained, organized and equipped to wage war, and that violent insurgency looks a lot like war. The urge to do what one is trained, organized and equipped to do against something that looks so much like what one was trained, organized and equipped to address is powerful. But insurgency is not war, and to follow those instincts is to make the matter worse, and merely suppress the symptoms at best, and almost always making the root problems worse in the process.

The military aspect of fighting the insurgency is separate from the other. If you do not believe that the military is what is required to deal with the armed insurrection aspect of an insurgency then what is?

Again, we agree to disagree. I appreciate very much where you are coming from. I just believe it is high time to move forward. Today's suppressed insurgencies are the latent energy that organizations such as AQ tap into to wage their non-state campaigns of transnational terror. Old tactics as you, WILF, and many others promote make organizations such as AQ stronger, and create greater risks for our populaces at home and our interests abroad.

Bob, you are maneuvering around like wet soap in the shower. The problem is that (what you call) old tactics are not being used. Just what tactics are being used are not clear. Not sure they are working though.

You are so fixated on your target that you have forgotten your mission.

What is the mission Bob?

[Bob's World]

As I said, we'll agree to disagree. If you find that "slippery" of me, so be it. My platform is simple:

1. Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to government rising from a base of support within some significant and distinct segment, or segments, of the populace; and employing any mix of violent or non-violent tactics.

2. Such internal conflicts are natural, and the conditions they arise from appear to be driven primarily by perceptions within such populace groups along the following critical areas. It is these perceptions that must be addressed, regardless of if the tactics chosen to illegally address them are violent or nonviolent.

Sovereignty: How government acts to protect the entire populace
Legitimacy: Recognition of the right of government to govern
Justice: How the people feel about the application of the Rule of Law
Respect/Dignity: Official fairness/opportunity across the populace
Faith/Hope: Belief in trusted, certain, legal means to shape government

The primary source of causation is the government; though any number of internal or external actors with an equally wide array of agendas may well step up to exploit such conditions once the govenrment has created them.

Those who see insurgency as war attack the symptoms of the problems. They focus on these exploitative actors, their agendas and their ideolgies. Success in such operations will suppress the symptoms for some period of time, but is usually chalked up as a "win" so little follow on work is ever done to actually address the aspects of governance that caused this exploitable situation in the first place. In such places insurgencie re-occur over and over and over...

Those who see insurgency as a broader civil emergency act as reaonably necessary to mitigate the impact of the violence (government has a duty to protect the populace from all forms of violence, to include governmental violence) while focusing on understanding and addressing the root causal perceptions along the above mentioned lines.

Approaches that focus on "effectiveness" of government and that are overly weighted with development and nation building are as symtomatic and inneffective as those approaches that overly focus on "threats."

Like I said, you don't have to agree, and I will certainly not agree with you or WILF. I believe I am boringly repetitive on these points, only making minor changes as I refine my position. I have posted them here and elsewhere repeatedly, and have published several articles to the same effect. Hardly "slippery."