Plowing Over the Taliban

[RHaston]

I flew medevac in Northern Helmand June-November. The guys liked the following idea. My boss added that subsidizing soybeans would deny them the cornfields as cover.

Rather than turn it into a giant thesis (I've looked into all the details about wood for fuel, etc.) I tried to see how few words I could put it in.

Seeing that you could start with one dozer and a truckload of fencing and irrigation pipe, it would be easy to test. I know the exact tree line to start with.


Plowing Over the Taliban


We overlooked why the Taliban are so entrenched – it’s the trenches. Afghanistan is wasteland except for a 5 kilometer wide ribbon of antiquated overgrown irrigation trenches and mud walls. Any soldier will tell you, the denser and wider the web, the thicker the bullets. This war costs $18,000 an acre, annually.

Each troop removed could buy a million feet of wire fence or irrigation pipe. The lead should be the USDA, not the USMC. Afghanistan’s green belt could be cleaner than Kansas. The farmers would love us. Hunting the Taliban would become unsporting.


Robert Haston, LtCol, 920th Rescue Wing

[jcustis]

Sir,

What do you propose is done with the fencing and irrigation pipe?

Destroy the current organization of earthen land plot dividers and lay pipe where earthen canals currently exist?

I could fight in the plains of the Midwest and still have enough micro-terrain to stymie an opposing force that is MRAP bound and constrained by counter-mobility devices (IEDs).

[davidbfpo]

Robert,

Welcome aboard SWC and your first post is intriguing. I shall wait for those with agricultural and development expertise to comment. Jon of course has his own perspective having been in the south of Helmand.

[Infanteer]

Do they want us to demolish their centuries old agricultural system and replace it with soybeans, fencing and pipes (that they'll be unable to replace after we leave)?

I don't think we are dealing with a Pashtun insurgency because of the thickness of a grapehut.

[Bob's World]

Afghanistan is an intriguing land to fly over and look down upon.

I think this concept is an important one as it highlights how many smart, capable, professionals sent to Afghanistan see the problem that they are attempting to resolve. They see the insurgency in Afghanistan as being caused by the insurgents, and that if we simply clear the critical spaces of insurgents, or separate the insurgents from the populace (whatever that means), or in this case presumably convert the spaces they operate withing to have less obstacles to our maneuver or cover to hide behind?

But insurgents don't cause insurgency any more than a hacking cough causes the flu. They are an obvious, painful symptom of the disease, but they are not the disease, they are not the cause, and the defeat of them is no more the cure than suppression of that afore mentioned annoying cough.

Like the cough, however, the presence of insurgents is a powerful indicator that an unhealthy situation exists that must be dealt with properly, as left alone it could progress until it threatens the life of the "patient", which in this case is the affected nation state (regardless of how "primitive" it may seem compared to the ones we all live in, the factors of human nature and human dynamics that insurgency is shaped by are largely constant in humans everywhere).

Most Afghan insurgents come from families and tribes and ethnic groups that are excluded from full participation in the economic and political aspects of their own country. Most come from families and tribes and ethnic groups that were included in this under the Taliban, but have become excluded as US and foreign action shifted the balance of power over to the Northern Alliance, and then dedicated itself to preserving that artificial shift.

In a heavily patronage society, where concepts of loyalty and revenge burn deep, such a shift forced upon one is something that one cannot simply ignore. It is more than just a desire for power, or wealth; it is a duty of dignity and honor to resist.

In a perfect world Karzai and the Northern Alliance would demand that ISAF stop perpetuating this unsustainable situation with our blood and treasure and allow them to shred their current constitution that codifies this monopoly of Northern Alliance governance and that turns traditional Afghan patronage into a massive Ponzi scheme that enriches them unfairly and denies the people at the local level of the traditional benefits of Afghan-style governance. They would conduct a massive Loya Jirga to bring all Afghans into fair competition for power and influence and would craft a new constitution designed to create trust between these parties who have no natural reason to trust each other. The kind of trust necessary for any such diverse populace to advance.

But this is not a perfect world. Karzai and the rest of the Northern Alliance prefer the low level violence and the artificial situation that ISAF provides. That is good enough for them. When one knows they are illegitimately in power, a reliance on foreign protection and endless insurgency are success.

So no, the roots of this conflict are not in the valleys of the Helmand, they are in the halls of Kabul and Washington. Mostly due to well-intended ignorance by most, but guided by very intentional self-serving objectives by others.

[JMA]

Afghanistan is an intriguing land to fly over and look down upon.

I think this concept is an important one as it highlights how many smart, capable, professionals sent to Afghanistan see the problem that they are attempting to resolve. They see the insurgency in Afghanistan as being caused by the insurgents, and that if we simply clear the critical spaces of insurgents, or separate the insurgents from the populace (whatever that means), or in this case presumably convert the spaces they operate withing to have less obstacles to our maneuver or cover to hide behind?

He makes a valid point Bob. It is the politicians that send the soldiers into Helmand. It is the soldiers who must do the best they can while they are there. It is a fair question to ask why the junk woodland and scrub bush which has provided cover for the TB has not been cleared after five years of heavy activity in the area. Why do you think this has not been done? When the Marines arrived in Helmand they used bulldozers to widen roads so as to not become trapped in the narrow lanes with high walls on each side. Why did they not pay Afghan labour to clear the bush along the canals (as he suggests)?

[I][B]Most Afghan insurgents come from families and tribes and ethnic groups that are excluded from full participation in the economic and political aspects of their own country. Most come from families and tribes and ethnic groups that were included in this under the Taliban, but have become excluded as US and foreign action shifted the balance of power over to the Northern Alliance, and then dedicated itself to preserving that artificial shift.

Actually Bob they are doing quite well given all the drug money floating around and the aid money the US is throwing down the toilet there. So if the US is intent on throwing money away why not consider fixing the terrain to their advantage?

This view from the air is critically important, more so than grunts walking up and down the same paths day after day at mine clearing pace and finding IEDs along the way. How can one be 'holding' the ground if the TB and their local helpers have free reign (normally at night) to plant/lay IEDs?

The military have a job to do on the ground and will have until 2014 so they can't just sit on their hands and take causalities while they wait for their tour to end.

It is becoming commonly reported from Afghans now days that within three months of the departure of ISAF the TB will take over control of those areas again.

In a heavily patronage society, where concepts of loyalty and revenge burn deep, such a shift forced upon one is something that one cannot simply ignore. It is more than just a desire for power, or wealth; it is a duty of dignity and honor to resist.

And this is not something the soldier deployed on the ground in Helmand can do anything about. You can take this problem to the politicians on their behalf while they get on with attempting to achieve something during their tour and staying alive in the process.

In a perfect world ...

It is not a perfect world and the politicians are screwing it up again.

So while the politicians try to figure their way out of the problem of their own making let the men on the ground do something that will achieve their lot.

[ganulv]

The social and legal context of irrigation is never anything less than complex. There is generally a good deal of haggling and friction involved, as to be expected when dealing with the scarcity of a vital resource. Think Chinatown. Now think Chinatown in a place were almost none of the outside parties understands even the physical infrastructure of local water networks.