Plowing Over the Taliban

[ganulv]

Am I incorrect in assuming that if a plan to clear the canal edges of their secondary growth were announced (and even if it were not I am sure word would go out on Radio Bemba) that the ACM would start an aggressive IED-laying effort in said environment? In the absence of a USDA ordnance disposal program no such plan is going to come about without the commitment of military assets. Even if an operation like that could be accomplished with zero casualties is the best judgment still that those resources aren’t of better use elsewhere?

[jcustis]

IEDs would be one obstacle for sure. Widespread razing of the scrub brush border (of which there really isn't a lot that affects our sensors) is sort of like using the hammer to swat a fly, and yes, the time and resources would be better expended elsewhere. The swath of arable land bordering the Helmand might be narrow, but it is massive when taken in sum.

We have had a hard fight in the Korengal, but we're not going to be razing the hillsides there to clear out the tree cover.

The root systems of the vegetation bordering land plots also serves to support the hand wrought canal troughs. When the seasonal floodings occur, the vegetation actually contributes to the farmer's livelihood. Destroying that can only have terrible second and third order effects, and again lead to pissing more people off, and turning then deeper towards the insurgency. Gen McChrystal had that concern right, and that's part of the reason why we don't swing hammers like that.

[Dayuhan]

What do you think was being suggested by the soybean crop substitution? Would a low growing substitute for a high growing, cover providing maize crop sound reasonable to you? You have an alternative suggestion?

Now as to the potential of being cozy with the locals I certainly hope that neither you nor any other person around here still entertains the idiotic notion that the 'hearts and minds' of the people of Helmand is still up for grabs after five odd years of throwing zillions of dollars at them and countless hours/days/months/years of groveling butt-licking by assorted ISAF forces and the promise of leaving in three years?

Substituting a low crop for a high one sounds like a wonderful solution. Bringing in a bunch of USDA technical people to introduce new crops and replace canals with piped irrigation sounds like a wonderful solution. Then you think about what you'd have to do to make that happen, and it sounds less wonderful.

Your troops are being shot at from cultivated areas and from cover provided by agricultural infrastructure. That's a problem. The proposed "solution" involves bringing in a large technical staff with zero local knowledge, finding and training local counterparts (how many USDA technical people speak Pashto?), hiring a large labor force, and trying to impose a total and immediate change in agricultural practice on a heavily armed populace that hates you, loathes your idea, and will do anything in their power to sabotage the project.

Now guess who gets the privilege of trying to secure and protect all the widely dispersed civilian managers, laborers, and equipment involved in this? Have you solved your problem or replaced it with a bigger one?

It's not about winning hearts and minds, it's about not shooting yourself in the putz.