Gloomy US intelligence assessment coming or Let's hear from the spies

[Bill Moore]

A good op is due to good planning and good execution, and a bad op is always due to bad intell. It has always been that way

Joking aside I tend to agree that most military analysts don't get it, they somehow manage to transform an insurgency into an order of battle with leaders and foot soldiers and suggest if you kill/capture the leaders you win, and 10 years later they're still saying it. Those who embrace population centric COIN, blindly suggest that we have to do development and then the population will simply turn its back on the insurgency, yet 10 years later.....
In my opinion Bob is on to something, and instead of everyone moving to defensive positions, they should try to figure out why are analysis is failing. I think part of it is telling commanders what they want to hear, but that isn't all of it.

[Bill Moore]

Davidbfpo,

This part of the article is what I found of interest.

It is said to raise doubts about the authenticity and durability of alleged gains in Kandahar and Helmand provinces since the Obama troop surge and also suggests that the next generation of political leaders after Karzai will be more corrupt.

I don't think we're capable of determining who is actually running the circus, and just because we have boots on the ground doesn't mean that adversarial forces aren't running the show. Most foreign troops are only capable of seeing overt armed insurgents, but the insurgency consists of much more than the militants. Equally important is the comment about durability. Very few gains are durable, and most will be reversed shortly after we let up a little on the pedal for a lot of reasons. While hardly a strong argument, the recent article in USA Today on the Special Forces village stability operations interviewed Afghans that said as soon as SF leaves the Taliban will return.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/a...tan/51145690/1

"If the Americans weren't here, the police and the local government would just run away," Mohammed says. "In three days, the district would fall back into the hands of the enemy."

Of course what does Mohammed know, he is only a local.

[ganulv]

Equally important is the comment about durability. Very few gains are durable, and most will be reversed shortly after we let up a little on the pedal for a lot of reasons. While hardly a strong argument, the recent article in USA Today on the Special Forces village stability operations interviewed Afghans that said as soon as SF leaves the Taliban will return.

From the couple of Afghans I know and the reading I’ve done my guess would be that the Taliban and GIRoA are conceived of by the majority of Afghans as rival Pashtun factions contending for control of centralized government power. One of the factions relies heavily on the aid of a distant foreign power whose date of departure is already set. The other faction just seems like the better bet to come out on top eventually. Does that sound reasonable to those who have been there?

[jcustis]

From the couple of Afghans I know and the reading I’ve done my guess would be that the Taliban and GIRoA are conceived of by the majority of Afghans as rival Pashtun factions contending for control of centralized government power. One of the factions relies heavily on the aid of a distant foreign power whose date of departure is already set. The other faction just seems like the better bet to come out on top eventually. Does that sound reasonable to those who have been there?

I think that is a totally reasonable conclusion. I also think it's important to recall the rise of the Taliban and the fractured state of Afghanistan at that time. We demonized the Taliban for going into league with Al Qaeda, and seemed to be in a bit of disbelief that AQ could be harbored within the country, but the past bears a lot of reflection.

Through either ideological satisfaction, or pay, or both, the Taliban's ranks swelled for a reason, and a lot of that had to do with the governance situation at that time. The footsoldier of today probably fights for a different range of reasons, but we continue to kill them and they continue to join and fight.

Afghanistan has been too brutalized, too fractured, and is too split along tribal lines to be able to embrace a central government unless a terribly broad range of issues (poppy, ISI, the Af-Pak border area, etc.) can be resolved to a level of compromise for the largest affected groups. I think the greatest issue we have is that we don't know how to establish that compromise, and worse, we cannot get the Karzai government to build those bridges and resolve the causes of instability.

The bureaucrats and localized ANSF leadership know what's up, and a look at their behavior in some of the far flung districts, like Rig and Garmsir, is telling.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by ganulv,

One of the factions relies heavily on the aid of a distant foreign power whose date of departure is already set.

First we addressed authenticity and durability, and as you pointed out we need to address sustainability (all concerned). Not taking a side on the debate, but assuming it was even possible for the President to not announce an end date with the current financial crisis and bigger priorities at home and other security concerns, would it make a difference if we stayed at current strength until 2020 in your opinion? On the other hand, I think you overstate the departure, we'll still have a considerable number of troops there long after 2014. If the Taliban is assuming that we're all leaving and taking the kitchen sink with us, they'll most likely end up being disappointed.

Posted by jcustis,

The bureaucrats and localized ANSF leadership know what's up, and a look at their behavior in some of the far flung districts, like Rig and Garmsir, is telling.

Please elaborate or provide a link to stories that will explain the behavior you're making reference to. Thanks.