Gloomy US intelligence assessment coming or Let's hear from the spies

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den (a UK-based blogsite on matters Afghan) for pointing at Steve Coll's column in the New Yorker:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...-estimate.html

Circling the Lion's Den summary, edited for brevity:

Excellent, well-informed article by Steve Coll.. on the latest US National Intelligence Estimate on the war in Afghanistan....

The new draft..is said to be gloomier than the typical public statements made by US military commanders in Afghanistan.

It is said to raise doubts about the authenticity and durability of alleged gains in Kandahar and Helmand provinces since the Obama troop surge and also suggests that the next generation of political leaders after Karzai will be more corrupt.

It also questions the success of the programme to train and equip the Afghan military and police forces, noting that the projected cost of running a force of 350,000 after 2014 will be $8-10 billion a year, more than the US is willing or able to pay.

From:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....elligence.html

There are some interesting parts to the Coll article, but this part struck me and partly as SWC have tried to consider what next?

In the Afghan war, there are now two plausible choices. President Obama has committed to one of them: a gradual drawdown by 2014, accepting three more years of sacrifice in blood and expenditure (on a declining slope, it is hoped), in the expectation that Afghan forces can be built up to hold off the Taliban, protect civilians, and prevent civil war, which would almost certainly spill into Pakistan, making things there even worse. Another choice would be to declare that the 2014 project is unaffordable and beyond hope, and to bring troops home faster and sooner. Both choices involve risks.

[jcustis]

I'm curious about the assessment that civil war would certainly spill into Pakistan, and what indicators that statement is based on.

I'm equally interested how domestic politics will serve to frame--or inflame--our way ahead, as the estimate is shared with the Government.

[ganulv]

It also questions the success of the programme to train and equip the Afghan military and police forces, noting that the projected cost of running a force of 350,000 after 2014 will be $8-10 billion a year, more than the US is willing or able to pay.

If Petraeus is of the opinion that a) the only thing standing between the ANA and ANP being an effective bulwark against the Taliban and the Haqqani Network is more time and b) there is no reason to believe that the U.S. Government is ever going to tire of subsidizing the two, effective or not, I have to wonder about his suitability for his current position.

In the Afghan war, there are now two plausible choices.

There would be more if the strategy had not been formulated around a centralized national government.

[Fuchs]

I suspect that the 'projected costs' of running an Afghan army after the withdrawal of most Westerners is a very tricky thing.

The relatively high pays for indigenous troops (all parties) is no doubt a result of the influx of US-$. The pay levels have to shrink once the dollar transfers of all kinds shrink.

Afghanistan can easily sustain a 350k personnel army on its own, all it needs is to raise enough revenue and make sure price levels are not terribly distorted by foreign money. You only need guns, ammo, boots, clothes, food and a meagre extra pay in indigenous cash to run an army. The current situation is ridiculous and current costs are a poor basis for projecting future costs.



There is the major problem of sticky wags, though. It's difficult to actually cut wages, especially if the employed men can mutiny.


This was only a tiny glimpse of the many problems and challenges caused by the limited-duration influx of foreign cash, of course..

[Bob's World]

So now the intel communtiy says this isn't working?

I hope everyone can appreciate the tragic irony of us allowing the intel community to lead us into a threat-centric "strategy" of clear-hold-build; night raids; and outrageous development programs against the resistance aspect of the insurgency internal to Afghanistan (while totally protecting and ignoring the causation of the insanely illegitimate Karzai regime and the Northern Alliance monopoly that is codified by the constitution we helped develop) and doing nothing to address the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency with the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan.

Now the same intel F-tards say "golly, this isn't working." No kidding. I have yet to meet a single person in the intel business who knows anything about insurgency. Not a one. They do threats. That's all they know.

Insurgency is not about threats, it is about governments that are out of synch and out of touch with the people they deem to govern. God save us from the intel community, and the politicians who listen to them.

Venting, but too many great young servicemen and women are being fed into this stupidity and it is all so avoidable.

[Entropy]

One wonders if there is a problem on this earth that Bob's Wold doesn't lay at the feet of those "f-tards" in intel.

[jcustis]

He just hasn't met a whole lotta intel folks, that's all.

[Bill Moore]

A good op is due to good planning and good execution, and a bad op is always due to bad intell. It has always been that way

Joking aside I tend to agree that most military analysts don't get it, they somehow manage to transform an insurgency into an order of battle with leaders and foot soldiers and suggest if you kill/capture the leaders you win, and 10 years later they're still saying it. Those who embrace population centric COIN, blindly suggest that we have to do development and then the population will simply turn its back on the insurgency, yet 10 years later.....
In my opinion Bob is on to something, and instead of everyone moving to defensive positions, they should try to figure out why are analysis is failing. I think part of it is telling commanders what they want to hear, but that isn't all of it.

[Bob's World]

One wonders if there is a problem on this earth that Bob's Wold doesn't lay at the feet of those "f-tards" in intel.

Entropy, I actually am one who does not believe that it was a "failure of intel" that led to 9-11; (that was a failure of foreign policy, not intelligence) but we have been over compensating ever since in a dogged pursuit of "threats" to defeat to ensure that it does not happen again. We have build a massive machine to stare at the symptoms, yet have done little to assess that true failure of policy. We could use some of that great talent in the intel community focused on the real problems, that are internal, rather than all staring outward looking for "threats."

I think the intel community is great at analyzing threats. Next time we are in a war, where success can be achieved by the defeat of some threat, we will need to apply the intel-driven process we apply now.

But what I cannot fathom, is why this community refuses to evolve? Why it refuses to shift focus from the analysis of the symptoms of the problems we face (detailed analysis of various "terrorist" organizations [most of which are actually nationalist insurgent organizations - but why quibble over a person's purpose for action?], the individuals in these organizations, who they talk to, where they sleep, who they call, etc, etc) while completely ignoring analysis of the root causes of this "threat" that lie primarily within the political, policy, operational and tactical approaches of the governments that are being challenged?

This is not state on state warfare that our intel community is trained, organized, and doctrinally equipped for. This is conflict between elements of various populaces and their government. This, for the West, is a conflict between various non-state actors who tap into these nationalist dynamics for all of their manpower, financing and sanctuary; and Western countries whose historic approaches to foreign policy are perceived as a major contributor to the problems between governments and populaces within these various states.

Intel guys will drill into religion and ideology - though ideology does not create such conflicts, but rather is merely the "lubricant" that leaders of such movements apply to get things to move at the rate and in the direction they desire. But they will not drill into what aspects of foreign and domestic policy that are far more provocative than any ideology.

90% of the intel work for the current "threat" is internal (internal to domestic policies for the states where these groups emerge from, and internal to the foreign polices of those states which find themselves the target of transnational terrorism); but 100% of our intel work is directed externally.

Now, you are right, this is not totally the fault of the intel community. I should not blame the scorpion for being a scorpion. Senior leadership outside of the intel community should have reached out and redirected the efforts of the intel guys long ago, and still show no inclination to do so. But nor do I see the intel community standing up in protest as to how they are being abused and misused. In fact, when one goes to them to discuss such matters they typically hide behind snarky self-serving cliche's, like "intel leads ops" and go back to doing what they have always done.

Even LTG Flynn's paper of a couple years ago that created such a stir by suggesting that we needed to analyze the entire populace and not just the combatant segment of the populace missed the main point. It still missed the point that it is the integration and interaction of government and the populace, not the "enemy" and the populace, that holds the keys to stability. Where is the analysis of GIRoA officials and their links to the segments of the populace that are either supportive or in rebellion? Where is the analysis of what former officials and their linkages that were dispossessed of power, wealth and influence by our efforts to tip the scales against them?

How many intel guys feed the machine for night raids in Afghanistan? How many focus of the effects of such raids and the manner in which they are executed? Such night raids make the insurgency worse along many key drivers of insurgency. We should study that, understand that, and refine operations accordingly. It would lead to about a 90% reduction in the number of such missions conducted though, and that would mean that more "threats" are out there unmolested. Why worry about how each such raid provides powerful motivation for entire communities to support the insurgency. More fun to celebrate the latest "Jackpot." Tactical successes paving the way to operational failure.

It was an intel assessment that lead us to Afghanistan and Iraq. It is intel assessments that point us toward Yemen, HOA and the Maghreb. Intel is great for tactics, but it sucks for strategy. Intel-led strategy is like 5-year olds playing soccer, chasing the ball in a big mob where ever it goes with little regard or understanding for the larger game being played. It ignores geostrategic importance, it ignores vital interests, it only chases the threat. If a place is only important because some non-state actor is currently hiding there, then that place is not important. Some few guys will indeed need to be taken out of those places, but we need to do so with clear understanding of political drivers that distinguish who is who, and not the ideological factors that join them together in action.

The Einstein quote below applies very much to our intel-driven efforts over the past 10 years, and we should think about that.

[Entropy]

Now that I'm not restricted by my Iphone (no keyboard and I'm not a master texter), I can give a more substantive reply.

So now the intel communtiy says this isn't working?

If by "now" you mean "at least since 2007-2008 and more like 2005" then you'd be right! The Intel community (IC) completed an NIE on Afghanistan in 2008 that used words like "grim," "gloomy" and "downward spiral." There was another assessment done a year ago and now this latest one. Unfortunately, the 2008 NIE is still classified because the Bush administration decided not to issue an unclassified executive summary or unclassified key judgments (Some said the administration tried to suppress it - I'm sure that had nothing to do with it coming right before a Presidential election ). However, Washington is a leaky sieve, and thanks to a host of "anonymous senior officials" who can leak without retribution, we basically know the NIE's broad conclusions. You can read two summaries and analysis for yourself here and here although there are many more if you spend a minute on Google. Additionally, there are more details available in Wikileaks if you want to go that route -for obvious reasons, I can't and won't link to them here.

I hope everyone can appreciate the tragic irony of us allowing the intel community to lead us into a threat-centric "strategy" of clear-hold-build; night raids; and outrageous development programs against the resistance aspect of the insurgency internal to Afghanistan (while totally protecting and ignoring the causation of the insanely illegitimate Karzai regime and the Northern Alliance monopoly that is codified by the constitution we helped develop) and doing nothing to address the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency with the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan.

There's a saying that goes something like, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." In this case, I'd settle for any evidence for the assertion you make here. Maybe I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that "clear, hold and build" was not the brainchild of the IC, but came from a certain coterie of active and retired senior flag officers, advisers like Kilcullen, think-tankers, etc. The strategy was transferred to Afghanistan after the apparent "success" in Iraq. I also seem to recall that many people who knew a thing or two about Afghanistan at that time warned that the TTP's as well as the strategy used in Iraq were not likely to work in Afghanistan, but all these COIN "experts" assured us they'd take Afghanistan's unique circumstances into account.

Now the same intel F-tards say "golly, this isn't working." No kidding. I have yet to meet a single person in the intel business who knows anything about insurgency. Not a one. They do threats. That's all they know.

Just "venting" here, but it kind of pisses me off when someone doesn't do 10 minutes worth of research and fact-checking before impugning an entire profession. People can draw their own conclusions about this statement, I don't feel it necessary to comment on it further.

Insurgency is not about threats, it is about governments that are out of synch and out of touch with the people they deem to govern. God save us from the intel community, and the politicians who listen to them.

Yes, God save us please!

Please tell us who politicians should listen to instead? CNAS? Retired General Officers? The defense industry? Whichever bureaucracy (or foreign power) has the best lobbyists? Serious question.

Of course, I might point out that "threats" are part of intel's raison d'erte and are its most important function whether you choose to accept that fact or not. The primary purpose of intelligence is to provide warning for "threats" be they strategic or tactical. Enemy and potential enemy capabilities and intentions (ie. "threats") are always going to be at the top of the intel priority list. This isn't exactly new. I think I've pointed out to you before that intelligence requirements, which are defined by military Commanders and our civilian leadership, are what drives intelligence and, guess what? Those requirements are largely threat-based. If that bothers you, then you need to take it up with those Commanders and civilian leaders.

Entropy, I actually am one who does not believe that it was a "failure of intel" that led to 9-11; (that was a failure of foreign policy, not intelligence) but we have been over compensating ever since in a dogged pursuit of "threats" to defeat to ensure that it does not happen again. We have build a massive machine to stare at the symptoms, yet have done little to assess that true failure of policy. We could use some of that great talent in the intel community focused on the real problems, that are internal, rather than all staring outward looking for "threats."

Well, you are wrong - 9/11 was an intel failure. As I said previously, intel's primary purpose is to provide strategic warning for such events. As it happens, the IC did know an attack was coming, just not the details. Unfortunately, details matter and the IC messed that up. That's not to say the IC was wholly to blame for 9/11 of course.

Why it refuses to shift focus from the analysis of the symptoms of the problems we face (detailed analysis of various "terrorist" organizations [most of which are actually nationalist insurgent organizations - but why quibble over a person's purpose for action?], the individuals in these organizations, who they talk to, where they sleep, who they call, etc, etc) while completely ignoring analysis of the root causes of this "threat" that lie primarily within the political, policy, operational and tactical approaches of the governments that are being challenged?

Frankly it amazes me that you, as a retired senior officer, do not know the answer to this question. Intel is a support element which helps to guide policy, not dictate it. You seem to think Intel is not only capable of putting policymakers into a box, but should put them into a box. I'm sorry but that is wishful thinking and even dangerous. Intelligence must inform policy, not determine it.

And, if you read some more US-Afghan history, the IC did evolve in exactly the manner you describe. During the post-invasion period (roughly 2002-2004) the intel community assessed that the Taliban was essentially destroyed and was no longer a threat. The IC's focus in Afghanistan therefore shifted to concern about the return of warlordism and chaos in Afghanistan. At the time, the concern was that the Taliban's defeat would create a power vacuum and return Afghanistan to the very conditions that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place. It was in this context that efforts were made to demobilize the "Northern Alliance" factions and begin the process that lead to the 2003 Loya Jirga and 2005 elections. In that context, there's this article which discusses policymaker views at that time as well as a bit of what was going on. Does that sound like an intel-driven threat-based policy discussion to you? The answer is "no" because intel was primarily supporting the various "non-kinetic" initiatives (reconstruction, DDR, demining, etc.) because the intel community believed the Taliban was no longer a threat.

Now, one can say the intel folks got it wrong and focused too much worry on the dangers of a return to warlordism, but I think it's pretty hard to argue what you seem to be arguing, which is that the intel community has been static for 10 years and focused on "threats" to the exclusion of all else.

At the same time, the IC has long been cognizant of corruption in Afghanistan in general and with Karzai in particular. My memory is a bit foggy at this point, but I seem to recall a lot of skepticism regarding Karzai's grandiose plans to reign in corruption and the drug economy after his 2005 election. Whatever skepticism did exist was overwhelmed by a bevy of useful idiots inside the beltway. We've known about the issue of overcentralization of Afghanistan's government for years as well. Questions about that came up immediately after the 2003 Loya Jirga and especially during the 2005 elections. It was ignored because it was decided (not by intel) that Karzai was going to be our guy.

Additionally, the IC has been telling policymakers for years about Pakistan's duplicity - why have policymakers not responded in an effective way? Is that something you can blame on bad intel? It's not like the facts of any of this are new or even controversial and it's not as if policymakers have not been exposed to all of this - they have been, but have ignored it for various reasons. Maybe this will come as a shock to you, but policymakers tend to ignore intel when it conflicts with the policies they'd prefer to implement.

Frankly, the rest of your comments suffer from the basic misunderstanding I just described. In short, while in principal I agree with your signature on Einstein and simplicity, one shouldn't run with it and go from simplicity to simplistic.