Gloomy US intelligence assessment coming or Let's hear from the spies

[Surferbeetle]

The maps and history of all of this are in an article on Musings on Iraq:

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...nance-and.html

The answers, however, rapidly become complex local ones---as Dayuhan wisely surmises, these are not questions for a foreign power to address, but ones that must evolve, or be fought through by locals.

STP,

Good job as always on your map work and the many associated linkages.

As one 'Iraq-Hand' to another here are a few articles that may provide some additional context with respect to the importance of having a broad contact base as well as a flexible mind...(as you and I were 'incentivized' to learn during our time in the Middle East )

Iraq oil: fools rush in, by Lex, Last updated: November 20, 2011 7:21 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Central bank gold buying at 40-year high, by Jack Farchy in London, November 17, 2011 7:54 am, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Shell pulls out of Kurdistan oil talks, by Sylvia Pfeifer and Javier Blas in Erbil, northern Iraq, November 16, 2011 10:05 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Qatar joins Mexico with oil hedge, by Javier Blas in London, Last updated: October 26, 2011 10:49 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Torrents in Arabia: the momentum for reform, by Lex, October 21, 2011 7:22 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

The Arab spring is delivering on its political promise. Three dictators have been ousted in north Africa, and the momentum for reform may now be unstoppable. If the vaguely democratic awakening that is now taking place is to have any chance of flourishing, however, it must be accompanied by total economic regeneration. Without that, sky-high expectations will be dashed.

[Steve the Planner]

Beetle:

I think this is where we really stalemate on these "threat assessments"---by focusing on things like the stability of a central government as measured by protests, attacks and opposition movements.

Somewhere down the road, Afghans will confront the problems of how they are to govern themselves---within a very conflicts and highly-differentiated political/economic/societal landscape bounded by certain physical geography.

The answers will, in all reality, move to the likes of regional special government considerations and reconstituted maps, boundaries, authorities and allegiances (ala Iraq's Article 140/123 issues). It is complicated stuff, does not result from outsider decisions (and there are many winners and losers) where, through underlying conflict, there are many unresolved grievances.

Economics plays a big role, too, but usually is represented by allocational challenges of the very kind in debate in the US (rich, middle class, poor; who gets it?).

For me, the Arab Spring, in its early stage, is still a debate about who sits in the seat of power, and has not yet reached the meaningful issues: How do we govern ourselves differently to achieve a different result?

Monitoring military threats, and driving responses to metrics related to military threats does not solve the underlying problem, answer relevant societal questions, etc... In fact, maybe the opposite---creating them.

[Bob's World]

I prefer to think of myself as an advocate for a fresh perspective. Some may find that to be "myopic," it's a fine line I admittedly cross at times. Guilty as charged, but that in no way grants amnesty to the intelligence community for remaining doggedly focused on threats to capture, kill or defeat as what we need them to apply their considerable skills on the most. We need them to study the roots, not the branches.

But I don't put everything at the feet of government. I don't think the government of Mexico, for example, created the drug violence that threatens their stability; as an example. Such profit-motivated challengers are not "insurgency" in my opinion, because I do (myopically) believe that conflicts need to be categorized by their causal roots rather than by the various tactical branches they might take. I believe that insurgency must be both internal and political, or it is not insurgency. By categorizing by like causes one also categorizes by family of solution as well. By mixing conflicts of various causation by categorizing by the tactics applied, one is far more likely to apply the wrong type of solution for the problem they actually face.

But when the causal roots are in domestic policy (insurgency) or foreign policy (transnational terrorism), I do indeed strongly advocate that governments challenged in such ways are only likely to find true "victory"/stability by honestly looking at the effects of their actions and making reasonable changes in how they do business where it affects a handful of critical perceptions that are major drivers of such conflicts. Always room for supporting efforts to mitigate those who wage illegal violence, or to improve effectiveness of how the government serves the people, but those should remain supporting efforts.

Governments are made up of politicians, and politicians are not big on personal responsibility. Just a fact.

Militaries fight wars, and went launched by politicians to resolve a conflict with some group waging illegal violence the military is apt to view that engagement as war and warfare. Just a fact.

Stepping back and breaking the cycle requires that we look at such conflicts differently if we hope to achieve different results. After all, its not like the historic approach and our current approach of massive foreign interventions, regime changing/protecting; followed by massive programs of assassination and state building (a bit of an oxymoron of an approach by any measure) is working in any enduring way.

What I offer is cheap and respective of the sovereignty of others in a manner consistent with the principles that America is founded upon. That alone makes it worth serious consideration.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Agree in part. Karzai did not create the problems in Afghanistan.

Pashtun issues are cross-border. 10-20% of Afghanistan's total population is transnational. Answers will not come in a vacuum, especially as Pakistanis, for their own domestic reasons, may pressure Afghans to return home at some point.

One thing I do know is that Ambassador Crocker has a very good grasp of the neighbor issues, which is a big asset. Real-life is that those neighbors in total are not just Pakistan by any means.

Looking perhaps way too out of the box, the underlying problems started with the artificial Durand carve-up, were exacerbated by the Muslin Exodus during the Indian Partition, and the push of that population created historical pressures on the Pashtuns, who are still struggling on both sides of the line with how they will succeed in a future where many different neighbors (internal and external) will ultimately crush them (notwithstanding their deep and unique cultures) if they do not find a self-contained and non-threatening way forward.


All these money flows from us have not been helpful.

[Bob's World]

Afghanistan is a unique situation (ok, all are, but a couple factors really affect this place)

1. The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps. When there are major swings of political power it drives an equally major swing of patronage. Over the past several decades the swings forced by Soviets, Muj, Taliban, and US/Northern Alliance have flipped patronage like a pancake, and the effects on the country are hard for non-Afghans to fully comprehend. Who has best title to that rich river bottom land that has switched hands 4 times in 40 years? What tribe should control that cash machine route from Kandahar to Quetta? etc, etc.

We forced the latest swing, and not patronage is firmly in the hands of the Northern Alliance Friends and Families plan. The current constitution and centralized government we were so keen on facilitating not only solidified the Northern Alliance monopoly on power, wealth and influence across Afghanistan (and made all government from District level up into "government in a box" - a box built by the constitution and filled by Karzai) but also turned the flow of patronage into a one-way upward sucking sound as everyone owes their patronage to Karzai and nothing to the people they are sent out to shake down, er, "serve."

The losers cannot accept this. They cannot accept this outcome and they cannot accept this constitution. Both offer little but effective slavery for entire families, tribes and regions. This guarantees insurgency.

I do not know if it is possible to regulate a reconciled form of patronage that breaks up this ageless system and divides power wealth and influence more equitably across the populace. Perhaps, but only if we recognize that this is critical and that must be forced on Karzai and the Northern Alliance, as it is not in their interest lead reform and give up what they hold now by both might and right.

I have not seen any general or any Ambassador see this for the problem it is and take it on.

2. External manipulations, British, Russian, US, etc. The Durand line is much like the line dividing North and South Vietnam. Westerners see these lines as real, legal and definitive. For the affected populaces they were and are largely moot. The only form of legitimacy that matters for insurgency is that in the eyes and minds of the affected populace. The Pashtun populaces in Pakistan are as much "Afghan" as those in Afghanistan. Both are really what I call "self-governed populaces" but both are equally affected by the impact on patronage as described above so are stakeholder populaces in this insurgency.

We'd do well to ignore the Durand line for purposes of defining the insurgency. This really is only a factor if one is out looking for threats to defeat. The brand of COIN I promote is primarily waged in Kabul and focused on tearing down the mechanisms of governance that are at the causal roots of the insurgency. Do that well and the good effects will flow across the Durand line as if it is not there (and for COIN and insurgency it is not there)

I listen to smart military leaders say silly stuff like "we defeated the insurgency in South Vietnam, but later the state of North Vietnam defeated the South in a conventional state on state war." We take ourselves and our lines far too seriously. The south went down in classic phase III Maoist insurgency as planned by Ho and Giap from the very start decades earlier.

But again, if one focuses on fixing government, these lines become far less important than when one is focused on defeating threats.

I'd love to see Crocker and Allen make a full-spectrum reconciliation and follow-on constitutional loya jirga the condition precedent to all development and any hope of ISAF leaving any presence there to help out. Unless we are willing to walk away we will remain a patsy of the Northern Alliance, filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap.

[Dayuhan]

The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps. When there are major swings of political power it drives an equally major swing of patronage.

Agreed.

The losers cannot accept this. They cannot accept this outcome and they cannot accept this constitution. Both offer little but effective slavery for entire families, tribes and regions. This guarantees insurgency.

This outcome is implicit in the cultural reality that you described above. The only question is who gets the top chair and who controls the patronage. That's what's being fought over. The constitution is irrelevant to anyone but a foreigner: whatever document is put in place will be twisted to fit the cultural reality, or ignored. Culture defines documents, documents don't change cultures.

I do not know if it is possible to regulate a reconciled form of patronage that breaks up this ageless system and divides power wealth and influence more equitably across the populace. Perhaps, but only if we recognize that this is critical and that must be forced on Karzai and the Northern Alliance, as it is not in their interest lead reform and give up what they hold now by both might and right.

How is this compatible with your earlier comment about the "cultural reality of Afghan patronage". Are you suggesting that "we" can restructure Afghan cultural realities? I don't see how an effort to "break up this ageless system" is something we can or should be messing with. Trying to dictate how other countries need to be governed seems to me to be something we should be avoiding, not pursuing.

Restructuring patronage systems is not likely to be easy or polite. Factions will fight over profitable milking cows. They will try to butt in on each other's territories. In essence you'd be going back to what you had between the Soviet withdrawal and the rise of the Taliban: chaos and conflict. We can pretend to ourselves that we can "regulate" this or assign who gets what and lay out a "system" for sharing the spoils... but that's a dangerous illusion. The culture is the culture. We won't change it, and it will take over no matter what system we put in place.

I'm recalling the transition from the Marcos dictatorship to the fragile Aquino democracy... Marcos was more corrupt, but things functioned, because the corruption and patronage were largely organized: you knew who to pay, and how much, and you generally got what you paid for. Once that system broke it was a free-for-all, with multiple parties fighting over rackets, everybody wanting a cut and nobody even trying to deliver on their promises. This sort of thing doesn't always make for an improvement.

The brand of COIN I promote is primarily waged in Kabul and focused on tearing down the mechanisms of governance that are at the causal roots of the insurgency. Do that well and the good effects will flow across the Durand line as if it is not there (and for COIN and insurgency it is not there)

Tearing down what you referred to as "the cultural reality of Afghan patronage"? You said it yourself: this is an all or nothing society. Do you want us to change that? Of course we can tear down the government we installed and try again, but whatever goes in will be a product and reflection of the same cultural reality.

I'd love to see Crocker and Allen make a full-spectrum reconciliation and follow-on constitutional loya jirga the condition precedent to all development and any hope of ISAF leaving any presence there to help out. Unless we are willing to walk away we will remain a patsy of the Northern Alliance, filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap.

Somebody will be filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap no matter what we do. It's not something we are going to change and it's not something a new constitution will change. It's a cultural reality and we have to work within cultural realities. The culture may evolve to a new reality but it won't happen because we want it to, and the process is going to involve a bunch of mess no matter what we do.

I think your diagnosis is reasonably accurate as a broad picture... but do you really think the US should be committing itself to an effort to restructure Afghan cultural realities?

My opinion only of course, but I don't think our problem is that we built the wrong kind of governance in Afghanistan, but that we tried to build governance in Afghanistan in the first place.

[Entropy]

Now that I'm not restricted by my Iphone (no keyboard and I'm not a master texter), I can give a more substantive reply.

So now the intel communtiy says this isn't working?

If by "now" you mean "at least since 2007-2008 and more like 2005" then you'd be right! The Intel community (IC) completed an NIE on Afghanistan in 2008 that used words like "grim," "gloomy" and "downward spiral." There was another assessment done a year ago and now this latest one. Unfortunately, the 2008 NIE is still classified because the Bush administration decided not to issue an unclassified executive summary or unclassified key judgments (Some said the administration tried to suppress it - I'm sure that had nothing to do with it coming right before a Presidential election ). However, Washington is a leaky sieve, and thanks to a host of "anonymous senior officials" who can leak without retribution, we basically know the NIE's broad conclusions. You can read two summaries and analysis for yourself here and here although there are many more if you spend a minute on Google. Additionally, there are more details available in Wikileaks if you want to go that route -for obvious reasons, I can't and won't link to them here.

I hope everyone can appreciate the tragic irony of us allowing the intel community to lead us into a threat-centric "strategy" of clear-hold-build; night raids; and outrageous development programs against the resistance aspect of the insurgency internal to Afghanistan (while totally protecting and ignoring the causation of the insanely illegitimate Karzai regime and the Northern Alliance monopoly that is codified by the constitution we helped develop) and doing nothing to address the revolutionary aspect of the insurgency with the Taliban government in exile in Pakistan.

There's a saying that goes something like, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." In this case, I'd settle for any evidence for the assertion you make here. Maybe I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that "clear, hold and build" was not the brainchild of the IC, but came from a certain coterie of active and retired senior flag officers, advisers like Kilcullen, think-tankers, etc. The strategy was transferred to Afghanistan after the apparent "success" in Iraq. I also seem to recall that many people who knew a thing or two about Afghanistan at that time warned that the TTP's as well as the strategy used in Iraq were not likely to work in Afghanistan, but all these COIN "experts" assured us they'd take Afghanistan's unique circumstances into account.

Now the same intel F-tards say "golly, this isn't working." No kidding. I have yet to meet a single person in the intel business who knows anything about insurgency. Not a one. They do threats. That's all they know.

Just "venting" here, but it kind of pisses me off when someone doesn't do 10 minutes worth of research and fact-checking before impugning an entire profession. People can draw their own conclusions about this statement, I don't feel it necessary to comment on it further.

Insurgency is not about threats, it is about governments that are out of synch and out of touch with the people they deem to govern. God save us from the intel community, and the politicians who listen to them.

Yes, God save us please!

Please tell us who politicians should listen to instead? CNAS? Retired General Officers? The defense industry? Whichever bureaucracy (or foreign power) has the best lobbyists? Serious question.

Of course, I might point out that "threats" are part of intel's raison d'erte and are its most important function whether you choose to accept that fact or not. The primary purpose of intelligence is to provide warning for "threats" be they strategic or tactical. Enemy and potential enemy capabilities and intentions (ie. "threats") are always going to be at the top of the intel priority list. This isn't exactly new. I think I've pointed out to you before that intelligence requirements, which are defined by military Commanders and our civilian leadership, are what drives intelligence and, guess what? Those requirements are largely threat-based. If that bothers you, then you need to take it up with those Commanders and civilian leaders.

Entropy, I actually am one who does not believe that it was a "failure of intel" that led to 9-11; (that was a failure of foreign policy, not intelligence) but we have been over compensating ever since in a dogged pursuit of "threats" to defeat to ensure that it does not happen again. We have build a massive machine to stare at the symptoms, yet have done little to assess that true failure of policy. We could use some of that great talent in the intel community focused on the real problems, that are internal, rather than all staring outward looking for "threats."

Well, you are wrong - 9/11 was an intel failure. As I said previously, intel's primary purpose is to provide strategic warning for such events. As it happens, the IC did know an attack was coming, just not the details. Unfortunately, details matter and the IC messed that up. That's not to say the IC was wholly to blame for 9/11 of course.

Why it refuses to shift focus from the analysis of the symptoms of the problems we face (detailed analysis of various "terrorist" organizations [most of which are actually nationalist insurgent organizations - but why quibble over a person's purpose for action?], the individuals in these organizations, who they talk to, where they sleep, who they call, etc, etc) while completely ignoring analysis of the root causes of this "threat" that lie primarily within the political, policy, operational and tactical approaches of the governments that are being challenged?

Frankly it amazes me that you, as a retired senior officer, do not know the answer to this question. Intel is a support element which helps to guide policy, not dictate it. You seem to think Intel is not only capable of putting policymakers into a box, but should put them into a box. I'm sorry but that is wishful thinking and even dangerous. Intelligence must inform policy, not determine it.

And, if you read some more US-Afghan history, the IC did evolve in exactly the manner you describe. During the post-invasion period (roughly 2002-2004) the intel community assessed that the Taliban was essentially destroyed and was no longer a threat. The IC's focus in Afghanistan therefore shifted to concern about the return of warlordism and chaos in Afghanistan. At the time, the concern was that the Taliban's defeat would create a power vacuum and return Afghanistan to the very conditions that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place. It was in this context that efforts were made to demobilize the "Northern Alliance" factions and begin the process that lead to the 2003 Loya Jirga and 2005 elections. In that context, there's this article which discusses policymaker views at that time as well as a bit of what was going on. Does that sound like an intel-driven threat-based policy discussion to you? The answer is "no" because intel was primarily supporting the various "non-kinetic" initiatives (reconstruction, DDR, demining, etc.) because the intel community believed the Taliban was no longer a threat.

Now, one can say the intel folks got it wrong and focused too much worry on the dangers of a return to warlordism, but I think it's pretty hard to argue what you seem to be arguing, which is that the intel community has been static for 10 years and focused on "threats" to the exclusion of all else.

At the same time, the IC has long been cognizant of corruption in Afghanistan in general and with Karzai in particular. My memory is a bit foggy at this point, but I seem to recall a lot of skepticism regarding Karzai's grandiose plans to reign in corruption and the drug economy after his 2005 election. Whatever skepticism did exist was overwhelmed by a bevy of useful idiots inside the beltway. We've known about the issue of overcentralization of Afghanistan's government for years as well. Questions about that came up immediately after the 2003 Loya Jirga and especially during the 2005 elections. It was ignored because it was decided (not by intel) that Karzai was going to be our guy.

Additionally, the IC has been telling policymakers for years about Pakistan's duplicity - why have policymakers not responded in an effective way? Is that something you can blame on bad intel? It's not like the facts of any of this are new or even controversial and it's not as if policymakers have not been exposed to all of this - they have been, but have ignored it for various reasons. Maybe this will come as a shock to you, but policymakers tend to ignore intel when it conflicts with the policies they'd prefer to implement.

Frankly, the rest of your comments suffer from the basic misunderstanding I just described. In short, while in principal I agree with your signature on Einstein and simplicity, one shouldn't run with it and go from simplicity to simplistic.

[Entropy]

We forced the latest swing, and not patronage is firmly in the hands of the Northern Alliance Friends and Families plan.

Ok, you bring this point up a lot. Let's examine it. What was the alternative? It was the Northern Alliance along with Royalist and various other Pashtuns that helped us to overthrow the Taliban. What were we supposed to back in 2002 - say "thanks, now sod off?" What do you think would have happened? What was the viable alternative?

It used to be that Afghanistan's minorities (Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks) could live with a soft Pashtun dominion, but the Taliban changed all that. The simple fact is that they would not have demobilized their militias if they had not been given a powerful stake the government. It's possible a more decentralized government structure would have assuaged their fears while creating better governance from the Pashtun perspectives, but that wasn't a certainty IMO. The analytical error we made, I think, was that we assumed most Pashtuns would be happy because Karzai and some others in the government (ie. Royalists) were Pashtun.

I do not know if it is possible to regulate a reconciled form of patronage that breaks up this ageless system and divides power wealth and influence more equitably across the populace. Perhaps, but only if we recognize that this is critical and that must be forced on Karzai and the Northern Alliance, as it is not in their interest lead reform and give up what they hold now by both might and right.

Force Karzai? With what leverage?

I have not seen any general or any Ambassador see this for the problem it is and take it on.

Well, they've been trying to "force Karzai" to be a good guy for a long time now, which is what you seem to advocate. Maybe we can keep trying to force the Pakistani's to play nice too - that's worked equally well.

2. External manipulations, British, Russian, US, etc. The Durand line is much like the line dividing North and South Vietnam. Westerners see these lines as real, legal and definitive. For the affected populaces they were and are largely moot.

That is only true for those who live near the border. For almost everyone else in Pakistan and Afghanistan the border dispute is important and the border is real.

Funny you don't mention Pakistan when talking of external manipulation. When it comes to Afghanistan, they are the masters. Your ideas on what we should do in Afghanistan seem to assume no interference from Pakistan and other outside powers.

We'd do well to ignore the Durand line for purposes of defining the insurgency. This really is only a factor if one is out looking for threats to defeat. The brand of COIN I promote is primarily waged in Kabul and focused on tearing down the mechanisms of governance that are at the causal roots of the insurgency. Do that well and the good effects will flow across the Durand line as if it is not there (and for COIN and insurgency it is not there)

You think the Pakistanis might have something to say and do about that? What you've described here is Pakistan's greatest fear - another schism with the bulk of Pashtun and Baloch lands ceded to Afghanistan. Once Pakistani gets a whiff that this is the new US policy, they will take action and this policy will fail.

But again, if one focuses on fixing government, these lines become far less important than when one is focused on defeating threats.

Great, please operationalize "fixing government."

I'd love to see Crocker and Allen make a full-spectrum reconciliation and follow-on constitutional loya jirga the condition precedent to all development and any hope of ISAF leaving any presence there to help out. Unless we are willing to walk away we will remain a patsy of the Northern Alliance, filling their pockets and protecting there status at the top of the patronage heap.

What is a "full-spectrum" reconciliation and how can Crocker and Allen "make" it? What makes you think another constitutional Loya Jirga will result in a better outcome than the last one? In other words, do you really think the current power brokers would submit to such a process without knowing the outcome first? And if they know the outcome is going to be a reduction in their power then it seems to me they will either game the system or refuse to participate.

The problem is akin to trying to get an alcoholic to quit drinking. There's simply not a lot we can do that will actually work.

[Bob's World]

Ok, running out the door, so I'll just touch one point:

The single essential task for stability in Afghanistan is not the "defeat" of any particular threat, nor is it the preservation of the current government. The later drives the former.

The single essential task is to change the government to a form that leverages the patronage culture toward stability rather than as a wedge that is continually driven between the victor and the loser. We must either:

1. Dedicate our main effort to forcing the current regime to take this on (and yes, the constitution is critical as it enforces this cultural wedge with the rule of law and Western support. If the design of the constitution does not describe and allow enforcement of a equitable distribution of patronage across society there will always be conflict. If the design of the constitution fuels a centralized upward Ponzi scheme of patronage there will always be outrageous, destructive corruption. If the constitution vests all power in one man, there will always be government in a box and never be legitimacy of government at any level in the eyes of people who are governed at those levels).

or

2. We must pack up and leave, recognizing that the only "vital interest" that we have in the region did not become vital until our own actions there had contributed so powerfully to the growing instability in Pakistan.

As an idealist, I vote for option 1. As a realist I vote for option 2. So, believe in 1, but execute 2. If we had vital national interests and if this were geo-strategically key terrain I would say commit to option 1 and make it work. We don't have either, so again the answer is 2.

What we do now is a threat-focused, tactically driven compromise that can only create suppression of threats for some temporary period of time to the current, unsustainable model of governance that is the root cause of the conflict. It is "doctrinally correct" but criminally stupid in its design.

[Fuchs]

Force Karzai? With what leverage?

His life.
He can neither survive in Afghanistan without U.S. money nor in exile against the will of the CIA.


This was no PC answer, but Karzai's dependance is still quite obvious. He's only independent and capable of own decisions in the framework of continued support.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

A mouthful.

I find it funny that the MG Flynn Intelligence gap was, perhaps, a gap between what was informing and driving military actions on the ground, as opposed to one of general understanding elsewhere.

There is no shortage of better wisdom all over the US, from Open Source to non, but it did not seem to survive translation into rational and consistent application.

I enjoyed Bob's latest mind warp: Let's go down to Kabul and....Karzai....regulated patronage.... Helps to understand the gap.

When I indicated that Crocker has a good grasp of the neighbors, that hardly meant that he was, or could, just go over there and fix them, as Bob suggested. Rather, it meant a realistic understanding of the complex challenges and linkages to all---most of which we could never really understand to their indigenous and competing satisfactions anyway.

At best, you discuss, you find common ground where you can, you diffuse the immediate bombs once triggered. It is a whack-a-mole task at best, and little of it is best done in a public spotlight.

It is from the complex understanding, however, that we can then understand our situation, and where/what comes next for us----a potentially very different problem set than what comes next for THEM.

Fact is that we are too often viewing these systems from a warped perspective of immediate post-conflict survivors, fueled by massive economic distortions/dislocations (some of our own doing).

The damage and fragmentation, however, is hardly the result of just us after 2002. The story goes before (and will continue after us). In reality, the door to Afghanistan's own destruction began when it broke politically between the new wave and the old traditional societies. That followed with various factions taking sides and bringing in outside influence to support their side. Pandora's Box was opened by Afghans, not us.

The big problem I have in these conflict zones with too-long US involvement is where our critics forget, after a decade or so, that it was pretty bad before we came, and the door to our coming was always opened from the inside.

Iraq, once credibly aspiring in the 1970s to be a jewel, was consumed by a brutal and self-inflicted war pattern resulting from attacks on its neighbors (Iran, then Kuwait). It's economic, physical and social infrastructure was destroyed then, not by us. The Anfal, draining the marshes, and mass graves pre-date us.

Same patterns in Afghanistan. The Taliban turning brutal, oppressive, and threatening to its neighbors and the world is what, in large part, drove a situation where someone had to go in and put a stop to it.

Obviously, our actions afterwards are a debate. But it is one intrinsically wrapped up in the delusional "Failed State" policies floating around Washington----lets just create a series of protectorates which we can manage through proxies (while outwardly asserting their independence and self-governance).

Just so much Lawrence/Bell delusions of grandure.

What to do next with these countries is something, however brutal and frustrating, which must come from within (even if that initially means returning to the initial Pandora's Box and the underlying and still unresolved internal and neighbor problems.

Remember that it was Crocker who was sitting at the table with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India and IRAN) to resolve the What Comes Next problem when the talks blew up after the Axis of Evil speech.

The US, now, is probably not the right player to put that Genie back in the Bottle---so it falls back to the neighbors and Afghanistan. Bad choices (one at the expense of another) will create reactions, and re-iterations). It is a process we stopped but needs to get back on track. The answers will not be ours.

As you rightly point out, intelligence was not the gap, and gloom is nothing new. Intelligence informing the ground actions (the MG Flynn problem) is, and remains the gap: Let's go up to Kabul and straighten things out...Let's get those Pakistanis in line...Let's have Karzai arrange a Loya Jirga...

[Entropy]

His life.
He can neither survive in Afghanistan without U.S. money nor in exile against the will of the CIA.


This was no PC answer, but Karzai's dependance is still quite obvious. He's only independent and capable of own decisions in the framework of continued support.

Karzai can't live in exile "against the will of the CIA?" Please explain what you mean. It sounds like you're suggesting that we threaten him with assassination.

[Entropy]

BW,

In my judgment option 1 in a pipedream and option 2 is not yet acceptable to a domestic political establishment that wants to avoid the political consequences of "losing" in Afghanistan. That is, admittedly, a cynical view, but these are cynical times.

[Fuchs]

Karzai can't live in exile "against the will of the CIA?" Please explain what you mean. It sounds like you're suggesting that we threaten him with assassination.

Well, I mean you could.

Force Karzai? With what leverage?

[Entropy]

Well, I mean you could.

The problem with threats used as coercion is that the threats must be credible in the eyes of the one being threatened. Is it really credible for Karzai to believe the US will not only abandon him, but kill him if he doesn't, in effect, become our puppet and then diminish his own authority in Afghanistan? I can't read the man's mind, but I really doubt it.

The second problem with threats is that if Karzai calls the bluff, then you have to be committed to actually carrying them out. So is, the US really prepared to deliver on those threats? No, it isn't.

The third problem with threats is that even if the above conditions are met, the person/country being threatened usually has the capability for some kind of reciprocity. Are we willing to suffer those consequences? Probably not.

This is the fundamental problem with the notion that we can force Pakistan and/or the Karzai government to bend to our will through threats.

[Old Eagle]

I'm not sure what an f-tard is, but I assume it's a legal term because, as I recall, BW is a JD.

BW -- Big point of contention: Intel doesn't lead anywhere. It informs and policy-makers (at the national level) and commanders (in the field) determine what actions will best accomplish their objectives. Classic case study by both academics and practitioners was the gap between intel analyses on how well the war was progressing in Vietnam (not well) and the commanders' assessments of the same topic (turned the corner, light at the end of the tunnel, etc.). In Washington, Pres Johnson reportedly chose commanders' assessments over intel, and in the field, Westmoreland let it be known that he had no use for gloomy intel.

This should come as no surprise. The analyst in the rear has much less on the line than the commander in the field. What happens to commanders who step forward and say, "Things are not going well; I think we're screwing this up."?

Can't wait to see how things play out at Langley now that Brother P is in charge.

[Bob's World]

BW,

In my judgment option 1 in a pipedream and option 2 is not yet acceptable to a domestic political establishment that wants to avoid the political consequences of "losing" in Afghanistan. That is, admittedly, a cynical view, but these are cynical times.

No more a pipedream than offered by our current approaches; only at a fraction of the cost and actually directed at the root causes rather slapping than away at the symptoms...

Strategic thinking should not be constrained by budget, policy, doctrine or degree of difficulty. There are plenty of folk in the chain of command who will slap all of those constraints into place. Start off as smart as possible and let such "realities" dumb it down. If one starts off stupid however it only gets dumber from there, and then the full onus is placed on the operators on the ground to somehow turn crapola into shinola. We owe those guys better. Way better. We owe the American people and those people we impact abroad (both allies and host nation) as well.

[Old Eagle]

BW, if strategic thinking shouldn't be constrained by budget, policy, etc., how can it maintain any semblance of reality? By Army defn., strategy is the balancing of ends (based on national policy/grand strategy), ways (based on existing or developing doctrine) and means (resources -- one of which is budget).

[Bob's World]

BW, if strategic thinking shouldn't be constrained by budget, policy, etc., how can it maintain any semblance of reality? By Army defn., strategy is the balancing of ends (based on national policy/grand strategy), ways (based on existing or developing doctrine) and means (resources -- one of which is budget).

Fair point, let me clarify.

I believe there are two components to strategy, the second component being the one you describe above and absolutely constrained by "Acceptable, Suitable, Feasible, Complete" criteria as it lays out the Ends-Ways-Means in which some action should be addressed. I frankly find this to be the least interesting aspect of strategy.

The first component is what I call "strategic understanding," that strategic mission analysis, that strategic SOD, that strategic drilling into the essence of some problem to understand it at a fundamental level in all of its complexity. This is the step that is often skipped in favor of pulling some doctrinal solution off of the shelf.

This is the aspect of strategy that should not be constrained and should not be left to some action officer's version of what some historian thought was important about the last war, that was also deemed to be politically correct enough for publication by the general officers in his chain of command... (i.e., "doctrine")

It goes to Einstein's famous quote (love how that man thought about thinking)

“If I had an hour to save the world
I would spend 59 minutes defining the problem
and one minute finding solutions”

or

"If I had an hour to solve a problem and my life depended on the solution, I would spend the first 55 minutes determining the proper question to ask, for once I know the proper question, I could solve the problem in less than five minutes."

[Dayuhan]

His life.
He can neither survive in Afghanistan without U.S. money nor in exile against the will of the CIA.

This was no PC answer, but Karzai's dependance is still quite obvious. He's only independent and capable of own decisions in the framework of continued support.

In the old days, If Karzai was unsatisfactory we'd just find a momentarily compliant general who was willing to tell us what we want to hear and have him stage a coup, after which he'd stop telling us what we want to hear and do whatever he pleased. Didn't work especially well in the old days, no reason to expect that it would work much better now.

Yes, Karzai is dependent. That doesn't give the US infinite options in dealing with him, because the US is constrained by its own prior efforts to convince the US populace that the Karzai government is "legitimate" and "democratic". To reverse that and take the position that we installed the wrong sort of government and we have to go back and do it all again would be politically unfeasible, not least because it would raise the prospect of another decade-long effort to keep yet another new government in power.

In theory, the US can ditch Karzai, and if they do he will fall. In theory, that provides leverage, and the US should be able to tell Karzai that they'll ditch him if he doesn't do what he's told to do. In practice, we won't do that and he knows it, so the bluff is pointless.

Even if Karzai would do what RCJ wants him to do, there's not a snowball's chance in hell that the Taliban would settle for shared patronage and a piece of the action. They want the whole thing and all they have to do to get it is hold on until we leave. Why should they compromise, except as a tactical step aimed at eventual victory?

The single essential task is to change the government to a form that leverages the patronage culture toward stability rather than as a wedge that is continually driven between the victor and the loser. We must either:

1. Dedicate our main effort to forcing the current regime to take this on (and yes, the constitution is critical as it enforces this cultural wedge with the rule of law and Western support. If the design of the constitution does not describe and allow enforcement of a equitable distribution of patronage across society there will always be conflict. If the design of the constitution fuels a centralized upward Ponzi scheme of patronage there will always be outrageous, destructive corruption. If the constitution vests all power in one man, there will always be government in a box and never be legitimacy of government at any level in the eyes of people who are governed at those levels).

I don't think this is compatible with what you wrote earlier:

The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps. When there are major swings of political power it drives an equally major swing of patronage.

If the problem is "the cultural reality of Afghan patronage", how can you say that "the single essential task is to change the government to a form that leverages the patronage culture toward stability"? If your earlier post is accurate, the essential task is not to change the government, but to change the cultural reality, because that cultural reality will dictate the actual pattern of governance no matter what formal structure you put in place. Culture trumps structure, every time.

Do you really think the US should be committing itself to an effort to alter Afghan cultural reality?

It may well be true that Afghan stability depends on a change in this culture... but do we really need stability in Afghanistan? I submit that we do not need it and are not in a position to achieve it with the time and resources we are prepared to commit. All we need is to assure that all of the contending parties understand that the cost of attacking us or sheltering those who do exceed any possible benefits.