Gloomy US intelligence assessment coming or Let's hear from the spies

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

What I said is I think the US should pack up and leave. In regards to reconciliation and a new constitution designed to build trust between those who have no trust for each other and to override the natural "all or nothing" execution of patronage for a more equitably shared form: I said it is idealistic and necessary for any enduring stability. IF the US truly had vital interests at stake there, and IF this was a geo-strategically vital region for the US (no on both counts IMO), then yes, we should stay and take on this difficult, idealistic mission. But it isn't, so we shouldn't.

And we absolutely should not stay simply to attempt to prop up the existing system that we put in place as it is irreparably illegitimate and designed in a manner guaranteed to promote perpetual instability and conflict. A disaster at any price, and we are paying a premium. I really can't sugar coat it any more than that. LTG Barno set us on a course to this place, yet because the insurgency he set in motion had not picked up steam yet at the time he left he is not only held blameless, he holds an influential position at the helm of a major think tank selling solutions to the current mess. Ironic.

[Steve the Planner]

I always get frustrated by supposedly well-informed people criticizing "patronage" systems.

Having spent 25 years in and around government at every level, you would have to be on drugs to not understand that patronage and preference are key drivers of almost all political processes.

The balance to keep these things in check are, among other things, transparent budget and financial reporting processes, management and performance metrics, ethics and contract guidelines, and, when all else fails, an FBI investigation. Did I say I am from Maryland?

In Iraq, a tremendous amount of fraud, waste and abuse was ours (US), and not Iraqis. (SIGAR always reports its big busts, and plenty of sources for the rest).

Effective management and performance controls are, in the best light, ideals, but, in the course of decision-making, political and budget trade-offs, and implementation, there is often a "slip twixt the cup and the lip," and that's without a backdrop of war, corruption, and lost in translation.

Under those conditions, any complex and challenging programs, projects, and tactics are running hard against any credible probability of successful implementation. Bottom Line: Lucky if anything works out.

Constant management focus, once a program gets underway, is disaster avoidance (from many sources), and afterwards, whether success is possible.

These are embedded realities underscoring any credible assessments in Afghanistan (policing, anti-corruption, extension of services, etc...), and really unaffected by changes in personalities (Karzai, for example).

Sorry, Bob, but strategies that do not factor in these essential system parameters are just pipe dreams.

This stuff is just plain hard.

[Bob's World]

Steve,

I don't criticize the Afghan patronage system. I simply recognize how fundamental it is to all things Afghan and I also recognize how the current Constitution of Afghanistan takes that traditional system and horribly perverts it into what I can only describe as a Ponzi scheme. Patronage does not create the problems in Afghanistan, but it is the dormancy at work that leads to universal flips of fortune when regime changes take place such as the one we implemented in our efforts to exact revenge on AQ. The US needs to appreciate that it was our efforts that caused the latest "flip" and that it was our efforts that led to the current constitution that has so disrupted how patronage works in that society.

State department agonizes over "corruption" as one of their primary "causes" of instability and seek to eradicate it at all levels. They see the "corruption" inherent in normal day to day Afghan patronage as a problem. I don't agree at all. I do find it ironic, however, that State Department equally cheers the Afghan Constitution and their role in helping Karzai and the Northern Alliance develop this current document. If I were to identify a COG for the current insurgency in Afghanistan the current Constitution would certainly be on my top-3 list. That document set the insurgency in full motion. It codified the Northern Alliance monopoly on governance (and thereby patronage, power and wealth); It ensured that virtually all government officials would be hand selected by, and owe their patronage to, the President in that Northern Alliance controlled system. That turned off the natural cycle of patronage at every level and created a massive sucking sound upwards. This made is so that the non-Northern Alliance factions could not simply wait and compete, they were at that point forced to fight or submit. They chose to fight, and you have to respect them for that.

I curse what the constitution does to Afghan patronage, not Afghan patronage. It destroys legitimacy of government at all levels across Afghanistan (but particularly in the non-Northern Alliance areas) and it is the primary driver of the outrageous degree of corruption that has plagued Afghanistan in recent years.

I agree complete that strategies must factor in such things, and cannot simply look at threats, infrastructure, cleared ground, etc. I completely agree.

[Dayuhan]

I still think you're vastly overrating the impact of a Constitution on a political culture. The culture comes through no matter what the Constitution says; if the Constitution is not compatible with the prevailing political culture it's ignored or manipulated. I think Karzai and his people would have found ways to dominate the patronage system no matter what the Constitution said... as you said above, the tradition is winner take all. Similarly, the Taliban aren't going to settle for part of the pie. They want to be the winner and to take all.

This is perhaps more clear if you've been in a country through changes of Constitutions and seen how little things actually change.

That's not to say political cultures don't evolve. They do, but they can't be evolved by some internal or external deus ex machina bringing a new system or a new Constitution. They evolve through a process of negotiation and competition, and that process often involves violence. The process can't be short-cut, because it's not just about finding a "right" system, it's also about the contending factions and populaces evolving to a point where the political culture begins to change. Even if you could jump 20 or 50 years into the future and look at what system eventually emerges in Afghanistan, you couldn't simply install that system today and cut out the process.

[Fuchs]

A constitution can coin the entire country if it's well-done and comes at a time when the country is desperately in need of a new way.

[Bob's World]

Consider the matter of "War Lords" that the US found so offensive.

Who did War Lords owe their patronage to??

Who provided security under the War Lord system??

How was security paid for, and who paid for it under the War Lord system?

Who benefited from patronage under the War Lord system?


None of that exists any more under the constitution. Some good in that, and much bad as well. The net loser is the average Joe Afghan.

Sure the people did not select their War Lord, but they respected and understood the process under which a guy rose to that position and how he held it. He had "legitimacy" of the variety that is essential for stability. Not the legal variety we put so much stock in with our "rule of law" approach.

Today leaders at District and Province level are selected from above and owe their patronage to above. The security leaders do not owe patronage to the political leader at their level, but to above as well. Money is collected and sent up. Security and Political leaders compete with each other for influence from their respective Patrons on high, and one sure way to be a rising star is to send big bags of cash up to Kabul. The loser of this competition? Average Joe Afghan.

I do not say that constitutions are cure-alls. Like the Rule of Law in general, they can be a miracle of COIN like the US Constitution is; or a miracle of Insurgency causation like the Afghan Constitution is. The difference is in fine nuance and the societies they are applied to. I do not know what an effective Afghan Constitution looks like. It will contain many aspects that make US officials blanch. But so long as it empowers the positive aspects of that society and creates mechanisms that allow for trust to grow where none currently exists it will be a major move toward stability.

[Entropy]

It seems to me the elephant in the room is, and always has been, Pakistan. As long as Pakistan continues to believe it must essentially control most of Afghanistan, then our efforts at promoting Afghan governance will fail. Afghanistan is simply too weak economically and politically to fend off its neighbor to the east. Any kind of stability in Afghanistan - no matter the system of governance - is going to require Pakistani support. It's been ten years and I don't see any signs that Pakistan is ready to look at Afghanistan as much beyond a pawn in its conflict with India.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy: Or vice versa for India. (Iran? China? Russia? US?)

Fuchs: The idea of a post-capitulation "new way" forward just doesn't seem to me to apply where (1) there was a winner/loser, unresolved competition, no capitulation; (2) a weak country dependent on others where all those others had separate goals and agendas (however sane or not).

The same in Iraq we, perhaps, held off and delayed decades of pent-up competition/vengeance/reckonings/reconciliations. In January 2012, all these unaddressed issues must, once again, find their resolutions.

Is progress measured by the conflict that results in resolutions, or the suppression of conflicts by external forces that will ultimately have to be resolved?

Sometimes, the Motto--- Will FIGHT for Peace---is not misplaced. Successful conflict resolution is predicated on recognizing that there is conflict, the parties in conflict, and the matters over which they are in conflict. Dealing with them frankly and objectively is not easy.

[Bob's World]

Pakistan and Afghanistan will always have a shared border, a shared populace and a shared destiny.

I believe the Elephant in the room is the US. We can agonize over how Pakistan being Pakistan is an obstacle to our objectives in the region, but Pakistan will not stop being Pakistan simply because we find it inconvenient to our current objectives in the region. We did not curse Pakistan for being Pakistan when we found that to be convenient to our current objectives in the 80s.

We cannot simply demand that everyone bend to our whim and will as it suits us. We are attempting to create something in Afghanistan that suits us and that suits the Northern Alliance. It does not suit much of the populace in the region, spanning borders in all directions. Nor does it suit the governments of Afhanistan's neighbors. These are inconvenient metrics we choose to ignore.

Our actions are well intended and make a certain American-centric sense. But they are il-conceived as they are not built upon a sophisticated strategic understanding of the region or of insurgency. It was an ugly baby. It is an ugly adolesent. No amournt of nurturing will grow it up to be a beautiful adult. It's never too late to reframe and start over, it is never too early to stop doing what cannot work.

Blaming Pakistan, AQ, Hekmayer, ideology, etc, etc is a natural response but does not address our own mistakes that contribute so heavily to the current situation. Taking responsibility for one's own actions are step one to getting healthy. We need to take step one.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Agree with your observation that we are trying to create something that suits the Northern Alliance (again, competition and conflict in a winner take all system), but I believe that what suits them, and what we thought we might get from them (minimal governance/stability), are at loggerheads.

Our actions, however intentional or unintentional, have fueled a great many consequences, which are, perhaps, more apparent after the big surge than when the pot was essentially left on a low boil for many years.

The issue remains, concurrent with the perennially gloomy NIEs whether we ever should have aspired to much more than "keeping a lid on it." Are all the current consequences the result of the pressures to do more, and not to just do what was minimally necessary?

[Bob's World]

There is no easy answer at this point, but there are smart answers.

If we simply pack up and walk, if we do not garner guarantees in advance from those who will swoop in to fill the vacuum, it will be those at the lowest level who have trusted in us the most that will suffer the most.

If we stay we will need to make dramatic changes in our priorities and approaches. We will need to be more accepting of the fact that US goals, values and interests are not only not universal, but for many in this region they are incomprehensible.

History says we will ultimately adopt some version of "pack up and leave." Perhaps, like Kissinger in the '70s we will negotiate "a decent interval" to walk away with some form of "success" to point to. Or perhaps we do like the Baltimore Colts.... Time will tell. (or note, I suspect the Vietnamese are more forgiving of our departure there than the people of Baltimore of for how the Colts broke it off)

[Fuchs]

Fuchs: The idea of a post-capitulation "new way" forward just doesn't seem to me to apply where (1) there was a winner/loser, unresolved competition, no capitulation; (2) a weak country dependent on others where all those others had separate goals and agendas (however sane or not).

I didn't write "post-capitulation".

The Eastern Europeans and the recent incarnation of the French Republic appear to have had quite good experiences with their constitutions.

[Entropy]

Bob,

My comment was an implicit criticism of our own strategy. It's success is based on Pakistan playing ball and they haven't played ball for 10 years, yet we continue to try to change Pakistan instead of changing strategy. And the reason, I hate to say, is domestic politics. Our politicians, for obvious reasons, do not want to own the perception of us "losing" in Afghanistan. They keep hoping that someone will deliver something like we got in Iraq - an honorable disengagement.

[Dayuhan]

Consider the matter of "War Lords" that the US found so offensive.

Who did War Lords owe their patronage to??

Who provided security under the War Lord system??

How was security paid for, and who paid for it under the War Lord system?

Who benefited from patronage under the War Lord system?


None of that exists any more under the constitution. Some good in that, and much bad as well. The net loser is the average Joe Afghan.

Sure the people did not select their War Lord, but they respected and understood the process under which a guy rose to that position and how he held it. He had "legitimacy" of the variety that is essential for stability. Not the legal variety we put so much stock in with our "rule of law" approach.

Today leaders at District and Province level are selected from above and owe their patronage to above. The security leaders do not owe patronage to the political leader at their level, but to above as well. Money is collected and sent up. Security and Political leaders compete with each other for influence from their respective Patrons on high, and one sure way to be a rising star is to send big bags of cash up to Kabul. The loser of this competition? Average Joe Afghan.

I do not say that constitutions are cure-alls. Like the Rule of Law in general, they can be a miracle of COIN like the US Constitution is; or a miracle of Insurgency causation like the Afghan Constitution is. The difference is in fine nuance and the societies they are applied to. I do not know what an effective Afghan Constitution looks like. It will contain many aspects that make US officials blanch. But so long as it empowers the positive aspects of that society and creates mechanisms that allow for trust to grow where none currently exists it will be a major move toward stability.

Is the Warlord system disrupted by the Constitution, or by our presence and our support for the Government?

If we weren't there, Karzai - like every other ruler of an essentially feudal country - would have to rely on the barons to implement his policies, maintain order, and collect the tithes. The barons would have enormous leverage and would be able to control a great deal of patronage themselves. Unless Karzai had a substantial military apparatus that was directly loyal to him (not likely in our absence) the barons would largely take over, as they'd be the ones controlling the coercive force and collecting the revenue.

These things are not functions of the Constitution. They are functions of the balance of power: who has the guns and the money. The Constitution hasn't changed the balance of power of the culture, our guns and money supporting Karzai has altered it... for as long as we're there at least.

If we simply pack up and walk, if we do not garner guarantees in advance from those who will swoop in to fill the vacuum, it will be those at the lowest level who have trusted in us the most that will suffer the most.

Are we in a position to "garner guarantees" that would be observed or that would mean anything after our departure? I'm not sure I'd bet on it.

If we stay we will need to make dramatic changes in our priorities and approaches. We will need to be more accepting of the fact that US goals, values and interests are not only not universal, but for many in this region they are incomprehensible.

I suspect that the idea of compromise, inclusion, and an orderly sharing of patronage are high on the list of "US goals, values and interests" that are incomprehensible for many in the region. Easy for us to say that these things must happen for stability to arrive, but if the idea is coming from us and has yet to achieve substantial traction among the people and leaders who are expected to share... well, good luck.

A constitution can coin the entire country if it's well-done and comes at a time when the country is desperately in need of a new way.

Very true... but the people in that country have to agree that they need a new way and they have to have a basic level of agreement on what that new way should be. Not likely to work if the new way is brought by a foreign power.

[Bob's World]

The constitution as written is what disrupts the Patronage process. Equally disruptive (and part of the constitution) are the centralized form of government and the centralized national military and police.

For what purpose does Afghanistan need a centralized police and military??? Only one: to control the populace of Afghanistan. We just saw it as how grown up states do business, so we went a long and promoted this without appreciating the real purpose. Plus we saw it as an additional counter to the messy War Lord system.

The War Lord system has served to defeat the most powerful professional militaries of the Western world (British , Russian, US); so to what purpose would one create a national force? Such a force is far easier for a professional military to defeat, and the remnants would be forced to surrender on day 3-4 of the war when the capital fell. A "well regulated militia" answering to District and Provincial governors selected by elders and shuras of the regions they represent would be far more cost effective and far more legitimate, and far more appropriate to the true security needs of the country.

If we were there protecting such a regional, bottom-up system of locally legitimate leaders and locally raised and trained militias there would be no disruption of the patronage system. We could have provided the checks and balances to ensure that no region used its force to dominate another, and none would have the power on their own to threaten any neighbors as well. The only problem with such a system is that the Northern Alliance would not be able to dominate the entire country as they do now with centralized control and a national security force made primarily of Northern Alliance personnel.

We were so fixated on what we wanted and what we thought was "right" that we never saw that we were being played the entire way by the Northern Alliance. What Afghanistan needs is a new Loya Jirga with appropriate reps from across the populace to develop a system that makes sense to them. They will tell us everyone is represented at such Jirgas, but when one asks penetrating questions one quickly finds out that only those inside the circle of patronage trust get invited. MG Nick Carter worked his tail off in Kandahar to get past the games and get the best representation as possible at such Jirgas. He totally gets it. But even with his focus I am sure we got played as well. We are babes in the Afghan woods.

[Ken White]

We were so fixated on what we wanted and what we thought was "right" that we never saw that we were being played the entire way by the Northern Alliance...We are babes in the Afghan woods.

Syngman Rhee suckered Truman (and MacArthur...), The Diems played the Kennedy brothers like a fiddle. They and others played us before there was a Northern Alliance. The Kosovars were the most blatant but fortunately did little damage -- only because no one paid much attention to To Wesley Clark and Clinton didn't know what to do...

Those who want to save the world cause considerable harm. More harm than good, as always...

[Dayuhan]

The constitution as written is what disrupts the Patronage process. Equally disruptive (and part of the constitution) are the centralized form of government and the centralized national military and police.

Again, I don't think so. yes, the patronage system is distorted, but it's not by the Constitution, it's by our guns and money supporting Karzai. Without that, Karzai would have to reach an accommodation with the regional power brokers no matter what the Constitution says. Even with all the power vested in him by the Constitution, how long do you think he'd last without us?

I know that to an American and a lawyer it's akin to blasphemy, but in much of the world what's written on paper has little or nothing to do with actual power relationships. Those are determined by guns and money, not by words on paper.

If we were there protecting such a regional, bottom-up system of locally legitimate leaders and locally raised and trained militias there would be no disruption of the patronage system. We could have provided the checks and balances to ensure that no region used its force to dominate another, and none would have the power on their own to threaten any neighbors as well.

Do you really believe that such a system would be so easily manageable, or that "we" could realistically provide meaningful checks and balances?

We are babes in the Afghan woods.

Now you make sense. Yes, we are babes in the Afghan woods: babes with guns and money, a dangerous combination. We will be played no matter what system we install. We will be manipulated no matter what system we install. The problem is not that we installed the wrong system, the problem is that we think we can install a workable system at all. We can't. There isn't one. The Afghans may be able to evolve one over time, but we can't impose one and we can't simply force everyone to sit down and make one. It will emerge gradually from a period of competition and conflict, like most political systems.

The answer (IMO as always) is not to install better governments, the answer is to stop trying to install governments. The local political culture will emerge no matter what we install, and we have a very hard time walking away from these projects once we embark on them. That leads us to a place where we're supporting a government that cannot stand, but that we refuse to let fall, close to a worst case scenario. Note that our refusal to let it fall is not a function of vital national interests - there aren't any - but of reluctance to drop a project once we invest ourselves in it. That's our habit, and because of that habit we need to be very careful about what projects we invest ourselves in. The last thing I'd want to see is us investing ourselves in an effort to produce a new and improved Afghan government, because I think in 10 years time we'd be right back where we are now: that government will be overtaken by the political culture no matter how it's structured.

[davidbfpo]

My comment was an implicit criticism of our own strategy. It's success is based on Pakistan playing ball and they haven't played ball for 10 years, yet we continue to try to change Pakistan instead of changing strategy. And the reason, I hate to say, is domestic politics. Our politicians, for obvious reasons, do not want to own the perception of us "losing" in Afghanistan. They keep hoping that someone will deliver something like we got in Iraq - an honorable disengagement.

Entropy,

In another post you referred to:

It seems to me the elephant in the room is, and always has been, Pakistan.

I would argue that there are two elephants in the Afghan policy arena or strategic space. Pakistan and domestic politicians, mainly in the USA.

What is clear in the UK is that a significant factor in the informal, conversational airing of the issues around our Afghan involvement is that "losing" means all the nearly four hundred dead's lives have been wasted. A point that is beginning to appear in TV documentaries. Given our history with Afghanistan and the "kith & kin" impact of South Asian affairs I doubt if there is any prospect - for the UK - of an 'honourable disengagement'.

I have noted almost no reaction in the UK amongst our Pakistani-related communities (which are mainly Kashmiri) to the recent border post attack; probably a reflection of their negative attitude to the politics of Pakistan.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan, Hey I always make sense! (ok, at least that's what my mother tells me.)

Also, I get it that you disagree in regards to the effect and importance of the Afghan Constitution. I think you're wrong, but I can live with neither of us changing our mind on this issue.

I don't take this position as a lawyer, though being one does bring a certain background and experience that shapes my thinking. I don't take this position as a guy who spent 20 years as a US Special Forces officer (and yes, we often jump out of short aircraft...). I don't take this position based on my time and experience in Afghanistan. Nor from all of the research and writing on insurgency in general and related matters over the past 7-8 years. All of these things do contribute, however to my thinking on this.

I do not believe that ALL constitutions can have such positive or negative effects, nor do I believe that every nation needs a constitution. I do believe, however that some constitutions are special in terms of their either positive or negative effect on the likelihood of insurgency in the nation they define. The US Constitution is an example of excellent preventative COIN (Of note it was produced by one class of citizen, but from across the young country, and with no external influence as to what it should or should not be; and all of those men had been oppressed citizens, insurgents, and were newly counterinsurgents at the time of the convention). The Afghan Constitution is an example of excellent insurgency causation (of note, half the populace was excluded from representation and Western "experts" weighed in throughout the process). My assessment. Reasons for that laid out above.

Oh, and put on your helmet before reading this post!

[Dayuhan]

I make an issue of it because I believe that the focus on "The Constitution" or "the Government" raises a very dangerous possibility. If that's presented as the problem, some less than bright person somewhere is going to have the wonderful idea that all we have to do to solve the problem is to fix the Government or change the Constitution, and that's just going to start the cycle of mess and intervention all over.

Far better, I think, to focus on what you described like this:

The cultural reality of Afghan patronage. This is an all or nothing society. If you are on the in team, you have full chance at power, land, influence, wealth. If you are on the out team you get scraps.

Our people need to understand that the obstacle is not a government or a document, but the existing cultural reality, something that is not going to change because we put someone new on the chair or change Constitutions. Understanding that provides a badly needed perspective: people who might be tempted to try and "fix" a government or a Constitution might think twice - or one hopes more than that - about trying to "fix" a culture.