Iraq: Strategic and Diplomatic Options

[Rob Thornton]

We were talking about this last night (me and my Iraqi counterpart) over chai. One of the things I've learned is that if you want to know what is going on, you have to be open to listening to conversations where the dialogue may not be in line with what you think you should be hearing, or would like to hearing – which is why I think its probably going to be a combo of several, but the Iraqis get a vote - it does not matter if we acknowledge they do or not. I also don’t think its going to be nice and clear cut.

-Feudalistic partitioning will only lead to more trouble - the Kurds just tested the water in Kirkuk, and found it too hot. However, there is some acknowledgment that within the areas they administer, local governments can have "some" autonomy. Nobody is happy if they get left out, nobody really trusts the other enough to believe they will get a fair share of the revenues - oh, and they have their own opinions about "fair" share.

-Iran is not about to help establish a resurgent, strong Iraq in any shape or form. It is clearly not in their perceived interest - which should tell us something about what Iran really wants. They will however be happy to tell the international community what they want to hear. They will gladly sacrifice 1000s of Iraq's Shia (remember, this is the State that bussed up civilians with hand grenades to the Iraq/Iran front) for the maneuver room to improve their own position. They are currently able to keep Iraqi Shia armed and informed, and as long as Iraq is infighting it prevents any neighborhood competition. They would prefer us to decouple cooperation with the on Iran with the nuclear option - why do we think that is? In truth the two are solidly linked to the pursuit of Iranian power. Iran is very involved in regional politics to serve their own ends, we need to be honest about where ours interests and theirs diverge - it may be from the start point.
-Syria, might be more willing if it can ever figure out what Iran is really up to, and acknowledge the danger it also poses to them. However, they are so concerned abut Palestine they were willing to cooperate with Iran in resourcing Hezbullah to hurt Israel (also a player in this equation), which to me indicates they will cut off their nose to spite their face.
-Overall, if I were pursuing help, I'd turn to the border Arab states and Turkey, and quietly suggest that if they do not want to have to deal with an Iranian powerhouse, they'd better use their influence to help stabilize Iraq. Which leads to question of a "strong man"

-Bringing in a "strongman" may not be as easy as it sounds. First you have to find a guy that is willing and capable. This may not be easy as many candidates have been quietly eliminated - check out the New York Times , November 12, 2006, Pg. 1 article "Sectarian Rifts Foretell Pitfalls Of Iraqi Troops' Taking Control", by Richard A. Oppel Jr. - somebody is setting the conditions and are a couple of steps in front of us. If you do find this guy, the Iraqis may not welcome him with open arms - nobody is going to willingly give up what gains they have made for a guy who may not be an equal opportunity dictator - so its unlikely that the three groups would back a single candidate for Dictator for Life - there is some bad karma associated with the position.


The United States is going to have to play this game of "Texas Hold'em" (no pun intended ref. Texas ) very close. We will have to call in favors, make some difficult choices, and find out what levers can be pulled to shape this to an acceptable outcome. I've read recently some opinions that our policy must consider first the regional future, and I agree. Too many things depend on the balance of power in the Middle East. Being shortsighted to serve political ends will only mean paying the long term consequences.

[Bill Moore]

Like it or not Iraq's neighbors get a vote, and they have a voice. A voice that will be heard on the battlefield through surrogates, or a voice that could be heard in civil negotiations. We don't go into these conversations with a weak hand, but we will have to go into them.

Every country that borders Iraq has an interest in a stable Iraq, since instability will eventually cross borders. Very few, if any, countries bordering Iraq has an interest in a democratic Iraq, which is a threat to their regimes, which some think was the purpose of the war to begin with. However, we missed the window of opportunity to achieve this.

Al-Maliki obviously must go, but the trick is determining how. Do we throw him out? Do we quietly allow an Iraqi military coup? It is obvious that martial law needs to be implemented, and tough security measures implemented. We need carrots (hard to come by where the unemployment in many parts of Iraq exceeds 40 plus percent) and big sticks. Big sticks best carried by Iraqi security forces that are not burdened by our rules based on political correctness instead of necessity.

As for a time table to withdraw U.S. forces, I think we need to push it hard. We can withdraw from the urban areas to remote desert locations where we can provide a credible military response to any Iraqi forces being overwhelmed. I think the security situation will improve when we pull out, despite all the empty rhetoric to the contrary. Let the Iraqis fight an all out war without our oversight, and they'll get to an end state. Al Qaeda will be desimmated after we pull out by the Iraqis. We are the center of gravity for the hostile forces, we pull out of the urban areas and turn the fight over to the Iraqis, we might take the wind out of their sails.

As we all know there are no good answers at this point, but I recommend reaching common ground with all of Iraq's neighbors, getting professionals to advise to the Iraqi military and police instead of putting third string NG troops on the MiTTs, invest in the surge of the money and manpower needed to bring the Iraqi Army and police up to an acceptable Arab level (largely based on their previous organizations), then rapidly pull back, then pull out.

Staying the course sounds nice, but we'll continue to waste human and monetary treasure to no end if we do. There are several other areas in the world that require our attention, we can't afford to let our pride tie us down needlessly.

[Rob Thornton]

As we all know there are no good answers at this point, but I recommend reaching common ground with all of Iraq's neighbors, getting professionals to advise to the Iraqi military and police instead of putting third string NG troops on the MiTTs, invest in the surge of the money and manpower needed to bring the Iraqi Army and police up to an acceptable Arab level (largely based on their previous organizations), then rapidly pull back, then pull out.

Most of the TTs are about 50/50. Believe it or not, our 3rd stringers provide balance and some mature perspective that their counterpart AC professionals just don't have (we have not trained nor conditioned them to - its a matter of available resources). They also bring what Marc had referred to as life experiences to the table - when you are dealing with people who have an agenda that is different than yours, you better have some leadership experience that requires getting people to come to a consensus for reasons other then because you rate them.

There is also the question of where you are going to resource the AC professionals from - as long as its a tasking your QA/QC on AC folks is going to be hit or miss - how many units really give up their best folks for a tasker? No, the problem is less about the people they send, then it is about how we are approaching the train up that puts people from disparate organizations into hastily organized teams and tries to educate them on everything from est. a TCP to political histories & culture in a short span of time. As one of the AC guys on the team, I can tell you that some of the RC guys have acquitted themselves far better then some of their AC contemporaries - professionalism extends beyond component and beyond technical competence. Professionalism originates from commitment.

As for the part about regional neighbors worrying about Iraq's instability spilling over - I'd say equally important is is the recognition of how they perceive the consequences of the act vs. the perceived benefits. Their actions may not make sense in a western sense, but then again they don't really need to. What is the cost of Iranian assistance in stabilizing Iraq? Does Iran really need to worry about sectarian violence spilling over the border when they have the political, military and religious means to limit it in pursuit of their more primary goals? What do past actions and statements tell us about what Iran is willing to risk? I'm as frustrated as anybody, about the lack of a clean solution, but I am cautious about improving the position of a state whose agenda runs in clear opposition to our own.

Iran recently ran a series of naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf on the heels of our own for the purpose of making a statement - they consider the name of that body of water to imply ownership. They will also likely contest the rights to the Caspian in a louder voice as their military capability becomes stronger. They have aligned themselves with Russia and China in order to limit Western influence in the security council by using the promise of favored energy partner and regional influence. I'm not saying we cannot engage them, they do get a vote. I am saying that their motivations may not be what we think they are, just because we see them that way.