Iraq: Strategic and Diplomatic Options

[SWJED]

19 November Los Angeles Times - U.S. Has Many Options in Iraq, None Easy by Paul Richter.

Go to the link for a listing of five options, the advocates and pros and cons for each option.

[SWJED]

20 November Christian Science Monitor - U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq May Rise, Then Decline by Howard LaFranchi.

It's being dubbed by some as the "last big push" option, and it appears increasingly to be what President Bush favors on Iraq.

Despite growing expectations of a troop withdrawal from Iraq in the wake of Democratic gains in Congress, the White House appears to be leaning in a different direction: at least a temporary rise in US troop levels.

The numbers would not be huge, perhaps 20,000 on top of the 144,000 US soldiers already fighting the war. But the idea would be to stabilize Baghdad - a priority that has proved dishearteningly elusive since September - and to allow for a major diplomatic push aimed at drawing Iraq's neighbors into resolving the spiraling violence.

Implicit in the perspective of the officials and experts who see this as a kind of military "Hail Mary" pass is the assumption that a phased reduction of US troops would begin next fall - whether or not Iraq had been brought back from the brink of all-out civil war.

Some experts who have favored increasing the number of US troops in the past say conditions have deteriorated to such a degree that before any steps are taken, the United States must first differentiate between a knee-jerk act of desperation and something that can really improve the situation in Iraq...

[SWJED]

20 November New York Times - General Discusses Goals of His Return to Iraq by Thom Shanker.

Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, who returns to Iraq next month to take charge of the day-to-day fight as commander of the Multinational Corps-Iraq, says he departs for Baghdad with a clearer, perhaps even diminished, set of expectations of what the military can be expected to accomplish now, more than three years after the invasion.

“You have to define win, and I think everybody has a different perspective on winning,” General Odierno said during an interview at the Army’s III Corps headquarters here.

“I would argue that with Saddam Hussein no longer in power in Iraq, that is a partial win,” he said. “I think what we need is an Iraqi government that is legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi population, an Iraq that is able to protect itself and not be a safe haven for terror. That’s what I think winning is.”...

“Notice I left out a few things, such as a democracy in the sense that we see a democracy in the United States. We have to allow them to shape their own democracy, the type of democracy that fits them and their country.”

It has become a truism of the war in Iraq that there can be no military victory without a political solution, which requires the coordinated efforts of the entire United States government and of the Iraqi one, as well.

“The longer we stay in Iraq, the less of a military fight it becomes,” the general said. “We have to understand that.”...

[Bill Moore]

“I would argue that with Saddam Hussein no longer in power in Iraq, that is a partial win,” he said. “I think what we need is an Iraqi government that is legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi population, an Iraq that is able to protect itself and not be a safe haven for terror. That’s what I think winning is.”...

We can’t develop a strategy without an overall achievable objective.

LTG Odierno's stated objectives liberates us from the stable democracy end state (if it is accepted) which is helpful, but I’m still wrestling with how we “the military” facilitate establishing a government that is seen as legitimate by those it governs and how we deny Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. I don’t think that the U.S. military can do much more to facilitate these objectives. While drawing parallels can lead to misleading conclusions, it is worth noting that the more stable governments of Columbia, Pakistan, and Philippines as a small example all have large ungoverned areas that are safe havens to various extents for terrorists. How long will it be until the Iraq government is prepared to effectively provide security throughout its entire territory? Saddam couldn’t do it with a large Army and no rules of engagement. While I admire LTG Odierno’s attempt to narrow down the objective to the achievable, I think we need to go back to the drawing board and do the hard, yet basic, work of clarifying our realistic end state objectives.

[Around Midnight]

Gen Wayne A. Downing (USA, Ret) said to Tim Russert, Rep Duncan Hunter (chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), and Rep Ike Skelton (ranking member, House Armed Services commitee) on the November 26, 2006 Meet the Press:

“But what we don’t want to do, Tim, and, and, and, you know, my congressmen here, don’t let us go out of this thing the way we did it in Vietnam. Let’s not sell these people down the river the way we did the, the, the South Vietnamese. Let’s do this smart.”

Gen Downing’s heartfelt plea to the congressmen was to avoid a "Vietnam situation" in Iraq and do it the “smart” way. So much of our current national discussion is rightfully about what the Iraqi’s are able to do (or not able to do), what military decisions the US will make regarding force levels, force composition and military strategy and tactics and what Iraqi politics and middle east issues are in play. The one issue that is not given enough discussion time and planning is the deliberate cultivation of a “unified national will.” Leadership decision making is well and good, but unless there is a intentional and effective mobilization of a supportive US constituency, how can any American decision or plan succeed?

Simply put, any plan regarding Iraq that is not integrated with a successful plan to motivate domestic political support will fail and we will be “doing it” again exactly the way we did “it” in Vietnam.

This kind of foreign policy that is integrated with domestic politics demands a higher quality of political leadership than the US has had to date. Unless and until the American People have this kind of excellence in domestic political leadership the US will be tragically unequal to the task that is Iraq.

(http://sundayschoolforsinners.blogspot.com/)

[Bill Moore]

I doubt my call for an Iraqi Army take over of the government will receive much support (darn it), so I pondered the situation some more. What we have here is a civil war much like Lebanon (numerous players, not just a couple of groups), and perhaps some similarities to Bosnia.

Perhaps by the definition of insurgency, this would count as an insurgency, but let's face it the current government is unlikely to win over the support of the local populace. I agree with a previous post, it is a pretend government of sorts, only recognized outside of Iraq by the world's diplomatic corps, but not by those it governs. This leads me to my next course of action proposal. Send in a non-bias international actor to act as a peace mediator with the various groups (minus AQ) and work out a peace plan, then send in a UN force under Chpt VI to enforce it.

The groups that won't come to the table to talk should be eradicated. We'll give them enough rope to tie Iraq together, or to hang themselves. Those that won't bargin for their representatives should be cannon floder for an IO campaign directed against them.

We're going to have to get tougher, much tougher to defeat the various armed groups, but first we need to identify those that we can reach a political agreement with. The rest we destroy.

While this sounds like chest thumping I admit, I am not an advocate of military action in most cases, but when it is needed, we need to lift the restrictions on fighting and allow them (us) to defeat the enemy. The alternative is to continue half stepping and dragging the Iraqi people through years of continuing misery. Cliche but true, we need to be cruel to be kind.

[UCrawford]

Going through each option...I would elect for 2, by the way

1. I think that setting a timetable would be problematic for us and cause greater destabilization in the region. When you set out your timetable for withdrawal, you give your opponent a timetable to cause you problems on that withdrawal. They can focus their efforts on causing maximum damage to us as we're pulling out, which is desirable for the more extreme groups.

2. I think it might make us look bad in the short-term considering the amount of hostility we've had with Iran and Syria over the last few years, but frankly I think that Bush's whole Axis of Evil rhetoric hasn't been particularly helpful to us to begin with and has been a big part of our problem with getting the international community to buy into the GWOT and Iraq. Most of the world probably realizes that Iran and Syria aren't ideal partners politically, but I think most nations start getting twitchy when the biggest superpower starts breaking things down into "good" and "evil" and acting unilaterally. Syria and Iran are not a direct or huge threat to us militarily or economically (since we don't import Iranian oil and since Iran will realistically not develop a nuclear arsenal capable of wiping us out) so it's not necessarily a bad thing to engage them. It's their neighborhood and they would likely have a better idea of how to stabilize and proceed there. The Iranian/Syrian alliance is also in part a reaction to our presence there...if we're out of the mix it could also weaken their cooperation by removing what they perceive as a common threat. We'll also still have troops in the area with our forces in Afghanistan to deal with the Iranians if they get out of hand. And if we've made a legitimate effort to engage Iran diplomatically, it would give the international community more of an incentive to back us if military action against Iran becomes necessary because they won't see us as just trying to impose our will. Engagement may be painful in the short-term but it gives us options in the long run.

3. I think legal trisection would open the gates for widespread ethnic cleansing in all of the territories (Shi'a, Sunni, Kurd). It already happens, and it's currently a major issue, but trying to partition the major cities in particular has the potential to create a massive humanitarian crisis that we would be blamed for (as the British often are for their partitions in colonial times). If trisection is going to be tried, it needs to be Middle Eastern countries trying it, not us.

4. Al-Maliki is a horrible prime minister. But al-Sadr would be far, far, worse, and he's the best bet for being able to control the country (because he controls the biggest armed force and has the biggest constituency). Worst of both worlds if we install him...he'll be hostile to the U.S. and we'll likely be blamed for everything he does if we allow him to take power. Any other Shi'a we install will likely be subordinated by al-Sadr. Any Sunni we install will likely cause the government to collapse (at best) and lead to immediate civil war (at worst). The Kurds don't have enough power outside of the north to fix the situation, assuming they'd be interested in doing so. They might just let the Sunni and Shi'a fight it out. Plus Turkey would likely object to a Kurdish strongman, which means there's a good chance we'd have to go back in if Turkey were attacked by Kurdish insurgents and had to go in (being a NATO ally). There's no strongman out there who could control Iraq that we could live with...better to let the regional powers sort it out, even if that includes Iran and Syria.

[jcustis]

Someone mentioned in another thread that the SWC and SWJ seem to have a dearth of lessons from Kosovo and Bosnia, and that the current state of affairs may approximate the shaky government of Lebanon soon.

With regard to Lebanon's history of governance (and realizing that 1:1 parallels are difficult due to the ethnic/religious terrain), are there any lessons we can gleam from that past, in order to find a way ahead in Iraq?

More importantly, are there any academics or policy-makers looking at the history of Lebanon for rudder steer? Can we focus our deliberations on strategic and diplomatic options by looking at what worked or didn't work there?

Both Syria and Iran have a stake in Iraq, and although it is not necessarily the same stake they had/have in Lebanon, can we build a model of likely responses to our moves (wargaming if you will) by analysing that country's past?

[Tom Odom]

JC

Dave mentioned Bosnia and Kosovo; I surfaced Lebanon as the most relevant war (over Vietnam) to Iraq.

The parallels are very close; the ethnic carpet is there although the Christian segment is larger.

The role of Hizballah and Nasrallah compared to Muqtada al-sadr and his militia is eeerily close as well as their relations with Iran. The inability of the IDF to pound Hizballah out of existence is well documented; the parallels to dealing with Sadr should be evident.

The roles of Syria and Iran as spoilers and manipulators are nearly identical, especially when examined in the light of Israeli inability to check those activities.

Best

Tom