The Village

[Mike in Hilo]

Concur in the foregoing. On War Comes to Long An: I agree, it's probably an essential read and, as suggested, I have indeed reread my copy at least three times. However, one would be advised to exercise caution--as with any book--in accepting all of the author's conclusions. Specifically, Race has difficulty explaining what happened in Long An that turned it from a notable problem case to arguably the most secure province in MR-III 1970-early '75. He lamely (IMO) suggests land reform--but Land to the Tiller land distributions weren't implemented till 1971-2...

On the other hand, Race forcefully disparages the massive kinetic onslaught that began 1967 and the unfortunate dislocations suffered as a result of the concomitant attrition and population resettlement. I would suggest that these were, in fact, the sine qua non for the "pacification" of Long An...

Illustrative of the change in the province, Long An RF, considered among the best troops in the country, held their own against PAVN 5th Division in March and early April 1975, despite taking considerable casualties. (Source, Col. William LeGro, From Cease Fire to Capitulation:http://www.amazon.com/Vietnam-Cease-...3853542&sr=1-1.)

Re: The Village. Concur regarding the tremendous importance of this work. I'd like to highlight one point: The CAP working with PF was essential in keeping the village from being overrun. Yet, it wasn't until, after a more highly kinetic phase (1968-69), that you could walk through the village without having to look over your shoulder. Bing attributes the difference to destruction by US air power (quite extraneous to the village) of the enemy unit based in its nearby sanctuary,that had been the major source of insecurity for the village...and to the shift in the balance of forces (decimation of the enemy units) that was the result of the kinetic activity brought on by the enemy initiated offensives of 1968 and '69.

Cheers,
Mike.