Kenya (catch all)

[jmm99]

While I still adhere generally to the concept of neutralization (not as a euphemism, but meaning to kill, detain indefinitely or convert), the option of conversion has never seemed to me - in and from the Vietnam era to the present - of much value in dealing with persons of strong ideologies (political or religious). Besides the "converts" are usually low-hanging fruit (lower rankers); and you can't really trust them.

The option of indefinite detention has the potential positive value of data gathering - we can discuss what techniques ought to be used ad infinitum. However, as the Gitmo cases show, indefinite detention has become a limited US option; and, perhaps, that is as it should be. I'm OK with that so long as the kill option is open.

The kill option has three parts:

1. The person killed did, or was involved in the doing of (including being an immediate or imminent threat, #3 below), a bad thing (so, the killing is "retribution").

2. The reasons for killing that person are articulated and absolutely no apology is made for the killing (our articulation is "reprobation").

3. By killing that person, we prevent future bad acts by that person; but we also have to kill those persons who are an immediate or imminent threat to do, or who are involved in the planning of doing, bad acts ("specific deterrence").

I'm not in favor of the US being the World's go to sniper; and personally favor non-violent action in all cases where it's likely to work. But, there are man-eating humans roaming the World; and after initial contact, the US should do onto them as they do unto the US.

NB: The theory of general deterrence (influencing a number of others not to do something by punishing a guilty person) is really an attempt at indirect conversion. Thus, I believe in general deterrence even less than direct attemps at conversiom. I'm also a hard sell on rehabilitation programs.

In reality, I'm a lousy singer - except when very drunk, or in the shower. I also confess to having used the metaphor "man-eating tiger" more than once at SWC and elsewhere.

Regards

Mike

PS: After posting this, I read Kilcullen's Westgate mall attacks: urban areas are the battleground of the 21st century - As the terror attack in Nairobi this week brutally illustrates, cities will be the war zones of the future (Guardian, 27 Sep 2013). I've been preaching about littorals for years; the Marine Corps has been preaching about littorals since well before I was born; and if anyone hasn't seen the population move to slum-cities (on or a vertical envelopment's distance from a coast), that person is blind.

Unless it is very implicit, Kilcullen does not offer an ideology to deal with the "urban problem":

Understanding the new, highly connected nature of urban environments like Mumbai or Nairobi is an important first step in preparing to deal with this problem. Big data can sometimes help. Analysts can now track millions upon millions of data points (traffic patterns, say, or cellphone usage, or pedestrian movement, or prices in markets, or internet hits, or bank transactions, or numbers and types of cars in parking lots) to understand, through remote observation, how a city works. But how do we do that in enormous megaslums that are constantly growing and morphing and which don't have the street names and building addresses that allow geo-data to mean something?

Many of today's coastal cities, especially those in the developing world, are growing at breakneck speed. In a conflict, people's uncertainty arises from armed groups targeting the population; in a city that's growing exponentially – constantly outgrowing itself – the same terrifying lack of predictability can arise simply from the pace of change. Thus a megacity under stress can offer opportunities for conflict entrepreneurs (gang leaders, crime bosses or militant extremists) to control populations, provided they create a predictable rule set that makes people feel safe in the face of instability. This occurs because of the predictability inherent in the rules, whether people like the group or not, and regardless of the content of those rules. You don't have to like the cops, or agree with the speed limit, for the road rules to make you feel safe. Eventually, provided the group builds consistency and order, through a spectrum of persuasive, administrative and coercive measures, it may gain the loyalty and support of the local population.
...
As we dust ourselves off after a decade of war, community resilience, public safety and economic opportunity in crowded urban areas may turn out to matter more than counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. Designers and urbanists speak of participative development and human-centred design as key elements of a new approach to city development. Figuring how to co-design solutions in partnership with a local community, when the community is under threat and someone is shooting at you, may be the hardest challenge of all.

Whether you like it or not, "talion" (retribution, reprobation, specific deterrence) is an ideology. But in the US: here, yesterday; gone, today.

Unlike us, the "conflict entrepreneurs" are not shy about a talion ideology. They apply its principles and its moderators within their group (e.g., Taliban in Astan), but are at war with the outside groups that oppose their interests.

The only recipe Kilcullen offers in the article is "...community resilience, public safety and economic opportunity ..." Please, spare me more state building; excuse, city buliding.

I've cited "Eye for an Eye" in another thread; but here's the ideology that used to be - Hitesman, Setting the Stage for Justice in the Revenge Genre Film (2005) (a good short treatment).