Kenya (catch all)

[omarali50]

There are two different scenarios in which someone may attack a developed city in this way and while the initial hysterical-phase reaction is likely to be similar in both cases, they are not the same:
1. Some small demented group of crazied (aum whatever or suchlike) gets it into their head to do something spectacular. They kill many people, they get killed, their associates and known members get tracked down and killed or imprisoned, billions or trillions get wasted on new "Mall security" or some such, but its not really a repeatable and constant threat.
2. Some group with a real agenda, a real organization, a real ideology, attacks a developed city because their grievance with country X has reached criticality. The most likely suspect for such an act in the years to come is the jihadis. But even they cannot do this again and again. After the first attack or the third, their goose will be cooked. A sustained campaign needs a base, needs an organization, needs a pipeline of volunteers and trainers and financiers. How long before Pakistan is forced to stop any and all connection with ANY such business (or to die trying to cut them off)? I dont see how it can become a sustained and "normal" threat in advanced countries.
Its a different story for corrupt and incompetent regional powers. THEY should worry.

[Sargent]

1. Some small demented group of crazied (aum whatever or suchlike) gets it into their head to do something spectacular. They kill many people, they get killed, their associates and known members get tracked down and killed or imprisoned, billions or trillions get wasted on new "Mall security" or some such, but its not really a repeatable and constant threat.

Repeatability over the long term would likely reduce the efficacy of such attacks. But even without achieving that, constancy of threat is entirely different. That is about perceptions and expectations, fear and concern. And we're not talking about how you or anyone here will appreciate such events - rather, it's about how Joe and Jane Schumackatelli deal with it - which in the short run is not good, and in the long run actually improves. But in that first window of chaos you could see a state or society flail badly, to quite harmful effect.

2. Some group with a real agenda, a real organization, a real ideology, attacks a developed city because their grievance with country X has reached criticality. The most likely suspect for such an act in the years to come is the jihadis. But even they cannot do this again and again. After the first attack or the third, their goose will be cooked. A sustained campaign needs a base, needs an organization, needs a pipeline of volunteers and trainers and financiers. How long before Pakistan is forced to stop any and all connection with ANY such business (or to die trying to cut them off)? I dont see how it can become a sustained and "normal" threat in advanced countries.
Its a different story for corrupt and incompetent regional powers. THEY should worry.

Does one need to maintain a regular tempo for such attacks to be effective? I think you could manage one or two a year and cause real damage - again, too much frequency allows people to adapt and realize they can prevail. Anyway, I don't think we can apply all of the same rules of warfare as are required in high intensity conventional conflict. There may be more and longer temporal gaps - as the enemy copes with the issues you cite.

And even as they are identified, how much did OEF really do to eliminate AQ's threat? Or the Taliban's? So, even as we might be able to identify who is supporting such groups and where, that does not guarantee that they will be dealt with effectively.

Jill

[omarali50]

" how much did OEF really do to eliminate AQ's threat? Or the Taliban's? So, even as we might be able to identify who is supporting such groups and where, that does not guarantee that they will be dealt with effectively."

Well, one could say that OEF was misdirected. Still, there has not been another attack, not just because one group of attackers was disrupted and scattered, and because huge investments were made in security, but also because those states capable of hosting and organizing a really serious group of attackers are now scared of the consequences. Deterrence may have been possible at much less cost, but that is a separate issue. Some deterrence was undoubtedly created by that response..and organized groups with serious and capable backers are still (at least somewhat) scared. Otherwise, they would have tried something by now. Or at least, taken very few steps to prevent an operation being carried out by crazier, smaller, less-sane groups.

[davidbfpo]

Two pieces by Aidan Hartley, a white Kenyan reporter, in The Spectator. The first is an account of two white Kenyan survivors, which is grim reading.

From the penultimate paragraph an optimistic note:

Both Simon and Amanda stress to me repeatedly that they are proud to be Kenyans. Their origins are British, but Simon’s family arrived here in 1908. ‘Everybody has been so good to us. We are Kenyans, whether we’re Hindus, Christians or Muslims. And we are not blaming Muslims.’

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/...te-mall-siege/

Alongside in the printed edition is a shorter piece, with the title 'An African Khmer Rouge' and the online version is called 'Al-Qa'eda targeted Kenya not because it's a banana republic, but because it's a symbol of African success'.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/...t-its-founder/

Note the similarity between this and Steve Metz's recent WPR comment, posted elsewhere and the link is:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/a...ly-exaggerated

[M-A Lagrange]

This certainly does not settle the scores but it sent a clear message:

Militant base 'attacked from sea' in Somalia

A spokesman for the al-Shabab Islamist group told Reuters news agency that a fighter had been killed in the raid.

Reports speak of residents in the militant-controlled town being woken by heavy gunfire before dawn prayers.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-afri...97#TWEET911207

[Bill Moore]

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...s-8860808.html

The Islamist militia group al-Shabaab has said that a military strike on one of its strongholds in southern Somalia was carried out by British and Turkish special forces.

break

Somali security officials told the Reuters news agency that the target of the attack had been a Chechen leader of the Islamist group, which has formal ties to Al-Qa'ida.

But official accounts differ over who carried out the operation.

"We understand that French troops injured Abu Diyad, also known as Abu Ciyad, an al-Shabaab leader from Chechnya. They killed his main guard who was also a foreigner. The main target was the Shabaab leader from Chechnya," said an intelligence officer based in Mogadishu, who gave his name as Mohamed, speaking to Reuters.

First reports are generally inaccurate, but if you believe Al-Shabaab this particular raid didn't go so well. In the real world (as differentiated from the world the media projects) not all operations go well, and high risk still means high risk.

[davidbfpo]

I think the allegation that Turkish SF were involved is interesting. Turkey has of late been pushing its influence and activity in Mogadishu, with airlinks, NGO activity and the like - with a reported favourable local reaction. IIRC Turkey has eschewed any military role and awhile ago Al-Shabaab launched an attack on one outpost.

[JMA]

First reports are generally inaccurate, but if you believe Al-Shabaab this particular raid didn't go so well. In the real world (as differentiated from the world the media projects) not all operations go well, and high risk still means high risk.

This, I submit, is part of the problem.

We need to question how a 'mickey mouse' organisation can control - and thereby manipulate - the information flow... unless there was no attack after all.

[JMA]

This certainly does not settle the scores but it sent a clear message:

Exactly what message is that?

[davidbfpo]

Now the NYT reports, after a "leak" that:

A Navy SEAL team seized a senior leader of the Shabab militant group from his seaside villa in the Somali town of Baraawe on Saturday, American officials said

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/wo...ml?smid=tw-bna

[JMA]

Exactly what message is that?

Let me expand on this...

It is claimed that the reported attack (of sorts) on a Shabab target in Baraawe has sent a signal to "them" that they won't forget.

Even (that opportunist) John Kerry has used the term (in a slightly different context).

Firstly (like after 9/11) the victims side are happy (at a most basic human level) that 'they' (the perps) are receiving payback. Understandable.

It was this primitive instinct that drove the post 9/11 rush to action (however misguided). A pity.

So often these emotionally driven knee jerk reactions do not have desired outcome. Nuff said.

Then often what the US and others carrying out the counter strike fail to factor in is what actual message is sent to the perpetrators - as opposed to the "that will teach them" after action feel good feeling among those who carried out the raid/response/etc.

Not to beat around the bush... I wonder if there are more than a handful (less than a dozen) in the US military that understand what action will send the right message to the African mind?

This almost certainly is not what non-Africans would consider 'the right message'.

In the case of Somalia IMHO the wrong messages have been consistently sent.

From the impotent response to Somali piracy to the use of inept proxy military forces (Kenya and Uganda) the message that has been sent has been a 'weak' one.

Don't take my word for it... speak to an African. Not an Uncle Tom who will tell you what he thinks you want to hear. Caution: you might not like what you hear.

[Sargent]

Well, one could say that OEF was misdirected. Still, there has not been another attack, not just because one group of attackers was disrupted and scattered, and because huge investments were made in security, but also because those states capable of hosting and organizing a really serious group of attackers are now scared of the consequences. Deterrence may have been possible at much less cost, but that is a separate issue. Some deterrence was undoubtedly created by that response..and organized groups with serious and capable backers are still (at least somewhat) scared. Otherwise, they would have tried something by now. Or at least, taken very few steps to prevent an operation being carried out by crazier, smaller, less-sane groups.

There were 8 years between the two WTC attacks. In between there were smaller acts outside of CONUS. AQ has been very active around the globe in the past decade, and have successfully diversified the operational entities into multitudes of wholly owned subsidiary actors. As for sponsorship, I'm not sure I understand exactly who is afraid of whom, but I don't see AQ and the related entities suffering for a lack of safe havens. Finally, the investment in security will, as ever, be gotten around soon enough.

We have done a whole lot with force and not really changed or improved the situation - and given the time and financial resources expended, this is troubling. We have done blessed little in other areas comparatively, and we certainly haven't done much to understand why there is such permissive support for the animosity towards the West. And that, my friends, is why we are in no better place than 13 years ago. Shame.

Jill

[omarali50]

I think the point at which leverage can be applied most cost-effectively is at the level of state supporters of terrorism. They have the most to lose. If no organized state is supporting them, then their future remains dark. Where were the attackers organized, trained and rehearsed? They cannot achieve much out of truly ungoverned spaces like Somalia. If every organized state is afraid of hosting or training them, they will eventually lose.
That is a big IF.

[carl]

We have done a whole lot with force and not really changed or improved the situation - and given the time and financial resources expended, this is troubling. We have done blessed little in other areas comparatively, and we certainly haven't done much to understand why there is such permissive support for the animosity towards the West. And that, my friends, is why we are in no better place than 13 years ago. Shame.

Jill

Omar is right. Organized states are the critical node, one that we basically refuse to address. Flat out refuse. It is no wonder that the situation doesn't change, even perhaps worsens over time, when Osama is found where he was found and we don't change how we deal with Pakistan.

As far as AQ, their affiliates and all the other crazy Wahabi takfiri killers go, the Pak Army/ISI keeps them going. We know it, the takfiri killers know it, the world knows it. Yet we do nothing. You're right. We should be ashamed.

[Bill Moore]

Omar is right. Organized states are the critical node, one that we basically refuse to address. Flat out refuse. It is no wonder that the situation doesn't change, even perhaps worsens over time, when Osama is found where he was found and we don't change how we deal with Pakistan.

As far as AQ, their affiliates and all the other crazy Wahabi takfiri killers go, the Pak Army/ISI keeps them going. We know it, the takfiri killers know it, the world knows it. Yet we do nothing. You're right. We should be ashamed.

Important but overstated. Do the Mexican cartels need state support, or do they have the ability to co-opt individuals within the government? Is ISI the state? Or are we they an organization beyond control of the state? State support for terrorists can be a powerful enabler but it is not essential for terrorists to operate. It is more likely states will syndicate with terrorists when they have common interests.

[carl]

Important but overstated. Do the Mexican cartels need state support, or do they have the ability to co-opt individuals within the government? Is ISI the state? Or are we they an organization beyond control of the state? State support for terrorists can be a powerful enabler but it is not essential for terrorists to operate. It is more likely states will syndicate with terrorists when they have common interests.

Not overstated at all. The Mexican cartels are not trying to take over the government. They are only after the getting the gov off their backs so they can do business. If they really and truly tried to take the gov down, they would darn well need support from outside because they wouldn't last long otherwise. Mexican history shows those guys don't fool around when things get serious.

The Pak Army/ISI is the government. They aren't beyond the control of anybody. The ISI is part of the Pak Army (check out what assignments Kayani had) and the Pak Army runs the outfit along with the feudal elites. If whoever is the putative head of the government calls up the army and asks for the resignation of the army head, the ISI head and the corps commanders, he won't be the putative head of the government for long.

Of course state support for terrorists isn't essential for them to operate. That isn't what I referred to. The Tsarnaev brothers didn't have state support but they didn't last long either. Big league persistent outfits have it though, or they wouldn't be big league persistent outfits. Common interests? I don't know. It's not important. The Pak Army/ISI backs all sorts of takfiri killers. We know it and don't do a damn thing about it. That's important.