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Thread: Kenya (catch all)

  1. #61
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    Default I think you're preaching to the choir

    While I still adhere generally to the concept of neutralization (not as a euphemism, but meaning to kill, detain indefinitely or convert), the option of conversion has never seemed to me - in and from the Vietnam era to the present - of much value in dealing with persons of strong ideologies (political or religious). Besides the "converts" are usually low-hanging fruit (lower rankers); and you can't really trust them.

    The option of indefinite detention has the potential positive value of data gathering - we can discuss what techniques ought to be used ad infinitum. However, as the Gitmo cases show, indefinite detention has become a limited US option; and, perhaps, that is as it should be. I'm OK with that so long as the kill option is open.

    The kill option has three parts:

    1. The person killed did, or was involved in the doing of (including being an immediate or imminent threat, #3 below), a bad thing (so, the killing is "retribution").

    2. The reasons for killing that person are articulated and absolutely no apology is made for the killing (our articulation is "reprobation").

    3. By killing that person, we prevent future bad acts by that person; but we also have to kill those persons who are an immediate or imminent threat to do, or who are involved in the planning of doing, bad acts ("specific deterrence").

    I'm not in favor of the US being the World's go to sniper; and personally favor non-violent action in all cases where it's likely to work. But, there are man-eating humans roaming the World; and after initial contact, the US should do onto them as they do unto the US.

    NB: The theory of general deterrence (influencing a number of others not to do something by punishing a guilty person) is really an attempt at indirect conversion. Thus, I believe in general deterrence even less than direct attemps at conversiom. I'm also a hard sell on rehabilitation programs.

    In reality, I'm a lousy singer - except when very drunk, or in the shower. I also confess to having used the metaphor "man-eating tiger" more than once at SWC and elsewhere.

    Regards

    Mike

    PS: After posting this, I read Kilcullen's Westgate mall attacks: urban areas are the battleground of the 21st century - As the terror attack in Nairobi this week brutally illustrates, cities will be the war zones of the future (Guardian, 27 Sep 2013). I've been preaching about littorals for years; the Marine Corps has been preaching about littorals since well before I was born; and if anyone hasn't seen the population move to slum-cities (on or a vertical envelopment's distance from a coast), that person is blind.

    Unless it is very implicit, Kilcullen does not offer an ideology to deal with the "urban problem":

    Understanding the new, highly connected nature of urban environments like Mumbai or Nairobi is an important first step in preparing to deal with this problem. Big data can sometimes help. Analysts can now track millions upon millions of data points (traffic patterns, say, or cellphone usage, or pedestrian movement, or prices in markets, or internet hits, or bank transactions, or numbers and types of cars in parking lots) to understand, through remote observation, how a city works. But how do we do that in enormous megaslums that are constantly growing and morphing and which don't have the street names and building addresses that allow geo-data to mean something?

    Many of today's coastal cities, especially those in the developing world, are growing at breakneck speed. In a conflict, people's uncertainty arises from armed groups targeting the population; in a city that's growing exponentially – constantly outgrowing itself – the same terrifying lack of predictability can arise simply from the pace of change. Thus a megacity under stress can offer opportunities for conflict entrepreneurs (gang leaders, crime bosses or militant extremists) to control populations, provided they create a predictable rule set that makes people feel safe in the face of instability. This occurs because of the predictability inherent in the rules, whether people like the group or not, and regardless of the content of those rules. You don't have to like the cops, or agree with the speed limit, for the road rules to make you feel safe. Eventually, provided the group builds consistency and order, through a spectrum of persuasive, administrative and coercive measures, it may gain the loyalty and support of the local population.
    ...
    As we dust ourselves off after a decade of war, community resilience, public safety and economic opportunity in crowded urban areas may turn out to matter more than counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. Designers and urbanists speak of participative development and human-centred design as key elements of a new approach to city development. Figuring how to co-design solutions in partnership with a local community, when the community is under threat and someone is shooting at you, may be the hardest challenge of all.
    Whether you like it or not, "talion" (retribution, reprobation, specific deterrence) is an ideology. But in the US: here, yesterday; gone, today.

    Unlike us, the "conflict entrepreneurs" are not shy about a talion ideology. They apply its principles and its moderators within their group (e.g., Taliban in Astan), but are at war with the outside groups that oppose their interests.

    The only recipe Kilcullen offers in the article is "...community resilience, public safety and economic opportunity ..." Please, spare me more state building; excuse, city buliding.

    I've cited "Eye for an Eye" in another thread; but here's the ideology that used to be - Hitesman, Setting the Stage for Justice in the Revenge Genre Film (2005) (a good short treatment).
    Last edited by jmm99; 09-30-2013 at 03:17 AM.

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    the option of conversion has never seemed to me - in and from the Vietnam era to the present - of much value in dealing with persons of strong ideologies (political or religious). Besides the "converts" are usually low-hanging fruit (lower rankers); and you can't really trust them.
    My comment was intended to imply we can win them over if we convert to their religious views, but even that would fail. Besides who wants to convert to any religion, especially one based on hate and ignorance? Obviously some do, probably come from the same psychological stock as the anarchists.

  3. #63
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    Default Yup, by "conversion" (not my favorite),

    I mean attempting to convert the bad guys to "our" ideology.

    Regards

    Mike

  4. #64
    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    Default Let’s try to have a different angle

    I will not disagree with Dr Kilcullen, cause he is the expert. But I would like to point 2 things:
    1. Nairobi is no coastal city and it drags most of the people in Kenya. In Kenya, the coastal cities, like Mombasa, are the areas where AS and radical Islam find support.
    2. Like for the radical Islamist from Uganda (Jamil Mukulu from ADF), Godane, the AS leader, studied in Pakistan and tied links with radical Islam in Pakistan. (See: Kenya mall attack mastermind studied in Pakistan: Report, http://articles.timesofindia.indiati...somali-militia)
    The real question that comes is not so much what the hell Kenya is doing against Somalis but rather what the hell the world is not doing about Pakistan fueling and training radical Islamist in Africa.
    Pakistan presence, like Indian one, in Africa is still under estimated and the role of Pakistani peace keepers in proselytism and black economy still not understood nor evaluated.

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    Quote Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange View Post
    I will not disagree with Dr Kilcullen, cause he is the expert. But I would like to point 2 things:
    1. Nairobi is no coastal city and it drags most of the people in Kenya. In Kenya, the coastal cities, like Mombasa, are the areas where AS and radical Islam find support.
    2. Like for the radical Islamist from Uganda (Jamil Mukulu from ADF), Godane, the AS leader, studied in Pakistan and tied links with radical Islam in Pakistan. (See: Kenya mall attack mastermind studied in Pakistan: Report, http://articles.timesofindia.indiati...somali-militia)
    The real question that comes is not so much what the hell Kenya is doing against Somalis but rather what the hell the world is not doing about Pakistan fueling and training radical Islamist in Africa.
    Pakistan presence, like Indian one, in Africa is still under estimated and the role of Pakistani peace keepers in proselytism and black economy still not understood nor evaluated.
    I think the greater worry is Saudi Arabia - but the West can't run a foreign policy it cannot afford, so no Western diplomat or politician is EVER going to take a tough stance on Saudi funded preachers, Saudi-trained fundamentalists preachers, Saudi funded fundamentalist Mosques or Wahabbi influence in Africa.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09...0-students-in/



    KingJaja, this type of attack should be a redline for any nation. I have seen little evidence that moderate responses work against animals like this.
    The Nigerian Army is as brutal as they come, but we are dealing with something that might be beyond the capacity of the Nigerian Army (120,000 soldiers also managing a Niger Delta insurgency & a Middle Belt crisis).

    The Sahel had great inland cities & it's economy was based on transactions between the interior & the Maghreb. Unfortunately, European trade with the coasts broke those links & even though the physical routes for trade are intact, very little trade occurs in that region.

    That region is not economically productive & will never be, but it is still linked to the Maghreb & the interior. So we are dealing with a transnational problem that might only get worse with time.

    It is impossible to police Nigeria's Northern borders - so these animals will have free movement through even weaker states like Niger, Chad & Cameroun - which they could destabilize large parts of in future.

    I don't know how this thing will end, but it won't end soon. It will end only after all parties are exhausted.

  7. #67
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Two points and some questions.

    First, the North American continent is getting very close to energy, fossil fuel, self sufficiency, even to the point we get to be exporters again, especially in natural gas. How might that affect our relations with Saudi Arabia?

    Second, it seems the takfiri killers are embarking upon a simple religious war, kill the Christians. This is being seen in quite a few countries. How might this play out? Are they trying to provoke a reaction directed against all Muslims? That would make sense since that would give them the upper hand in the on-going struggle for leadership in the Muslim world.

    Another point I just thought of. M-A is right about the Pak Army/ISI. They are the main devil. When/if they win in Afghanistan, they will be hugely encouraged as will all the takfiri killers worldwide. They will want to go on to bigger and better things. Ultimately theynwill have to be taken care of. How?
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    So my question is this: Their arguments and actions are horrible, tragic, sad, etc. But are they now so routine that they have become in some sense legitimate? That we accept them as part of the nature of war? after all, when more advanced countries fight each other (or weaker countries) and use aircraft to drop bombs or fire missiles, we sort of take it in our stride. War is bad, but when it does happen (and sometimes it happens), this is just how it is. Will we think about Mumbai-style attacks the same way now?
    I wonder why we think this will be limited to Africa or jihadists? It seems to me that any radical group watching these events is going to see a very effective vehicle to attack. While we may no longer spool up much emotion or response to these events within the GWOT context, when they happen in Paris, Beijing, or Dallas and are related to other issues this will be seen as the challenge of the next several decades to come.

    In general, though, I think it would be more useful to stop calling this terrorism and start recognizing it as a legitimate shift in the warfare of the weaker or dispersed party.

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    Default King of the Pecos - a Movie Review

    I've watched Unforgiven and Seven (each top notch), two of the three movies reviewed by Hitesman, several times each. The first and oldest movie in the review is King of the Pecos (Wiki - King of the Pecos), which I watched last nite on Youtube, Youtube - King of the Pecos (1 hr). This is a morality play in black & white.

    I'm following Hitesman's review for the movie's scenes - the "quotes" below are mostly my summings of his facts (so, whatever errors are mine). The brief comments are entirely mine.

    1. The Basis for John Clayborn's Personal Revenge-Retribution

    Alexander Stiles, an ambitious land grabber (he envisions a million acre empire), and his lawyer Brewster, visit the Sweetwater homestead of the Clayborn parents and their son John. Stiles offers $1,000 for the land (probably fair for the land, but ignoring the strategic value of its key watering hole which controls the route between Texas and the Kansas cattle markets ). Clayborn pere refuses the offer. Stiles calls in his running gun Ash and his men. The parents are shot and their son is beaten and left for dead. Stiles then homesteads Sweetwater himself !
    I follow Bill Miller's revenge = retribution equation; but I point out that there is a wide spectrum between (1) a one person vendetta; and (2) a society based on talion principles and having mediators to regulate the process.

    2. John Clay's Insurgency - Non-Violent Action

    Ten years pass. John Clayborn (having taken the name, John Clay) has grown up into a gunslinger and lawyer - don't laugh; recall Andrew Jackson (successful as lawyer and duelist; and not a bad tactician). J.C. (are the initials a coincidence ?) moves to Stiles' county seat, and takes on a group of independent cattle owners as clients in a lawsuit against Stiles. The county judge is an honest but timid man; and Stiles intimidates him from coming to the court house. Clay keeps to non-violent action, but safeguards the judge's passage into the courtroom with an armed force he has mustered. There, Stiles, represented by Brewster, has to sit in a civil trial aimed at voiding Stiles' water hole claims because they are public domain; and thus requiring re-payment of the exorbitant tolls he got from the independent cattle owners. The Court finds for Clay's clients on all counts, except that Stiles is entitled to Sweetwater (which Stiles homesteaded himself after killing Clay's parents). Brewster is fired by Stiles for losing the trial; paid off by Stiles (a "fair cut"); and later killed by Ash at Stiles' behest with recovery of Stiles' money.
    Note that this result, besides being non-violent action (Clay employs defensive armed force to protect the judge), is not retribution for Clay or for his clients. It is restitution for the clients, but not for Clay (Clayborn). So, the movie still goes along with the moral sentiments of the 1930s political elites in eschewing revenge-retribution and substituting the idea of restitution. A more touchy-feely segment of today's political elite would require, in addition, reconciliation - with a truth and reconciliation committee facilitating "making nice" between Clay (Clayburn) and Stiles.

    3. John Clay's Insurgency - Violent Action

    Despite his losing of the legal trial, there is a inadequate legal system to enforce the Court's order, and even to prevent Stiles from using force. No longer able to control the other rancher's cattle by means of the watering holes, Stiles orders Ash and his men to gather all of their cattle by force ("rustle 'em"). To defeat Stiles and his men, Clay organizes the ranchers into a mass cattle drive that must stop in Sweetwater on its way to Abilene. When Stiles refuses access to Sweetwater, Clay (now revealing himself as John Clayborn) and the ranchers kill Stiles and Ash in somewhat the same fashion that Clayborn's parents were murdered years before.

    But, before that happens, Clayburn offers Stiles the option of returning (with Ash) to the county seat to face trial for the murder of his parents. Stiles had set up an ambush of Clayburn, but Clayburn had set up a counter-ambush. Stiles decided it was better to live and fight from a fortified position, and waved off Ash and his ambushers.
    So, in the end, Clayburn gets his personal revenge-retribution, but only because Stiles refused to take a chance on a murder trial - where a conviction in those days (19th century Texas) would have resulted in group revenge-retribution against the bad guys.

    But, we have more. I've cast Clayburn in the insurgent's role to give viewers some mind exercise. Actually, he is the counter-insugent who employs the strategies and tactics of the insurgent. Stiles is the insurgent who takes over Sweetwater and the rest of the Pecos by Lawfare (Brewster) and Warfare (Ash). So, Clayburn responds by neutralizing (options are to kill, detain or convert) Stiles, Ash and his crew; Clayburn goes from non-violent to violent action, when necessary.

    That kind of response spans John McCuen's spectrum - see thread for John McCuen, RIP. As Ken White points out in the thread, McCuen's principles work better in cities ! As Cavguy points out in his OP on McCuen:

    (1) You must secure your urban centers. I agree with John McCuen that you don't uncover your semi-secure urban base to chase insurgents in the wild. The enemy wants you to do that so he can infiltrate and begin building the political and operational cells in the now-undermanned cities while you chase his bands in the bush, and then look back to find your cities on fire. ...
    My 19th century morality play is addressed to the 21st century, but I don't expect its political elite to take notice.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-01-2013 at 03:47 AM.

  10. #70
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Kenyan priorities, profits and losses

    For African "hands" I doubt the allegations made in a Kenyan newspaper will come as a surprise; the sub-title:
    It can now be revealed that the KDF stole cash and other miscellaneous items worth millions of shillings from the westgate mall. This happened during a rescue operation to end the recent siege by Al shabaab militants.
    Link:http://www.nairobiexposed.com/2013/0...westgate-mall/
    davidbfpo

  11. #71
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Not surprising but always so sad to hear, especially since the article says the Kenyan Police figure many fewer people would have died if the army had kept out of it.

    It's bad on another level too. When this kind of thing happens, people figure why bother with Africa?
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    Two points and some questions.

    First, the North American continent is getting very close to energy, fossil fuel, self sufficiency, even to the point we get to be exporters again, especially in natural gas. How might that affect our relations with Saudi Arabia?

    Second, it seems the takfiri killers are embarking upon a simple religious war, kill the Christians. This is being seen in quite a few countries. How might this play out? Are they trying to provoke a reaction directed against all Muslims? That would make sense since that would give them the upper hand in the on-going struggle for leadership in the Muslim world.

    Another point I just thought of. M-A is right about the Pak Army/ISI. They are the main devil. When/if they win in Afghanistan, they will be hugely encouraged as will all the takfiri killers worldwide. They will want to go on to bigger and better things. Ultimately theynwill have to be taken care of. How?
    Sub-Saharan Africa is a bit different from the Middle East - it has a lot more Christians than Muslims & Christians tend to be located more in the wealthier, coastal cities.

    If they want to provoke a reaction from Christians in Sub-Saharan Africa - eventually they'll get it, but they will regret it.

  14. #74
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    Quote Originally Posted by KingJaja View Post
    Sub-Saharan Africa is a bit different from the Middle East - it has a lot more Christians than Muslims & Christians tend to be located more in the wealthier, coastal cities.

    If they want to provoke a reaction from Christians in Sub-Saharan Africa - eventually they'll get it, but they will regret it.
    From what I read, it doesn't seem that Boko Haram is inclined to being talked out of murdering people. Do you think the Nigerian Army can keep them suppressed to the extent that the people won't sort of take things into their own hands in a very big way?
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    to read with caution:

    Names of Westgate attack mastermind revealed

    According to Channel 4 News in UK the alleged leader of the Nairobi shopping mall attack was born a Christian in Kenya and is a former member of the country's special forces.
    The number one Westgate attacker was named as Omar or Umayr, who is believed to have been killed in this week’s siege.
    Omar was a Kenyan national, born to a Christian family from Nairobi. He converted to Islam and was also a former member of Kenya’s special forces.
    Umayr is understood to have left Kenya for Somalia in 2005, where he joined the Kamboni militant Islamist group. Kamboni later joined with al-Shabaab.
    The report said the second man is known as Khadhab, who is a Somali national who worked in an Islamic bookshop in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh. He was arrested and imprisoned in Somalia, and it is alleged he was tortured by the CIA while in custody there.
    http://dalsanradio.com/articles/1568...rmind-revealed

    Somalia: Al-Shabab Finds Fighters Among Somali Youth in Minnesota
    Nimco Ahmed, a Somali activist who works for the Minneapolis City Council, says the war and resettlement has fractured the traditional family structure.

    "Most of our fathers are either not here or not in the country or dead pretty much. So not having a father figure for boys has been a struggle for us. And it is still a struggle for us," said Ahmed.

    Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2007 was viewed by some Somalis as a violation of Somali sovereignty even though the troops intervened at the request of the transitional Somali government and with the backing of the African Union and the U.S.

    Using a mixture of religion, nationalism and what some say is deception, the Islamist militant group al-Shabab has recruited at least 20 Somali-Americans to fight against foreign troops in Somalia
    .
    http://allafrica.com/stories/201310010226.html

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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    From what I read, it doesn't seem that Boko Haram is inclined to being talked out of murdering people. Do you think the Nigerian Army can keep them suppressed to the extent that the people won't sort of take things into their own hands in a very big way?
    Part of the Nigerian Army strategy seems to be to empower local civilians to take on Boko Haram (hence the "Civilian Joint Task Force"). Boko Haram's most vicious recent attacks have been against these people.

    I expect the army to redouble efforts, re-arm the civilians and have them take on Boko Haram again. It will be very messy.

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    There are two different scenarios in which someone may attack a developed city in this way and while the initial hysterical-phase reaction is likely to be similar in both cases, they are not the same:
    1. Some small demented group of crazied (aum whatever or suchlike) gets it into their head to do something spectacular. They kill many people, they get killed, their associates and known members get tracked down and killed or imprisoned, billions or trillions get wasted on new "Mall security" or some such, but its not really a repeatable and constant threat.
    2. Some group with a real agenda, a real organization, a real ideology, attacks a developed city because their grievance with country X has reached criticality. The most likely suspect for such an act in the years to come is the jihadis. But even they cannot do this again and again. After the first attack or the third, their goose will be cooked. A sustained campaign needs a base, needs an organization, needs a pipeline of volunteers and trainers and financiers. How long before Pakistan is forced to stop any and all connection with ANY such business (or to die trying to cut them off)? I dont see how it can become a sustained and "normal" threat in advanced countries.
    Its a different story for corrupt and incompetent regional powers. THEY should worry.

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    Quote Originally Posted by KingJaja View Post
    Part of the Nigerian Army strategy seems to be to empower local civilians to take on Boko Haram (hence the "Civilian Joint Task Force"). Boko Haram's most vicious recent attacks have been against these people.

    I expect the army to redouble efforts, re-arm the civilians and have them take on Boko Haram again. It will be very messy.
    That is a classic small war fighting action, arming the local civilians. How is the army going about that? Is there some kind of formally organized entity like the CIDG or RF/PFs in Vietnam, recognizing and supporting something already forming on its own like the Sons of Iraq or is it a more informal thing?

    (I expect David may moves this exchange which would be fair enough.)
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    That is a classic small war fighting action, arming the local civilians. How is the army going about that? Is there some kind of formally organized entity like the CIDG or RF/PFs in Vietnam, recognizing and supporting something already forming on its own like the Sons of Iraq or is it a more informal thing?

    (I expect David may moves this exchange which would be fair enough.)
    Carl, this smacks of reckless desperation.

    The key to any grand strategy is to make sure that whatever you do/use/implement during a 'war' it does not lead to greater polarization of groups/factions after the war.

    As with anywhere - and most certainly in Africa - vigilantly 'justice' will often lead to scores being settled etc. Soon will get get out of control.

    A sure indication the police and military have lost control.

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    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    JMA:

    You know Africa. I only know a little. But my question and observation were made because this is a classic thing done when fighting a small war, you get the civilians on your side and into the fight in an active way. The best way to my mind is if they are somehow connected to the gov. The way the Thais did it, by putting national policemen in a village and having the civilian effort coalesce around him, is a good way. But I imagine the best way will depend upon the circumstances and place. That the Nigerian army is doing this kind of thing is to be expected but the way they are going to go about it seems to be important which is why I asked.

    You know the area well. Do you think the army or gov in Nigeria can do it in such a way that they can keep some kind of control?
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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