A war in the Gulf / Straits of Hormuz: the past and the future

[Jedburgh]

What level of provocation do you think would have to occur for the US to take a Praying Mantis-level response?

They would have to move beyond provocation to presenting an actual physical threat to our Naval Forces in the Gulf.

The navies of the US and the USSR used to play provocative games with each other for decades - ranging from the occasional belligerent nonsense as described above to continual attempts (successful and not) at strategic probing of defenses.

If you recall, Operation Praying Mantis was launced in retaliation for the Iranians mining the Gulf - which we discovered when the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine and blew a gaping hole in her hull. Three days later, payback. I don't believe they've forgotton that lesson.

The current belligerance is, as you stated, mere provocation. And the intent is to elicit a disproportionate response. I don't think its necessary to lay out the potential negative effects of that type of incident.

[MattC86]

If you recall, Operation Praying Mantis was launced in retaliation for the Iranians mining the Gulf - which we discovered when the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine and blew a gaping hole in her hull. Three days later, payback. I don't believe they've forgotton that lesson.

The current belligerance is, as you stated, mere provocation. And the intent is to elicit a disproportionate response. I don't think its necessary to lay out the potential negative effects of that type of incident.

That's true, my example was disproportionate to the provocation here; nothing comparable to the Roberts incident. However, the Navy's own account claims that they were in the process of "giving the order to fire" when the IRGC fast-attack boats turned away at 200 yards - danger close. Even the firing of a couple .50MGs would have been a major escalation, and could have caused exactly the negative effects you're referring to. We sink a "fastboat" with .50cal fire, and what happens next?

Granted, that's pure speculation, but the accounts indicate it was closer than would be comfortable.

And I think the combination of geographical constraints in the Strait and Gulf, combined with the partial asymmetry of the threat - a Soviet blue-water fleet vs. IRGC fastboats, light warships, shore-based missiles, etc., makes this a more dangerous flashpoint.

The old rule about ROE not relieving the commander of responsibility for his ship could lead to itchy trigger fingers, IMO. Especially with provocations and threats like this one.

Maybe I'm overreacting. . .

Matt