Finally, insurgents traditionally seek to discredit the government they are fighting and breed dependency on the part of local populations through low intensity conflict warfare targeting local political and economic interests. Later, they may seek to control territory. Note, for example, that the Abu Ghadiyah network “planned to use rockets to attack multiple Coalition forces outposts and Iraqi police stations, in an attempt to facilitate an AQI takeover in Western Iraq,” according to information released by the Treasury Department. In both cases, insurgents have to assume a level of financial responsibility for the local economy while increasing the costs of the insurgency and also building grassroots support among local populations.
It should be stated from the outset that, given the relatively strong return on minimal financial investment, Syrian support for insurgents and terrorists will remain an attractive option for the regime in Damascus so long as it continues to be a viable and productive means of furthering the regime’s domestic and foreign policy goals. And given the financial interests of local and national officials, cracking down on established smuggling networks (and thereby threatening the regular payments that supplement officials’ income) is no easy task. A multi-faceted approach to the foreign fighter facilitation network problem is therefore required, including:
A plan to backfill the local economies with jobs and services to replace the losses sure to follow the shuttering of the smuggling economy;
An anti-corruption and civil society campaign aimed at breaking the traditional and deeply ingrained culture of bribing people in positions of authority as the cost of doing business;
Robust efforts to secure political stability in Iraq generally and specifically in areas controlled or largely influenced by insurgents;
Diplomatic efforts to address the underlying policy concerns that have led Syria to support insurgents and terrorists as a means of furthering domestic and foreign policy;
Finally, all efforts on the Syrian side of the border will have to be replicated by concurrent and parallel efforts on the Iraqi side of the border.
At the end of the day, however, political and diplomatic efforts may fall short, in which case targeted financial sanctions – focused on illicit activity, authority figures engaged in criminal or other activity threatening regional security, and corruption – present an attractive second option.
Combined with regional diplomacy employing a variety of countries’ efforts to cajole Damascus when possible and sanction the regime when necessary, sanctions can at least increase the costs to the regime of its continued belligerent behavior. Sanctions alone will never solve national security problems, but when used in tandem with other elements of national power in an integrated, strategic approach they can be very effective.
Were the shadow economy of smuggling enterprises to contract, the most critical and time sensitive issue would be to successfully jumpstart legitimate economic growth in its place.
In the words of General Sir Frank Kiston, “The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”
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