Today's Wild Geese: Foreign Fighters in the GWOT

[Jedburgh]

Moderator's Note

This is a new thread, based on two old threads and re-titled. The term foreign fighters (FF) appears in numerous threads, there are two threads specifically on the theme and I understand during the peak of operations in Iraq (OIF) it was frequently raised - although I was unable to identify a specific thread. See Post 28 for details. Moderator ends.


From the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus: Reinforcing the Mujahideen: Origins of Jihadi Manpower

Much is written about how non-indigenous, would-be Islamist fighters enter the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan to join the mujahideen fighting U.S.-led coalitions in both countries. Do they enter Afghanistan from Pakistan? Or Iran? Perhaps Central Asia? What about Iraq? Which border is the most porous? Does that dubious honor belong to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Iran? These are, of course, important questions. To know and close the entry points of these aspiring mujahideen would slow the pace at which foreign fighters could join the fray. It also would make local insurgent field commanders unsure about the dependability of the flow of replacement fighters for their units, and thereby probably limit their willingness to undertake operations that are likely to result in sizeable manpower loses.

A more basic question, however, is seldom asked or debated. While it is clear that closing points of entry would give the U.S.-led coalitions a better chance to reduce the level of each insurgency, the more important path to victory probably lies in determining exactly from where these prospective insurgents emanate...

[davidbfpo]

On the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, US soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have confronted third-party national combatants. Widely known as 'foreign fighters,' these individuals have gained deadly skills, combat experience and global connections that can be exported and exploited to devastating effect, Michael P Noonan writes for FPRI.

Appeared Oct '09 and missed by me.

Link:http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200910.no...ghterflow.html

The issues around foreign fighters has appeared on SWC before, within existing threads; notably when concerning Iraq and the article is a good read.

The foreign fighter pipeline has three phases: (1) source country/flashpoint, (2) safe havens and the transit network, and (3) target locations. Others suggest that a fourth phase, outflow destinations, is important as well.

(Concludes)..while foreign fighters are by no means chiefly responsible for all of the problems in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, working against them successfully will help to reduce violence in the war zones. Combined with effective actions on the ground, an indirect strategy that husbands and appropriately distributes resources across borders to limit recruitment, transit, and logistics for these international killers is essential to success.

[AdamG]

A wave of Germans traveling to training camps for militant jihadists has alarmed security officials back in Europe. The recruits are quickly becoming radicalized and, in some cases, entire families are departing to hotbeds for terrorism. It is even believed that colonies catering to German Islamists have taken shape in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...687306,00.html

[Bob's World]

Some are mercs, most are simply the "road team" for the hometown insurgency of their homeland.

AQ's message is clear and effective, essentially: "you can't win at home until you break the support of the US to the region and to your government." So they go to where the west is most vulnerable and attempt to hurt them there.

To me the only logical point to target is the perception within each of these states these men travel from that the U.S. stands between them and achieving better governance at home. Simply killing them when they arrive only motivates more to come; the routes they travel will flow to the paths of least resistance; and to target them in their homelands is to only validate AQ's propaganda as we step in to help some fairly unsavory state leaders to suppress the insurgent segments of their societies in the name of "counterterrorism."

My $.02

[davidbfpo]

The German journalist Yassin Musharbash has written before extensively on this "tourism" to the FATA; the 'German colony' had not been detected until the Sauerland (or Saarland) plotters were arrested and made admissions when in custody. Note the 'colony' in South Waziristan is linked to a rather low profile AQ-leaning group the Islamic Jihad Union, for a fuller details (albeit from 2008):http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscel...faijuoct08.pdf

The IJU attracted the Sauerland plotters to a "holiday camp", where it was "fun" and to their surprise asked them to return home, to await the call, not fight in the FATA etc.

In response to Bob's World and I

To me the only logical point to target is the perception within each of these states these men travel from that the U.S. stands between them and achieving better governance at home.

I agree we do need to find messages that undermine the AQ / IJU "offer" at home, that mixture has yet to emerge IMHO. These messages cannot be solely be state responses. That AQ has killed more Muslims than non-Muslims is not said enough. A difficult thing messages.

See this CTC article for analysis on Muslims -v- non-Muslim deaths:http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Deadly%20Van...Complete_L.pdf

[Bob's World]

David,

When I say target perceptions, I do not mean messaging. No mere words mean much, when our actions speak volumes.

What I mean is a holistic top-down assessment of the nature of our entire foreign policy, with a focus on these nations where the populaces seem most inclined to join the foreign fighter band wagon; and then looking past they hyperbole of "Islamism" and "Caliphates" and "terrorism" and looking at things more fundamental such as how the West is perceived in that populace and what goes to shape that perception, and how we can modify our behavior and words to create better perceptions without also compromising critical national interests. Asking ourselves if we are supporting a populace or a government or worst yet, just a particular leader? Have we fallen into a relationship where we can be reasonably perceived by that populace as injecting our will over that of the populace and de-legitimizing their leadership in their eyes?

I hate victim mentality. You see it in individuals, and in groups of individuals. You often see it in governments faced with insurgency. You see it in the West's approach to the terrorist attacks of the past decade. "Oh woe is us, we are innocent and being attack for no reason by evil people." While nothing justifies acts of terrorism, nor absolves those who practice it, it is not healthy to simply think that you are a victim and that everyone else is wrong and must make all of the adjustments so that you can continue with your own destructive behavior. It is a syndrome common to addicts.

The West needs to take a 12-step program. "Hello, I am the West, and I have a problem..." Once we get as serious about our own behavior as we have been about modifying the behavior of others, we can begin to get in front of this.

So yes, we must manage perceptions in these populaces that feel inclined to attack us. But no, that does not mean seeing it as their entire fault and sending them a nice note to please stop.

[Jedburgh]

International Security, Winter 2010/11:

The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad

...The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to establish foreign fighters as a discrete actor category distinct from insurgents and terrorists; second, to present new empirical information about Muslim foreign fighters; and third, to propose a plausible hypothesis about the origin of the phenomenon. The analysis is based on a new data set of foreign fighter mobilizations, a large collection of unexplored primary and secondary sources in Arabic, as well as personal interviews with former foreign fighters conducted in Britain, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.

The scope of the article has two important limitations. First, the conceptual focus is on movement formation, not on general mechanisms of foreign fighter mobilization. I do not formulate a universal theory of foreign fighters, predict rates of recruitment, or explain individual recruitment. Second, the empirical focus is on the Muslim world. A study of Muslim foreign fighters arguably has intrinsic value, because Muslim war volunteers are much more numerous and have affected many more conflicts than have foreign fighters of other ideological orientations. In addition, their involvement in major conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as their role in facilitating al-Qaida recruitment, make them a particularly significant challenge to contemporary international security....

[Presley Cannady]

To defeat al-Qaeda, it is crucial to understand who seeks to join and why.

Curious. How much of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS recruitment of 14-30 year olds did we have to understand to beat them?

[Kiwigrunt]

An eight minute TED talk on how the Taliban recruit/brainwash children.

[davidbfpo]

A SWJ Blog pointer to the Newsweek article 'Inside Al Qaeda', a recommendation from another watcher and the All Things CT (from Australia) too. Sub-titled:

Nine years after 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s network remains a shadowy, little-understood enemy. The truth, as revealed by one of its fighters, is both more and less troubling than we think.

Newsweek link:http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/04/inside-al-qaeda.html

All Things CT link:http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/201...-old-chestnut/

An interesting account of a juvenile, of Afghan origin living in Pakistan, being recruited, trained and then leaving - in response to his mother's pleas. Yes, some gaps and credibility to this armchair watcher.

So now All Things CT's comment:

one thing stood straight out when I read this. Their account of the class size–some 30 persons. Why this stood out is that this was the size of AQ’s basic training course at al-Farouq (though sometimes they had up to 40). And this size is actually bigger than the advanced training course size at Tarnak, which usually sat at around 15-20 persons.

Previous reports from recent training had tended to suggest AQ was only training at around 15 or so in a group, so this 30 figure stood out immediately. Whether they can still do this is of course a matter for debate, but nonetheless, even with talk of taking out so many fighters, which the authors cover in their article, this account of a full training compliment gives pause for thought.

Then there is a Peter Bergen piece:http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/04/w...l-matters.html

All Things CT again:

Might we finally be seeing the death of that hoary old chestnut thrown about for so long–about a robust pre-9/11 ”AQ” with a large membership base of at least several hundred or more usually several thousand members, instead of the just under 200 strong membership (198 actually) it had as 9/11 loomed??? As long term readers of this blog will know it is one of the first things I wrote about when I started allthingsct last year.

Peter Bergen’s new piece gives me hope that this may be taking place.

[davidbfpo]

A German story, albeit reported in The Scotsman:

GERMAN intelligence sources have revealed how a group of Islamist radicals discovered the path of Holy War was more difficult than they supposed. The nine would-be terrorists travelled, with two women, from Germany to Afghanistan in 2009 in a bid for glory.

(Later)They were also alienated by the experienced Uzbek fighters they had been taken on by, dispelling their notions of Islamic unity.

Link:http://www.scotsman.com/news/Wouldbe...war.6587573.jp

Yes, "spin" from Germany, but accords with other independent reports on the reality volunteers find upon joining the global Jihad.

[Bob's World]

Best to focus on the aspects of a problem within one's control

Causation rests primarily with the Government; Motivation comes from elsewhere.

As an example, within the states the Tea Party drives the Obama administration mad, but for the policies of the Obama administration, there would be no Tea Party. They attack the symptom, but don't ask; 'What is it about our approach to governance that leaves this segment of the populace feeling that they must organize and challenge us?"

The big benefit on this particular example is that those who join the Tea Party still have hope. Not the hope offered by the Administration in it's campaign bid, but the hope that comes with the certainty that the Constitutional guarantees of term limits, their right to vote, the timeline of when elections will be held, the knowledge that the President will not call upon the military to thwart the will of the people, etc. This is why the US can absorb a lot more causation than other countries can.

Motivation is another factor. This gets to ideology, recruiting, etc. But just as a wet forest is hard to burn, a well governed populace is hard to motivate to act out illegally to challenge government.

Germany must ask itself why it, of all non Muslim European states provides the most foreign fighters to Afghanistan? May be closely related to the fact that Turkey is a major source of foreign fighters there as well.

[Jedburgh]

INEGMA, 8 Nov 10: Conduits to Terror - Classifying the Methods of Jihadist and Middle Eastern Terrorist Recruitment

...From the perspective that people are the core of any organizations’ sustainable achievement, and that manpower is a critical success factor for terrorists, this report will investigate the recruiting and training methods and trends in terrorist organizations of the Middle East and Central Asia. The source of much disagreement today is whether recruitment is driven by a central leadership structure or more “bottom-up” in that actors self-radicalize and carry out an attack....

[Bob's World]

Still valid. By following the back trail of the "foreign fighters" (more accurately, young men who are frustrated with their own governance and opportunity at home, but who feel they are unable to act out to effect change yet on the home front). AQ targets these young men with an ideologically fused message that focuses on a message that is in effect: 'we will help you at home, but first you must help us abroad. Breaking the influence of the US over the region and with these governments is the critical first step."

For the US the main effort must be one of updating our Foreign Policy from one overly rooted in the Cold War (What does one become when ones starts out as the lesser of two evils, and the greater evil falls away?) to one designed for the world emerging around us today. Our interests have not changed, but the environment has. Military efforts to mitigate the symptoms of the friction caused by our policies must be held in a focused, supporting role for best effect.

Some thoughts for you all to consider from someone who was embedded with the Egyptian Army during the first Gulf War:

1. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a lot in common in that the populaces of both states suffer under dictatorships that are supported in power largely by the U.S in exchange for support that we ask of those governments.

2. Most foreign fighters (some 40%) in Iraq are indeed Saudi, and I would expect a large number to come from Egypt as well, though I am not aware of their open source percentage. Some 20% each come from Libya and Algeria.

3. The Saudi's fear any growth of Shia power in particular and Iranian power in general and often play the U.S. has a hedge to protect them from this. This is due largely to the heavily oppressed Shia minority in NE Saudi Arabia that is the most motivated dissident group in Saudi Arabia, though there is a large Sunni dissidence as well.

4. This thread started off by stating how "Egypt" was running insurgent supporting information on TV, I suspect that "Egypt" i.e., the state of Egypt, was not running this at all, and the reason this was running was because it is very popular with a suppressed Egyptian populace.

5. The Saudi and Egyptian populaces fully recognize that they have no real hope of resolving their issues of poor governance at home until they can break the support of the U.S. in the region in general, and to their governments in particular. This is a critical point to understand. Young Saudi and Egyptian men see phase one to successful nationalist insurgency at home to be this breaking of U.S. support to two governments that have very little in common with the principles that the U.S. holds so dear.

6. When you see that the Saudi government is "cracking down on terrorists" at home, you would be wise to consider that the people they are cracking down on are Saudi citizens who are rising up in a quest for self-determined governance, and that this tremendous "help" by our Saudi allies most likely translates to their populace as all the more why reason they must work harder to break U.S. support to this government.

7. Some of these Saudis follow an extreme Wahabist brand of Islam, but most are moderates who want something even more extreme in this region of the world: self-determined democracy.


My point in all of this is that this often gets colored in just one way as it is presented to the American populace. We see ourselves as "the good guys" and therefore our allies are on the "good guy" team too. We are good guys, but as our leadership has stated, we are addicted to oil, and addicts make bad decisions. Just keep an open mind, and try to see these things though the perspectives of others as well.

To apply the concepts that I presented a few months ago in the paper on "Populace-Centric Engagement" the course I would offer is that we need to be much more tuned in to the needs, will and requirements of populaces like those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia; and take a much firmer line with their governments, using a full bag of carrots and sticks to put more effort to getting them to evolve their governments in ways that give their entire populaces more voice, and less effort on turning a blind eye to that in order to gain their support for GWOT related issues, or out of fear that they would somehow stop selling us oil.

Americans all wish that the Middle East would change how it views us. I suggest that the critical first step is changing how we view them. The Cold War lens we view them through gets a little cloudier every day.

[carl]

Still valid. By following the back trail of the "foreign fighters" (more accurately, young men who are frustrated with their own governance and opportunity at home, but who feel they are unable to act out to effect change yet on the home front).

I think you are giving way to much credit to the political motivation of the "young men." That probably does exist, but as or more important is just the restlessness and violent tendencies of young men. Just about any half-baked political theory is going to be enough to get them to doing what young men are so prone to do anyway, be violent.

The underwear bomber, the Times Square bomber and many of the people going from the UK and US to Pakistan or Yemen or Somalia weren't frustrated by political helplessness at home. They have more opportunity to affect political change in the US and UK than anywhere. The underwear bomber was a rich kid whose family had real influence at home. He and the others just picked something to be upset about and somebody else took advantage of it.

Similar thing with many of the imported suicide bombers. They weren't the most politically sophisticated. They were the isolated losers.

There are a lot of things that motivate these guys but to focus on political grievances is give them a certain false nobility and to miss something as important, the violent nature of youth and violent movements that take advantage of that.

5. The Saudi and Egyptian populaces fully recognize that they have no real hope of resolving their issues of poor governance at home until they can break the support of the U.S. in the region in general, and to their governments in particular. This is a critical point to understand. Young Saudi and Egyptian men see phase one to successful nationalist insurgency at home to be this breaking of U.S. support to two governments that have very little in common with the principles that the U.S. holds so dear.

I wonder if this has observation has been overtaken by events or was flawed in an Arab world sense to begin with. The Tunisians did pretty good without us interfering much. I think the jury is still out on Egypt but we didn't do much except watch. Libyans threw off a tyranny that wasn't supported by the US and in fact did it with US help. The Syrians are keeping up the fight against a tyranny that is hostile to the US and has been for years. It seems to be that Arab tyrannies stand or fall pretty much on their own ability to keep power and our support or money doesn't have a whole lot to do with it.

[Dayuhan]

Interview-based studies of foreign fighter motivation yield little or no evidence to suggest that breaking US support for the home country government is a significant motivation. The motivation cited is consistently of the "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" variety. It's also hard to ignore the reality that foreign fighters have been effectively recruited from countries where the government was not supported by the US, such as Syria and pre-revolution Libya, and the foreign fighters have been successfully recruited from all of these countries to fight in wars that had nothing to do with the home country government, such as the resistance to Soviet-era Afghanistan.

This theory seems to me to be unsupported by any evidence, and it's a dangerous theory: it suggests that al we have to do to de-motivate foreign fighters and terrorists is to fix the governments of Saudi Arabia et al. This we cannot do, and trying would make a huge mess and likely give us a great deal more terrorism.

US military intervention in Muslim countries motivates foreign fighters and provides them with a target. Easiest way to manage that is less intervention, and certainly less occupation, which provides enduring motivation and static targets.

We deceive ourselves if we pretend that these problems were created by meddling and that they can be resolved by good meddling. The answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling.

[carl]

We deceive ourselves if we pretend that these problems were created by meddling and that they can be resolved by good meddling. The answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling.

Geesh that is nice writing. I'm jealous...again.

[davidbfpo]

The term foreign fighters (FF) appears in numerous threads, there are two threads specifically on the theme and I understand during the peak of operations in Iraq (OIF) it was frequently raised - although I was unable to identify a specific thread.

Bob's World recently resurrected the issue on an old thread about the media in OIF and led me to think again about the issue.

The use of the term 'Wild Geese' IIRC comes from Irish history and I think is appropriate:

More broadly, the term "Wild Geese" is used in Irish history to refer to Irish soldiers who left to serve in continental European armies in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_of_the_Wild_Geese

[jmm99]

about any "appropriate" comparison of the "Wild Geese" (whether Irish, Scottish or even English) with the AQ "foreign fighters".

The Wild Geese served in regular regiments, or in regular naval forces, which fought conventionally and under the laws of war then extant. Their motto was Pro Deo, Rege et Patria:



Their uniforms were well-defined in terms of "Rege et Patria" (several Jameses and their United Kingdom):



and in the British uniforms of the time, including reversed colors for sergeants.

See Wild Geese Heritage Museum and Library, with articles on the regiments of Galmoy and Lally (quite representative of the Wild Geese in the French Service), the Wild Geese in the Spanish Service, etc.

Trinity College (Dublin), Centre for Irish-Scottish and Comparative Studies (CISCS), made a large-scale study of Irish Military Migration to France:

Organised recruitment of Irish regiments to the French army dates from 1635 and seven regiments were recruited to fight in France. Harman Murtagh states that the Walls of Coolnamuck, Co. Waterford played a crucial role in this recruitment. While numbers declined in the 1640's, eight regiments fought in French service after the Catholic defeat in Ireland. Wall's own regiment passed to the exiled James Stuart, Duke of York, and disbanded in 1664 (then called the Royal Irlandais).

The most significant military migration to France occurred with the advent of the Williamite wars in the early 1690's, the defeat of James II's army in Ireland, and the Treaty of Limerick (1691). The first mass military migration of troops that would later form the Regiments Irlandais or Irish regiments took place in 1690. In exchange for a contingent of French soldiers sent to Ireland, around 5,000 Irish soldiers sailed from Kinsale to Brest in France under the command of Justin MacCarthy, Viscount Mountcashel. This group formed a foreign brigade within the French army, receiving the higher rate of pay. Soldiers in French military service enlisted for a minimum of six years according to a law of 1682. This term of service was increased to eight years in 1762 but the reality was rather different. Terms of service lasted from a few weeks to decades. The wages of ordinary soldiers were fixed at six sous per day until 1762 when they were raised to eight sous. Foreign troops were paid one sou more per day. Andre Corvisier estimates these wages were equal to that of a tradesman or a peasant, but soldiers had the advantage of receiving pay on Sundays and holidays.

Further migration of Irish troops took place after the defeat of the Jacobite forces, supported by Louis XIV in his European campaign against William of Orange. Under the Treaty of Limerick (1691), the Williamite commander, General Ginkel (1644-1703) allowed for the transport to France of all Irish forces who wished to leave. About 12,000 sailed for France and this group formed a separate army in France under the command of James II and then his son, James III. This army, unlike Mountcashel's brigade, was not part of the French army although the French crown paid the troops.

According to John Cornelius O'Callaghan, the organisation of the Irish regiments in France (in French service and the Stuart army) was along the following lines before the Treaty of Ryswick (1697). The infantry regiments of Clare, Dillon and Lee, with a total strength of over 6,000 troops formed Mountcashel's brigade in French service. The Stuart army in France had ten infantry regiments in seventeen battalions, three independent companies, two troops of Horse Guards and two regiments of Horse, each containing two squadrons, amounting to 12,326 soldiers and horsemen. This gave the Jacobite forces a total strength in France of 18,365.

With the return of peace, the French army was reformed in 1698 and the Irish regiments were extensively reduced. Henceforth, the Irish and Jacobite regiments, troops and companies were reorganised into an Irish force in the service of the king of France. As Louis XIV had recognised William of Orange as king of England, he could not openly harbour an army of the deposed king of England and pretender to the throne on his soil. However, this did not change the conviction of the Jacobite forces in his army, as later invasion attempts would prove. As a result of the reform, the infantry was reduced to eight one-battalion regiments of fourteen companies of fifty men, giving a paper strength of 700 men per regiment and a total infantry force of 5,600 men. The regiments were named after the colonel proprietors, Albermarle, Berwick, Burke, Clare, Dillon, Dorrington, Galmoy and Lee. The cavalry were reduced to one regiment of two squadrons, commanded by Dominic Sheldon. Like ordinary French soldiers, the disbanded troops were left to fend for themselves, and many turned to brigandage and begging, reinforcing negative French stereotypes of Irish immigrants.

The War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713) provided employment for all elements of the French army including the Irish regiments. With the end of the conflict, the Irish regiments were again reduced, this time to five regiments. The regiments of Berwick, Clare, Dillon, Dorrington and Lee remained in service, as did Sheldon's cavalry under the new colonel-proprietor Christopher Nugent. Burke's infantry passed into Spanish service, the other regiments were disbanded and the soldiers were incorporated into the surviving regiments. A royal decree of 2 July 1716 introduced a system of troop records to the French army. French regimental commanders were henceforth required to keep precise registers of non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers. These records provide the core source for the website of ordinary soldiers in the Irish regiments and can shed new light on the composition of the bulk of the troops in the Irish regiments from 1691 to the French Revolution. In 1791, the foreign regiments were disbanded as a result of French army reforms of the French Revolution. As yet the database is incomplete, including 16000 out of approximately 20,000 soldiers in French service for the period under examination. It is envisaged that the officers and the remaining ordinary soldiers will be included at a later date.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Men participate in foreign wars for many reasons, the least of which is that they're frustrated with their own government at home. Many men search for adventure and it isn't much more complicated than that. You can join a mercenary group, join a resistance movement, etc. to fight communism, a dictatorship, to support a communist insurgency, wage Jihad, or carry the Cross into battle. Men throughout time have longed for the excitment of battle. Only the bureaucrats would come up with something along the lines that they're frustrated with their government at home.