Today's Wild Geese: Foreign Fighters in the GWOT

[George L. Singleton]

Dr. Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near Policy and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His linked article draws on his testimony in the civil case Gates V Syria, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No 06-1500 (RMC), September 2008, as well as on his interviews and research for a study co-authored with Michael Jacobson entitled “The Money Trail: Finding, Following and Freezing Terrorist Finances (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008). It also draws on the Sinjar documents made public by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, where the author is an adjunct fellow.

For a few years I was Assistant to the Executive Vice President for all bank Operations and Real Estate [he later was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Board] at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company in NYC…then the fourth largest bank in the world. Today MHTCo. is by multiple mergers a part of JP Morgan Chase Bank.

Subsequently I am retired from US Civil Service and from the Air Force Reserve (6 years active, 25 in the weekender Reserve at the JCS level with HQ USSOCOM for almost 10 years)

My unique bank officer training and few years experience in both domestic and international bank operations, money wire transfer, Federal Reserve Bank operations, Broker Loan, Letters of Credit, Bills of Trade, off shore bank operations and accounts, etc. allow me, even in my old age, to know a fair amount about the mechanics of money laundering and movement of funds for wayward, as in terrorist, purposes.

I advised the shadow #2 of what became the Homeland Security Department before it was “stood up” in the field of money gamesmanship, for free, my duty as a knowledgeable citizen, and was glad to have done so. Some little good perhaps came from my suggestions and shared knowledge to a then active duty Navy Rear Admiral whose career field was the military side of terrorism senior management.

I have highlighted some statements by Dr. Levitt at the conclusion of his article…these are bits and pieces cut and pasted by me, to note that I may disagree with Dr. Levitt that insurgency is not primarily a military activity. Rather than be the village idiot know it all myself, perhaps others here on SWJ may want to comment on this focused topic…that insurgency is not primarily a military activity.

I, for one, think we all agree that use of military force of any sort is traditionally a form of foreign policy, but since we are dealing with a stateless grouping of terrorists, the floor is open for some new definitions.

Dr. Levitt’s complete article which is public domain information I think would be useful if reprinted in THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL whose current issue theme is to discuss and invites articles/contributions to help them better develop their strategy and tactis regarding insurrections, guerilla warfare, the sorts of things Dr. Levitt’s good article deals with in terms of the “show me the money” theme.

Finally, insurgents traditionally seek to discredit the government they are fighting and breed dependency on the part of local populations through low intensity conflict warfare targeting local political and economic interests. Later, they may seek to control territory. Note, for example, that the Abu Ghadiyah network “planned to use rockets to attack multiple Coalition forces outposts and Iraqi police stations, in an attempt to facilitate an AQI takeover in Western Iraq,” according to information released by the Treasury Department. In both cases, insurgents have to assume a level of financial responsibility for the local economy while increasing the costs of the insurgency and also building grassroots support among local populations.

It should be stated from the outset that, given the relatively strong return on minimal financial investment, Syrian support for insurgents and terrorists will remain an attractive option for the regime in Damascus so long as it continues to be a viable and productive means of furthering the regime’s domestic and foreign policy goals. And given the financial interests of local and national officials, cracking down on established smuggling networks (and thereby threatening the regular payments that supplement officials’ income) is no easy task. A multi-faceted approach to the foreign fighter facilitation network problem is therefore required, including:

A plan to backfill the local economies with jobs and services to replace the losses sure to follow the shuttering of the smuggling economy;

An anti-corruption and civil society campaign aimed at breaking the traditional and deeply ingrained culture of bribing people in positions of authority as the cost of doing business;

Robust efforts to secure political stability in Iraq generally and specifically in areas controlled or largely influenced by insurgents;

Diplomatic efforts to address the underlying policy concerns that have led Syria to support insurgents and terrorists as a means of furthering domestic and foreign policy;

Finally, all efforts on the Syrian side of the border will have to be replicated by concurrent and parallel efforts on the Iraqi side of the border.

At the end of the day, however, political and diplomatic efforts may fall short, in which case targeted financial sanctions – focused on illicit activity, authority figures engaged in criminal or other activity threatening regional security, and corruption – present an attractive second option.

Combined with regional diplomacy employing a variety of countries’ efforts to cajole Damascus when possible and sanction the regime when necessary, sanctions can at least increase the costs to the regime of its continued belligerent behavior. Sanctions alone will never solve national security problems, but when used in tandem with other elements of national power in an integrated, strategic approach they can be very effective.

Were the shadow economy of smuggling enterprises to contract, the most critical and time sensitive issue would be to successfully jumpstart legitimate economic growth in its place. In the words of General Sir Frank Kiston, “The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”