Today's Wild Geese: Foreign Fighters in the GWOT

[carl]

We deceive ourselves if we pretend that these problems were created by meddling and that they can be resolved by good meddling. The answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling.

Geesh that is nice writing. I'm jealous...again.

[davidbfpo]

The term foreign fighters (FF) appears in numerous threads, there are two threads specifically on the theme and I understand during the peak of operations in Iraq (OIF) it was frequently raised - although I was unable to identify a specific thread.

Bob's World recently resurrected the issue on an old thread about the media in OIF and led me to think again about the issue.

The use of the term 'Wild Geese' IIRC comes from Irish history and I think is appropriate:

More broadly, the term "Wild Geese" is used in Irish history to refer to Irish soldiers who left to serve in continental European armies in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_of_the_Wild_Geese

[jmm99]

about any "appropriate" comparison of the "Wild Geese" (whether Irish, Scottish or even English) with the AQ "foreign fighters".

The Wild Geese served in regular regiments, or in regular naval forces, which fought conventionally and under the laws of war then extant. Their motto was Pro Deo, Rege et Patria:



Their uniforms were well-defined in terms of "Rege et Patria" (several Jameses and their United Kingdom):



and in the British uniforms of the time, including reversed colors for sergeants.

See Wild Geese Heritage Museum and Library, with articles on the regiments of Galmoy and Lally (quite representative of the Wild Geese in the French Service), the Wild Geese in the Spanish Service, etc.

Trinity College (Dublin), Centre for Irish-Scottish and Comparative Studies (CISCS), made a large-scale study of Irish Military Migration to France:

Organised recruitment of Irish regiments to the French army dates from 1635 and seven regiments were recruited to fight in France. Harman Murtagh states that the Walls of Coolnamuck, Co. Waterford played a crucial role in this recruitment. While numbers declined in the 1640's, eight regiments fought in French service after the Catholic defeat in Ireland. Wall's own regiment passed to the exiled James Stuart, Duke of York, and disbanded in 1664 (then called the Royal Irlandais).

The most significant military migration to France occurred with the advent of the Williamite wars in the early 1690's, the defeat of James II's army in Ireland, and the Treaty of Limerick (1691). The first mass military migration of troops that would later form the Regiments Irlandais or Irish regiments took place in 1690. In exchange for a contingent of French soldiers sent to Ireland, around 5,000 Irish soldiers sailed from Kinsale to Brest in France under the command of Justin MacCarthy, Viscount Mountcashel. This group formed a foreign brigade within the French army, receiving the higher rate of pay. Soldiers in French military service enlisted for a minimum of six years according to a law of 1682. This term of service was increased to eight years in 1762 but the reality was rather different. Terms of service lasted from a few weeks to decades. The wages of ordinary soldiers were fixed at six sous per day until 1762 when they were raised to eight sous. Foreign troops were paid one sou more per day. Andre Corvisier estimates these wages were equal to that of a tradesman or a peasant, but soldiers had the advantage of receiving pay on Sundays and holidays.

Further migration of Irish troops took place after the defeat of the Jacobite forces, supported by Louis XIV in his European campaign against William of Orange. Under the Treaty of Limerick (1691), the Williamite commander, General Ginkel (1644-1703) allowed for the transport to France of all Irish forces who wished to leave. About 12,000 sailed for France and this group formed a separate army in France under the command of James II and then his son, James III. This army, unlike Mountcashel's brigade, was not part of the French army although the French crown paid the troops.

According to John Cornelius O'Callaghan, the organisation of the Irish regiments in France (in French service and the Stuart army) was along the following lines before the Treaty of Ryswick (1697). The infantry regiments of Clare, Dillon and Lee, with a total strength of over 6,000 troops formed Mountcashel's brigade in French service. The Stuart army in France had ten infantry regiments in seventeen battalions, three independent companies, two troops of Horse Guards and two regiments of Horse, each containing two squadrons, amounting to 12,326 soldiers and horsemen. This gave the Jacobite forces a total strength in France of 18,365.

With the return of peace, the French army was reformed in 1698 and the Irish regiments were extensively reduced. Henceforth, the Irish and Jacobite regiments, troops and companies were reorganised into an Irish force in the service of the king of France. As Louis XIV had recognised William of Orange as king of England, he could not openly harbour an army of the deposed king of England and pretender to the throne on his soil. However, this did not change the conviction of the Jacobite forces in his army, as later invasion attempts would prove. As a result of the reform, the infantry was reduced to eight one-battalion regiments of fourteen companies of fifty men, giving a paper strength of 700 men per regiment and a total infantry force of 5,600 men. The regiments were named after the colonel proprietors, Albermarle, Berwick, Burke, Clare, Dillon, Dorrington, Galmoy and Lee. The cavalry were reduced to one regiment of two squadrons, commanded by Dominic Sheldon. Like ordinary French soldiers, the disbanded troops were left to fend for themselves, and many turned to brigandage and begging, reinforcing negative French stereotypes of Irish immigrants.

The War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713) provided employment for all elements of the French army including the Irish regiments. With the end of the conflict, the Irish regiments were again reduced, this time to five regiments. The regiments of Berwick, Clare, Dillon, Dorrington and Lee remained in service, as did Sheldon's cavalry under the new colonel-proprietor Christopher Nugent. Burke's infantry passed into Spanish service, the other regiments were disbanded and the soldiers were incorporated into the surviving regiments. A royal decree of 2 July 1716 introduced a system of troop records to the French army. French regimental commanders were henceforth required to keep precise registers of non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers. These records provide the core source for the website of ordinary soldiers in the Irish regiments and can shed new light on the composition of the bulk of the troops in the Irish regiments from 1691 to the French Revolution. In 1791, the foreign regiments were disbanded as a result of French army reforms of the French Revolution. As yet the database is incomplete, including 16000 out of approximately 20,000 soldiers in French service for the period under examination. It is envisaged that the officers and the remaining ordinary soldiers will be included at a later date.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Men participate in foreign wars for many reasons, the least of which is that they're frustrated with their own government at home. Many men search for adventure and it isn't much more complicated than that. You can join a mercenary group, join a resistance movement, etc. to fight communism, a dictatorship, to support a communist insurgency, wage Jihad, or carry the Cross into battle. Men throughout time have longed for the excitment of battle. Only the bureaucrats would come up with something along the lines that they're frustrated with their government at home.

[AdamG]

Men participate in foreign wars for many reasons, the least of which is that they're frustrated with their own government at home. Many men search for adventure and it isn't much more complicated than that. You can join ...wage Jihad

To wit, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...24&postcount=1

[davidbfpo]

Foreign fighters is "pet" interest and Thomas Hegghammer, from Norway's Defence Research Institute, has circulated his article 'Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting', which has been published in an American academic journal (APSR) and is on his own website:http://hegghammer.com/_files/Heggham...hould_I_go.pdf

The article's synopsis:

This article studies variation in conflict theater choice by Western jihadists in an effort to understand their motivations. Some militants attack at home, whereas others join insurgencies abroad, but
few scholars have asked why they make these different choices. Using open-source data, I estimate recruit supply for each theater, foreign fighter return rates, and returnee impact on domestic terrorist activity. The tentative data indicate that jihadists prefer foreign fighting, but a minority attacks at home
after being radicalized, most often through foreign fighting or contact with a veteran. Most foreign fighters do not return for domestic operations, but those who do return are more effective operatives than non-veterans. The findings have implications for our understanding of the motivations of jihadists, for assessments of the terrorist threat posed by foreign fighters, and for counter-terrorism policy.

Fifteen pages, so to printed off and read another day.

[GorTex6]

The US government has supported islamic jihadist in the past to keep Russian interests(the infidels lol) out of central asia-see Soviet Afghan war and Chechnya. Ten bucks says they will also be used to keep China out.

Al Qaeda means " the base" or to be more accurate " the database". Twenty bucks says it is a code word for a database of tracked islamic terrorists gathered by a CIA modified version of PROMIS software. When the CIA wants to jack someone up and keep their hands clean-just agitate their pool of jihadists.

[aktarian]

Al Qaeda means " the base" or to be more accurate " the database". Twenty bucks says it is a code word for a database of tracked islamic terrorists gathered by a CIA modified version of PROMIS software. When the CIA wants to jack someone up and keep their hands clean-just agitate their pool of jihadists.

No. It refers to database of foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan. People who were sending them to Afghanistan kept their contact info which was used later.

[Jedburgh]

Transcript of testimony by Brian Jenkins to the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment on 5 Apr 07:

Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment

...Recently, we have begun to focus more attention on what I refer to in my book as the “front end” of the jihadist cycle. Growing concern has produced a growing volume of literature on the topic. My testimony today will simply highlight a few areas for further discussion:

- Building an army of believers—how the jihadists recruit
- Radicalization and recruitment in the United States
- How we might impede radicalization and recruitment, and
- Guiding principles for any actions we might consider.

These comments derive from my own study of terrorism over the years, and from a large body of research done by my colleagues at the RAND Corporation....

In reference to the last line quoted above, here are links to the footnoted documents:

Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment

Al Qaeda Recruitment in the United States: A Preliminary Assessment (The link is actually to the MIPT 2004 Terrorism Annual; the article is on page 29 of the pdf)

The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World

[Maximus]

I recently read John Poole's Terrorist Trail, where this subject is a primary focus. All reviews that I've read and experiences in Iraq back up much of what he writes about where terrorists and global insurgents come from and how they get from point A to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechyna, Pakistan, etc. While I'm not sure if Hezbollah has as strong an influence in as many places as he claims, the book's great nonetheless (plus I don't have anything to refute his claims).

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 4 May 10: Why Youth Join al-Qaeda

Summary
• Interviews and personal histories of 2,032 “foreign fighters” show that rather than be recruited, young men actively seek out al-Qaeda and its associated movements.
• Al-Qaeda is more than just an organization; it is an ideology and a popular global brand that spins a heroic narrative with an idealized version of Islamic jihad.
• Al-Qaeda’s ubiquitous message of anti-Muslim oppression and global jihad appeals to the developmental needs of adolescents.
• To defeat al-Qaeda, it is crucial to understand who seeks to join and why.
• Common myths and misconceptions about why young men join extremist movements ignore the proximate causes.
• Potential recruits have an unfulfilled need to define themselves. Al-Qaeda’s ability to turn them to violence is rooted in what each seeks: Revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seekers need adventure.
• To prevent radicalization, calm the revenge seeker with programs to vent his frustration (e.g., sports, creative arts, political discussion outlets, young adult mentors); promote the status seeker with opportunities to show off his self-perceived talents (e.g., local political participation, international exchange programs, positive public media depictions of young Muslims); give the identity seeker groups to join (sports leagues, model governments, student societies, community service programs, adventure groups); and turn off the thrill seeker by tarnishing al-Qaeda’s image.
• Fragmented efforts of public diplomacy, strategic communications, and information operations are underresourced, poorly coordinated, and understaffed given the strength and pervasiveness of al-Qaeda’s message.
• A U.S. Strategic Communications Agency should be established to consolidate efforts under a cabinet-level secretary of strategic communications; execute a presidentially approved national communications strategy; manage funding of all U.S. communications programs; enable, empower, support, and reinforce credible existing voices in the Muslim world; build U.S. message credibility with honest, transparent dialogue that closes the “say-do” gap in recent foreign policy; and collect, synthesize, and analyze public opinion research.

[SWJED]

5 May Washington Post - An Uphill Battle to Stop Fighters at Border by Joshua Partlow.

Iraqi general in charge of guarding the border with Syria said his forces cannot completely prevent suicide bombers, who often carry fake passports and appear well trained and funded, from slipping into Iraq.

"This borderline cannot be controlled 100 percent," said Maj. Gen. Hadi Taaha Hasoun al-Mamoori, commanding officer of the 2nd Region Department of Border Enforcement, responsible for 830 miles of border and a force of about 12,000 people. "If there was a desire on the part of the Syrians to help us, it would have been possible to wipe out a large segment of the terrorists."

The issue of foreign fighters entering Iraq has become an increasingly high priority for U.S. officials, many of whom consider Syria a primary stopover for insurgents making their way from other Middle Eastern countries to Iraq...

[SWJED]

5 May NY Times - U.S. Forces Break Up Arms Smuggling Ring in Baghdad by Alissa Rubin.

American soldiers broke up a weapons smuggling ring on Friday in Baghdad, detaining 16 men who were accused of procuring powerful, armor-piercing bombs and other arms from Iran, the American military said.

The operation, in Sadr City, the heavily Shiite neighborhood that has at times been a center of resistance to the Americans, was one in a series of raids recently aimed at stopping the flow into Iraq of armor-piercing bombs, known as explosively formed projectiles, or E.F.P.’s, said Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, a spokesman for the military. “We’re dismantling the networks link by link, and one link leads us to another,” he said.

But he acknowledged that there were plenty of insurgents willing to smuggle and place the bombs. The military’s hope is to reduce the number of successful attacks by arresting the most experienced of the smugglers and assemblers...

[RJO]

Not sure if this AFP news report (15 July 2007) has been noted here:

Most foreign fighters and suicide bombers in Iraq come from Saudi Arabia, despite attempts by US officials to portray Syria and Iran as the main culprits of violence, a US newspaper reported Sunday.

Citing an unnamed senior US military officer and Iraqi lawmakers, the Los Angeles Times newspaper said about 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting US troops and Iraqi security forces were from Saudi Arabia, 15 percent from Syria and Lebanon, and 10 percent from North Africa

RJO

[SteveMetz]

Not sure if this AFP news report (15 July 2007) has been noted here:



RJO

I think this reinforces the point I've been trying to make--the Saudis act like they're trying to catch extremists at the same time that they tolerate and even promote the ideology which inspires them. It's like our government arresting people who smoke pot at the same time that they provide everyone with a copy of "Harold and Kumar Go to White Castle"

[Ski]

Either way, it removes a threat from the Saudi government. They go off to Iraq to fight, most of them die or are captured, so there's one less opposition member to worry about.

Of course, this is a delaying action. Enough of them will come back to Saudi in time to create problems. But the short term results benefit the House of Saud just fine.

[SteveMetz]

Either way, it removes a threat from the Saudi government. They go off to Iraq to fight, most of them die or are captured, so there's one less opposition member to worry about.

Of course, this is a delaying action. Enough of them will come back to Saudi in time to create problems. But the short term results benefit the House of Saud just fine.

I think you've nailed Saudi strategy. They rely on us to kill their excess militants for them. And it irks me to no end that we play along.

[Tom Odom]

I think you've nailed Saudi strategy. They rely on us to kill their excess militants for them. And it irks me to no end that we play along.

Agreed. It is much the same with government policy in Egypt where radical venting against the West and Israel is allowed to bleed off any pressure on the government.

Tom

[Granite_State]

I think you've nailed Saudi strategy. They rely on us to kill their excess militants for them. And it irks me to no end that we play along.

And they get the side benefit of killing Shiites and potential Iranian allies in the process. Two birds with one stone.

[Rex Brynen]

Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S.
New York Times, November 22, 2007

By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.

BAGHDAD — Saudi Arabia and Libya, both considered allies by the United States in its fight against terrorism, were the source of about 60 percent of the foreign fighters who came to Iraq in the past year to serve as suicide bombers or to facilitate other attacks, according to senior American military officials.

The data come largely from a trove of documents and computers discovered in September, when American forces raided a tent camp in the desert near Sinjar, close to the Syrian border. The raid’s target was an insurgent cell believed to be responsible for smuggling the vast majority of foreign fighters into Iraq....