Today's Wild Geese: Foreign Fighters in the GWOT

[Jedburgh]

Speaking to the NYT article that Rex linked is the Terror Finance Blog, 27 Nov 07:

Saudi Arabia Releases 1,500 Repentant Jihadists

On November 26, 2007, Arab News reported that Saudi Arabian authorities had released after their repenting of their Jihadist ways, approximately 1,500 “reformed extremists”. It went on to say that: “The committee has met around 5,000 times to offer counseling to 3,200 people, who were accused of embracing the takfeer ideology. The committee has successfully completed reforming 1,500 people." So who are these reformed extremists? The New York Times reports that of the estimated 60 to 80 foreign fighters who enter Iraq each month, nearly half of them are from Saudi Arabia. They arrive in Iraq not only with arms, but also with millions of dollars. Funds donated to the insurgents by private Saudi citizens as zakat. According to the Los Angeles Times, 50% of these Saudi fighters come to Iraq to be suicide bombers. Once caught by American forces they are repatriated to Saudi Arabia for prosecution......

[ODB]

Any thoughts on this?

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=180

Faced with a large population of young, Islamic-extremist prisoners during the Afghan jihad, governments across the Arab world found a release valve for radical religious pressures in their societies by freeing ideological prisoners on the condition that they would go to fight the atheist Soviets in Afghanistan. Many such prisoners agreed and were released by regimes that hoped they would go to Afghanistan, kill some infidels, and be killed in the process. Many of these fighters were killed, but many were not and returned to bedevil their respective governments to this day. Still, for more than a decade, the Afghan jihad allowed Arab governments to redirect domestic Islamist activism outward toward the hapless Red Army. Although the policy proved shortsighted, it reduced domestic instability for most of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.

Today, it is hard to know for sure whether this trend is repeating itself. Yet, we do know three things for certain: (a) every Arab government faces a domestic Islamist movement that is broader and more militant—though not always more violent—than in the 1980s; (b) the insurgency in Iraq, because the country is the former seat of the caliphate and is located in the Arab heartland, is an attraction for Islamists far more powerful than was Afghanistan; and (c) the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan seems to be more than sufficient to allow a steady increase in the combat tempo of each insurgency. Thus, the situation seems ideal for Arab governments to try a reprise of the process that lessened domestic instability during the Afghan jihad.

This circumstantial argument that the current situation in Iraq is an almost ideal opportunity for Arab regimes to export their Islamic firebrands to kill members of the U.S.-led coalitions and be killed in turn is augmented—if not validated—by the large numbers of Islamic militants that have been released by Arab governments since the invasion of Iraq. The following are several pertinent examples drawn from the period November 2003-March 2006:

November 2003: The government of Yemen freed more than 1,500 inmates—including 92 suspected al-Qaeda members—in an amnesty to mark the holy month of Ramadan [1].

January 2005: The Algerian government pardoned 5,065 prisoners to commemorate the feast of Eid al-Adha [2].

September 2005: The new Mauritanian military government ordered "a sweeping amnesty for political crimes, freeing scores of prisoners…including a band of coup plotters and alleged Islamic extremists" [3].

November 2005: Morocco released 164 Islamist prisoners to mark the end of the holy month of Ramadan [4].

November 2005: Morocco released 5,000 prisoners in honor of the 50th anniversary of the country's independence. The sentences of 5,000 other prisoners were reduced [5].

November-December 2005: Saudi Arabia released 400 reformed Islamist prisoners [6].

February-March 2006: In February, Algeria pardoned or reduced sentences for "3,000 convicted or suspected terrorists" as part of a national reconciliation plan [7]. In March, 2,000 additional prisoners were released [8].

February 2006: Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali released 1,600 prisoners, including Islamist radicals [9].

March 2006: Yemen released more than 600 Islamist fighters who were imprisoned after a rebellion led by a radical cleric named Hussein Badr Eddin al-Huthi [10].

The justifications offered by Arab governments for these releases vary. Some claim they are to commemorate religious holidays or political anniversaries; others claim they are part of national-reconciliation plans. In some of the official statements announcing prisoner releases, Islamists are said to be excluded from the prisoners freed; in others, they are specifically included. In all cases, the releasing governments are police states worried about internal stability in the face of rising Islamist militancy across the Islamic world, the animosities of populations angered at Arab regimes for assisting the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the powerful showings Islamist parties have made in elections across the region. While the motivation of Arab governments in releasing large numbers of prisoners is impossible to definitively document, it seems fair to conclude that those governments are not ignorant to the attraction that the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan will exert on newly freed Islamists, nor of the chance that it might take no more than a slight incentive to dispatch some of the former prisoners to the war zones. It may well be that the West is seeing but not recognizing a reprise of the process that supplied manpower to the Afghan mujahideen two decades ago.

[Ron Humphrey]

Any thoughts on this?

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=180

To look for ways to utilize their prison populations for warfighting, building foreign bases, creating havoc, or anything else they could find to help divest themselves of the burden of caring for/ dealing with them. In that sense it doesn't seem all that surprising.

[bourbon]

Any thoughts on this?

http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=180

Thoughts of how we could exploit this immediately come to mind. I imagine it would largely hinge on tagging and tracking technology available. Do we have subdermal gps chips yet? Can they be inserted surreptitiously? Those who would know likely cant say. This does not directly address the topic at issue, but it is where my mind jumped to.

[Rex Brynen]

It seems to me that Scheuer is really stretching to make his supposed point here.

Several of the prisoner releases that he cites are overwhelmingly criminal, not political, prisoners. In these cases, most were nearing the end of their sentences, and their release (to mark religious and national holidays) has come to be as much an expected part of the judicial and incarceration system as is parole in the US.

Second, Arab regimes are--precisely because of blowback from the Afghan experience--fully aware of the dangers of militants traveling out of country to receive "work experience" in a foreign insurgency. It stretches credulity to expect that most would today see this as an effective strategy for limiting domestic national security challenges given their knowledge that most of those chickens come home to roost.

Third, some of those prisoner releases have to be seen in the context of successful deradicalization efforts by Arab governments. In Algeria, for example, national reconciliation efforts have reduced the militant Islamist movement to a tiny, tiny fraction of what it was during the height of the post-1991 civil war (a conflict that claimed well over 100,000 lives). Egypt and Saudi Arabia have also experienced some substantial deradicalization successes, in part because of their manipulation of selective inducements such as early release.

Certainly there are recent cases of released prisoners going on to cause mayhem elsewhere (Shakir al-'Absi of Fateh al-Islam comes to mind), and there is particular grounds for concern regarding Yemen's detention-and-release (or escape) policies.

However, I suspect that a look at the background of captured foreign jihadists in Iraq in particular would show that very, very few of them had been imprisoned Islamists given early release in their native countries. On the contrary--and rather more alarmingly--a significant proportion were rather latent Islamists mobilized into action by US intervention in Iraq.

[Ron Humphrey]

Several of the prisoner releases that he cites are overwhelmingly criminal, not political, prisoners. In these cases, most were nearing the end of their sentences, and their release (to mark religious and national holidays) has come to be as much an expected part of the judicial and incarceration system as is parole in the US..

This one I can agree with you on

Second, Arab regimes are--precisely because of blowback from the Afghan experience--fully aware of the dangers of militants traveling out of country to receive "work experience" in a foreign insurgency. It stretches credulity to expect that most would today see this as an effective strategy for limiting domestic national security challenges given their knowledge that most of those chickens come home to roost..

The thing about that is how often those in power don't actually care to look so far as the roosting since their expectation is for it not to happen until after their gone. I will accept however that some of those whose leadership seem to never () be gone may tend to look at it more long term.

[Van]

Someone in the Arab world read their history carefully, and is undoubtedly laughing his rear end off at the symmetry of the situation.

One piece of driving force of the Crusades was "What the heck do we do with all these uppity younger sons?"

Now, I know that this is only one piece, usually ignored under the religious, political, and economic issues, but it was a piece of the European motivation. Looks like the Islamic violent fundamentalist extremist terrorist criminal elements (or whatever Dept. of State wants us to call them this week) jumped on this population control technique.

[BillClewis2]

The author should have given consideration to profile information gleaned from Abu G detainees. It would have been a larger sampling as well as truer indication of FF presence and country of origin for FF's picked up in IZ.

[Van]

Bill, this sounds really interesting and like a great thread. What are we referencing?

[Shek]

Bill, this sounds really interesting and like a great thread. What are we referencing?

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008...fghanistan.php

[drewconway]

An interesting note from Fed Biz Ops this morning regarding an academic conference on foreign fighters.

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) intends to negotiate and award a sole source contract with Foreign Policy Research Institute Inc., 1528 Walnut St Ste 610, Philadelphia, PA, for access to plan, coordinate, and execute an open academic conference on the Foreign Fighters. This conference is geared toward assisting USSOCOM in better understanding the foreign fighter problem on a global scale...The conference is scheduled from 14 July to 15 July 2009, the period of performance will complete on 25 July or after all conference materials are delivered to USSOCOM.

More here

[marct]

Hi Drew,

Thanks for the note! I do wish that these conferences would get a little more advance notice, though .

[drewconway]

I got some additional information on the conference for those interested

[marct]

Thanks, Drew. I'll probably go for the video-on-demand option .

[Valin]

Counter Terrorism Blog
Matthew Levitt

On July 14-15, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) sponsored a conference in Washington DC at the National Press Club on "The Foreign Fighter Problem." I presented a paper for a panel on "Foreign Fighters and their Economic Impact," focused on the case study of Syria as a foreign fighter hub for AQI. The following is taking from the introduction to my paper:

Running an insurgency is an expensive endeavor. Financing and resourcing insurgent activities, from procuring weapons and executing attacks to buying the support of local populations and bribing corrupt officials, requires extensive fundraising and facilitation networks that often involve group members, criminal syndicates, corrupt officials, and independent operators such as local smugglers.....

The full paper is available online here.

[George L. Singleton]

Dr. Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near Policy and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His linked article draws on his testimony in the civil case Gates V Syria, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No 06-1500 (RMC), September 2008, as well as on his interviews and research for a study co-authored with Michael Jacobson entitled “The Money Trail: Finding, Following and Freezing Terrorist Finances (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008). It also draws on the Sinjar documents made public by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, where the author is an adjunct fellow.

For a few years I was Assistant to the Executive Vice President for all bank Operations and Real Estate [he later was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Board] at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company in NYC…then the fourth largest bank in the world. Today MHTCo. is by multiple mergers a part of JP Morgan Chase Bank.

Subsequently I am retired from US Civil Service and from the Air Force Reserve (6 years active, 25 in the weekender Reserve at the JCS level with HQ USSOCOM for almost 10 years)

My unique bank officer training and few years experience in both domestic and international bank operations, money wire transfer, Federal Reserve Bank operations, Broker Loan, Letters of Credit, Bills of Trade, off shore bank operations and accounts, etc. allow me, even in my old age, to know a fair amount about the mechanics of money laundering and movement of funds for wayward, as in terrorist, purposes.

I advised the shadow #2 of what became the Homeland Security Department before it was “stood up” in the field of money gamesmanship, for free, my duty as a knowledgeable citizen, and was glad to have done so. Some little good perhaps came from my suggestions and shared knowledge to a then active duty Navy Rear Admiral whose career field was the military side of terrorism senior management.

I have highlighted some statements by Dr. Levitt at the conclusion of his article…these are bits and pieces cut and pasted by me, to note that I may disagree with Dr. Levitt that insurgency is not primarily a military activity. Rather than be the village idiot know it all myself, perhaps others here on SWJ may want to comment on this focused topic…that insurgency is not primarily a military activity.

I, for one, think we all agree that use of military force of any sort is traditionally a form of foreign policy, but since we are dealing with a stateless grouping of terrorists, the floor is open for some new definitions.

Dr. Levitt’s complete article which is public domain information I think would be useful if reprinted in THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL whose current issue theme is to discuss and invites articles/contributions to help them better develop their strategy and tactis regarding insurrections, guerilla warfare, the sorts of things Dr. Levitt’s good article deals with in terms of the “show me the money” theme.

Finally, insurgents traditionally seek to discredit the government they are fighting and breed dependency on the part of local populations through low intensity conflict warfare targeting local political and economic interests. Later, they may seek to control territory. Note, for example, that the Abu Ghadiyah network “planned to use rockets to attack multiple Coalition forces outposts and Iraqi police stations, in an attempt to facilitate an AQI takeover in Western Iraq,” according to information released by the Treasury Department. In both cases, insurgents have to assume a level of financial responsibility for the local economy while increasing the costs of the insurgency and also building grassroots support among local populations.

It should be stated from the outset that, given the relatively strong return on minimal financial investment, Syrian support for insurgents and terrorists will remain an attractive option for the regime in Damascus so long as it continues to be a viable and productive means of furthering the regime’s domestic and foreign policy goals. And given the financial interests of local and national officials, cracking down on established smuggling networks (and thereby threatening the regular payments that supplement officials’ income) is no easy task. A multi-faceted approach to the foreign fighter facilitation network problem is therefore required, including:

A plan to backfill the local economies with jobs and services to replace the losses sure to follow the shuttering of the smuggling economy;

An anti-corruption and civil society campaign aimed at breaking the traditional and deeply ingrained culture of bribing people in positions of authority as the cost of doing business;

Robust efforts to secure political stability in Iraq generally and specifically in areas controlled or largely influenced by insurgents;

Diplomatic efforts to address the underlying policy concerns that have led Syria to support insurgents and terrorists as a means of furthering domestic and foreign policy;

Finally, all efforts on the Syrian side of the border will have to be replicated by concurrent and parallel efforts on the Iraqi side of the border.

At the end of the day, however, political and diplomatic efforts may fall short, in which case targeted financial sanctions – focused on illicit activity, authority figures engaged in criminal or other activity threatening regional security, and corruption – present an attractive second option.

Combined with regional diplomacy employing a variety of countries’ efforts to cajole Damascus when possible and sanction the regime when necessary, sanctions can at least increase the costs to the regime of its continued belligerent behavior. Sanctions alone will never solve national security problems, but when used in tandem with other elements of national power in an integrated, strategic approach they can be very effective.

Were the shadow economy of smuggling enterprises to contract, the most critical and time sensitive issue would be to successfully jumpstart legitimate economic growth in its place. In the words of General Sir Frank Kiston, “The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”

[Bob's World]

I will read this article with some interest, as the whole nature of AQ and the phenomenon of "foreign fighters" one of the main areas that our policy and intel types don't get and mischaracterize.

First: AQ is not an Insurgent organization. As a non-state entity AQ has no state and no populace. They are a new breed, a franchiser, a non-state acting like a state to conduct unconventional warfare to incite insurgency in many states, and to borrow members of said insurgencies to contribute to shared ends.

Second as to Syria. This is the route, the pipeline these nationalist insurgents who share ends with AQ travel along and through. Is the pipe the problem or the ends of the pipe? Many branches feed into the main line going through Syria, and most of those branches originate in the lands of our allies. The largest branch begins in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have a long history of diffusing dissidence at home by encouraging the exportation of such dissidents to go to places like Afghanistan in the 80s, and more recently Iraq. We need to overcome our politically driven tendency to focus on largely irrelevant aspects like the pipeline through Syria; and focus on the real issue: The dissatisfied insurgent populaces of the states these men and the money that funds them come from.

[Bob's World]

Ok, I read Dr. Levitt's article. It adds nothing new, merely parroting the same old, flawed thinking. So I ask, does Dr. Levitt really just not get it? Or, in the alternative, does Dr. Levitt and the others who work so hard to shift the focus to state's like Syria have some alternative motivation, and what is it??

AQ is in Iraq for one reason: Because America is there. Fight us where we are, follow us where we go. Remain focused on their primary goal of taking down the Saudi Government and to break the will of the US to prop up the many governments of the region that we have invested so heavily in over the duration of the Cold War and work to sustain in a favorable relation with us today long after that conflict is over.

Foreign Fighters travel to Iraq for similar reasons to fight with AQ. They have poor governance at home that they want to change but believe that they cannot so long as that same governance is protected by the US; and they buy into the AQ mantra that step one is to break the support of the US to the region.


So, like flood waters flowing down hill to the sea; will blocking the path of least resistance stop the flood? No.. it merely changes the route.


This is not unlike a similar situation in US history. My family were Quakers back in the 17 and 1800s; and by the 1830s had migrated to southern Ohio and Michigan. There many of them became heavily involved in the very illegal business of smuggling escaped slaves out of the South up into the North and to Canada.

The governments and populaces of those states largely turned a blind eye to this illegal activity because they in some measure supported the moral cause for the action. Would strong sanctions against these states or populaces worked to shut down the pipeline? Perhaps, but at what consequence? Would targeting the otherwise solid citizens engaged in actually running the pipeline out of their strong religious and moral convictions shut down the pipeline? Doubtful, and again at what consequence?

After all the real problem was not the pipeline, but the governmentally supported institution of slavery; and the destination of Canada and the promise of freedom as powerful of a draw to enslaved people as the Ocean and gravity are to water.

We lacked the moral courage to make the hard decision to do the right thing then, and chose instead the harder path to the eventual unavoidable resolution of the problem.

We face a similar choice in the Middle East today. We can make the hard moral choice now; or ignore it and face the much harder inevitable resolution. I for one, vote for the former.

Men like Dr. Levitt are dangerous. Challenge them and their thinking. Challenge me and my thinking, but above all, think, and draw your own conclusions. The rhetoric is loud, but really does not stand up to close inspection.

[bourbon]

Or, in the alternative, does Dr. Levitt and the others who work so hard to shift the focus to state's like Syria have some alternative motivation, and what is it??

Dr. Levitt is a senior fellow The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which was founded by AIPAC. While WINEP avoids AIPAC’s partisan image and was established to present a balanced view of the Middle East, its critics contend it a research arm of the pro-Israel lobby.

If one were looking for such an alternative motivation I would start there.

[SWJ Blog]

Foreign Fighters in Syria and Beyond

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