SWJ Small Wars Survey 2012

[Ken White]

...but the policy class will still see a tool as a tool and would certainly structure any conscription system to exempt their peers (need we remember that "universal health care" isn't really universal, as Congress and others still retain their own, superior systems).

Both Korea and Viet Nam were fought with conscripts / draftees; both had far larger deployed forces than have the recent actions and both had (and caused...) far, far more casualties. Both, in terms of percent of GDP expended and including current VA expenditures also cost more...

National service will just provide larger forces enabling larger commitments and which will get more people killed in more dumb wars -- which, like all our wars, the Armed Forces do NOT start...

[AmericanPride]

We, for instance, haven't been fighting "small" wars as we have in the past. Our entire procurement and development system was geared for "big" wars, and developed its habits in rehearsals for wars that never came. It also has a great deal to do with our insistence on revolutionary weapon development as opposed to something more gradual (limited number of test systems evolving from something that worked as opposed to extended "super system" development cycles that produce wildly expensive systems that are focused on one or two specific, usually big war missions that may not be relevant by the time the system is fielded). Does everything have to be mutil-role or stealth? Likely not, but that's how development works these days.

I know. And I'm saying that it's not sustainable. Unless we are willing to release the political controls on America's monetary policies, the defense budget will continue to eat up larger portions of scarce financial resources, producing fewer and less combat-ready/relevant systems, at the cost of America's overall defense readiness. We are spending more money for less amount of equipment (which are more delicate than previous generations and therefore require more maintenance) at the expense of personnel end-strength. This translates directly into reduced combat power, which constrains America's strategic options, which in turn endangers American national security.

All-volunteer armies are the norm for the United States.

Conscription is a regular feature of America's military experience; a part of every major war since the War of Independence. Furthermore, non-military conscription remains an accepted feature of American society, including youth education and jury duty. What is unique to the United States is the maintenance of a small "peace-time" military (not that the US has known many years of peace). But the inefficient defense economy means that the all-volunteer force cannot be sustained under even limited conditions.

[Ken White]

Conscription is a regular feature of America's military experience; a part of every major war since the War of Independence.

True, but...

In all those wars where it was used -- Civil, WW I, WW II, Korea and Viet Nam, a net of 31 years or so out of 224 or about 14% -- it's been universally unfair in application, gamed and not nearly as effective as one might think. The only benefit is to provide mass and we have no need for that at this time. Au contraire...

Furthermore, non-military conscription remains an accepted feature of American society, including youth education and jury duty.

I'll give you education, which is kinda pathetic and a worse misuse of talent than is military service but comparing a week or so of Jury Duty with a few months of military service is really stretching things...

What is unique to the United States is the maintenance of a small "peace-time" military (not that the US has known many years of peace).

Not so. The British have even more years of doing that than do we. The Continental Europeans have always since the French Revolution pretty much opted for conscription -- but we are far different folks than those good people. Further, it should be noted that just as Europe is dismantling the social democratic welfare state while we are trying to enhance ours, they are also ditching conscription and going to all volunteer forces. Thus like our current administration you seem determined to copy policies that the originators of said policies are now realizing they couldn't afford or that were not effective...

But the inefficient defense economy means that the all-volunteer force cannot be sustained under even limited conditions.

Very much arguable. Boils down to politics -- which in essence is what this thread is degenerating to.

As an aside, the entire US economy, not just the defense portion, is inefficient. The US government is inefficient. Inefficiency isn't all bad. Ineffectiveness OTOH is bad -- but it would be a big mistake to equate the Afghan-Iraq episodes admitted relative ineffectiveness (which had many parents, not all in uniform nor even all human) on the part of the Armed Forces with a generic case of all round ineffectiveness...

By all accounts, the CPA moved fairly quickly in organizing an Iraqi government.

After first disbanding the Iraqi Army and Police, putting a couple of hundred thousand armed men on the street, broke and unemployable. Absolutely flipping brilliant -- and totally political. Caught the US Army by surprise, too.

The question is why did the mission failed because that's the question I've been asking and answering.

As several have pointed out, it did not quickly achieve all objectives due to failures in execution. It's too early to say it failed, let's give it another 10 to 15 years, then we may be able to tell and my suspicion is that it'll be declared a flawed effort with an ultimately generally successful outcome. We'll have to wait and see. It had some strategic merit and it was not a waste but the execution was flawed and both the Army and the politicians erred and did so repeatedly.

You have not been answering your own question, you have been providing your perspective. Very different things.

[Compost]

It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?

The US military is known to generally stress a need for obedience, and also subordination of the armed forces to the political administration of the day. Both those may be all well and good but an essential role for senior military officers is to provide pertinent and objective advice without fear or favour. If unable to do that or if such advice is routinely rejected or ignored, then one alternative is to resign. That course of action is rarely followed even though every senior officer knows that another responsibility is to develop able subordinates and hence potential successors as opposed to fairly competent or even incompetent placeholders.

An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.

So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?

And secondly: At what level are US officers required to provide forthright confidential advice direct to the political administration?

And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

[MikeF]

So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?

Why are you limiting your question to pre-determine a U.S. military solution to solving other states problems?

What evidence do you have to suggest that a better war theory or better resourced military could in fact provide the solution that you are seeking?

In my mind, the question itself is inherently lacking sophistication or any sense of creativity.

An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.

Really? Is this an early attempt at historical revisionism? McChrystal is currently on speaking tours getting paid handsomely for his thoughts.

And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

General Officers have a duty to tell the truth.

[Ken White]

It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?

This thread may lead to that perception but the bulk of comment on this Board trends to suggesting we avoid those 'small wars' that entail large troop commitments and instead use better Intelligence, diplomacy and Special Forces in small numbers to intervene early. I think that may equate to your "small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed."

The reason for avoiding the commitment of large forces is the historic probability of a lack of success due to flawed policy maker perceptions of the problem, US national traits of impatience and our electoral cycle which can -- and usually does -- undermine political will. Almost no one asserts "do not do this," rather most say avoid large commitments if at all possible.

So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?

Makes sense to me -- the issue then becomes how to do that and how to avoid those that likely cannot be properly "structured" -- or adequately fought. The rub in that is such decisions will almost always be based on less than full information and for the US on domestic politics rather than the international situation or pure foreign policy concerns. That last item is quite important and often not understood by observers, domestic and foreign...

And secondly: At what level are US officers required to provide forthright confidential advice direct to the political administration?

Too much variance to answer succinctly but at the level you probably mean, by US law, only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is at that level. Practically speaking, the service Chiefs are generally involved in providing such advice. On occasion, for specific issues, a four star Combatant or Geographic Commander may also weigh in. In the recent strategy sessions in Washington, all those were apparently involved.

And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

Such resignations are essentially a European construct, US tradition differs and here such resignations are extremely rare. The rationale is that if one resigns in protest, the Administration will simply keep asking people until it finds one who will do what is desired and thus, if one disagrees with a policy, it is better to stay and try to ameliorate the potential damage. There is also the factor that US tradition places strong emphasis on loyalty and adherence to the civil power, more so than is the norm in most nations.

It would be easy to say such an approach is self serving and less honorable than a resignation in protest, both arguably true. It is even more true that the rationale for not resigning is correct and the powers that be will simply keep going down the well until they find a turtle that will do what's wanted. IMO the American solution is more practical if less praiseworthy in the eyes of some.

[davidbfpo]

Ken as always comments wisely and whilst noting there are differences between the European and US approach to WM's question:

And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?

It is quite clear, even for someone not within, that a good number of British Army officers have taken another way out - resignation, often after a tour in operational command. A good number have commented in public, usually in carefully phrased media interviews.

Some I expect have other reasons than the political directions given and the military command's response.

[Ken White]

It is quite clear, even for someone not within, that a good number of British Army officers have taken another way out - resignation, often after a tour in operational command. A good number have commented in public, usually in carefully phrased media interviews

It will be interesting in the next few years to see how much the monolithic entity that is Defence / Defense changes in response to such resignations. Or to the current US grumbling within the ranks

I think we can all agree that turning Elephants is hard work. Rewarding, perhaps but difficult...

[Compost]

Too much variance to answer succinctly but at the level you probably mean, by US law, only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is at that level. Practically speaking, the service Chiefs are generally involved in providing such advice. On occasion, for specific issues, a four star Combatant or Geographic Commander may also weigh in. In the recent strategy sessions in Washington, all those were apparently involved.Such resignations are essentially a European construct, US tradition differs and here such resignations are extremely rare. The rationale is that if one resigns in protest, the Administration will simply keep asking people until it finds one who will do what is desired and thus, if one disagrees with a policy, it is better to stay and try to ameliorate the potential damage. There is also the factor that US tradition places strong emphasis on loyalty and adherence to the civil power, more so than is the norm in most nations.

It would be easy to say such an approach is self serving and less honorable than a resignation in protest, both arguably true. It is even more true that the rationale for not resigning is correct and the powers that be will simply keep going down the well until they find a turtle that will do what's wanted. IMO the American solution is more practical if less praiseworthy in the eyes of some.

There is the certainty that the CJCS will sometimes like every narrow conduit inadvertently act as an information cutout, upward and or downward. So all-in strategy sessions will hopefully become the norm.

But despite any all-in sessions it would be appropriate for every member of the joint chiefs plus the relevant theatre commander and the joint force commander to be able/encouraged to provide non-interruptible independent dissenting advice in written form, with a concurrent advisory copy to all other such officers.

The European or more accurately the British method of resignation as described in post 51 seems preferable, especially for ABCANZ forces. Any senior resignation closely followed by a public explanation - preferably delivered in forthright language - could be productive. And even a short conga line of resignees would likely be decisive.

Revisionism is a foolish concept.
All history is revisionism as told from the mind of the author

Agree all history may be re-visionism. But prefer dictionary definition such as “the academic discipline of understanding or interpreting past events”.

My comment that “revisionism is a foolish concept” was predicated upon its alternate use as a pejorative term by communists and socialists squabbling over orthodoxy. It is annoying to have a useful word subsumed by idealogues.

But on reflection such people should be encouraged to make frequent and energetic use of the word. So correcting myself: “revisionism can be useful concept” .

Well better to be paid handsomely rather than not at all. Perhaps, but that is dependent on one's value system.

Yes but many of yesterday’s active folk have already lost too many teeth to be paid peanuts.
________________________________________

[MikeF]

Yes but many of yesterday’s active folk have already lost too many teeth to be paid peanuts.

Very true

I think, when we look at McChrystal down the road, we'll see two stories,

1. The amazing organizational changes that he overcame (1990-2009) to build a small, elite force. I wished that the story stopped there.

2. Being overwhelmed trying to implement his micro-level changes on the macro-level. Mintzberg provides a good guide to affecting change in the bureaucracy. Charismatic leaders are one way, but it takes time.

[Ken White]

There is the certainty that the CJCS will sometimes like every narrow conduit inadvertently act as an information cutout, upward and or downward. So all-in strategy sessions will hopefully become the norm.

Unlikely. Entirely too dependent on circumstances versus personalities in place at the time. A continued mix will probably be the case. All in has its disadvantages in both the group-think and weak consensus variants. We'll continue to muddle along -- as do most other nations.

But despite any all-in sessions it would be appropriate for every member of the joint chiefs plus the relevant theatre commander and the joint force commander to be able/encouraged to provide non-interruptible independent dissenting advice in written form, with a concurrent advisory copy to all other such officers.

That currently happens in a sense but it is still subject to being ignored or over ruled by a particularly strong CJCS or, far more likely, by the civilian policy makers with whom ultimate decisions rest *. The ideal solution, of course is to always have informed and sensible civilian policy makers. Since those people are always politicians, that's an impossibility...

The European or more accurately the British method of resignation as described in post 51 seems preferable, especially for ABCANZ forces. Any senior resignation closely followed by a public explanation - preferably delivered in forthright language - could be productive. And even a short conga line of resignees would likely be decisive.

We can disagree on that. I've seen little evidence that your assertion is true and have seen evidence in both Britain and Canada that such actions accomplish virtually nothing. Canadian resignations and very forthright protestations over the 1964 unification of Canadian Forces, for example, resulted only in the loss of some very good people. It changed nothing. My recollection of similar actions in Britain and Australia is that little real change occurred in such cases.

In any event, the traditions differ and are unlikely to change.

* US examples include both Viet Nam and Iraq, military advice was ignored by Kennedy and Bush 43 and the various policy wonks hired by those two. Interestingly, amid much pressure from Congress and the media to intervene earlier in Viet Nam, then President Eisenhower listened to the then Army Chief of Staff General Ridgeway and refused to commit troops to Viet Nam. Much as George H.W. Bush listened in 1991 to his military advisers with reference to not entering Iraq. The key is an informed and sensible decision maker. Hard to find and retain...

FWIW I agreed with Eisenhower on Viet Nam, it was a stupid and unnecessary war in which I partook. However I disagreed with Bush 41 on Iraq. I was only peripherally involved in that one but it was obvious that we were going to leave a festering wound that would require later action -- it would have been difficult in 1991 but still far easier than it worked out to be in 2003.

[Dayuhan]

It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed.

Again, for me this comes back to decisions on where and when to engage.

For a war to succeed, large or small, the goals have to be clear, specific, practical, and - with the resources and time we are prepared to commit - achievable. We have to be clear on what we propose to achieve, how we propose to achieve it, and why it's important. That last point is critical, because even if resources are available, the will to allocate them will quickly fade if the conflict is not seen as essential.

If we chose to involve ourselves only where and to the extent that we really have to, we'd avoid a lot of problems, and a lot of wars.

You hear a lot of talk these days about complexity, and the mantra holds that the world and its conflicts have become more complex than they used to be. I'm not sure that's the case at all. A lot of the supposed "complexity" is something we impose with our own uncertain, vacuous, and ephemeral goals and limited commitment to those goals, which in turn is a function of the perception that those goals are not critically important to us as a nation. If you're not sure what you're trying to achieve or why or whether it makes any difference, everything looks complex. When you're messing in a situation you don't understand and where your need to be there is doubtful, things suddenly seem complex. If you know exactly what you want and why, the same situation becomes simpler.

One of the reasons we find these fights challenging and our opponents so resilient is simply the difference between involvement and commitment. We all know the old saying about the difference. Think of bacon and eggs: the chicken is involved, the pig is committed. We're the chicken, they're the pig. We can walk away with no great loss; they can't. This is not implicit in the situation, it's a function of where, when, and how we choose to involve ourselves.

Certainly there's infinite space for better strategy, better tactics, better understanding of the situation and the antagonist... but ultimately the first step toward getting small wars right is in re-evaluating the decision to get involved and the selection of the goals to be pursued. Get those wrong and it will be very difficult to dig out of the hole.