SWJ Small Wars Survey 2012

[jmm99]

from Compost
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?

First off (to Compost), I can suggest "small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed." So also can a whole bunch of other people here ! As an example, I'd say "regime removal" - you want him taken out, the US "can do". The totally different "small war" of "regime change" is another story.

One material question in this thread is what constraints should be applied to a given state (not the USA, necessarily). Everything I post about "COIN" should have the disclaimer "try this at home first".

Another question (which is wholly individual) is what restraints should be applied to foreign interventions.

You use the word "failure". That is obviously different from "victory" (or is it ? - a good case can be made for a USAian "failure" at San Juan Hill, etc.)

But, is "failure" different from "defeat" and "disaster" ? Well, "yes" and "no" - and consider the following resources (I have read them):

British Military Defeats

The French Military as Contrasted with the English since 1500: Proud Traditions or a Badge of Shame?

Wiki - List of military disasters

Regan, Great Military Disasters: A Historical Survey of Military Incompetence

Lind on U.S. Military Failures during the Cold War

Lind on Nixon’s Strategic and Tactical Failures

Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict (Simon & Schuster, 1999)

William R. Corson, Consequences of Failure (W W Norton , 1973)

David MacIsaac, Of Victories, Defeats, and Failures (Air University Review, 1974)

Bill Corson’s Consequences of Failure bears little resemblance to the Loory or Chodes books. Where Loory speaks of defeat, Corson treats of what he prefers to call failure; where Chodes uses history he tends to invent it whereas Corson’s grasp of historical perspective is what lends to his analysis its particular cogency. Corson, a retired Marine colonel, is well known to readers of military literature, particularly for his scathing indictment of search-and-destroy tactics in The Betrayal, which appeared in 1968. In the more recent book Corson ranges well beyond I Corps in an attempt to “evaluate the consequences of America’s failure in Vietnam in terms of its observable effects upon the United States and its institutions.” (p. 17)

Corson begins by reminding us to understand that we have not experienced a defeat in Vietnam but a “military failure” - defined as the nonperformance of something required or expected - a phenomenon with distinct characteristics and by no means an uncommon experience in the life of a nation. Such failures have been less studied than victories and successes, even though “failure is as much a determinant of future political behavior as is success.” Corson fervently believes that we will repeat our failure in Vietnam elsewhere unless we as a nation immediately acknowledge the fact of failure and undertake a rigid examination of our collective conscience. (pp. 15-18)

By means of a series of historical case studies, Corson sets out to illustrate how the violating or ignoring of certain principles of “limited war” strategy contributes to the failure of a great power in any conflict that does not affect its national existence. Starting with the Dacian and Parthian campaigns of the Emperor Trajan (A.D. 98-117), he moves through the catastrophic involvement of Spain in its war in the Netherlands during the sixteenth century to the British problems on this continent during the eighteenth century. Then, in somewhat more detail, he treats Britain’s military failure in Ireland between 1916 and 1922. From these examples Corson derives a number of general principles that need be applied (and others that need be omitted) if a great power is to avoid encountering military failure. (pp. 28-30, 72-73)

In essence, these boil down to abandoning—for limited wars not affecting national survival—MacArthur’s definition of victory in favor of Clausewitz’s rather more complex idea that winning means either to achieve one’s objectives by offensive action or, defensively, to thwart the enemy’s intentions; that losing is defined simply as the failure to achieve one’s objectives even though one’s forces are undefeated and still able to engage the enemy. Or, to quote Secretary of State Kissinger on Vietnam, “In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win."

Bill Corson started out with a huge concept - to distinguish "failure" from "defeat" and "disaster"; but then got lost in the immediate situation - the close of the Vietnam War. As Ken says: Wait for 40 years. In any case, we should be looking not only to "victory" and "defeat"; but also to "failure" and (I'd say) "success" (a state less than "victory").

OK, SMG White, Can we now start ? Like, who really "won" (or "succeeded in") the SE Asian War (and Non-War) Games ? And, where did Indochina fit into that picture (if at all) - yes, I know Dayuhan has a possible oar in that boat.

BLUF at end: There is a long history to "Small Wars"; but it has to be explored very carefully with discernment as to "constraints" (which are set by the environment) and "restraints" (which are set by each of us).

For my large rugby-playing friend from That Place on the Hudson, I'd suggest your pick of eras is appropriate to understand the "beginnings". Owen Fiss called 1888-1910 the "Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State" (Holmes Devise History of SCOTUS; too expensive unless you are a Con Law scholar - find a library copy - or come up to Northern Michigan and read it - that's a real invite, BTW ).

I've been in the same era for the last year or so - re: the most important issue - what are the reasonable limits of USAian force projection ??

Regards

Mike