SWJ Small Wars Survey 2012

[Dayuhan]

Once committed to conflict, the role of the "foreign policy establishment" is very minimal, and reduced mostly to capitalizing on the gains of the military effort.

Sometimes the role of the foreign policy establishment once committed to conflict is to shift the goalposts and creep the mission. Thus it was in this case, much to our detriment. Once the goal of installing stable democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan was adopted - and I don't think that goal was selected by the military - we were in unachievable territory.

But this effort has not produced any measurable or suitable gains to be used to forward America's political interests abroad.

I don't think there was ever much clarity on what interests were meant to be advanced, and how.

Occupation is a military function in the absence of a capable political authority in the defeated country. By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.

Occupation is a military function. The creation of a "capable political authority" is not a military function, and that's where we've failed. That means occupation has to be more or less eternal, which of course will produce durable resistance. The initial error was the assumption that we could install a capable political authority when in fact we could not. That was an error on the civilian leadership side.

When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.

If those were the goals, how did we end up trying to install governments and build nations? I don't blame the military for being confused over that question. Mission creep is a bitch. It's easy to say words like "set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries", but somebody has to define what those conditions are to be. That definition comes from civilian leadership, and in this case it was set at an unreasonable level that could not be achieved by military force or by any other means at our disposal.

It's a convenient lie to claim ignorance in defense of the military's failure to produce favorable conditions in either country. This is awfully similar to another country's "stab-in-the-back" theory and is just as laughable.

Whether that mission as practical and achievable or not depends on what "favorable conditions" the military was expected to produce. Armies don't install stable governments. They break things. That's what they're trained and equipped to do.

President Bush saw differently, as did the entirety of the national security establishment through numerous public statements, publications, and actions. Only in 2008 with the change in administration and the virtual collapse of the economy did priorities shift. The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?

Whoa, the goalposts just shifted. Earlier you were talking about "pressing national security requirements" Now you speak of priorities. Requirements and priorities are very different things. Removal of the government of Iraq may have been a priority, but I can't see how it was ever a requirement. I don't see that installing new governments in Iraq or Afghanistan was ever a requirement. If priorities don't match requirements, questions need to be asked about the setting of priorities.