Quote Originally Posted by Compost View Post
There is the certainty that the CJCS will sometimes like every narrow conduit inadvertently act as an information cutout, upward and or downward. So all-in strategy sessions will hopefully become the norm.
Unlikely. Entirely too dependent on circumstances versus personalities in place at the time. A continued mix will probably be the case. All in has its disadvantages in both the group-think and weak consensus variants. We'll continue to muddle along -- as do most other nations.
But despite any all-in sessions it would be appropriate for every member of the joint chiefs plus the relevant theatre commander and the joint force commander to be able/encouraged to provide non-interruptible independent dissenting advice in written form, with a concurrent advisory copy to all other such officers.
That currently happens in a sense but it is still subject to being ignored or over ruled by a particularly strong CJCS or, far more likely, by the civilian policy makers with whom ultimate decisions rest *. The ideal solution, of course is to always have informed and sensible civilian policy makers. Since those people are always politicians, that's an impossibility...

The European or more accurately the British method of resignation as described in post 51 seems preferable, especially for ABCANZ forces. Any senior resignation closely followed by a public explanation - preferably delivered in forthright language - could be productive. And even a short conga line of resignees would likely be decisive.
We can disagree on that. I've seen little evidence that your assertion is true and have seen evidence in both Britain and Canada that such actions accomplish virtually nothing. Canadian resignations and very forthright protestations over the 1964 unification of Canadian Forces, for example, resulted only in the loss of some very good people. It changed nothing. My recollection of similar actions in Britain and Australia is that little real change occurred in such cases.

In any event, the traditions differ and are unlikely to change.

* US examples include both Viet Nam and Iraq, military advice was ignored by Kennedy and Bush 43 and the various policy wonks hired by those two. Interestingly, amid much pressure from Congress and the media to intervene earlier in Viet Nam, then President Eisenhower listened to the then Army Chief of Staff General Ridgeway and refused to commit troops to Viet Nam. Much as George H.W. Bush listened in 1991 to his military advisers with reference to not entering Iraq. The key is an informed and sensible decision maker. Hard to find and retain...

FWIW I agreed with Eisenhower on Viet Nam, it was a stupid and unnecessary war in which I partook. However I disagreed with Bush 41 on Iraq. I was only peripherally involved in that one but it was obvious that we were going to leave a festering wound that would require later action -- it would have been difficult in 1991 but still far easier than it worked out to be in 2003.