SWJ Small Wars Survey 2012

[MikeF]

And again none of this is new.

And the Native Americans didn't get much choice or freedom as we pushed them into reservations.

[Steve Blair]

And the Native Americans didn't get much choice or freedom as we pushed them into reservations.

Nor did the Cheyenne when the Sioux pushed them out of the Black Hills. Or the smaller tribes that were absorbed by the Aztecs to our south. There are precious few "good guys" in history. It's mostly a collection of gray (good intentions mixed with bad outcomes, or in some cases the reverse), with a few sparkling despots thrown in for good measure.

In terms of the military, we've been here before. Many times. And again we have a chance to change or break the cycle. The question remains...will we do so? Even when we were "isolationist," we tended to intervene if we thought it was in our interest to do so. The size of the military never really hindered this effort (and it accelerates if you view the western expansion as an actual conflict instead of some Oregon Trail-based migration). In fact, I'd contend that some of our best interventions (at least from a short term policy standpoint) were conducted with that smaller military.

[MikeF]

Nor did the Cheyenne when the Sioux pushed them out of the Black Hills. Or the smaller tribes that were absorbed by the Aztecs to our south. There are precious few "good guys" in history. It's mostly a collection of gray (good intentions mixed with bad outcomes, or in some cases the reverse), with a few sparkling despots thrown in for good measure.

In terms of the military, we've been here before. Many times. And again we have a chance to change or break the cycle. The question remains...will we do so? Even when we were "isolationist," we tended to intervene if we thought it was in our interest to do so. The size of the military never really hindered this effort (and it accelerates if you view the western expansion as an actual conflict instead of some Oregon Trail-based migration). In fact, I'd contend that some of our best interventions (at least from a short term policy standpoint) were conducted with that smaller military.

If I can recommend one time in World/US History to study right now, it's 1866-1916

[Steve Blair]

If I can recommend one time in World/US History to study right now, it's 1866-1916

Exactly. That's been one of my foci for some years now. There are many similarities between what we found in Afghanistan and what we found in Arizona (in general terms at least), and there are other social similarities as well.

[MikeF]

Exactly. That's been one of my foci for some years now. There are many similarities between what we found in Afghanistan and what we found in Arizona (in general terms at least), and there are other social similarities as well.

I know. You're the one who told me to look there three years ago

[Steve Blair]

I know. You're the one who told me to look there three years ago

Yep. I'm a bit of a single-track record sometimes...

[Ken White]

I think freedom is frequently inaccurately equated with choice ... Law and obedience to it is the foundation of liberty. National service is just as well not an obligation, but an exercise in freedom.

That strikes me as the classic small 'l' liberal approach. While I'm inclined to take the large 'L' liberal view, I certainly accept the fact that about 30 percent or so of my fellow Americans tend to the former persuasion and they're welcome to do so...

I'm with WM on that issue. Further, from your earlier post:

The military can potentially train people in valuable skills in trades or services, promote education, provide widespread employment, and coalesce increasingly fractured elements of society.

That too is a 'liberal' -- and IMO, quite dangerous -- construct. That approach has been followed several times in the past by the US and is in part cumulatively responsible for many of the flaws you decry in the Armed Forces of today; excessive Social Engineering culminating (I hope) with Robert Strange McNamara's Project 100,000 whose reverberations are still being felt today -- our terribly flawed "Task, Condition and Standard" training model derives directly from that intake and as those folks moved up in rank they significantly harmed the NCO Corps of the Army.

The military is in need of substantial reform...

I totally agree. I suspect we differ significantly on just what those reforms should be -- but we can probably agree that a big financial hit is in order.

I believe that inviting the participation of the American public in that reform would deliver the most desirable outcomes.

Had the educational system that existed at the end of WW II been improved instead of debilitated and prostituted in part by design, I'd agree. Since it was not improved, I suspect you'd get little of real merit from such an approach, indeed, I can make the case that such involvement over the years has greatly contributed to the malaise you note.

The current trends are not sustainable and the poor outcomes and high costs during the War on Terrorism are severely negative indicators of our declining military capabilities.

While I broadly agree, I will here note the War on Terror is a political not a military construct conceived by a small 'l' liberal administration about 10 years ago (that was not a conservative admin in any sense...). That is in keeping with many of your other here stated positions which are essentially political and not militarily oriented. Nothing wrong with that, just trying to preclude confusion.

I do not think it is because Americans can't "do" counter-insurgency, but that the structure in place is incapable of adapting to meet pressing national security requirements.

In reverse order, I agree; and no one can "do" counter insurgency today because it's a concept whose time has passed.

[Dayuhan]

That is the origin of the problem. Despite increased military spending, the output has sharply declined. Estimates of the War on Terrorism range from three trillion dollars up to eight trillion (if we are to include annual defense budgets, homeland security expenditures, etc). In comparison, the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan cost the United States 3.5 trillion dollars (when adjusted for inflation). The inability to produce favorable outcomes in so-called "small" wars (the costs and consequences are anything but) is a clear indicator of institutional failure. The usual obsession with training quality and high-tech weapons systems dismisses the failure to properly identify threats and trends, leverage the appropriate resources, and implement an effective strategy. The military is being "stretched to capacity" because it is declining in strategic effectiveness despite the nearly asymmetric advantage in tactical capabilities. America is disarming itself because the defense economy is consuming the country's fiscal health.

Disagree on most points.

Defense is a burden on the economy, but that's not why the economy is shaky: there are much more important economic issues at hand.

The institutional failure I see is not on the part of the military, but on the part of those who repeatedly send military forces to accomplish that military force can't reasonably expected to accomplish (e.g. "nation building") and bite off commitments that we haven't the political will to complete. The military has been effective at the tasks it's trained and equipped to accomplish. It's been ineffective at tasks it's not trained and equipped to accomplish. This should not be a surprise. Using a hammer as a screwdriver is likely to be ineffective and messy, but that's not the hammer's fault.

The military can potentially train people in valuable skills in trades or services, promote education, provide widespread employment, and coalesce increasingly fractured elements of society.

True to some extent, but is it the most cost-effective way to accomplish these goals?

The current trends are not sustainable and the poor outcomes and high costs during the War on Terrorism are severely negative indicators of our declining military capabilities.

The poor outcomes and high costs in the "War on Terrorism" are to me indicators of bad policy decisions, rather than of declining military capabilities. Start with the whole ridiculous idea of a "War on Terrorism"...

I do not think it is because Americans can't "do" counter-insurgency, but that the structure in place is incapable of adapting to meet pressing national security requirements.

Is counterinsurgency necessarily a pressing national security requirement? I see no reason why it must or should be.

[AmericanPride]

Defense is a burden on the economy, but that's not why the economy is shaky: there are much more important economic issues at hand.

I did not state that the defense economy is the primary or direct cause of our current economic problems, though it is a major contributor to America's gradual economic decline. For economy in general, the most important issue is the regressive tax and financial policies that have resulted in the largest transfer of wealth in American history. For the defense economy specifically, the problem is that budgets continue to grow while output and quality decrease. The GWOT has brought into sharp focus the inadequacies of the military establishment. Trillions of dollars have been spent but there are zero favorable political outcomes from the conflict. That's the bottom-line.

The institutional failure I see is not on the part of the military, but on the part of those who repeatedly send military forces to accomplish that military force can't reasonably expected to accomplish (e.g. "nation building") and bite off commitments that we haven't the political will to complete. The military has been effective at the tasks it's trained and equipped to accomplish. It's been ineffective at tasks it's not trained and equipped to accomplish. This should not be a surprise. Using a hammer as a screwdriver is likely to be ineffective and messy, but that's not the hammer's fault.

It's been the military that has been the largest proponent of "counter-insurgency" and targeting the population instead of the enemy. The political leadership empowered the military to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has not occurred. And so it has been the military wrestling internally about what to do next since our doctrines, technologies, wealth, and combat power is relatively ineffective. Blaming the political leadership for the "nation building" mission is a convenient defense for inviting that obligation by assuming the "counter-insurgency" mantle in the first place.

True to some extent, but is it the most cost-effective way to accomplish these goals?

Cost-effectiveness is not the only measurement of success, nor the most desirable one. I certainly think a national service program should not be limited to military service. All departments can benefit from such a program.

The poor outcomes and high costs in the "War on Terrorism" are to me indicators of bad policy decisions, rather than of declining military capabilities. Start with the whole ridiculous idea of a "War on Terrorism"...

There is no defending military ignorance on how to define the GWOT. It's fairly well understood that the intent is/was to prevent or deter another catastrophic terrorist attack on American soil and more specifically, to defeat Al-Qaeda and its allies. The military is not the sole responsible party in the GWOT, but it is the responsible party for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither of which have produced desirable political outcomes despite high costs in treasure and lives. The military's sole purpose is to use violence to achieve national political objectives by producing victory (i.e. defeating the adversary). This has not been accomplished. In comparison, the intelligence community, and departments of Justice and Homeland Security are doing fairly well in their mandates.

Is counterinsurgency necessarily a pressing national security requirement? I see no reason why it must or should be.

It is when the military is/was actively engaged in two simultaneous "small" wars that have profound political, economic, and security consequences.

[Dayuhan]

The GWOT has brought into sharp focus the inadequacies of the military establishment. Trillions of dollars have been spent but there are zero favorable political outcomes from the conflict. That's the bottom-line.

To me that just highlights the inadequacies of the foreign policy establishment. We've repeatedly committed forces and resources to tasks we have no appropriate tools to accomplish, with wildly contradictory goals (such as wanting to install independent democratic governments that support US objectives). Favorable political outcomes in these conditions are so improbable that they approach impossibility. I don't blame the military for this. If the task at hand is to ride a unicycle up Mt Everest, you don't need a better unicycle, you need a more sensible task.

It's been the military that has been the largest proponent of "counter-insurgency" and targeting the population instead of the enemy. The political leadership empowered the military to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has not occurred. And so it has been the military wrestling internally about what to do next since our doctrines, technologies, wealth, and combat power is relatively ineffective. Blaming the political leadership for the "nation building" mission is a convenient defense for inviting that obligation by assuming the "counter-insurgency" mantle in the first place.

We are ineffective because the task is absurd. It was recognized from the start that full defeat of the Taliban required the development of a fully functioning Afghan government, broadly recognized as legitimate and capable of governing. The military task was to suppress the Taliban long enough for this to occur. The problem is that we can't make it occur, so we're stuck with eternal suppression. This is a fool's errand, and a mission that should never have been assigned. The political leadership is absolutely responsible for the "nation building" mission. That mission is implicit in the entire concept of "installing democracy", and that was the centerpiece of the goal the political establishment adopted.

Certainly the military side of the picture has been flawed, and there were many things that could have been done differently or better. At root, though, the critical flaw in the entire effort is on the policy side: the lack of goals that are practical, realistic, and achievable with the time and resources we are willing to commit.

Cost-effectiveness is not the only measurement of success, nor the most desirable one. I certainly think a national service program should not be limited to military service. All departments can benefit from such a program.

Disagree for many reasons, but a national service program is probably a subject for another thread.

There is no defending military ignorance on how to define the GWOT.

The responsibility to "define GWOT" lies with those who declared it. Of course they can't define it, because nobody can; it's an absurd concept to begin with. Terrorism may be called a tactic or a strategy, but it isn't an actor, and you can't declare war on a strategy or a tactic.

The military is not the sole responsible party in the GWOT, but it is the responsible party for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither of which have produced desirable political outcomes despite high costs in treasure and lives.

Since when has the military been responsible for the decision to go to war? The first step in achieving desirable outcomes is the selection of reasonable and achievable goals and the application of suitable tools. This is not the job of the military. If the military is assigned to pursue an unachievable goal that is totally inappropriate to pursuit by military means, is it their fault if the effort is unsuccessful.

For example: the defeat of Saddam's armed forces was a task suited to accomplishment by the military. It was efficiently and expeditiously achieved. Asking a military force to stabilize Iraq and install a functioning government was like asking an engineer to perform neurosurgery. Of course the outcome wasn't good. Why would anyone expect otherwise?

The military's sole purpose is to use violence to achieve national political objectives by producing victory (i.e. defeating the adversary). This has not been accomplished.

It hasn't been achieved because the objectives in question require a great deal more than simply defeating an adversary. Much of what those objectives require could not be achieved through military force, and a lot of it probably can't be achieved at all. If you bite off more than you can chew, you're likely to choke on it. That's not the fault of your teeth.

It is when the military is/was actively engaged in two simultaneous "small" wars that have profound political, economic, and security consequences.

I don't see how either of those wars is a "pressing national security requirement".

[AmericanPride]

To me that just highlights the inadequacies of the foreign policy establishment. We've repeatedly committed forces and resources to tasks we have no appropriate tools to accomplish, with wildly contradictory goals (such as wanting to install independent democratic governments that support US objectives). Favorable political outcomes in these conditions are so improbable that they approach impossibility.

We are ineffective because the task is absurd. It was recognized from the start that full defeat of the Taliban required the development of a fully functioning Afghan government, broadly recognized as legitimate and capable of governing. The military task was to suppress the Taliban long enough for this to occur. The problem is that we can't make it occur, so we're stuck with eternal suppression. This is a fool's errand, and a mission that should never have been assigned. The political leadership is absolutely responsible for the "nation building" mission. That mission is implicit in the entire concept of "installing democracy", and that was the centerpiece of the goal the political establishment adopted.

Certainly the military side of the picture has been flawed, and there were many things that could have been done differently or better. At root, though, the critical flaw in the entire effort is on the policy side: the lack of goals that are practical, realistic, and achievable with the time and resources we are willing to commit.

Once committed to conflict, the role of the "foreign policy establishment" is very minimal, and reduced mostly to capitalizing on the gains of the military effort. But this effort has not produced any measurable or suitable gains to be used to forward America's political interests abroad. Occupation is a military function in the absence of a capable political authority in the defeated country. By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.

When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.

The responsibility to "define GWOT" lies with those who declared it. Of course they can't define it, because nobody can; it's an absurd concept to begin with. Terrorism may be called a tactic or a strategy, but it isn't an actor, and you can't declare war on a strategy or a tactic.

Senior military leadership has never requested for clarification on their role and mission. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have made public their intentions in the GWOT, and more specifically, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's a convenient lie to claim ignorance in defense of the military's failure to produce favorable conditions in either country. This is awfully similar to another country's "stab-in-the-back" theory and is just as laughable.

Since when has the military been responsible for the decision to go to war? The first step in achieving desirable outcomes is the selection of reasonable and achievable goals and the application of suitable tools. This is not the job of the military. If the military is assigned to pursue an unachievable goal that is totally inappropriate to pursuit by military means, is it their fault if the effort is unsuccessful.

I never claimed the military was "responsible for the decision to go to war". Labeling the task as "unachievable" is another convenient ruse to excuse the failure of the military to accomplish its mission. I frequently hear how the US military is the best in the world. It is certainly the best equipped, best funded, and best trained; so how exactly are the objectives stated by Bush, Rumsfeld, and CENTCOM, "unachievable"? The military was admittedly unprepared for the initial requirements in Afghanistan, and to some extent Iraq, but that was ten years ago. Ignorance of the goals and an inability to meet them are not excuses that last ten years.

I don't see how either of those wars is a "pressing national security requirement".

President Bush saw differently, as did the entirety of the national security establishment through numerous public statements, publications, and actions. Only in 2008 with the change in administration and the virtual collapse of the economy did priorities shift. The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?

[Ken White]

... By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.

That's true

If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.

That is not true.

The political mandate was and is unachievable, the military responded as they always do with 'Yes, Sir' and moved out; the American tradition of trying to make it work took over and the services merely did what they could given state of training and overall capabilities provided -- and directed -- by the political establishment. There's plenty of egg for everyone's face in these debacles. The Armed Forces are not blame or error free admittedly but neither is the political establishment -- and they are the ones who committed to those very specious 'missions.''

I frequently hear how the US military is the best in the world...

It isn't, it's just big, not totally incompetent, is good at some things and has a bunch of stuff and, fortunately, a few really good people.

It is certainly the best equipped, best funded, and best trained...

None of that is totally true. We have a lot of stuff but it isn't always the best of class; even the "best funded" is a trifle suspect given the tremendous waste and terrible inefficiencies in allocation by DoD and an overly prescriptive Congress; We have aspects of training that are quite good and aspects that are marginal to poor. Our initial entry training in the basics of the trade (it's a trade, not a profession) for Officers and Enlisted persons is quite poor in comparison to almost all the Commonwealth nations and to others.

so how exactly are the objectives stated by Bush, Rumsfeld, and CENTCOM, "unachievable"? The military was admittedly unprepared for the initial requirements in Afghanistan, and to some extent Iraq, but that was ten years ago. Ignorance of the goals and an inability to meet them are not excuses that last ten years.

Sclerosis in the training bureaucracy; A flawed personnel system design that is not able to cope with long duration operations due to politically dictated rotation polices; total authorized end strength was and is inadequate to missions assigned; political determination to enter a second 'war' over the objections of the forces before finishing the first. All those are only slightly the fault of the services who would change many things if they could but all are absolutely politically directed by the Congress -- even DoD and the various SecDefs have had little effect on those issues. Congress ignores the Constitution unless it suits them, it suits them to cite the fact that they and they alone 'raise Armies...'

Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?

Dayuhan can answer that but I'll say it is not. Much of that spending is due to a profligate Congress forcing money on certain expenditures that generally benefit the Congroids more than they benefit the nation. The Defense budget is an overflowing trough for them (as is DHS...), both parties. We have developed a 'system' that requires military effort and adventurism or a 'threat' of some sort in order for the economy to not sputter too badly. That is totally, absolutely, blatantly political -- and wrong.

You're correct that the Armed Forces aren't as competent as they could or should be -- but they are not solely to blame. Not by a long shot, far from it, in fact...

[wm]

When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.

It seems to me that the first set of Presidential goals you list above have been pretty much achieved in some form or other. I will note that the first goal is rather amorphous--no specific amount of disruption nor any timeframe or duration of disruption was designated. The second, more specific goals, are a different matter. However, I suspect that the Taliban (or any other organization fo that matter) would find it hard to "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals" since they had lost their authority as a governing force in Afghanistan." The point here, is that, as both Ken White and Dayuhan note, the missions/goals set by the executive were unattainable. They were and are unattainable in part because they are contradictory. How can one exercise the effective control need to close training camps when those same camps are being actively disrupted? It is like you telling me to put out the fire inside my house as you keep throwing incendiaries into the building, turn off the water, and break all my fire extinguishers.

The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?

I think that this is a false measure. Compared to today, the US had much less "national treasure" to spend in the 1940s, I believe. What percentage of the nation's total economic output was used to prosecute WWII? Comparing that percentage to the percentage of GNP/GDP used for GWOT activities is a more appropriate measure IMHO.

[Dayuhan]

Once committed to conflict, the role of the "foreign policy establishment" is very minimal, and reduced mostly to capitalizing on the gains of the military effort.

Sometimes the role of the foreign policy establishment once committed to conflict is to shift the goalposts and creep the mission. Thus it was in this case, much to our detriment. Once the goal of installing stable democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan was adopted - and I don't think that goal was selected by the military - we were in unachievable territory.

But this effort has not produced any measurable or suitable gains to be used to forward America's political interests abroad.

I don't think there was ever much clarity on what interests were meant to be advanced, and how.

Occupation is a military function in the absence of a capable political authority in the defeated country. By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.

Occupation is a military function. The creation of a "capable political authority" is not a military function, and that's where we've failed. That means occupation has to be more or less eternal, which of course will produce durable resistance. The initial error was the assumption that we could install a capable political authority when in fact we could not. That was an error on the civilian leadership side.

When Bush addressed the country on 07 October 2001, he stated the goals of military operations in Afghanistan were to: "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime." He made no mention of nation-building. The ultimatum to the Taliban government prior to the invasion made no demand of conversion to democracy, but insisted that the Taliban "close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals." On the same day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the aim in Afghanistan "is to create conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan..." to "make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations." CENTCOM's website lists the goals in Afghanistan as "clear", to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries like the ones al-Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11." If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.

If those were the goals, how did we end up trying to install governments and build nations? I don't blame the military for being confused over that question. Mission creep is a bitch. It's easy to say words like "set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries", but somebody has to define what those conditions are to be. That definition comes from civilian leadership, and in this case it was set at an unreasonable level that could not be achieved by military force or by any other means at our disposal.

It's a convenient lie to claim ignorance in defense of the military's failure to produce favorable conditions in either country. This is awfully similar to another country's "stab-in-the-back" theory and is just as laughable.

Whether that mission as practical and achievable or not depends on what "favorable conditions" the military was expected to produce. Armies don't install stable governments. They break things. That's what they're trained and equipped to do.

President Bush saw differently, as did the entirety of the national security establishment through numerous public statements, publications, and actions. Only in 2008 with the change in administration and the virtual collapse of the economy did priorities shift. The GWOT consumed twice as much treasure as WW2 when adjusted for inflation. Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?

Whoa, the goalposts just shifted. Earlier you were talking about "pressing national security requirements" Now you speak of priorities. Requirements and priorities are very different things. Removal of the government of Iraq may have been a priority, but I can't see how it was ever a requirement. I don't see that installing new governments in Iraq or Afghanistan was ever a requirement. If priorities don't match requirements, questions need to be asked about the setting of priorities.

[AmericanPride]

Sometimes the role of the foreign policy establishment once committed to conflict is to shift the goalposts and creep the mission. Thus it was in this case, much to our detriment. Once the goal of installing stable democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan was adopted - and I don't think that goal was selected by the military - we were in unachievable territory.

Occupation is a military and political function, where the armed forces of the occupying country assume control and authority of the governance of the occupied territory. Once the former governments were removed, the default goal became to install new governments. International law establishes the legal conditions for the occurrence of military occupation. This is not "mission-creep" but the logical progression of the original objective of removing the government of Iraq from power. The military did not anticipate the requirements for this objective, and failed to prevent the resurgence of armed resistance that deterred the formation of stable government. The military leadership failed to do the appropriate analysis and planning that would have determined actions with the onset of military occupation and anticipate the consequences of removing a government from power. That is the role of the senior leadership.

It's easy to say words like "set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries", but somebody has to define what those conditions are to be.

That's the role of the senior military leadership, which should either detail its intent (since they understand the political mandate as "clear"), or in the event of confusion, request clarification. The fact that CENTCOM lists the military objectives underscores that the senior military leadership understands what their objectives to be. If they do not, then they failed as leaders by not requesting guidance.

Armies don't install stable governments. They break things. That's what they're trained and equipped to do.

Then it's the fault of the senior military leadership for not properly training the force and providing the strategy to conduct military occupation with the intent of facilitating stable governments. The military assumes de facto and legal responsibility for an occupied territory when the territory passes into the military's control. Stable government cannot be established with the presence of a powerful, popular resistance. The military has not successfully defeated armed resistance. That is not the fault of the political leadership but the failure of military strategy. The goals given by the political leadership were not unattainable. The military strategy was inadequate for the desired end-state.

I think that this is a false measure. Compared to today, the US had much less "national treasure" to spend in the 1940s, I believe. What percentage of the nation's total economic output was used to prosecute WWII? Comparing that percentage to the percentage of GNP/GDP used for GWOT activities is a more appropriate measure IMHO.

That reveals a large part of the problem. WWII engaged the better part of America's manpower and industrial output but still only was about half the cost of the GWOT. WWII was fought against two major industrial powers whereas Iraq and Afghanistan are considered "small" wars. WWII set the foundations for a post-war economic boom. Yet the GWOT has significantly contributed to the financial emergency facing this country. This is because of the gross inefficiencies of the defense economy; particularly the high financial inputs and the low acquisition and mission outputs. This trend is not sustainable, which is why the SECDEF has already acknowledged the downgrade of America's military capabilities to now be only able to fight one major theater war at a time. We could barely sustain two "small" wars. The continued reduction in military capabilities is a direct result of poor financial management.

Ken,

I agree with you that the military is not solely to blame. I should clarify that I mean senior military leadership since they have a foot in both the political and military worlds and are ultimately responsible for the maintenance of military capabilities and the development and execution of strategy.

[Ken White]

I agree with you that the military is not solely to blame. I should clarify that I mean senior military leadership since they have a foot in both the political and military worlds and are ultimately responsible for the maintenance of military capabilities and the development and execution of strategy.

Yes, the senior military leadership has been and is remiss, no question. The important thing is that everyone realize that while they have not done some things at all well, they are captives of a system that is both civilian politically and societally induced. They have significant impediments to better performance only some of which they perpetuate themselves...

Society will effectively fix itself or not, not too much one can do about that. The civilian political problem will not fix itself unless it is forced to do so -- that can be achieved by continually voting out incumbents until it penetrates that things need changing. The senior leadership will not change their ways, they're on short final; the only hope is that new leaders rise and find ways to circumvent the systemic problems.

Key to that is a radical revamp of the archaic Personnel System and disestablishment of HRC -- it is a major contributor to the systemic problems and it takes its cues almost equally from the senior leadership and the Congress (much by Statutory requirement, much by barely concealed and not too subtle fund sequestration and blackmail). Second most important is replacement of the terribly flawed BTMS Task, Condition and Standard foolishness with outcome based training and evaluation. We must improve initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted and that will be difficult as both the system and Congress are ill disposed toward more competent Soldiery and Junior Officers, they tend to be too much trouble,

A better and more practically educated public could and would fix all of that but we are not likely to see that in my lifetime. With a little luck, perhaps in yours that can be realized. Basically, I'm not optimistic barring a major existential problem...

[Steve Blair]

And our system has never been especially good at basic military training (which wasn't even really formalized until the mid-1880s). It was somewhat possible to work around this when personnel rotation was minimal (read unit-based training at the company or regimental level), but once that stability was removed it brought the initial training flaws to the fore (where it was promptly ignored). We have from time to time tried to improve the system, with varying degrees of success or failure. I'd contend that the personnel system tends to act against the development of a good training system, simply because no one is in place long enough to really put weight behind the need.

[Dayuhan]

Occupation is a military and political function, where the armed forces of the occupying country assume control and authority of the governance of the occupied territory. Once the former governments were removed, the default goal became to install new governments. International law establishes the legal conditions for the occurrence of military occupation. This is not "mission-creep" but the logical progression of the original objective of removing the government of Iraq from power.

Just because the rules say you have to do it doesn't mean that you can do it.

The rules say you have to provide a new government. American politics require that the new government be recognizable to Americans as democratic. Nothing short of divine intervention could produce a government in Iraq or Afghanistan that would meet those criteria with anything approaching stability. These are inherently unstable societies not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force, and fledgling democracy is an unstable system even under ideal conditions.

This contradiction was implicit from the moment the goal of removing and replacing the governments in question was set. Trying to perform the same task in two places at once was just the icing on a thoroughly inedible cake. I agree with the points made by Ken and Steve, but I also don't think any level of training or quality of leadership would have made that set of goals achievable. They were just stupid goals, especially since they were thoroughly unnecessary: the US had no pressing need to remake Iraqi governance or to transform Afghanistan into a democracy.

That's the role of the senior military leadership, which should either detail its intent (since they understand the political mandate as "clear"), or in the event of confusion, request clarification. The fact that CENTCOM lists the military objectives underscores that the senior military leadership understands what their objectives to be. If they do not, then they failed as leaders by not requesting guidance.

Understanding a goal doesn't make it achievable. There's a certain institutional resistance to saying "that can't be done"... and didn't the military request more troops for Iraq, pointing out that while the force allotted was sufficient to defeat the Iraqi military, it was not sufficient to secure a post-invasion Iraq? That request was turned down, IIRC.

Then it's the fault of the senior military leadership for not properly training the force and providing the strategy to conduct military occupation with the intent of facilitating stable governments.

Facilitating stable governments?? Are you serious?? Are stable governments simply going to appear from thin air with a bit of facilitation? That's a completely unrealistic expectation that was never going to be met.

Civil war was a likely feature in any post-Saddam scenario that didn't involve an equally ruthless dictator. Afghans were going to fight for the spoils in any post-Taliban environment These were givens from the start, and our error was in the absurd hubris of believing that these conditions could be conjured away or suppressed. The goals were poorly selected and the challenges grotesquely underestimated at the time the mission was set. Certainly there were errors in execution, but the fundamental error lay in the selection of missions that were inconsistent with our capacities and interests.

[wm]

That reveals a large part of the problem. WWII engaged the better part of America's manpower and industrial output but still only was about half the cost of the GWOT. WWII was fought against two major industrial powers whereas Iraq and Afghanistan are considered "small" wars. WWII set the foundations for a post-war economic boom. Yet the GWOT has significantly contributed to the financial emergency facing this country. This is because of the gross inefficiencies of the defense economy; particularly the high financial inputs and the low acquisition and mission outputs. This trend is not sustainable, which is why the SECDEF has already acknowledged the downgrade of America's military capabilities to now be only able to fight one major theater war at a time. We could barely sustain two "small" wars. The continued reduction in military capabilities is a direct result of poor financial management.

I think you are still missing my point. Your numbers are absolute rather than comparative. GWOT may have cost more than WWII in terms of total dollars spent, but I doubt the the same can be said in terms of percentage of dollars available to be spent.

BTW, both GWOT campaigns were/are fought in a theater farther from the US than either of the two major WWII theaters. Thus, cost to get stuff to the fight is higher due to the distances involved. I submit that the maintenance support needs of the GWOT forces are significantly greater due to the more advanced sophistication of the weapons systems currently in use compared to those in use during WWII--chewing gum and a piece of aluminum foil might be able to patch the bullet holes in a P51 that had rolled off the assembly line 6 months prior--not so easy to maintain an F16 that has been flying for 10 years or more already. I don't know how much of the GWOT costs are due to little more than fair wear and tear on an aging fleet of equipment, but I bet it is rather significant.

High OPTEMPO also has a big impact on the stuff one uses. I doubt the WWII OPTEMPO was ever anything close to that of our GWOT forces (with the possible exception of transportation used to move supplies forward across Western Europe from July 44-Dec 44, at which point the advanced slowed again, allowing time for rest and refit of much of the support infrastructure while the Bulge was reduced and Allied forces figured out how to slug through the West Wall and get across the Rhine).

America today could sustain a much larger war effort, given the political will to do so. WWII saw that will manifested. GWOT, not so much--letting troops in uniform board planes ahead ogf the everyday vaction traveler doesn't come close to accepting rationing of sugar and gasoline by the folks at home. Cutting payroll taxes while increasing the amount of time one can draw unemployment compensation is rather at odds with sustaining any kind of increase in spending by the federal government on other than entitlement-like programs.

[AmericanPride]

The rules say you have to provide a new government. American politics require that the new government be recognizable to Americans as democratic.

Americans were quite content with friendly relationships with illiberal and non-democratic regimes for the sixty years prior and to this day. So I very much doubt the assertion that "American politics" somehow requires any new government to be "recognizable" as democratic.

These are inherently unstable societies not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force, and fledgling democracy is an unstable system even under ideal conditions.

Civil war was a likely feature in any post-Saddam scenario that didn't involve an equally ruthless dictator. Afghans were going to fight for the spoils in any post-Taliban environment These were givens from the start, and our error was in the absurd hubris of believing that these conditions could be conjured away or suppressed.

That certainly smacks of Orientalism. What features of North African, Arab, and Central Asian societies make them "not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force"?

the US had no pressing need to remake Iraqi governance or to transform Afghanistan into a democracy.

I never made any assertion to the contrary. My argument has consistently been that the US military has failed accomplish the mission given to it. I'm not concerned with their necessity; though once committed to action, achieving a favorable outcome regardless of the original cause(s) becomes a necessity.

Understanding a goal doesn't make it achievable. There's a certain institutional resistance to saying "that can't be done"... and didn't the military request more troops for Iraq, pointing out that while the force allotted was sufficient to defeat the Iraqi military, it was not sufficient to secure a post-invasion Iraq? That request was turned down, IIRC.

Then that's a problem of military culture, which is influenced by the senior military leadership. General Shinseki testified to Congress that "hundreds of thousands" of troops would be needed for Iraq. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz disagreed. It can't be determined who was right because the military plan that was executed was itself painfully inadequate, wasting precious time between the collapse of the Hussein regime and the re-establishment of order.

Facilitating stable governments?? Are you serious?? Are stable governments simply going to appear from thin air with a bit of facilitation? That's a completely unrealistic expectation that was never going to be met.

I suppose it is when you assume that these countries "are inherently unstable societies not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force." Transfers of power occur frequently. Machiavelli discussed it in some detail hundreds of years ago. There was some serious error in planning for not anticipating that a new government will need to be established after demolishing the old one. Since you agree that stable governments do not "appear from thin air", why didn't the military anticipate and plan for a transfer of power? The political leadership made such preparations, including the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the facilitation of Iraqi government working groups. But the military did not provide the necessary security measures to assist the political process. Why?

wm,

The absolute comparison is more relevant because we are more likely to see limited and "small" wars in a globalizing international environment dominated 24-hour real time media, all-volunteer armies, and the growing "distance" between the civilian population and the country's wars. The distinct advantages of an all-volunteer force is that it requires less political support to deploy and obeys orders even in the absence of popular support. But what has happened in the United States is that the defense economy is now wildly inefficient, with significantly higher costs for substantially less output. "Small" wars now cost more than "big" wars. How much are "big" wars going to cost and can we afford them if we're already bankrupted by "small" wars? This has been labelled the "defense death spiral" where the procurement and replacement cycle continues to require more investments but fields less equipment per generation. This is particularly true for aircraft and warships. And this in turn pressures cuts in personnel and training, reducing combat power all around. Not to mention competition with other domestic agendas and social programs.