Philippines (2012 onwards, inc OEF)

[Bob's World]

What President Aquino is attempting is the most strategic bit of COIN I have seen by any government in the past 12 years. Will it work? Well, there are a 1000 ways it could go bad, but it starts with a strategic level of understanding of the nature of insurgency in general and the nature of this particular problem they are attempting to address. It takes ownership on the part of government to evolve to better address the reasonable concerns of a segment of the populace that has always been treated separately, but not equally.

This is a model we should adopt for Afghanistan. It is the model that the government of Yemen should adopt. It is the model that makes the most sense for the growing challenges Egypt has in the Sinai. Obviously each would need to be tailored to the realities of their specific situation.

As to the author of the article that Dayuhan shared the link on: While that piece surely recommends the majority position on these types of conflicts, I would only offer that the record of the majority is hardly one to brag about...

Thinking about revolutionary insurgency as war is perhaps the least appropriate and least effective way to solve these types of problems that lead to revolution. Yes one can suppress or defeat the insurgent, but invariably the insurgency grows from the process, coming back again and again until something changes in governance or the people prevail.

This is not resistance, this is revolution, and that is a very different type of conflict. The relationship between the parties and the primary purposes for action are the key criteria for framing these types of problems. Ideology applied or tactics employed are interesting at the tactical level, but have little place in a strategic discussion geared to understanding and framing the problem. We in the West are trapped in a world of tactics and one that sees governments as victims in such conflicts. We need to evolve, and this is a great guide for that evolution.

[jmm99]

but, it sure as hell isn't the model that:

from BW
"... we should adopt for Afghanistan.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

but, it sure as hell isn't the model that:



Regards

Mike

Mike,

No arguments. After 12 years ISAF / US is only just now starting to truly get serious about recognizing Afghan sovereignty. And we wonder why we can't seem to get in front of that problem. We are also just starting to realize that what we have thought was important is not at all what the current government of Afghanistan thinks is important.

So, yes, this is a model the government of Afghanistan should adopt. I actually think it is much more likely that they will do something along these lines as we begin to pull out than it is for ISAF switching to such an approach.

cheers,

Bob

[Dayuhan]

What President Aquino is attempting is the most strategic bit of COIN I have seen by any government in the past 12 years. Will it work? Well, there are a 1000 ways it could go bad, but it starts with a strategic level of understanding of the nature of insurgency in general and the nature of this particular problem they are attempting to address. It takes ownership on the part of government to evolve to better address the reasonable concerns of a segment of the populace that has always been treated separately, but not equally.

Possibly a bit overrated. In substance this isn't all that different from the model Marcos used to disable the MNLF: offer a nominal autonomy, get senior rebel leaders into lucrative positions in the new autonomous government, and get them inside the tent pissing out instead of outside the tent pissing in. The people, of course, still get pissed on, and those left out in the cold become prime bait for recruitment by more radical or violent groups, just as those left out in the cold in the MNLF settlement were ripe for recruitment by the Abu Sayyaf.

This kind of settlement is not a solution. It can provide a window of opportunity within which a solution to the real problems can be pursued, but unless those problems are recognized and confronted, that isn't likely to happen. There's little evidence that this is happening.

This is not resistance, this is revolution, and that is a very different type of conflict.

That would depend on perspective. Many Muslims in the souith (and many of the indigenous groups in the north) do see Manila's military and the settlers as an occupying force, and might consider themselves to be a resistance.

I don't know if it is as bad as the author makes out, but I do agree if the peace deal goes bad it will likely lead to another surge in fighting/killing. The younger members of the MILF are not as interested in peace as the senior leaders of MILF whose time is probably short. A lot of potential spoilers on both sides of the fence.

The author of the article is in the camp of the previous administration, and has a vested interest in opposing the agreement, but the points he raises are repeated by many who don't like the idea. In many cases the reflexive reaction is that the agreement is an act of appeasement toward terrorists. How the deal will fare in the legislative brance or the courts is difficult to predict, but the administration does have a fair degree of influence in both.

For me the biggest problem with the agreement is that it treats the problem purely in terms of political structure, with no acknowledgement of the degree to which political culture has obstructed all efforts at development and peacemaking. As long as the culture of corruption, abuse, and elite impunity continues, structural approaches will have limited impact. Manila's problem, as ever, is less how to bring the rebels within the rule of law than how to bring its own agents within the rule of law.

[Dayuhan]

The relationship between the parties and the primary purposes for action are the key criteria for framing these types of problems.

Talking about "the relationship between the parties" oversimplifies and misrepresents the situation, because in fact there are multiple parties involved, often with widely divergent interests. It's not just the MILF and the Government. The Christian settler bloc and the Muslim traditional politicians that have been allied with Government haven't openly opposed the agreement, but will be trying to manipulate it to serve their interests. MNLF factions have expressed displeasure, less with the agreement than with their exclusion from the negotiating process. The ASG has little political influence but will do what it can to disrupt. There are sub-factions within each of these groups, and within the MILF and the Government. It's messy.

[Dayuhan]

Brief description of ongoing incident:

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/5...sabah-standoff

The Philippines on Saturday called for a peaceful resolution to a tense stand-off between Malaysian forces and a group of gunmen claiming to be followers of the heir of a former Borneo sultan.

The group, estimated at 200 with dozens believed to be armed, landed by boat near the Borneo town of Lahad Datu in Malaysia's Sabah state from the neighboring Philippines on Tuesday.

Police say the group has declared itself followers of a former Philippine-based Islamic sultanate that once controlled parts of Borneo, including the standoff site, and is refusing to leave Malaysian territory.

Further coverage:

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/5...t-leave-borneo

Followers of a Philippine sultan who crossed to the Malaysian state of Sabah this month will not leave and are reclaiming the area as their ancestral territory, the sultan said Sunday amid a tense standoff.

Sultan Jamalul Kiram said his followers -- some 400 people including 20 gunmen -- were resolute in staying despite being cornered by security forces, with the Kuala Lumpur government insisting the group return to the Philippines.

"Why should we leave our own home? In fact they (the Malaysians) are paying rent (to us)," he told reporters in Manila.

"Our followers will stay in (the Sabah town of) Lahad Datu. Nobody will be sent to the Philippines. Sabah is our home," he said....

Little background:

The southern Philippine-based Islamic sultanate once controlled parts of Borneo, including the site of the stand-off, and its heirs have been receiving a nominal yearly compensation package from Malaysia under a long-standing agreement for possession of Sabah.

The Sultan leased the area to the British in perpetuity for a nominal annual payment, which independent Malaysia has continued to pay. There's been occasional agitation for a Philippine claim to Sabah based on the assumption that when the Sultanate ceased to exist as a sovereign entity the claim was absorbed by the Philippine Government, but this incursion does not appear to be sanctioned by Manila.

The connection to the recent peace agreement:

Kiram said he was prompted to send the group to Sabah after the sultanate was left out of a framework agreement sealed in October between Manila and Filipino Muslim rebels, which paves the way for an autonomous area in the southern Philippines that is home to the Muslim minority of the largely-Christian nation.

There's some talk that other groups intend to follow, but the Malaysian Navy says they won't let them approach the shore. Malaysia says the group will be deported, the group says they won't go. Unclear how it will all work out. Also unclear whether the Sultan's family seriously thinks they can settle people in Sabah or whether they're looking for some money to get them to stop making trouble. An increase in the nominal rent has been occasionally mentioned by the Sultan's family, and ignored by the Malaysians.

Another recent development that may be an unexpected consequence of the peace agreement is that the MNLF has recently gone after some ASG units, quite aggressively:

http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/...-sayyaf-267276

The attacks were not sanctioned or expected by the Government and the reasoning behind them is not entirely clear. Part of the reason may be an MNLF effort to push their way back into a place at the negotiating table.

New news, the group in Sabah wants to leave, but first wants to meet with "certain personalities", whcih the Malaysians refuse:

http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%...18-402657.html

And a bit more, bit of a hint of how Malaysians see the whole idea:

http://thestar.com.my/columnists/sto...Man%27s%20Meat

We shall see...

[Dayuhan]

http://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/18/wo...ines-standoff/

Filipinos' standoff in Borneo linked to peace deal with Muslim rebels

...The members of the sultanate's royal family, although riven by internal disputes over who the rightful sultan is today, appear to have felt isolated by the provisional accord signed in October by the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which has fought for decades to establish an independent Islamic state in southern Philippines.

Malaysia, a mainly Muslim country, helped facilitate the agreement.

Kiram was cited by AFP as saying that the sultanate's exclusion from the deal, which aims to set up a new autonomous region to be administered by Muslims, prompted the decision to send the men to Sabah this month.

Dispatching the boat loads of followers to Lahad Datu served to make the sultanate's presence felt, according to Wadi.

"The whole aim is not to create conflict or initiate war, it is just to position themselves and make governments like Malaysia and the Philippines recognize them," he said....

[Dayuhan]

This:

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/20...ge-peace-talks

Raises an interesting question... who's paying for the so-called "sultan's army".

[Dayuhan]

Almost a year back I wrote this...

MNLF factions have expressed displeasure, less with the agreement than with their exclusion from the negotiating process.

Last month Nur Misuari, the leader of one such faction "declared independence", and claimed a new republic consisting of Mindanao, Palawan, the Sulu archipelago, and Sabah and Sarawak.

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/re...s-independence

Misuari doesn't have the influence he had back in the 90s, and has been one of those most notably peeved at being left out of the peace agreement with the MILF. The declaration was not taken terrible seriously.

This week, an MNLF force believed to be loyal to Misuari attacked Zamboanga. The situation remains ongoing, several districts of the city are effectively occupied, hostages have been taken. Today there were reports of fighting very close to City Hall. The initial goal was allegedlyu to hoist the MNLF flag at City Hall.

It's a considerable escalation, as Zamboanga has long been fairly peaceful. Hard to know where it will go. The number of sub-leaders loyal to Misuari and the number of troops they control is not accurately known; estimates vary widely. I've read figures from under 1000 to 4000, don't think anyone really knows. These figure can change rapidly as local leader shift alliances.

It's widely suspected in Manila that the whole thing is an effort to distract from a huge ongoing corruption scandal involving major political figures; there may or may not be something to that. It does illustrate the difficulty of negotiating peace, and the number of potential spoiler groups involved.

Reportage on the Zamboanga situation:

http://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/...k-its-villages

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/484401/...-leaves-6-dead

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/re...anga-city-hall

[Dayuhan]

Fighting still ongoing in Zamboanga...

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...98D02V20130914

Fighting intensified on Saturday in the southern Philippines between government troops and rogue Muslim separatists, shattering a ceasefire almost immediately as it was to go into effect and leaving many residents running low on supplies.

The army said 53 people had been killed in the fighting, now in its sixth day in the port city of Zamboanga, known as the city of flowers.

Dozens have been wounded and more than 60,000 people displaced, with hundreds of homes razed and a hospital still in flames. Rebels have fired on government positions and seized civilians to use as human shields.