I am less sanguine, as one might expect. If it was possible to pigeonhole the conflict as "oppressed Muslim populace vs centralized imperial government", then an autonomous government might help, but the conflict is a lot more complicated than that.
After reading it a few times, I will say this much: despite the lack of specifics, much of which will have to be resolved in the "basic law" for the region that is still to be formulated, this is probably about as much as the Philippine Government could have brought out of peace talks with the MILF. That said, it will not solve the problem. It may create a window of opportunity during which the real problems could be addressed, but whether or not that will happen remains to be seen. Precedents are not encouraging.
Effectively what the agreement does is carve out a largely (not entirely) Muslim-majority area and designate it "Bangsamoro", literally "Moro Nation" but applicable to either a territory or a populace. The territory is slightly larger than the old ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) and the degree of autonomy is somewhat greater. Both the territory and the degree of autonomy are substantially less than what would have been provided in the monumentally flawed MOA/AD (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain) that was shot down by the Supreme Court several years ago.
What the agreement does not address is the scourge of big man politics, the single greatest obstacle to peace and prosperity in Mindanao. In some ways the autonomous status of the region may even exacerbate that scourge, as any effort by central government to bring local big men within the rule of law will be presented by those threatened as constraints on local governance.
The immediate conflict set up by the agreement is between the former rebels who aspire to positions in the new autonomous government and the Muslim big men who have been cooperating with government and occupying political positions in the old ARMM and the other areas included in the autonomous region. The rebel leaders have some credibility for having fought and for having forced an agreement, but the existing political elite have a lot of money (gained through exorbitant corruption) and well established patronage networks. Even in their base areas in Central Mindanao it's not in any way clear that MILF leaders can displace the seasoned political operators of the dominant clans, even with the Ampatuans out of play to a large extent.
The most likely outcome, in my cynical view, is a mad scramble for advantageous places at the feeding trough offered by the new governmental entity. That will be accompanied by a decrease in organized "rebel vs government" violence, but an uptick in "candidate vs candidate" violence. Once the places are grabbed, those who get in will move to build patronage and cement their positions, those on the outside will accuse them of corruption and other assorted evils. The losers will end up on the periphery, disgruntled, angry, and prime candidates for recruitment by more radical groups.
Previous efforts at autonomy have foundered not because they were not autonomous enough, but because they were ruled through an antiquated and destructive "big man" system that effectively created feudal lords with absolute power in their turf. The central government typically cut deals with the feudal powers, effectively trading off immunity from law for guaranteed votes and assurances that the feudal lords would suppress rebellion in their territory (latter promise often not pursued with any great vigor). Those deals had a pretty pernicious effect and are not conducive to long term peace or development.
The problem is how to grant the politically necessary autonomy while still trying to control the rapacious and feudal local elites that are such a burden on the region. This agreement is not going to solve that problem, but it's not certain that any agreement would. What could have a really positive impact would be a decisive effort by central government to arrest and prosecute some of the worst offenders in the fields of corruption, collusion with criminal elements, human rights violations, etc, and deliver the message that it's serious about bringing its own people within the rule of law... but that is not going to happen.
This agreement will probably have little impact in the OEF/P area of operations, for the most part outside core MILF territory. It would IMO be a good excuse for the US to reduce the commitment and announce a plan for eventually phasing it out. There needs to be an end to every operation and I think this one is past the point of diminishing marginal returns... not that cooperation shouldn't continue, but I think scaling down the deployment in the conflict area in the south makes good sense at this time.
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