In Afghan War, Officer Becomes a Whistle-Blower

[Polarbear1605]

http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2...69/#more-35169
isn't there something I usually say about new ideas and old books???

[Entropy]

http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2...69/#more-35169
isn't there something I usually say about new ideas and old books???

Interesting. The same site also has a letter from LTC Davis with additional information:

Scott Shane from the New York Times will publish a story on the actions I’ve taken, and the Armed Forces Journal will simultaneously publish an article i’ve written explaining why I submitted a Department of Defense Inspector General complaint against select senior leaders of the Armed Forces for so being so deceptive to the US Congress and American people that the truth is no longer recognizable — and the biggest bill-payer for this deception has been the lives and bodies of America’s service men and women.

and

Part of my AFJ article includes a link to a web site I set up for the purpose of hanging the unclassified report for everyone to see (the AFJ article is only 2,400 words, while the unclassified report is 86 pages; the classified report is 58 pages). However, there is a battle within the Army Public Affairs on releasing the document, which I submitted for review on 20 January – the same day I disclosed to the Army’s senior leaders and my chain of command what was coming. Officers from the Army Media Relations department tried to pry it loose on Friday because they believe it is the right thing to do, but someone – they didn’t tell me who – overruled them and said it would take longer still…

more at the link.

[Ken White]

Do you think some of the principles of cockpit resource management might be persuasive on that point? Air safety has improved immensely because of the that, the prime idea being that the captain is not an infallible god, just the man in charge of making sure that the capabilities of all the crew members are used to their fullest extent in order to insure the safe completion of the flight.

Given the issue: "The need for immediate, unthinking obedience served a valid military purpose for many centuries but it has become a harmful anachronism in the last 100 or so years" and a need to adjust to more thoughtful methodologies, cockpit management techniques can be helpful but it is a really knotty problem -- if it weren't, it would not still be a problem 100 years later...

In armed combat, there are always multiple opposing factors at play:

- A need for instant response versus a need to assess and respond thoughtfully.

- A need for tasks to be completed versus a desire to live through the effort.

- A need for obedience to orders versus a requirement for sensible demurral.

- A need for subordination to team goals versus the necessity of individual moral strength.

There are a few, anyone could name a dozen others. Those dichotomies led to the European (among others...) hearth style of 'unthinking' obedience to orders and total loyalty to the Crown, cause or force. Both those factors have merit and are sometimes -- even quite often -- militarily desirable -- however, thoughtful non compliance and deviation form a directed course are also frequently desirable and that loyalty has to be strong enough to speak truth to power. Good commanders instinctively know and cultivate these ideas and manage the conflicts to lead successful units. So it would seem the or certainly 'a' solution is to simply select 'good' commanders. That, however, is not possible for a variety of reasons.

One reason is the number required. There may not be an adequate pool of persons available so some less than stellar souls may have to command. Another is the variability of humans and circumstances; Good Company Commanders do not always do well at Battalion Command (Conversely a poor Battalion Commander may turn into an excellent Brigade or higher commander). Peace versus war bring out some interesting contrasts. Yet another are societal or statutory pressures or requirements (of which the US Army is prime example...). All sorts of things can impact the ability to select only the best as Commanders. So the 'system' has to be designed to cope with that shortfall. That pushes for extreme loyalty upward but not so much downward and for obedience.

In my view, combat requirements should dictate response in all things. I sadly discovered many senior people in the Armed Forces did not share that view -- then I even more sadly discovered that our elected leaders were even less supportive of that idea -- they wanted Armed Forces that were 'representative' of society and that operated with policies that were fair and criteria that were 'objective.' Who could argue with that? Many could, few did -- so that's the way we operate. Combat capability is not a major issue with most politicians. So the 'system' has to cope with that shortfall. That emphasizes form over function...

Given those and other such shortfalls, the Troops have to be a meld of thinking persons and rapidly responding automatons. Surprisingly, they do that fairly well and if we eliminate our terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard based training process (which literally demands unthinking adherence to someone's idea of what a condition might be and what standard one might derive under those conditions), they are capable of doing so much more than we now allow them to do.

The terrible thing is that the Army in the late 1950s and early 1960s was actually, as a result of World War II and Korean experience, in the process of developing thinking combat oriented self discipline as a counter to the old lock step methods. Unfortunately, along came Robert Strange McNamara with his management by objectives, total adherence to the party line approach and Viet Nam. After Viet Nam in an effort to cope with the McNamara-Johnson dictated Project 100,000 (LINK) debacle, the Army decided to go to an industrially based civilian training process which was great for training assembly line workers but lousy for training soldiers. It is noteworthy that the training process was being discarded by industry as not adequately responsive to changing needs for thinking workers just as the Army moved to adopt it.

It is also noteworthy that the adverse impacts of Project 100,000 both through the flawed BTMS training process and personnel policies are still affecting the Army today and the knock on effect impact the other services.

So. After all that, the answer, I think is that, yes, Cockpit Management Techniques as a model would be beneficial because it is Outcome Based Training and Education. OBTE emphasizes desired end results and not getting 'Goes' on mundane tasks that no one knows how to integrate and that therefor insist on non-thinkers. The Army has made much noise about teaching people "how to think and not what to think." They may eventually get around to actually doing that. Firing all the senior civilians at TRADOC might help...

The real issue is that such 'discipline' was necessary to get people to put up with the privations and perils imposed by combat in earlier eras. As I said, 100 years we knew that was no longer valid -- yet we're still using old methods and models mostly due to legalistic and societal pressures. Those old methods do work -- not well, but marginally and military forces are conservative, they are reluctant to cast aside things that work, no matter how poorly, because changes may not work as well...

We could do and be so much better...

[slapout9]

The terrible thing is that the Army in the late 1950s and early 1960s was actually, as a result of World War II and Korean experience, in the process of developing thinking combat oriented self discipline as a counter to the old lock step methods. Unfortunately, along came Robert Strange McNamara with his management by objectives, total adherence to the party line approach and Viet Nam. After Viet Nam in an effort to cope with the McNamara-Johnson dictated Project 100,000 (LINK) debacle, the Army decided to go to an industrially based civilian training process which was great for training assembly line workers but lousy for training soldiers. It is noteworthy that the training process was being discarded by industry as not adequately responsive to changing needs for thinking workers just as the Army moved to adopt it.

You said a mouthful there!

[Entropy]

LTC Davis' unclassified report, courtesy of Rolling Stone (PDF File).

[Ken White]

Read and being digested...

Initial impression, much truth -- most really known to the cognoscenti -- some over statement and some excessive simplification (Taliban and US casualty issues both in that category).

Broad take: Well, yeah -- but he's attacking the symptoms not the problem. People are doing what society and the system indicate they should be doing. Societal change is extremely difficult, system change only a little easier...

We'll see.

[Entropy]

Thanks Ken. I haven't had a chance to read it yet - will get to it this weekend.

[davidbfpo]

I have read the report and it does make some key observations, notably on the Sunni Awakening and Afghanistan.

It is marred sadly by some strange editing and formatting errors, notably when tables are used.

Worth reading? Yes. I expect the themes will resonate far more in the USA.

[omarali50]

Many people far more capable than me can suggest many better alternatives, but even someone like me can see that the better alternatives involve too much readjustment in worldview and habit to be likely.
What is likely is this:
1. Nobody wants to be defeated in a rout. So the top priority will be to find some way to make a deal with the Taliban/ISI that permits the US to leave in good order and to announce victory on their way out.
2. Such a deal will be very hard to make and step by step the negotiators will accept outlandish compromises that even professional bureaucrats would have considered unacceptable and dishonorable at the git go.
3. Even though it will be impossible to get anywhere close to the "this" that was imagined in "lets call this a victory" in 2011 planning sessions, some pathetic facsimile will be labelled thus and the US will get out.
4. THEN the fun will begin in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
5. Even though promises of money and UN this and EU that will have been made and there will be strong incentive to pretend that the US is in love with its helpful friend and ally, once the place starts to fall apart, Pakistan will suddenly become public enemy number one and all promises of help and eternal friendship will be broken from the US side as well. The event will be presented as the sudden discovery of some new unimaginable betrayal and will be grossly unfair and even untrue in that narrow sense.
6. GHQ will not even get one year to enjoy "strategic victory".
THis is, of course, a somewhat Pakistani POV. From the US POV, the sooner the whole mess becomes a distant memory, the better.
I am not having a good day.
On other days, I am more optimistic.

[jmm99]

The title of the unclassified report is Dereliction of Duty II.

Is there a "Dereliction of Duty I" ?

Use of the UCMJ term "Dereliction of Duty" is ironic in light of what we've just had "settled" for us.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

LINK

Good book.

Clever author, that Davis fellow...

[jmm99]

McMaster's "Dereliction of Duty" is an outstanding book, ideally suited for lovers of the Johnson-McNamara couplet.

I was just checking to make sure that Davis didn't have a "Dereliction of Duty I" - usually the first in a mutiple part series is better than the successor(s).

Regards

Mike