Vote: have we lost in Iraq?

[Tom Odom]

I would say that it is not only a question of defining victory. It is inherently at this stage also a question of defining defeat. Both of those issues were either poorly defined (victory) or not addressed at all (defeat). In a regional context and a local context, they play against us, heavily. The opposition--again another one of those ill-defined concepts that has as we all know evolved over the past several years--does not have to define victory. They simply have to avoid losing, that being defined as their destruction and/or the mobilization of what constitutes an "Iraqi society" at this stage--yet another ill-defined concept to say the least.

And at the risk of saying I have said this before, the truly operative defintions are those set by the "Iraqi" people. If they first redefine themselves along ethnic and sectarian lines then they are very much altering the right and left limits of what we discuss as victory or defeat. And that paradigm also affects how they define their own victory. When it was a case of insurgency, then as I said above victory for the insurgents was a case of the insurgents not losing. Victory for the remainder of Iraqis was determinable by how they aligned themselves in that fight. For the majority as is the case in most insurgencies victory was simple survival in the hopes of betterment for their lives. In the situation now with ethnic and sectarian fault lines grating, victory and defeat for the "Iraqi" people is no longer truly operative. Victory and defeat are according to group and that is a zero sum game--the classic dillema in such conflicts--because any win means that somebody lost and lost big. In that case they can no longer hope to win by avoiding defeat; they have to win in absolute terms, knowing the alternative is absolute defeat.

best

Tom

[bspeer]

I am sorry if my comments were viewed as a personl attack. My point is and always will be that posting in anonymity is not the way legitimate historians approach issues, especialyl if they expect serious discussion of their points.

Once again, I apologize.

bs

[Culpeper]

Even so far, both sides in play.

I don't see either side even reaching their goals. Both sides are losing. One side has to win while the other side only doesn't have to lose. So far, my vote is the Lone Ranger on this poll. The Coalition isn't exactly winning the hearts and minds of the population in the hot spots and the insurgency is going overboard by disregarding the hearts and minds of the population through Murder Incorporated. And to top it all off there is no single insurgency. Their collective plan and performance, for a lack of better words, is worse than ours! Not only are they dealing with the war against the Coalition they are fighting each other as well.

BTW, I posted first then read through the thread. There are some outstanding posts in this thread.

[Fabius Maximus]

You raise a great point -- which I deliberately omitted from the question to keep the discussion focused. We may be losing, but that does not mean anyone is winning! War is not a zero sum game -- everyone loses if "Chaos" wins.

[Danny]

"bspeer," I cannot imagine what you have done to "offend" anyone. Good Grief! Much harder criticism is proferred to my posts on my own web site. Warfare is hard and emotional business. Concerning Iraq, we have not lost it yet. The future has not yet happened, and as argued on my web site thematically, "force projection" is the key.

Do we have the collective will as a nation? That is another story. Our children will tell it to their children.

[Jones_RE]

I think the relevant questions are: how do our enemies define defeat and victory?

Specifically: how to Sunni insurgents define them? Al Qaeda in Iraq? The Mahdi Army and Badr Brigades? Run of the mill criminals? We've got five enemies out there in Iraq right now - and what they're after tells us a lot about what we need to do.

I'd venture that the Sunni insurgents define victory as: a retreat by US occupation forces from Iraq, dominance of at least the Sunni triangle, and enough of the oil revenues to stay in business. They'd define defeat as an unresisted occupation by US or Iraqi government forces (i.e. the local population turning to the US as the legitimate authority), economic privation through loss of oil money, and political or military domination by Shiites.

Al Qaeda in Iraq would define defeat as the crippling of their operational cells in Iraq at an acceptable cost to "the West." Note that crippling may not mean shooting everyone or putting them in jail - if they run out of useful targets or get run out of the country by the locals that's as much of a defeat. Victory (against the US) would consist of driving US troops out of the region on a permanent basis. Everything else is a means to that end.

The Badr Brigades and Mahdi Army are seeking a government of Iraq based in Shiite Islam, revenge for Sunni atrocities and control of oil revenue. Note that this is a goal local to their organization. They don't want oil revenue for Shiites, they want it for their members. They are subnational entities which command a patriotic loyalty from their membership. The Mahdi Army additionally does not wish to full under foreign occupation, so they've got to get rid of the US at some point. Defeat would consist of an oil sharing deal that favors Sunnis, or the inability of their armed and political wings to operate effectively.

Garden variety criminals simply want to turn a profit and remain alive and out of jail. Defeat is anything that interferes with those goals.

Thus far, I'd hazard a guess that the Sunni insurgency is headed towards defeat. It's only a matter of time before the weight of numbers begins to tell and the Shiites rip them to shreds.

[slapout9]

JONES RE, that is a pretty sharp analysis of the internal situation. What are your thoughts on the impact of Syria and Iran??

[SWJED]

24 November Los Angeles Times - Iraq Strategy Takes Page from Vietnam Playbook by Peter Spiegel.

New tactics favored by U.S. commanders in Iraq borrow heavily from the end of another war that might seem an unlikely source for a winning strategy: Vietnam.

The tactics — an influx of military advisors and a speeded-up handover to indigenous forces followed by a gradual U.S. withdrawal — resemble those in place as the U.S. effort in Vietnam reached its end.

In historical assessments and the American recollection, Vietnam was the unwinnable war. But to many in the armed forces, Vietnam as a war actually was on its way to succeeding when the Nixon administration and Congress, bowing to public impatience, pulled the plug: first withdrawing U.S. combat forces and then blocking funding and supplies to the South Vietnamese army.

If they hadn't, the South Vietnamese army, which had been bolstered by U.S. advisors and a more focused "hearts and minds" campaign in the later stages of the war, could have been able to fend off the communist North, many leading military thinkers have argued.

In their view, progress was undermined by President Nixon's decision to begin withdrawing U.S. troops in 1969 in the face of political pressure at home, despite military objections that the South Vietnamese army was not ready to go it alone. Another key U.S. mistake, they contend, was the deep cuts Congress made to military aid to Saigon beginning in 1974.

For many in the military, the lessons of Vietnam are clear: Maintain public support, and be patient...