Vote: have we lost in Iraq?

[Ray Levesque]

Trouble with that analysis is that public support was lost in Vietnam and has been lost in Iraq, pretty much game set and match for the insurgents. I am sure the military would have wanted to keep the conflict going, but without the support of the people it's a moot point. The Hearts and mind's strategy was needed at the beginning of the (Iraq) conflict, while it may have some small impact now, I think its a case of shutting the gate after the horse has bolted.

First I think we'd both agree there's more than one factor in winning or losing, and that "public opinion" is only a single factor. However, sticking to the "public opinion" factor -- I do agree that it's down, but I also believe it can be regained. The problem is that there is a perceived lack of success in Iraq and the administration's primary message for the last six-eight months has been "stay the course." (Yes, I know the phrase has been deleted from the administration’s vocabulary, but the reality is that an alternative to "stay the course" has yet to be articulated.

In order to regain public opinion a new strategy has to be identified, so people can believe change is coming, and we need to play the "information war" better. There are bright spots, and the reality is that the violence is mostly confined to 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces IIRC.

However, as long as we don't change the way we do business and as long as anecdotal evidence without context is presented as reality in the press, we will continue to have a public opinion problem.

[Fabius Maximus]

[QUOTE=Ray Levesque;6217]However, sticking to the "public opinion" factor -- I do agree that it's down, but I also believe it can be regained. The problem is that there is a perceived lack of success in Iraq and the administration's primary message for the last six-eight months has been "stay the course." ... In order to regain public opinion a new strategy has to be identified, so people can believe change is coming, ...QUOTE]

"Perceived lack of success"? Quite an optimistic formulation!

I agree that a new strategy is needed. Here is the opening for part II of my Iraq Sitrep (now in the hands of the DNI editing team, as they munch leftover turkey in the secret bunker) Comments greatly appreciated!

How can we tell that we have lost in Iraq?

* The cost in money? Perhaps a trillion dollars, including the costs of not only the war but also the long tail of post-war costs – in essence, borrowed from the Central Banks of Asian and OPEC nations.

* The cost in blood? Almost four years of war have resulted in thousands of Coalition dead, hundreds of thousands of dead Iraq civilians, and countless more wounded and disabled.

Neither are reliable indicators. More significant is the total disconnect between our tactics and strategy. That is, our daily actions in Iraq produce no good long-term outcome – and the war’s proponents have no reasonable ideas how to achieve victory.

[Sarajevo071]

The “best” solution for US (if you pay attention I am saying for US, not Iraq or everybody) would be to divide Iraq in 3 parts for easier control and conquer. But, that’s not what Some Iraqi wants. Division will just lead to more war after… Plus, I do believe neither Iran neither any other nation around wish for division of Iraq (no matter how much some of American Congress would prefer to see “Balkan Solution”).

But, Middle East and Iraq it’s a different game… That’s cradle of civilization and source of Islamic dream for great Islamic Caliphate (was true and not a dream in one point of time). Going in without those knowledge of history, religious or ethnicity/tribe customs and differences was big mistake… Mistake that US lead coalition made but Iraqi paying with they lives enough brutal and bloody that many now saying it was better under Saddam!?

[Bill Moore]

Ray you could sell ice to Eskimos, I loved your approach "the insurgency is only in 14 of 18 provinces". So the insurgency is "only" in 78% percent of Iraq's provinces?

I'm not convinced that the American people should support a conflict without a viable strategy. As stated above the dollar cost is astronomical, and we're sacrificing America's finest to no end.

I think at the moment we have two options. Option one: Prepare for the loss of central government in Iraq and start planning on how to mitigate the negative effects on our allies and our national interests. What does that mean to our allies in the region and beyond the region? How do we help them? I can't help but think some of this radicalism will cross the borders into Saudi. Saudi has actually done a decent job lately on cracking down on their extremists, now they have severe border problem. NASA we have a problem, most of the world's oil supply is exposed to extremist attacks now, or in extremist hands in the case of Chavez in S. America. This option allows us to focus our military efforts on other important areas where we can make progress. Since AQ is reportedly moving into N. Africa next, we should be there waiting for them as one example.

Option two: We don't want to lose Iraq because it will destablize the entire region, but sending more trainers won't fix it. It is a training problem, they won't fight period for this government, so we need to get rid of the government. Hopefully there is an ambitious Iraqi General who wants to save his country, and we need to turn a blind eye to any coup attempts (it is Iraqi business, not ours). I know it isn't PC, but this is a war. I also know it goes contrary to the neocon dream of one big happy democracy in Iraqi that would then spread throughout the Middle East. We need to get over it, and focus on our real national security interests, not democratizing the Middle East. In return for allowing a strong arm government (perhaps military) to take the lead we may get a reasonably stable Iraq that doesn't threaten its neighbors and helps stabilize our (the West, India, China) access to oil. We probably need to pull out shortly after the coup, because the way they are going to stabilize the country won't fall in line with our ROE.

I'm sure smarter guys will come up with other options, but my simple mind has narrowed it down to chaos which equals regional instability or a strong arm government that brutally restores order. Saddam? No, another butthead. Doing a little bad to do a lot of good.

In time we could work with the government and attempt to direct them towards democracy, but first and foremost security, then economic development, then we'll talk about the government.

[Ray Levesque]

Ok, first, I'm a gonna' slap myself in the head...I meant to say that 14 of 18 provinces are insurgent free for the most part....darn, I hate it when I do that. :-)

As for the strategy thing and keeping in mind that I was only discussing the issue of "public opinion"....I definitely agree we need a new strategy. As I mentioned, the "stay the course" strategy is a failure. If we continue doing the same we can expect the same results. If we want different results, we have to do something different.

As for the 4 of 18 provinces with serious insurgent problems....I don't want to minimize the issue, but not all the provinces require the same "strategy" or the same number of troops.

I do believe the bottom line is this -- unless the people of Iraq feel secure; unless they feel they can support the government today without having to worry about the radicals taking revenge on them tomorrow any strategy will fail. It is about security. The military must have the numbers required to provide a security screen behind which the government can provide social services, insfrastructure development, power, safe shopping, garbage disposal, etc.

Unfortunately this is not easy. The government must provide security 24x7 and you can't do this with raids and short term military actions.

[Fabius Maximus]

unless the people of Iraq feel secure; unless they feel they can support the government today without having to worry about the radicals taking revenge on them tomorrow .

What radicals?

Iraq has ethnic divisions. Arab vs. Kurd vs. Turkman. It has religious division, obviously. But whatis the basis for assuming that the fighters are not mainstream representatives of these groups?

There are foreign elements, which I agree can be considered "radical", but most sources consider them marginal at this point (although perhaps important in setting Iraq afire).

Also, what is this Iraq "government" of which you speak?

Unfortunately, there is no longer an Iraq polity, no political structure holding the allegiance of Iraq army and police. There are only regional, ethnic, and/or religious leaders.

The Green Zone placeholders pretending to be a government are mostly either representatives of these groups or colonial satraps. We pretend that there is an Iraq government so that we have something through which to implement our policies.

The US can give Prime Minister al-Maliki air power, but not what he most needs: legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraq people.

There may no longer even be either an Iraq State or Nation, just a brightly colored space on our maps.

Reassembling its shards is a task for Iraq’s people; doing so is beyond our power and ability. Hoping for Iraq to reappear is a dream, not a strategy.

[Culpeper]

They [radicals] are self sustaining through illegal activities such as smuggling, kidnapping, corrupt charity, counterfeiting, and so forth. I find it hard to believe that you think Iraq has a pretend government when countries like Syria and Iran are holding summits with it. Not to mention that the United Nation has recognized it. But you can't approach this problem with a flair of history and op/ed aspersion. No offense.

[Fabius Maximus]

Diplomatic recognition means little. There are many instances in history of States treating with “faux” governments as equals, esp. colonial governments.

As for the UN recognition as an indicator of legitimacy, the USSR had three seats: Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. The last 2 were of course diplomatic illusions.

Let’s look instead at reality. Governments have specific characteristics, the more of these they possess, the stronger. Just to hit the high points…

· Control of armed force
· The ability to levy and collect taxes
· An administrative mechanism to execute its policies
· Territory in which it is the dominant political entity.
· Control of borders
· Legitimacy (not love) in the eyes of its people

The “government” of Iraq has, by most reports, none of these.

“I am now prime minister and overall commander of the armed forces yet I cannot move a single company without Coalition approval…”
Nuri al-Maliki, Prime Minister of Iraq, interview with Reuters on October 26, 2006

It lives on oil revenue and US funding.

The ministries are owned by ethnic and religious groups, parceled out as patronage.

The only territory it controls is the Green Zone.

Etc, etc.

[Sarajevo071]

What radicals?

Iraq has ethnic divisions. Arab vs. Kurd vs. Turkman. It has religious division, obviously. But whatis the basis for assuming that the fighters are not mainstream representatives of these groups?

Don't forget Persians. Iranians/some Shia in Iraq are not Arabs.