Vote: have we lost in Iraq?

[slapout9]

JONES RE, that is a pretty sharp analysis of the internal situation. What are your thoughts on the impact of Syria and Iran??

[SWJED]

24 November Los Angeles Times - Iraq Strategy Takes Page from Vietnam Playbook by Peter Spiegel.

New tactics favored by U.S. commanders in Iraq borrow heavily from the end of another war that might seem an unlikely source for a winning strategy: Vietnam.

The tactics — an influx of military advisors and a speeded-up handover to indigenous forces followed by a gradual U.S. withdrawal — resemble those in place as the U.S. effort in Vietnam reached its end.

In historical assessments and the American recollection, Vietnam was the unwinnable war. But to many in the armed forces, Vietnam as a war actually was on its way to succeeding when the Nixon administration and Congress, bowing to public impatience, pulled the plug: first withdrawing U.S. combat forces and then blocking funding and supplies to the South Vietnamese army.

If they hadn't, the South Vietnamese army, which had been bolstered by U.S. advisors and a more focused "hearts and minds" campaign in the later stages of the war, could have been able to fend off the communist North, many leading military thinkers have argued.

In their view, progress was undermined by President Nixon's decision to begin withdrawing U.S. troops in 1969 in the face of political pressure at home, despite military objections that the South Vietnamese army was not ready to go it alone. Another key U.S. mistake, they contend, was the deep cuts Congress made to military aid to Saigon beginning in 1974.

For many in the military, the lessons of Vietnam are clear: Maintain public support, and be patient...

[Tc2642]

For many in the military, the lessons of Vietnam are clear: Maintain public support, and be patient...

Trouble with that analysis is that public support was lost in Vietnam and has been lost in Iraq, pretty much game set and match for the insurgents. I am sure the military would have wanted to keep the conflict going, but without the support of the people it's a moot point. The Hearts and mind's strategy was needed at the beginning of the (Iraq) conflict, while it may have some small impact now, I think its a case of shutting the gate after the horse has bolted.

[Fabius Maximus]

Thanks for posting a link to this fascinating article. The Iraq War run as boomer nostalgia, that's something to consider.

But what is this "Iraq" they speak of? A brightly colored space on the map, certainly. A State, with a government capable of weilding an army -- not likely. A nation-state, certainly not now (or "no more", or perhaps "not yet").

How many wars hve been lost through small but critical false assumptions, like this?

[SWJED]

24 November Chicago Sun-Times commentary - Dividing Iraq Might Multiply Problems by Jaroslav Tir and Paul F. Diehl.

... Our research indicates that the best time to divide a country along ethnic or religious lines is before tensions escalate to civil war or large-scale violence. Since 1900, mini-states that emerge from peaceful breakups of countries have a 95 percent success rate in avoiding militarized confrontations with each other.

The bad news is that the optimal time to partition Iraq has passed. The months soon after Saddam Hussein's removal from power in 2003 -- that is, before Iraqi politics came to be dominated by extremist leaders advocating sectarian violence -- provided a window of opportunity for dividing the Iraqi state...

The partition scenario that now faces Iraq is not as desirable as it once was, but neither is it hopeless. A partition designed to stop a civil war runs the risk of transforming the conflict into an international battleground between the mini-states (e.g., the 1998 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea).

One might similarly worry about Sunni and Shiite states clashing in the future. Based on past cases of partition carried out after civil war, this is a 50-50 proposition. There is also the risk that the new states will fall prey to future civil wars, but this occurs only a third of the time. Thus, there is reason to hope that a divided Iraq could avoid future problems, but several risks loom on the horizon.

Given that the Kurdish northern part of Iraq is generally stable and that there is relatively little violence between the Kurds and other major groups, the separation of the Kurds from Iraq could reinforce peace in the north. Yet, this could also activate a potentially dangerous territorial dispute with Turkey, which has a large and rebellious Kurdish population within its own southeastern borders. Any attempts to expand a nascent Kurdish state could ignite a war with Turkey (and perhaps with Iran and Syria as each has significant Kurdish populations). Securing Turkish cooperation for any plan is essential.

The more problematic scenario is presented by the potential Sunni-Shiite separation. The present sectarian violence suggests that the Shiite and Sunni states would not only be predisposed to fight each other after the separation, but also to experience future civil wars within their own mini-states...

[SWJED]

4 December issue of the Weekly Standard - We Can Put More Forces in Iraq - and they Would Make a Difference by Frederick Kagan.

Many months into the debate over finding a new strategy in Iraq, two myths continue to cloud the discussion. The Washington Post recently proclaimed: "The United States and its allies in Iraq would need at least 500,000 and perhaps more than 1 million troops" to bring order to the country. Incoming House majority leader Steny Hoyer declared: "As a practical matter, there are no troops to increase with." Neither of these statements is true. The persistence of these myths forecloses serious consideration of the only option likely to bring peace to Iraq.

Relevant historical examples do not support the notion that hundreds of thousands more troops are needed to improve security in Iraq. A study of post-conflict operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere conducted by Ambassador James Dobbins showed that success in those operations--characterized by severe ethnic and sectarian violence--required force ratios of 1 soldier per 100 inhabitants. Iraq poses challenges that are in some respects more severe, at the moment, but it also offers its own rules-of-thumb. Successful clear-and-hold operations in Tal Afar required a force ratio of around 1 soldier (counting both U.S. and Iraqi troops) for every 40 inhabitants. On the other hand, in 2004 Major General Peter Chiarelli suppressed a widespread uprising in Sadr City (an area inhabited by about 2.5 million Shiites) with fewer than 20,000 U.S. soldiers--a ratio of about 1 to 125.

Then there's the question of the size of the population to be pacified. Most of Iraq is relatively calm. Instances of violence in the Kurdish north and the Shia south are rare. No responsible analyst advocates sending large numbers of troops into either area--they are not needed and would not be welcomed. Disarming the Shia militias is a process that must be undertaken only after the Sunni Arab insurgency is under control, and it cannot be undertaken primarily by American forces directly confronting the Shiite population. Using all of Iraq's 27 million people as a baseline for estimating force ratios is, therefore, an invalid approach.

The U.S. command repeatedly and correctly points out that about 80 percent of the violence in Iraq occurs within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad, among a population of perhaps 10 million. Baghdad itself has roughly 6.5 million inhabitants, including the 2.5 million Shiites in Sadr City. These figures provide the basis for a more realistic estimate of the force levels needed. Applying the high-end ratio used in Tal Afar over the entire metropolitan Baghdad area would generate a requirement of 250,000 troops--both U.S. and Iraqi. There are currently about 100,000 Iraqi army troops that the U.S. command considers trained and ready. There are almost 150,000 American troops in Iraq now, including perhaps 70,000 combat troops. Conducting Tal Afar-type operations across the entire capital region all at once would require concentrating all available forces in the area and a "surge" of about 80,000 U.S. soldiers--a large number, to be sure, but very far from the "hundreds of thousands" or even "millions" generated by the use of specious historical examples.

But the situation is not even this dire. Not all areas of the capital region require such an intensive deployment. Indeed, previous successful operations even in Baghdad did not require such high force ratios. What's more, skillful military planners conduct operations in phases, and that is exactly how this one should be prepared and executed. The recent unsuccessful effort to secure Baghdad, Operation Together Forward II, was broken into a series of phases. U.S. and Iraqi troops working together succeeded in clearing the neighborhoods they entered one after the other. But that is not why the operation failed. The problem, according to much anecdotal evidence and the recent testimony of the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Michael D. Maples, is that the U.S. military command did not leave American forces behind in the areas that had been cleared. That mistake allowed insurgents to reinfiltrate those neighborhoods and begin the cycle of violence again.

There is every reason to believe that a reformulated operation, proceeding in phases to clear Baghdad neighborhood by neighborhood, but with sufficient force levels to leave significant American troops behind in the cleared areas, would be much more successful...

Much more at the link...

[Culpeper]

The U.S. command repeatedly and correctly points out that about 80 percent of the violence in Iraq occurs within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad, among a population of perhaps 10 million. Baghdad itself has roughly 6.5 million inhabitants, including the 2.5 million Shiites in Sadr City.

Well than for crying-out-loud, let them kill each other in that radius until they had enough. We're not talking about the entire country of Iraq. It's a 35 mile radius. What we have here is a riot taking place. Send in the LAPD advisors.

[Ray Levesque]

Trouble with that analysis is that public support was lost in Vietnam and has been lost in Iraq, pretty much game set and match for the insurgents. I am sure the military would have wanted to keep the conflict going, but without the support of the people it's a moot point. The Hearts and mind's strategy was needed at the beginning of the (Iraq) conflict, while it may have some small impact now, I think its a case of shutting the gate after the horse has bolted.

First I think we'd both agree there's more than one factor in winning or losing, and that "public opinion" is only a single factor. However, sticking to the "public opinion" factor -- I do agree that it's down, but I also believe it can be regained. The problem is that there is a perceived lack of success in Iraq and the administration's primary message for the last six-eight months has been "stay the course." (Yes, I know the phrase has been deleted from the administration’s vocabulary, but the reality is that an alternative to "stay the course" has yet to be articulated.

In order to regain public opinion a new strategy has to be identified, so people can believe change is coming, and we need to play the "information war" better. There are bright spots, and the reality is that the violence is mostly confined to 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces IIRC.

However, as long as we don't change the way we do business and as long as anecdotal evidence without context is presented as reality in the press, we will continue to have a public opinion problem.

[Fabius Maximus]

[QUOTE=Ray Levesque;6217]However, sticking to the "public opinion" factor -- I do agree that it's down, but I also believe it can be regained. The problem is that there is a perceived lack of success in Iraq and the administration's primary message for the last six-eight months has been "stay the course." ... In order to regain public opinion a new strategy has to be identified, so people can believe change is coming, ...QUOTE]

"Perceived lack of success"? Quite an optimistic formulation!

I agree that a new strategy is needed. Here is the opening for part II of my Iraq Sitrep (now in the hands of the DNI editing team, as they munch leftover turkey in the secret bunker) Comments greatly appreciated!

How can we tell that we have lost in Iraq?

* The cost in money? Perhaps a trillion dollars, including the costs of not only the war but also the long tail of post-war costs – in essence, borrowed from the Central Banks of Asian and OPEC nations.

* The cost in blood? Almost four years of war have resulted in thousands of Coalition dead, hundreds of thousands of dead Iraq civilians, and countless more wounded and disabled.

Neither are reliable indicators. More significant is the total disconnect between our tactics and strategy. That is, our daily actions in Iraq produce no good long-term outcome – and the war’s proponents have no reasonable ideas how to achieve victory.

[Sarajevo071]

The “best” solution for US (if you pay attention I am saying for US, not Iraq or everybody) would be to divide Iraq in 3 parts for easier control and conquer. But, that’s not what Some Iraqi wants. Division will just lead to more war after… Plus, I do believe neither Iran neither any other nation around wish for division of Iraq (no matter how much some of American Congress would prefer to see “Balkan Solution”).

But, Middle East and Iraq it’s a different game… That’s cradle of civilization and source of Islamic dream for great Islamic Caliphate (was true and not a dream in one point of time). Going in without those knowledge of history, religious or ethnicity/tribe customs and differences was big mistake… Mistake that US lead coalition made but Iraqi paying with they lives enough brutal and bloody that many now saying it was better under Saddam!?

[Bill Moore]

Ray you could sell ice to Eskimos, I loved your approach "the insurgency is only in 14 of 18 provinces". So the insurgency is "only" in 78% percent of Iraq's provinces?

I'm not convinced that the American people should support a conflict without a viable strategy. As stated above the dollar cost is astronomical, and we're sacrificing America's finest to no end.

I think at the moment we have two options. Option one: Prepare for the loss of central government in Iraq and start planning on how to mitigate the negative effects on our allies and our national interests. What does that mean to our allies in the region and beyond the region? How do we help them? I can't help but think some of this radicalism will cross the borders into Saudi. Saudi has actually done a decent job lately on cracking down on their extremists, now they have severe border problem. NASA we have a problem, most of the world's oil supply is exposed to extremist attacks now, or in extremist hands in the case of Chavez in S. America. This option allows us to focus our military efforts on other important areas where we can make progress. Since AQ is reportedly moving into N. Africa next, we should be there waiting for them as one example.

Option two: We don't want to lose Iraq because it will destablize the entire region, but sending more trainers won't fix it. It is a training problem, they won't fight period for this government, so we need to get rid of the government. Hopefully there is an ambitious Iraqi General who wants to save his country, and we need to turn a blind eye to any coup attempts (it is Iraqi business, not ours). I know it isn't PC, but this is a war. I also know it goes contrary to the neocon dream of one big happy democracy in Iraqi that would then spread throughout the Middle East. We need to get over it, and focus on our real national security interests, not democratizing the Middle East. In return for allowing a strong arm government (perhaps military) to take the lead we may get a reasonably stable Iraq that doesn't threaten its neighbors and helps stabilize our (the West, India, China) access to oil. We probably need to pull out shortly after the coup, because the way they are going to stabilize the country won't fall in line with our ROE.

I'm sure smarter guys will come up with other options, but my simple mind has narrowed it down to chaos which equals regional instability or a strong arm government that brutally restores order. Saddam? No, another butthead. Doing a little bad to do a lot of good.

In time we could work with the government and attempt to direct them towards democracy, but first and foremost security, then economic development, then we'll talk about the government.

[Ray Levesque]

Ok, first, I'm a gonna' slap myself in the head...I meant to say that 14 of 18 provinces are insurgent free for the most part....darn, I hate it when I do that. :-)

As for the strategy thing and keeping in mind that I was only discussing the issue of "public opinion"....I definitely agree we need a new strategy. As I mentioned, the "stay the course" strategy is a failure. If we continue doing the same we can expect the same results. If we want different results, we have to do something different.

As for the 4 of 18 provinces with serious insurgent problems....I don't want to minimize the issue, but not all the provinces require the same "strategy" or the same number of troops.

I do believe the bottom line is this -- unless the people of Iraq feel secure; unless they feel they can support the government today without having to worry about the radicals taking revenge on them tomorrow any strategy will fail. It is about security. The military must have the numbers required to provide a security screen behind which the government can provide social services, insfrastructure development, power, safe shopping, garbage disposal, etc.

Unfortunately this is not easy. The government must provide security 24x7 and you can't do this with raids and short term military actions.