Could the CAP concept work in Afghanistan?

[Eden]

Could CAP work in Afghanistan? Maybe, but basic math says it will be, at best, too little too late. According to estimates from several study groups and Afghan government ministries, there are at least 30,000 villages in Afghanistan. Even if you only put CAP teams (as described by COMMAR) in 5% of those villages, that's an investment of 30,000 troops. Add in the needed support personnel and some 'main force' combat elements which will be required to prevent Taliban concentration against small CAP teams, and suddenly the village war requires more boots on the ground than we are likely to commit.

Also, it has been decades since I read The Village, but I recall that casualties among the featured CAP team was around 50%.

CAP is not a cheap alternative to other forms of counterinsurgency. It might have worked in 2003 - but I can't see it being tried as we are pulling out.

[jmm99]

As I "perceive" COMMAR's concept, it's intended as being transitional, since a 100% immediate withdrawal is not feasible (and in any event, is not intended as a universal prescription throughout Afghanistan). Nor, does it seem to be intended to provide for "pacification" (if that is even possible, except in the abstract) - or a "How to Win in Afghanistan" theory.

As such, it appears to focus more on the major strength of the VN CAPs as seen by Col. (then Maj.) Phil Ridderhof, COMBINED ACTION AND U.S. MARINE EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM 1965-71:

The Marines originally meant for Combined Action to provide them with rear area security. The idea of using CAPs for pacification did not really take hold until 1967.[293] CAPs were placed so as to fulfill a security mission. They only took hold in areas that had already been under U.S. military control. They were not placed out in areas that didn't have large units operating.[294] Most of the CAPs were placed on lines of communication in the I CTZ. This included such locations as Route 1, the main north-south artery in Vietnam, also known as the Street without Joy. This placement allowed for easier access and resupply to the CAP's. It also meant that the CAPs were providing security for these important supply routes.[295] Col. Solak, commenting on Combined Action, felt that they provided good rear area security and credible intelligence for Marine units. They did not, however, succeed as pacification. Their main success with the people was to provide a grassroots link with the Marines.[296] Security was the main benefit of Combined Action.
...
What Combined Action seemed to be best at was providing area control and security. Much of this accomplishment came about because of the aggressive military operations run by the CAPs. Body counts aren't a good indicator of pacification, but a favorable count can point to successful military operations.[303] In 1966 the kill ratio for CAP's was 14 VC KIA, confirmed, for every CAP Marine or Pr killed.[304] This even looked good to the military men favoring the big unit attrition strategy. One of the main arguments against Combined Action was the fact that the US didn't have enough troops to cover the area needed. To counter that, combined Action proponents gave statistics such as the fact that in 1968, CAP Marines comprised 1.5% of total Marine strength in Vietnam, yet they accounted for 7.6% of VC kills.[305]

The rest of the Ridderhof thesis is also a realistic ex post hoc look at VN CAP.

Maybe my perception is wrong; but that's how I take COMMAR's proposal.

Regards

Mike