Could CAP work in Afghanistan? Maybe, but basic math says it will be, at best, too little too late. According to estimates from several study groups and Afghan government ministries, there are at least 30,000 villages in Afghanistan. Even if you only put CAP teams (as described by COMMAR) in 5% of those villages, that's an investment of 30,000 troops. Add in the needed support personnel and some 'main force' combat elements which will be required to prevent Taliban concentration against small CAP teams, and suddenly the village war requires more boots on the ground than we are likely to commit.

Also, it has been decades since I read The Village, but I recall that casualties among the featured CAP team was around 50%.

CAP is not a cheap alternative to other forms of counterinsurgency. It might have worked in 2003 - but I can't see it being tried as we are pulling out.