Mass Insanity: Latest Trend in Army Doctrine

[Fuchs]

We look for smart ways to assess security force capacity. What we really need is a smarter way to assess the nature of the grievance between the government and the segment(s) of their populace they intend to use that capacity against.

Germany has had a foreign policy which included civil society support abroad;

Student exchanges, free university studies here for foreigners - to bring some 'western' liberal ideas into the world

Goethe Institute - basically cultural embassies which teach German language (good for trade, direct investment), promote German arts etc

Supporting intellectuals and opposition parties (in part even meeting them on a visit by the chancellor) by recognising them and speaking with them.


It's all very secondary and low-key, but it might be worth a look at. After all, it may have worked fine. Germany ranks really well whenever the BBC or another source asks world-wide about favourability ratings for countries.

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Imagine Obama launching a student exchange program with Saudi-Arabia; I bet the domestic political reactions would not be very "mature".

[Morgan]

I think Bob is DoctrineMan.

[Bob's World]

I think Bob is Doctrine Man.

LMFAO. I like Doctrine Man's stuff. I follow the D-Man on Facebook. But I don't even know who he is.

My boss does call me a heretic ("Heretic: a professed believer who maintains religious opinions contrary to those accepted by his or her church or rejects doctrines prescribed by that church")

I guess in a way that makes me the opposite of Doctrine Man. "Anti-Doctrine Man" perhaps.

The Naval Services loves tradition and are bound by it. The Army loves Doctrine, and is bound by it. The Army loves to Write, Read, Memorize, Change, Apply, Assess with, Employ, Quote, etc, etc, etc, Doctrine. 15 years ago Bob and Doctrine Man were both probably a great deal like BYAM in this little saga. Hell, I got "the white brief case" at CGSC and was #1 in my Advanced Course Class. I was BYAM. Nothing wrong with that, it is the Army way.

But the world is changing far faster than BYAMs can write and memorize doctrine. In many ways doctrine is becoming as much a part of our problem as it is part of our solution. As an example, at a recent session to update the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, a document that is likely to be a statement of the Chairman's vision and intent for how the military approaches this rapidly evolving world do you know what the Army's primary input was??? "You can't make this too different from the old vision because we just got doctrines X Y and Z signed, and this would force us to have to change them again!" We need to get back to where doctrine is a guide for thought, not a prescriptive checklist for action. Soon.

[Fuchs]

I saw some incredibly irrelevant U.S: field manuals. There's for example on about Distributed Operations (USMC). I wanted to read it because I was interested in learning about DO and there was absolutely nothing of interest in it. Page after page irrelevant bureaucratic stuff, it sounded like a "make up work for the hierarchy and staffs" paper, not like a paper about dispersed small team actions. -.-

Well, that's what I remember about it, maybe I'm unfair.

[Bob's World]

I saw some incredibly irrelevant U.S: field manuals. There's for example on about Distributed Operations (USMC). I wanted to read it because I was interested in learning about DO and there was absolutely nothing of interest in it. Page after page irrelevant bureaucratic stuff, it sounded like a "make up work for the hierarchy and staffs" paper, not like a paper about dispersed small team actions. -.-

Well, that's what I remember about it, maybe I'm unfair.

You are probably being kind.

Here's an example:

In "On War" a guy named Carl von Clausewitz briefly discusses a broad concept to help commanders focus on what is most important in a battle or campaign. He calls it a "center of gravity" (or whatever the German for that is, I defer to you on that)

In Army doctrine we adopt this concept and write a half a page or so to describe it. Then guys like Dr. Strange at the USMC university started to do some really fascinating work on various ways to dissect and analyze the concept. Soon the doctrine evolved to be nearly an entire chapter prescribing a rigid set of bins one must fill in a set order, etc. Any thinking on COG from that point forward was either "doctrinal" (followed the prescription) or "non-doctrinal" (dares to actually apply a little creativity and color outside the lines a bit). CvC would roll over in his grave.

I never did well in Kindergarten art class. I just couldn't color inside the lines very well.

[Fuchs]

You don't seem to understand the extent of the stupidity surrounding the CoG stuff in the USMC...

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....f-gravity.html

[J Wolfsberger]

In Army doctrine we adopt this concept and write a half a page or so to describe it. Then guys like Dr. Strange at the USMC university started to do some really fascinating work on various ways to dissect and analyze the concept. Soon the doctrine evolved to be nearly an entire chapter prescribing a rigid set of bins one must fill in a set order, etc. Any thinking on COG from that point forward was either "doctrinal" (followed the prescription) or "non-doctrinal" (dares to actually apply a little creativity and color outside the lines a bit). CvC would roll over in his grave.

What you are describing is representative of our current cultural mania for "process." It has a great appeal to bureaucrats in that you can measure how well you're filling up bins and checking boxes without ever being held accountable for achieving a goal.

Which is where the great problem with "metrics" comes from. Think about how often you've seen organization or activity measured against achieving a goal, versus the number of times you've seen them measured by all the little stepping stones associated with the goal. e.g. 'We dug x wells, handed out y blankets, and distributed z MREs, culturally suitable," but not 'The region has been pacified.' The former is, of course, trivially simple to measure, while the latter - which is the real goal or why the hell are we there - is notoriously difficult, which is, equally of course, the reason bureaucrats prefer the former.

[Bob's World]

It's not just doctrine that is becoming overly prescriptive and overly influenced by what we believe the "lessons learned" of the past 10 years to be; we have an equally dangerous situation developing in the area of plans and planning.

Plans are managed by geographic combatant commanders in large part. Regional perspectives on regional issues. But what, in today's emerging environment, is truly "regional"?

Increasingly, regional problems demand global perspectives and solutions; equally, regional actions can have global implications. GCCs and GCC-driven planning do not serve this emerging reality very well. Similarly, a "plan" tends to lock one into a certain perspective and sequence of events. Particularly when those doctrine-loving Army boys break out their sequentially numbered phases and start filling in the blanks.

How then, do we evolve in how we think about and write doctrine and plans?? This is a question we need to put some serious energy into. If we are to evolve to be as effective as we need to be, and equally as quick, flexible and agile as we need to be, we must first address how we think about the things we do or believe we might do; and how we balance the need for detailed preparation with the need for flexible execution.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,

But the world is changing far faster than BYAMs can write and memorize doctrine. In many ways doctrine is becoming as much a part of our problem as it is part of our solution.

I don't know if the world is changing faster now than before. I think as you have frequently commented that the Cold War created a temporary freeze frame bi-polar world from a strategic perspective, but once the Wall came down the world rapidly resumed its normal level of geopolitical unpredictability.

If the world is changing too quickly for our doctrine writers, then I think an argument can be made we're making doctrine overly prescriptive. Prescriptive processes and suggestions should be restricted to TTP manuals (which are not doctrine) and unit SOPs. Doctrine should be rather broad, but provide enough structure for the services to determine how to organize, equip, and train in general terms. However, doctrine shouldn’t prevent commanders from making whatever changes they need to make to organizations, processes, etc. when they employ, but we all know it does.

The worst part about doctrine despite the claims to the contrary is that it does tell its adherents how and “what” to think, which is one reason “group think” is so prevalent in our forces. We don’t go to military professional development schools to liberate our thinking, but to get indoctrinated, which are why our officers that go to Harvard, Yale, etc. frequently outperform graduates of our military colleges in so called complex environments.

Doctrine provides paradigms, and paradigms provide restrictive constructs that limit our view of a situation to fit within the paradigm. It is an endless cycle, because new ideas that create paradigm shifts evolve into their own paradigms over time, so in the end it is something we have to be aware of take efforts to mitigate the negative impact on our thinking process. Doctrine still serves a purpose, as does tradition, but they should serve as enablers not a inhibitors.

[Ken White]

...once the Wall came down the world rapidly resumed its normal level of geopolitical unpredictability.

True dat.

If the world is changing too quickly for our doctrine writers, then I think an argument can be made we're making doctrine overly prescriptive.

Absolutely correct!!!

Prescriptive processes and suggestions should be restricted to TTP manuals (which are not doctrine) and unit SOPs.

This is my minor quibble -- I wouldn't even go that far because if it's in a book, many will assume it is the only way (whether for career enhancing or staying alive...) to do things. I strongly believe most current manuals and even some from WWII when a rapidly changing Army needed more prescriptive literature are entirely too prescriptive. That inhibits flexibility of thought at best and stifles initiative at a moderate level and is prone to get regurgitated and expanded as the Manual is rewritten at worst.

Doctrine should be rather broad, but provide enough structure for the services to determine how to organize, equip, and train in general terms. However, doctrine shouldn’t prevent commanders from making whatever changes they need to make to organizations, processes, etc. when they employ, but we all know it does.

True again -- and transmutation of doctrine to manuals exacerbates the problem...

Agree with the rest of your post.

[Surferbeetle]

I don't know if the world is changing faster now than before. I think as you have frequently commented that the Cold War created a temporary freeze frame bi-polar world from a strategic perspective, but once the Wall came down the world rapidly resumed its normal level of geopolitical unpredictability.

Heh...the military is all about controlling and minimizing variables in the pursuit of defined objectives while the World has always and ever been about 'complexity'.

Recall that most do not buy into the 'fully controlled and minimized variables' paradigm/schtick...how many of our peers (recalling that all men are created equal) really read and believe 'doctrine'? How many of us have met Murphy in his various guises in various parts of the world?

The worst part about doctrine despite the claims to the contrary is that it does tell its adherents how and “what” to think, which is one reason “group think” is so prevalent in our forces. We don’t go to military professional development schools to liberate our thinking, but to get indoctrinated, which are why our officers that go to Harvard, Yale, etc. frequently outperform graduates of our military colleges in so called complex environments.

Self reliance, personal responsibility, and an open mind are what made this country great.

Expensive schools provide access to expensive networks and are a way to allow others to control one via debt if care is not taken.

Knowledge, however, is accessible to anybody via online, state, or elite 'delivery vehicles'....the GI Bill or other options await those who have the strength and courage to grasp them. Not easy, not painless, but always worth the trip...

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Doctrine still serves a purpose, as does tradition, but they should serve as enablers not a inhibitors.

Everything has it's place, while 'rules' are sometimes/often meant to be broken...

[slapout9]

The Army as an organization is obsolete(and so are the other services except SF and Marine Corps,but Marines are going in wrong direction) until that is fixed doctrine isn't going to matter much. It's the better operating manual for the crew of the Titanic.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Surferbettle,

Heh...the military is all about controlling and minimizing variables in the pursuit of defined objectives while the World has always and ever been about 'complexity'.

Read something recently in an unclassified SOCOM publication related to your comment that prompted an aha momement, since it brought a lot of thoughts together coherently (something I can rarely do without help).

Apparently it was extracted from Francois Jullien's book A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking:http://www.amazon.com/Treatise-Effic...9687314&sr=1-4 . He writes a truly skilled strategist makes a careful study of a complex situation to ascertain the natural inclination of the system (that will make slapout happy), then uses this knowledge to put himself in a position of strength. They use a river analogy to describe: Identify how the river naturally surges and moves and then use these powerful forces. Once others seek to act further downstream, the flow of the situation and power of the river becomes irresistible.

The Chinese supposedly seek to transform the situation and not act to reach goals, as western thinking does. We definitely try to achieve goals/effects, and spend a lot time trying to measure if we're succeeding, when in reality the trend is the trend (or the river is the river) and we're only fooling ourselves with our efforts to "force" change. Chinese logic states to continue any effect DO NOT link it to force, force is temporary in nature, as compared to the natural tendency of the situation. The more one merges with the natural proclivity of the situation, the more effective one is.

No truer words were ever written, and we have demonstrated that our attempts to force change have almost always failed. There are limits to military power (as most of us know, unfortunately our politicians don't get it). We can and should use force to kill terrorists that threaten the homeland, if removing Saddam was really in our interest, then using force to do so was appropriate; however, using force to transform the Iraqi, Afghan, and Vietnamese societies was and is a futile effort, we were rowing against the tide.

This gets to Bob's point about not using control as a strategy (I think); however, population control for temporary periods of time can be an effective tactical tool to achieve limited objectives. The key to clear, hold, build being successful is enabling the trend, if we're pushing against the trend we'll only clear and hold as long as we apply force, as soon as we stop, the trend will assume its course.

Funny how people with Phds, Graduate degrees, etc. can't grasp this. Higher education is effective for those that can liberate their thinking from the assumptions others have proposed and can think independently, for others it is a piece of paper that checks the block.

[Ken White]

The Army as an organization is obsolete(and so are the other services except SF and Marine Corps,but Marines are going in wrong direction) until that is fixed doctrine isn't going to matter much. It's the better operating manual for the crew of the Titanic.

...and Submarines...