Strategic Narrative

[Amy Zalman]

Bill,

Thanks for having noticed Strategic Narrative. I have been checking in at and learning from the contributors at Small Wars Journal for years. I used the site a few years ago to do an informal survey of the ways that “narrative” was being used in the defense community (the results are in "Narrative as an Influence Factor in Information Operations," in the 3rd quarter 2010 IO Journal)

Your kind words, and your remarks on “going with trends” got me to sign up and actually show my face here. From my vantage (not as a member of the military but as a close observer of the role of communication in it for the last decade), this point you and others are making about “going with” instead of “forcing against” is crucially important in the information realm as well. I have said in a number of venues that the concept of “counter-narrative” is counter-productive—it simply produces potentially lethal versions of shouting matches. The beauty (and challenge) of information contained in narrative form is that it is porous.

Narratives are composite, shifting things and they will inevitably reveal open areas, points of vulnerability, or internal contradictions—gaps between what others say and what they do--into which new information that directs a story in a more favorable way can be inserted. I thought that the language of “counter-narrative” may have begun to wither but someone who works at NSC recently told me that there, at least, the concept of “counter narrative” is alive and well as a communication strategy.

[selil]

Amy is to shy. She has talked extensively to my NDU students. Simply put she knows her stuff.

[Bob's World]

On narratives, I have long believed it is much more effective to think about "competing" narratives, rather than developing "counter" narratives.

To counter tends to lead one to taking opposing positions, whereas in my experience and study one is most likely to find best success by agreeing with much of one's opponent's narrative, and taking it out of their context and placing it into one's own.

As an example, AQ narrative had three main platforms:
Remove Western influence over the politics of the Middle East,
Remove "apostate" governments from power in the Middle East,
Unify the nations of the Middle East as a Caliphate.

We have been "countering" that narrative for 10 years with little effect, because each of those platforms contains a great deal of logic, albeit wrapped in crazy and violence.

The West could, however, compete a much more effective narrative built around the key concepts of the AQ platform:
1. Concede the point that yes, the Cold War led to an excessive degree of Western meddling over the governance of the Middle East, and that at the request of the governments of the region has remained in place long past the expiration date of the Cold War necessities. It is indeed time to re-evaluate and re-assess the role of Western Powers in the region and how they best pursue their vital interests in the region as it exists today.

2. Clarify that "apostate" governments are not the issue, but certainly there are many governments that are out of step with large segments of their populaces. Arab Spring is grim testament to this fact. The West should encourage greater dialog between the leaders of the region and their people, and the necessity of exploring appropriate vehicles to satisfy the people's evolving need for a legal voice on governance.

3. While an ideologically extreme Caliphate is inappropriate for helping the nations and people of the Middle East to engage on more equal and effective terms with other regions of the World, certainly some construct along the lines of the European Union may well be worth exploring and we support such efforts.


Once one steals the logic from their opponent's position, it often only leaves them with crazy and robs them of their influence as well.

[Dayuhan]

Recognizing the risk of rekindling an old argument, and recognizing as well that my qualifications on the subject of narratives are limited to several decades of observation, I'll say that for me, Bob's post above encapsulates some of the problems we have with comprehending narratives and their impact.

First, we tend to pay too much attention to the narratives proposed by various political groups, and too little to those actually adopted by audiences. Think of the US: Democrats, Republicans, candidates and factions within those groups, and a plethora of others, from the Tea Party to the radical left, all propose and set forth various narratives. Outside of a very small cluster of true believers, very few ever adopt those narratives as a whole. The actual competing narratives that prevail in society are more likely to blend elements of several of these proposed narratives.

Second, we tend to see narratives a fixed elements. They aren't. They grow and they change in response to different stimuli. The idea that we can conduct "information operations" to impose a narrative of our choice, whether competing or opposing, is hopelessly clumsy: we're better off trying to influence the inevitable evolution of the prevailing narratives in any given place. People aren't going to drop the narrative we don't like and accept the one we do. With subtle and well selected moves based primarily on actions, not words, we may be able to help a narrative evolve in a preferred direction.

Look at the steps proposed above for negation of AQ's preferred narrative:

1. Concede the point that yes, the Cold War led to an excessive degree of Western meddling over the governance of the Middle East, and that at the request of the governments of the region has remained in place long past the expiration date of the Cold War necessities. It is indeed time to re-evaluate and re-assess the role of Western Powers in the region and how they best pursue their vital interests in the region as it exists today.

2. Clarify that "apostate" governments are not the issue, but certainly there are many governments that are out of step with large segments of their populaces. Arab Spring is grim testament to this fact. The West should encourage greater dialog between the leaders of the region and their people, and the necessity of exploring appropriate vehicles to satisfy the people's evolving need for a legal voice on governance.

3. While an ideologically extreme Caliphate is inappropriate for helping the nations and people of the Middle East to engage on more equal and effective terms with other regions of the World, certainly some construct along the lines of the European Union may well be worth exploring and we support such efforts.

Everything here revolves around statements and positions, and as such will be ineffective: very few people anywhere, including our own people, notice what we say, and even fewer believe it. Worse, much of what's said here can easily be construed as presenting a desire to interfere in governance issues in Muslim nations, which directly reinforces AQ's narrative. Of course the intention is to present a desire to unravel the pattern of Cold War meddling, but who - even in the US - will believe that?

Furthermore, in focusing on the narrative AQ presents, rather than that which has been adopted, we lead ourselves to efforts we don't need to make. We don't need to counter, or even address, the desire for a Caliphate, because it's never been taken seriously among the intended audience anyway.

AQ and its predecessor groups have presented the narrative above, certainly. The only narrative that's ever actually worked for them, though, is "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful". AQ may have wanted and tried to build influence around the campaign against "apostate" governments or the campaign for a Caliphate, but they've never succeeded in gaining traction beyond a miniscule circle with those campaigns. In actual practice, AQ has gained support and credibility only when they've opposed military forces that intervene in Muslim lands. Without that circumstance, their support and credibility withers rapidly.

We can best subvert AQ's effective narrative (as opposed to their proposed narrative) simply by not intervening in Muslim countries. If intervention is necessary it should be short, sharp, and not involve occupation or "nation building", static enterprises that provide easy fodder for attacks both violent and ideological. AQ will try to force us to intervene, as they did on 9/11, but we need to recognize those moves for what they are and resist being manipulated into counterproductive moves.

Narrative and perception are intertwined, and we have to recognize that we cannot quickly or neatly unravel patterns of perception that have evolved over decades. The West in general and the US in particular have a bad rap in the Middle East, largely deserved. There is absolutely nothing we can do to change that in any immediate sense. The effects of bad meddling cannot be undone with good meddling, no matter how well intentioned. If we take a long-term view, though, we may be able to unravel those perceptions, over a span of time. That needs to be done with actions, not words. Not intervening in support of a Mubarak or a Ben Ali was a good start. Withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan and eschewing further attempts at occupation or "nation-building" will help. Not intervening in the internal politics of Muslim nations will help. Treating Muslim governments, even those we dislike, as equals will help: that doesn't mean we have to do whatever they want, it means that we have to treat them with respect, even when we pursue different perceived interests. We have to remember that even citizens who despise their government will rally behind it if they see it being dissed by foreigners, especially of the West. Even well-intentioned attempts to influence a government toward "getting in touch with its populace" can and will be perceived as self-interested meddling.

Unfortunately, subtlety has never been among our strong points. I don't suppose that's about to change.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Amy,

Thanks for having noticed Strategic Narrative. I have been checking in at and learning from the contributors at Small Wars Journal for years. I used the site a few years ago to do an informal survey of the ways that “narrative” was being used in the defense community (the results are in "Narrative as an Influence Factor in Information Operations," in the 3rd quarter 2010 IO Journal)

Amy I hope you stick around and post often to help some of us with your insights. SWJ is a good community, but without new voices it tends to get stagnant, because the same people continue to push their pet peeve into forums where it doesn't even fit. Not sure if that qualifies as a counter narrative, or just talking over everyone

Narratives are composite, shifting things and they will inevitably reveal open areas, points of vulnerability, or internal contradictions—gaps between what others say and what they do--into which new information that directs a story in a more favorable way can be inserted. I thought that the language of “counter-narrative” may have begun to wither but someone who works at NSC recently told me that there, at least, the concept of “counter narrative” is alive and well as a communication strategy.

Where I'm at we call it a competing narrative, but even that has the same connotation. I like your idea about finding internatal contradictions, etc., but wonder if there is a risk to doing this over time? For example, are we giving them the opportunity to evolve their message over time making it harder to undermine and therefore more dangerous?

[Bob's World]

Key to remember is that narratives do not create instability. Narratives do not create stability either.

Narratives must be in step with actions to be effective, and are used to facilitate efforts to exploit unstable situations, or to help sustain stable situations.

I think Dayuhan misses the point in my comments above. WE believe the AQ narrative for some bizarre reason, even if the populaces of the region it directly applies to all place it into a context that works for them. God knows how many times I've driven a virtual icepick into my forehead listening to some intel "expert" drone on about one threat narrative or another as if it were carved in stone tablets by the very hand of God. Flashing up big maps showing the boundaries of historic Caliphates with expanding ink blots of where AQ nodes are currently engaging with dissatisfied segments of various populaces. They make it look like maps of WWII and how the German army is advancing across France or Russia, coupled with grim analysis of the dangers of the advancing hordes. Pure theatrical, clueless, yet very dangerous, rhetoric from an intel community that refuses to evolve in their thinking about the type of political instability that gives rise to these populace-based threats.

We need to not just learn how to co-opt and compete more effective narratives of our own, but we must also learn what the actual roles of narratives are in the first place.

Governments need to stop trying to "counter" those who are competing with them for the support of the people. Governments need to stop seeing these competitors as "threats" to simply defeat, as if that solves the problems that give rise to such groups to begin with. Governments need to get off their hands and COMPETE for the support of larger percentages of their total populaces. Too many have relied too long on the support of some small base of populace and either ignored or exploited the rest. Governments need to start playing to the entire house, and not just the front row and the box seats.

[Dayuhan]

Key to remember is that narratives do not create instability. Narratives do not create stability either.

This is true, but they may give some indication of what is causing instability, and what's needed to create stability. Whether the US or any other outside power is in a position to provide what's needed is another question altogether.

There are always many narratives out there, and one danger of basing decisions on interpretation of narratives is that we all too easily choose to interpret the narratives that allow us to arrive at a preferred interpretation.

Governments need to start playing to the entire house, and not just the front row and the box seats.

Probably true, but not something we can do anything about, except to the extent that our government and our populaces are involved.

When "the entire house" is sufficiently divided, "playing to the entire house" may be all but impossible, especially when each side of the house wants control.