Why the U.S. Loses ‘Small Wars’

[SWJED]

At the History News Network blog - Why the U.S. Loses ‘Small Wars’ by Larry Kahaner. Hat Tip to SWC member Mark at ZenPundit.

... Why do powerful armies lose against decidedly weaker enemies, and what does it say about the US involvement in Iraq?

The answer lies in the study of “small wars.” At its simplest, a small war is one in which the relationship between the combatants is decidedly unbalanced. One side is not only militarily superior in size but its weapons are state of the art. Some call this Asymmetric Warfare or Fourth Generation Warfare, or the more familiar guerrilla warfare, from the Spanish for ‘small war.’ ...

While trying to understand how to win in Iraq, US military scholars are turning to the classics, and one of the hottest books making the rounds is, surprisingly, over a century old. Small Wars was written in 1896 by C.E. Callwell, a colonel in the British army, for British officers posted to Africa and India. It draws on his own experience in the Second Afghan and Boer Wars and claims that a powerful force can easily lose, if it doesn’t fully understand the enemy, fails to describe clear objectives or, worst of all, pursues military objectives that do not contribute to the conflict's political goal...

If Callwell got military scholars to think more clearly about small wars, a group of Marine Corps officers in the 1930s took it to the next level with production of the Small Wars Manual based on US experiences in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. While building on Callwell’s work, this landmark book published in 1940, points to what some say is one of the most important aspects of winning small wars - understanding the role of indigenous religion, ideology and tribal relationships. The manual not only talks about the military aspects of winning small wars – and yes, they can be brutal - but of more importance is a deep understanding of a society’s language, culture, religion, history, economic structures and mores. The manual is a hot seller from a much-clicked website, The Small Wars Center of Excellence, run by the Marine Corps, which advocates the use of simpler weapons and more complex soldiers in small wars – the opposite of current conventional wisdom. This is not the only take-away message from the manual, but it is a vital one.

Unfortunately the Department of Defense’s upper echelon are heading in the wrong direction. The proposed $200 billion Future Combat Systems is a mélange of expensive and complex high tech weapons that will be less effective in winning future small wars than thousands more soldiers with language skills, armed with durable rifles, who understand history, foreign culture, religion local customs and guerilla warfare.

The soldiers in Iraq understand this. Now it’s time for Pentagon planners to read and heed the classics. It’s not too late to win the ‘small war’ in Iraq, but the lessons of history must not be ignored.

[Mondor]

less effective in winning future small wars than thousands more soldiers with language skills, armed with durable rifles, who understand history, foreign culture, religion local customs and guerilla warfare.

Spot on! Just rereading T.E. Lawrence and found it interesting that he classified an British officer that he felt was very good at guerilla warfare, had excellent cultural awareness, and was an outstanding war fighter as “crippled” due to his lack of language ability.

[Steve Blair]

There's also a question of political and social patience, since small wars typically span years and not months. While the US had this level of patience in the past, it's very questionable if we do now.

[Mondor]

The Indian Wars are an example of a long conflict waged by volunteer / professional US forces that did receive support from the US public. The cold war is another example of a long term nontraditional conflict that was supported by the US populace. The US public would seem to support long conflicts if they perceive the conflict to be 1) morally justified, 2) in their long term interest and 3) the overall costs (manpower and budget) is not too high.

I am just waiting for a modern Alfred Thayer Mahan to define modern irregular warfare strategy and an Elihu Root to make the military and political establishments implement.

[Steve Blair]

Actually the Indian Wars are a very complex example of this, since they were supported (on the whole) by citizens in the West but were either ignored or condemned by citizens in the East.

[Ray Levesque]

The Indian Wars are an example of a long conflict waged by volunteer / professional US forces that did receive support from the US public. The cold war is another example of a long term nontraditional conflict that was supported by the US populace. The US public would seem to support long conflicts if they perceive the conflict to be 1) morally justified, 2) in their long term interest and 3) the overall costs (manpower and budget) is not too high.

I am just waiting for a modern Alfred Thayer Mahan to define modern irregular warfare strategy and an Elihu Root to make the military and political establishments implement.

The one strategy American Indians never could have overcome, and didn't, was the uncontrollable and continuous movement of settlers from the Eastern states and Europe into the west.

[Steve Blair]

Actually it was the pressure of that combined with the changes in their own culture that made them more vulnerable to military pressure. For good examples of this, compare the results of military operations against the Comanche (a buffalo culture people) with those against the Apache (a non-buffalo culture people). The buffalo tribes could never overcome the twin pressure of buffalo hunters and military campaigns aimed at their horse herds and supply bases (villages). The Apache were immune to the former pressure and proved very resilient against the latter.

[SWJED]

From the Thomas P.M. Barnett web log - What have we integrated in Iraq?

ARTICLE: Why the U.S. Loses ‘Small Wars’, By Larry Kahaner, History News Network, 11-27-06

Well written.

I especially like the USMC's Small Wars Center of Excellence's calling for simpler weapons and more complex soldiers.

But I think the author's only looking at the post-colonial backside in his summary judgment. Truth is, the West has done plenty well on small wars, so long as the goal is political/economic integration.

Wasn't the American West won by a simple weapon?

Or did that gun just do the killing and was the real victory found in the subsequent integration?

What have we integrated in Iraq? Not much. So what should we expect to win?

Not much...

[Steve Blair]

An over-simplification of the American West, but the entry itself is interesting.