Understanding our wartime experiences...

[carl]

OK Stan, I'm with you on this but would like to leave the door open for those with ideas for preexposure 'conditioning' to sound off.

Is there any preexposure training done now anywhere that combines live fire, burning vehicles with animals in them, shattered animal bodies, explosions, simulated casualties and manuevering (sic)? I will defer to you guys if it would do any good but I am just curious if it is being done.

Yes the emergency services people see some sights! Wonder if they do anything about it?

When emergency services people show up they have something urgent to do and stay busy until it is done. When their task is completed they leave. Most of them sign up for that work because they like the action and probably have psychologically prepared themselves beforehand. That doesn't mean they won't be affected by the more extreme things but the combination of almost always having something to do on the scene and suitability for the work may be important to dealing with regular exposure to bad things.

[carl]

JMA:

McDonough's words you cited are very important. They say that not only is the leader responsible for the men at the time he has command, he is in a sense responsible for their well being years into the future. By that I mean the ill effects of unrestrained descent into savagery may not be felt until a time in the future, maybe well into the future, and the leader can protect his men from those effects by making them comport themselves in ways they may not want to comport themselves at the time.

Is that responsibility for the future, as I see it anyway, stressed in officer training do you know?

[JMA]

JMA:

McDonough's words you cited are very important. They say that not only is the leader responsible for the men at the time he has command, he is in a sense responsible for their well being years into the future. By that I mean the ill effects of unrestrained descent into savagery may not be felt until a time in the future, maybe well into the future, and the leader can protect his men from those effects by making them comport themselves in ways they may not want to comport themselves at the time.

Is that responsibility for the future, as I see it anyway, stressed in officer training do you know?

Under the Brit regimental system the regiment acknowledges it has a duty of care towards their fellow members. Some more so than others and young subalterns eagerly look forward to returning the their parent regiment to command a company and as a long shot command a battalion. Today's troopie or squaddie (as they call them) maybe a corporal or sergeant when the first return and if they make it to command a battalion may be a sergeant major. One should not underestimate the strength of the regimental bonds that develop within these British regiments.

They tend to look after their own.

Para quits over troop treatment. A WAR hero Para chief is quitting the Army in disgust over the “appalling” and “shoddy” treatment of troops, it was revealed yesterday.

Then they do this stuff:

The Parachute Regiment Afghanistan Trust

The Parachute Regiment Charity

Note: Lt Col Tootal's action falls under the category of moral courage.

[carl]

JMA & Stan and anybody:

One of the things Marlantes mentioned in the first chapter of his book was remote control warfare, drones shooting Hellfires and killing people while being controlled by people literally on the other side of the world. He said something about those people not having a transformative psychological experience and this causing a psychic split. Is he worrying about something that isn't there? Maybe that is as jarring an experience as infantry combat but I have never read that drone drivers suffer problems as do people in face to face combat. I don't know but do artillerymen and sailors suffer from psychological troubles as much as men who kill people they can see and see as individual people? That would be an analog to drone drivers perhaps.

He also mentioned American long range aircraft aircrew having problems because they could fly combat missions and afterward go home to their families for dinner. That concern may be from only viewing recent American experience. Almost all our air fighting has been done by expeditionary forces on a limited tour of some kind. If you look at other countries, South Vietnam for example, it was normal for pilots to live at home and while flying combat missions, for years.

(If you want to provoke a storm of letters to the editor in Stars and Stripes, run an article suggesting Nevada based drone drivers are exposed to as much stress as guys downrange.)

[Fuchs]

One of the things you can study on a Bundeswehr university is IIRC psychology.
Maybe this combination yields some useful theories based to the Northern Afghanistan combat experiences.

[JMA]

One of the things you can study on a Bundeswehr university is IIRC psychology.
Maybe this combination yields some useful theories based to the Northern Afghanistan combat experiences.

And access to this data is gained how?

If so will there be a language barrier?

[Fuchs]

Psychology is a science, and this kind of mil research is unlikely to be kept a secret.

Results would sooner or later trickle to professional psychology journals. The Bundeswehr has universities, after all - not universities of applied sciences. They have a research mission, and their professors have accordingly some interest in writing papers and accumulating prestige by being cited. The usual science stuff.

Just sayin'; lots of German officers in AFG right now have a psychology degree.


Six psychology professors at the university of the Bundeswehr Hamburg alone: http://www.hsu-hh.de/PWEB/index_bAo4l0M1RG8nCsxc.html
The university of the B. in Munich has also some, but apparently they're part of a pedagogue department (lots of adult education stuff there).


About language barriers; can't help it if people learn only one language .

I can read with no barriers;
* German
* English
slowly and with problems;
* French
* Spanish
enough to usually identify the info I am seeking;
* Dutch
* Swedish
It helps.

[JMA]

When emergency services people show up they have something urgent to do and stay busy until it is done. When their task is completed they leave. Most of them sign up for that work because they like the action and probably have psychologically prepared themselves beforehand. That doesn't mean they won't be affected by the more extreme things but the combination of almost always having something to do on the scene and suitability for the work may be important to dealing with regular exposure to bad things.

I suggest that one should look at what these 'emergency services' people do to people do to prepare their new guys for the sights and sounds that await them.

Remember too that there is a mix of experience in these 'teams', not all, like so many military units, are straight out of training with no operational experience.

Big difference!

[carl]

I suggest that one should look at what these 'emergency services' people do to people do to prepare their new guys for the sights and sounds that await them.

Remember too that there is a mix of experience in these 'teams', not all, like so many military units, are straight out of training with no operational experience.

Big difference!

Great point, that I didn't think of, about the mix of experience on teams. A new police officer is paired with an experienced officer for months before they are on their own. I don't know how the fire dept and EMTs do it but I imagine they are similar.

In my limited experience the police do nothing at all specific to prepare the people for sights and sounds beyond war stories related during training.

[JMA]

Great point, that I didn't think of, about the mix of experience on teams. A new police officer is paired with an experienced officer for months before they are on their own. I don't know how the fire dept and EMTs do it but I imagine they are similar.

In my limited experience the police do nothing at all specific to prepare the people for sights and sounds beyond war stories related during training.

Here's an example of this from the Aussies:

“In August 1942 the 39th and 53rd Battalions of the Australian Militia, composed of 18 year old conscripts, collided with a Japanese brigade advancing south across Papua New Guinea’s Kokoda Trail. The 53rd battalion turned and ran. The 39th battalion, which a few weeks earlier had received an influx of experienced officers and NCO’s, stood its ground and over the next month fought the Japanese to a standstill. This action is regarded as a test in laboratory conditions of the impact of leadership on fighting performance.” - Serve to Lead

Then from that great source of wisdom, Von Schell in the booklet 'Battle Leadership' (available from the Marine Corps Association for $9.95):

At the beginning of a war new troops will be recruited and trained in all countries and naturally will enter into combat later than the active troops - frequently months later. If we give these inexperienced troops a backbone of experienced soldiers and experienced commanders their efficiency will be tremendously increased and they will be spared heavy losses.

This is so obvious that the question must really be why it has not been addressed before everywhere.

[carl]

You know now that I think about it, airlines do the same thing, putting experienced pilots with new guys. In fact I think there are regulations governing that, though it has been so long since I've been in the airline world I don't know for sure. You never ever put two pilots new to an airplane type or airline ops together if you can help it.

[Steve Blair]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

[Ulenspiegel]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

[JMA]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

If we look at Antony Beevor's book, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, on Kindle and search 'replacements' we get 39 instances. One as follows:

Replacements joined their platoon usually at night, having no idea where they were. The old hands shunned them, partly because their arrival came just after they had lost buddies and they would not open up to newcomers. Also everyone knew that they would be the first to be killed and doomed men seen as somehow contagious. It became a self-fullfilloing prophecy, because replacements were often given the most dangerous tasks. A platoon did not want to waste experienced men."

Further, in Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division, a neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob improved the manner in which "replacements" were introduced into front line units (this being part of Weintrob's pioneering work on combat stress.

Then you move on to the Pacific to get an inkling into the psychology of the group dynamic in combat units:

A rifleman, Brookes was in the line 20 days before he got his first Jap. After that, he said, he ‘felt better – like he belonged.’ Back in a rest area now, Brookes can lie on his bunk and talk and make gags with the older fellows about what happened. He’s not lonely any more. He’s a veteran. - from Pittsburgh Post-Gazette - Jun 26, 1945

Then we look at Vietnam and the FNG syndrome and need to wonder if anything improved.

What of today?