Understanding our wartime experiences...

[JMA]

When emergency services people show up they have something urgent to do and stay busy until it is done. When their task is completed they leave. Most of them sign up for that work because they like the action and probably have psychologically prepared themselves beforehand. That doesn't mean they won't be affected by the more extreme things but the combination of almost always having something to do on the scene and suitability for the work may be important to dealing with regular exposure to bad things.

I suggest that one should look at what these 'emergency services' people do to people do to prepare their new guys for the sights and sounds that await them.

Remember too that there is a mix of experience in these 'teams', not all, like so many military units, are straight out of training with no operational experience.

Big difference!

[carl]

I suggest that one should look at what these 'emergency services' people do to people do to prepare their new guys for the sights and sounds that await them.

Remember too that there is a mix of experience in these 'teams', not all, like so many military units, are straight out of training with no operational experience.

Big difference!

Great point, that I didn't think of, about the mix of experience on teams. A new police officer is paired with an experienced officer for months before they are on their own. I don't know how the fire dept and EMTs do it but I imagine they are similar.

In my limited experience the police do nothing at all specific to prepare the people for sights and sounds beyond war stories related during training.

[JMA]

Great point, that I didn't think of, about the mix of experience on teams. A new police officer is paired with an experienced officer for months before they are on their own. I don't know how the fire dept and EMTs do it but I imagine they are similar.

In my limited experience the police do nothing at all specific to prepare the people for sights and sounds beyond war stories related during training.

Here's an example of this from the Aussies:

“In August 1942 the 39th and 53rd Battalions of the Australian Militia, composed of 18 year old conscripts, collided with a Japanese brigade advancing south across Papua New Guinea’s Kokoda Trail. The 53rd battalion turned and ran. The 39th battalion, which a few weeks earlier had received an influx of experienced officers and NCO’s, stood its ground and over the next month fought the Japanese to a standstill. This action is regarded as a test in laboratory conditions of the impact of leadership on fighting performance.” - Serve to Lead

Then from that great source of wisdom, Von Schell in the booklet 'Battle Leadership' (available from the Marine Corps Association for $9.95):

At the beginning of a war new troops will be recruited and trained in all countries and naturally will enter into combat later than the active troops - frequently months later. If we give these inexperienced troops a backbone of experienced soldiers and experienced commanders their efficiency will be tremendously increased and they will be spared heavy losses.

This is so obvious that the question must really be why it has not been addressed before everywhere.

[carl]

You know now that I think about it, airlines do the same thing, putting experienced pilots with new guys. In fact I think there are regulations governing that, though it has been so long since I've been in the airline world I don't know for sure. You never ever put two pilots new to an airplane type or airline ops together if you can help it.

[Steve Blair]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

[Ulenspiegel]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

[Steve Blair]

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

Quite. And that's often what happened in the Pacific. It didn't happen to the same degree in Europe. Vietnam was a mixed bag, with much often left to individual divisions to determine. Some did it well, some were ok, and others were not very good.

[JMA]

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

Thats probably the ideal scenario in a conventional war environment.

The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.

You want to avoid the need for a continuous flow of replacements? Don't take the casualties. Not that easy in war. Easier if you have smart officers and tough and experienced NCOs and troops. Also not that easy.

Back to point...

...your man von Schell said back in 1933:

The German troops were young and had only undergone a short period of training. They had entered the army in October, 1915 and therefore had but three months of training behind them. However, they were intermingled with men who had already had some war experience, and who at least knew those first impressions that war brings. These veterans regarded themseleves as instructors to their young comrades; they felt a certain responsibility for them. Because of this feeling the value of the old soldiers was markedly increased,while the inexperienced men developed rapidly under their instruction. Although only one-fourth of the men were experienced , their influence was sufficient to give the entire organization a veteran character. I watched the same influence at work later in the war and it always had the same result.

Big difference in approach to that of the US.

[JMA]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

If we look at Antony Beevor's book, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, on Kindle and search 'replacements' we get 39 instances. One as follows:

Replacements joined their platoon usually at night, having no idea where they were. The old hands shunned them, partly because their arrival came just after they had lost buddies and they would not open up to newcomers. Also everyone knew that they would be the first to be killed and doomed men seen as somehow contagious. It became a self-fullfilloing prophecy, because replacements were often given the most dangerous tasks. A platoon did not want to waste experienced men."

Further, in Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division, a neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob improved the manner in which "replacements" were introduced into front line units (this being part of Weintrob's pioneering work on combat stress.

Then you move on to the Pacific to get an inkling into the psychology of the group dynamic in combat units:

A rifleman, Brookes was in the line 20 days before he got his first Jap. After that, he said, he ‘felt better – like he belonged.’ Back in a rest area now, Brookes can lie on his bunk and talk and make gags with the older fellows about what happened. He’s not lonely any more. He’s a veteran. - from Pittsburgh Post-Gazette - Jun 26, 1945

Then we look at Vietnam and the FNG syndrome and need to wonder if anything improved.

What of today?