Understanding our wartime experiences...

[JMA]

Great point, that I didn't think of, about the mix of experience on teams. A new police officer is paired with an experienced officer for months before they are on their own. I don't know how the fire dept and EMTs do it but I imagine they are similar.

In my limited experience the police do nothing at all specific to prepare the people for sights and sounds beyond war stories related during training.

Here's an example of this from the Aussies:

“In August 1942 the 39th and 53rd Battalions of the Australian Militia, composed of 18 year old conscripts, collided with a Japanese brigade advancing south across Papua New Guinea’s Kokoda Trail. The 53rd battalion turned and ran. The 39th battalion, which a few weeks earlier had received an influx of experienced officers and NCO’s, stood its ground and over the next month fought the Japanese to a standstill. This action is regarded as a test in laboratory conditions of the impact of leadership on fighting performance.” - Serve to Lead

Then from that great source of wisdom, Von Schell in the booklet 'Battle Leadership' (available from the Marine Corps Association for $9.95):

At the beginning of a war new troops will be recruited and trained in all countries and naturally will enter into combat later than the active troops - frequently months later. If we give these inexperienced troops a backbone of experienced soldiers and experienced commanders their efficiency will be tremendously increased and they will be spared heavy losses.

This is so obvious that the question must really be why it has not been addressed before everywhere.

[carl]

You know now that I think about it, airlines do the same thing, putting experienced pilots with new guys. In fact I think there are regulations governing that, though it has been so long since I've been in the airline world I don't know for sure. You never ever put two pilots new to an airplane type or airline ops together if you can help it.

[Steve Blair]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

[Ulenspiegel]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

[Steve Blair]

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

Quite. And that's often what happened in the Pacific. It didn't happen to the same degree in Europe. Vietnam was a mixed bag, with much often left to individual divisions to determine. Some did it well, some were ok, and others were not very good.

[JMA]

From German experience during WWI and WWII: A few weeks (3-6) training are enough for units, which have received their "green" replacements, to let the units regain cohesion. This training could be done near the front.
The key is to avoid a continuous influx of replacements.

Thats probably the ideal scenario in a conventional war environment.

The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.

You want to avoid the need for a continuous flow of replacements? Don't take the casualties. Not that easy in war. Easier if you have smart officers and tough and experienced NCOs and troops. Also not that easy.

Back to point...

...your man von Schell said back in 1933:

The German troops were young and had only undergone a short period of training. They had entered the army in October, 1915 and therefore had but three months of training behind them. However, they were intermingled with men who had already had some war experience, and who at least knew those first impressions that war brings. These veterans regarded themseleves as instructors to their young comrades; they felt a certain responsibility for them. Because of this feeling the value of the old soldiers was markedly increased,while the inexperienced men developed rapidly under their instruction. Although only one-fourth of the men were experienced , their influence was sufficient to give the entire organization a veteran character. I watched the same influence at work later in the war and it always had the same result.

Big difference in approach to that of the US.

[Ulenspiegel]

Thats probably the ideal scenario in a conventional war environment.

The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.

You want to avoid the need for a continuous flow of replacements? Don't take the casualties. Not that easy in war. Easier if you have smart officers and tough and experienced NCOs and troops. Also not that easy.

I think it was considered better to let units shrink due to losses and work with these smaller units as long as possible - a depleted unit which has strong coherence was better than a larger units which lacked it - then bring them back to authorized strength when you have the opportunity to incorporate the replacements, i.e. training time is available, more a "batch" approach in contrast to the "continuous flow".

IIRC the same approach was used by the British army in the Napoleonic era.

[JMA]

I think it was considered better to let units shrink due to losses and work with these smaller units as long as possible - a depleted unit which has strong coherence was better than a larger units which lacked it - then bring them back to authorized strength when you have the opportunity to incorporate the replacements, i.e. training time is available, more a "batch" approach in contrast to the "continuous flow".

IIRC the same approach was used by the British army in the Napoleonic era.

OK, I'm essentially in agreement on this... but lets make sure we agree on the semantics.

First, don't introduce new troops (FNGs) directly into battle. Rather attach a full platoon or company from an experienced unit the unit can be rotated for training and the assimilation of replacements in a structured manner.

If one waits for a unit to rotate out of the line before replacements are brought in then only a batch (or the required number of replacements) system can work.

In the COIN context of Rhodesia in the RLI we trained our own recruits throughout and fed them into the operational subunits as each course was completed. These replacements were for National Servicemen (conscripts) standing down, replacing regular soldiers whose contracts were up, and of course for casualties. This was a continuous trickle feed - in the sense that every two months we had ins and outs. Seldom would a troop (platoon) receive more than one or two on these occasions. These would be placed with the sergeant and the senior corporal but importantly 'buddied up' with an experienced troopie who was tasked to 'teach him the ropes'. They were also termed 'fresh-pussy' (or words to that effect) until they had been in a contact and done well and then another new guy or pair of new guys arrived - when they shed the 'fresh pussy' title and bought the troop a crate of beers (24) when like Brookes (in the article quoted above) they became full (and trusted) members of the group (like how I mentioned some time ago boys get membership of the club house built in a tree). It a troopie did something stupid later he would be 'fined' a crate of beers by the other troopies. There was never any shunning or ostracism of the 'fresh pussy' as it was in our interests to get them to the level of being able to be relied upon by their mates. As the troop commander for three years I saw this first hand many times.

To assimilate new replacements in ones and twos per platoon is pretty simple in this particular scenario. This is what I see as continuous flow - when it really is a couple of guys in and out of each platoon every few months.

[Ken White]

The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.

Was and is -- we have gotten no smarter...

Big difference in approach to that of the US.

Sadly, our approach is driven by a personnel system that is designed and operated to serve itself and its operators. It does a very poor job of supporting the Army.

It simply wants to produce Round Pegs, small Round Pegs, that will fit in any hole regardless of the size or shape that is an optimum fit for the hole in question. It is not solely the fault of the Personnel folks; the Army leadership and, more importantly, the Congress support, even demand, that approach. Sad...

It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.

[Steve Blair]

It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.

There was also the conscious decision taken to simply leave divisions in the line. The 82nd was by its nature pulled out of the line often, giving it time and space to train in addition to the policies you mention.

In contrast (in part due to the nature of the Pacific Theater), the Marine Corps preferred whenever possible to pull divisions out of action and give them a refit period. In most cases (with the exception of the botched refit of the 1st Marine Division before Peleliu) this policy seemed to work pretty well. Marine basic training at that time wasn't all that much better than the Army's; the difference was in the training that took place during those refit periods.

Vietnam is difficult to compare because there was a great deal of what I'd call unit-level autonomy, sometimes extending all the way down to battalion level. The 11th ACR by all accounts seems to have had a good system for dealing with new troops, while outfits like the Americal, some elements of the 4th ID, and some Marine units simply dumped new guys into units. You came in through two major processing centers and then were "chopped" wherever the clerks thought you were needed.

And FNG syndrome wasn't unique to Vietnam. It originated with burned-out divisions in the ETO and continued through to Korea. Vietnam's is simply more commonly known. There are even signs of something similar (Green Apples) going back to the Civil War.

[JMA]

It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.

Sounds good.

How long were these formations in theatre in which war?

Back to vietnam... I would appreciate your comment an this article:
Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy

[JMA]

Another thing that can be overlooked is how you mix those new troops with veterans. There's a fair amount of evidence that doing this mixing while a unit is in combat is a bad idea if it can possibly be avoided (drawn from World War 2 comparisons of practices in Europe and the Pacific by US forces and Vietnam).

If we look at Antony Beevor's book, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, on Kindle and search 'replacements' we get 39 instances. One as follows:

Replacements joined their platoon usually at night, having no idea where they were. The old hands shunned them, partly because their arrival came just after they had lost buddies and they would not open up to newcomers. Also everyone knew that they would be the first to be killed and doomed men seen as somehow contagious. It became a self-fullfilloing prophecy, because replacements were often given the most dangerous tasks. A platoon did not want to waste experienced men."

Further, in Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division, a neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob improved the manner in which "replacements" were introduced into front line units (this being part of Weintrob's pioneering work on combat stress.

Then you move on to the Pacific to get an inkling into the psychology of the group dynamic in combat units:

A rifleman, Brookes was in the line 20 days before he got his first Jap. After that, he said, he ‘felt better – like he belonged.’ Back in a rest area now, Brookes can lie on his bunk and talk and make gags with the older fellows about what happened. He’s not lonely any more. He’s a veteran. - from Pittsburgh Post-Gazette - Jun 26, 1945

Then we look at Vietnam and the FNG syndrome and need to wonder if anything improved.

What of today?